the two are confused) at Dienbienphu. In the national ethos the battle has assumed the importance of a combination of Waterloo, San Juan Hill and the surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown in 1781.

As the war against the United States continues, new epics of heroism are elaborated and woven into the fabric of national patriotism.

ISLAND BATTLE GLORIFIED

One of these revolves around the defense of Conco Island. Few Americans, except possibly some in South Vietnam, have ever heard of Conco Island. But few North Vietnamese have not. It has assumed a role in their war similar to that of Corregidor in the Pacific war of the United States against Japan in 1941. The island is a small one, about a mile off the coast near the demarcation line. Judging from a film glorifying its battle, it bristles with antiaircraft defenses and presumably serves as an important radar installation.

The battle of Conco Island goes on day after day and week after week in newsreels, newspaper articles and radio talks. The theme is the one that is constantly stressed in North Vietnam-of the struggle of a small determined band of men and women against the enormous material superiority of the United States.

A documentary film shows Conco defenders manning antiaircraft guns and firing rifles at wave after wave of attacking American fighter-bombers, holding their posts through violent bombardments, and repeatedly shooting American planes into the sea.

Premier Dong conceded that many of North Vietnam's friends did not see how such a small, poor country could stand up against the Americans' superiority. But he added that North Vietnam offered a practical demonstration of what an inspired populace could achieve.

Another epic that has been publicized concerns Hamrong Bridge across the Ma River at Thanhhoa. This bridge, on the main supply route to the south. has been attacked hundreds of times by the Americans, but by some quirk remains intact though badly battered. The bridge is defended by strong antiaircraft batteries.

SPEAK SIMPLY OF HEROISM

Its defense has been publicized as a demonstration of what bravery and determination can achieve against determined American air attacks. The defenders of Hamrong Bridge are pictured as models for other North Vietnamese to emulate.

North Vietnamese speak simply and often about heroism and their willingness to die for their country. They say that they are no more willing to die than anyone else, but that, if they must die, the best way is to die fighting for Vietnam. "We do not fear death," an official said. "We try to stay alive and to fight the enemy. We do not wish to die unnecessarily. It is important to stay alive because we have so much to do. We have to grow rice and we have to fight at the same time. We think heroism is both courage and creation."

A Communist visitor who had visited a North Vietnamese air force unit said he could not imagine other people carrying on under similar conditions.

"Imagine" this man said, "Their pilots get up at 4 A.M. They go out into rice paddies and work for three or four hours standing in cold water up to their hips. Then they come in and fly their planes against the Americans. I have never heard of such people."

PATRIOTISM AVOWED

It was impossible to finish any conversation, even with a family that had been bombed out of a house or a mother who lay on a hospital cot with a youngster wounded in the bombing, without winding up with a patriotic declaration.

At first it seemed as if all these people must have been coached to make little patriotic speeches testifying to their anger against "United States aggressors" and to their determination to fight to the end for "independence and sovereignty.” But finally it began to appear that no one had to do any coaching. This spirit has been dinned into the people so that it comes naturally. Or perhaps it was always there and is just brought out by their long-odds war. Whatever the cause, a priest even could not conclude a discussion of the Roman Catholic position under a Communist regime without a soliloquy along the same lines.

One official contrasted what he thought was the attitude of American youth with that of North Vietnamese youth.

"We don't underestimate American youth," he said. "If American youth had to fight and defend the United States, it would fight well. But American youth has been sent over here to fight a war that they do not understand and is not a just war. So they do not fight like our youth. Americans have good weapons, but they cannot cope with our fighters because they do not have the kind of spirit that we possess."

One Communist observer who has been in North Vietnam for two or three years said he had noted a steady growth in the intensity of nationalist feeling as the war went on. He said nationalism had been particularly strong since the launching of American air attacks on the North. He said that while the attacks had confronted the regime with serious economic problems and had made the support and supply of the South more difficult, they had stimulated mass patriotism among the people, who, in his opinion, now felt that they were all in the war together.

"I think something like this happened in England in the blitz," this diplomat said. "As a Communist I have been interested to see ideological propaganda gradually replaced by national patriotic appeals. Maybe you remember this in the Soviet Union during the critical days of the German attack."

Patriotic fervor in North Vietnam is also lashed by one of war's most frequent handmaidens-atrocity propaganda. The kind of atrocities that are ascribed in the most casual manner to Americans and their South Vietnamese allies are blood-curdling and revolting.

They are recited daily to the North Vietnamese populace. Whether people take them at face value is difficult to say, but history suggests that it is easy to believe anything terrible concerning an enemy.

Nevertheless this correspondent did not experience the slightest sign of ill will, unfriendliness or hatred because of being American. Other Westerners said they had never noted any animosity from Vietnamese.

North Vietnamese officials attributed the lack of ill will toward ordinary Americans to the Government's propaganda line that draws a distinction between "American aggressors" and the mass of the American citizenry, which is pictured either as friendly to Vietnam or as kept in ignorance of the true state of affairs.

However, the North Vietnamese do particularize some propaganda targets. Chief among these are President Johnson, Secretary of Defense McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Gen. William C. Westmoreland, Commander of United States forces in South Vietnam.

All four are caricatured savagely and are the object of vituperation and ridicule in the press and radio. President Johnson is probably the most frequent subject of wall caricatures in North Vietnamese towns. They are drawn in chalk directly on walls of buildings.

It should not be supposed that the North Vietnamese go about the war scowling and grim. On the contrary, teen-agers in the army, in transport brigades and construction teams seem to be full of jokes, judging from their chatter mixed with outbursts of laughter.

Youngsters throng to the movies and concert halls. There they devour a fare that is about 90 per cent patriotic propaganda, such as the story of a girl sharpshooter who brought down a United States plane or of a truck driver who got his cargo through in spite of being wounded in an air raid.

THE FEAT OF FEATS

The feat of feats is the shooting down of a United States plane. Everyone who has a rifle participates if planes come into sight. If by chance one is brought down by rifle fire-and the North Vietnamese say this occurs several times a month-villagers for miles around rush to the scene to share in the glory.

The only thing that tops the downing of a plane in popular esteem is the capture of an airman. Legends of such captures are legion and generally involve an unarmed villager who spots an airman coming down by parachute, grabs a hoe or pitchfork and captures the airman, who is armed to the teeth with survival weapons.

Or the story may be of a band of villagers who see pilots coming down and manage to surround the field and head them off before they can escape into the jungle.

The

Such feats are the subjects of popular ballads, music-hall skits and songs. shooting down of United States planes has become a kind of national contest. Papers print the official North Vietnamese figure on downed planes daily, now

1,600 by Hanoi's count. Commemorative postage stamps have been issued to mark important milestones-500, 1,000, 1,500.

It is all of these factors taken together that fuse into North Vietnam's spirit. Probably there are other factors that have been overlooked. But one thing appears certain: it is a powerful force and there is no doubt that this, more than anything else, is what keeps North Vietnam in the battle.

HANOI DENIES AIM IS TO ANNEX SOUTH-PROGRAM OF NORTH IS FOUND TO DIFFER FROM VIETCONG'S

Following is the sixth article by an assistant managing editor of The New York Times summing up observations on his recent visit to North Vietnam.

(By Harrison E. Salisbury)

HONG KONG, Jan. 11.-About 10 days ago Le Duan, First Secretary of the North Vietnamese Workers' (Communist) party, made a speech to army cadets, outlining the basis of party policy.

The party, he said, stands for "socialism in the North, democracy in the South." His declaration was the talk of Hanoi, not because he had enunciated a new line, but because he had found it essential to restate the policy at this particular moment.

The party secretary's name is not well known outside North Vietnam. But there it is regarded as quite possibly even more important in party circles than that of Premier Pham Van Dong.

There are some who believe that if President Ho Chi Minh were to die, he would be succeeded either by Mr. Le Duan or another figure equally little known in the West, Truong Chinh, a Politburo member, who heads the Party Control Commission.

ALLIES HAVE DIFFERENT PROGRAMS

The fact that North Vietnam and its southern ally, the National Liberation Front, possess basically different foreign policies seems to have gone almost unreported in the Western press. It came as a surprise to hear their representatives talk in casual terms of these differences, which are of long standing, and in a way that made it apparent that neither side expected an early change. The existence of different programs raises a question that has hardly been studied in the United States. It is whether the differences are so large that even in the event of a victory for the North Vietnamese and for the Liberation Front, which is the formal name for the organization that most Americans call the Vietcong, a coalition and unification of North and South would not automatically

occur.

PROPAGANDA PERVASIVE

Both the Northern regime and the Liberation Front are committed to reunification and the creation of a single Vietnamese state. Northern propaganda for reunification is pervasive. The old Metropole Hotel in Hanoi has been renamed Thong Nhat (Reunification) Hotel. A new park built by young people around the lake adjacent to the Polytechnic University is called Reunification Park.

No speech by a North Vietnamese politician is complete without a demand for reunification. No official, even when presenting statistics on health or education, would think of concluding his presentation without putting on record North Vietnam's insistence upon reunification.

Yet, when the question of when and how is posed, the answers begin to become vaguer and vaguer. Premier Dong, in speaking with this correspondent, emphasized the insistence of North Vietnam on reunification. But as to when this might be accomplished, that, he said, was for North and South to work out "as between brothers."

ANNEXATION AIM DISAVOWED

In discussing the same question, the spokesman of the Liberation Front in Hanoi, Nguyen Van Tien, said reunification was a matter that would require substantial time and a careful working out of details.

Premier Dong rebuked those who, he said, mistakenly credited the North with a desire to annex the South. The North has no intention of doing such a "stupid, criminal" thing, he asserted.

Most Americans have assumed that the Liberation Front is a puppet of the North, that was created by the North, that it is the creature of the North and that it is directed by the North.

This was not the impression given by representatives of the Liberation Front or of the North.

But, it may be asked, aren't the North and the Front just putting on an act? Won't they drop the mask and eliminate all their supposed differences if they win the war?

There is no way of telling, but if the published programs of the two groups are genuine reflections of attitudes, there seem to be sufficiently wide differences to make rapid unification difficult.

REGIONAL PERSONALITIES

Specialists in Vietnam have also noted marked differences of temperament and personality between natives of the South and of the North. These regional differences have been evident in the governments of Hanoi and Saigon, both of which include natives of the two parts of Vietnam. Saigon residents seem to possess a certain sophistication and big city gloss not found in the average Northerner. The Southerner seems to be more a man of the world. The Northerner is simpler, more direct, blunt and forceful.

These differences could be put aside for the sake of the common cause of Communism. But in other countries it has been demonstrated that Communism does not necessarily eliminate regional conflicts. This has been noted in the

Soviet Union and in some of the Eastern European countries.

The Front has now been in existence as a separate quasi-governmental organization for six years. In that period of time its leaders have acquired vested interests.

In the last few years they have established quasi-diplomatic missions in each of the Communist countries and in some other African and Asian countries. However, no foreign governments are represented at Liberation Front headquarters in South Vietnam. Only North Vietnam maintains a permanent representative in the South.

Who conducts the war in the South? The Front insists that it does, that all military operations are under its command and under its directions. Its representative in Hanoi was asked whether this meant that any forces sent south by Hanoi were put under Front command. He insisted that this was true.

TROOP JURISDICTION AN ISSUE

Diplomats in Hanoi are dubious about this. They doubt that regular North Vietnamese army units sent to the South are taken out of the North Vietnamese command. There have been rumors of disagreement between North and South regarding the employment of troops and the tactics to be followed in combatting the Americans.

The basic difference, the diplomats said, lies in a desire by Hanoi to engage the Americans in large-scale battles whereas the Front, with years of experience and confidence in hit-and-run tactics, is reluctant to commit large units.

Some Hanoi diplomats also contended that while the North Vietnamese were splendid combat troops, they had not proved as capable as the Front in carrying out guerrilla operations since their basic training had been for normal military service rather than special combat.

Neither Northern nor Southern representatives said in so many words that the North was sending regular combat troops to the South. But no one said that this was not the case. In two weeks in Hanoi, this correspondent never heard a denial of the presence of Northern forces in the South.

INDEPENDENCE IS AVOWED

On the contrary, the idea that the North was rendering aid to its Southern allies was stressed repeatedly.

The Front insisted that one reason for its success in the South was the independence of its leadership. It stressed its independence in contrast to what it called the dependence of Premier Nguyen Cao Ky and his Saigon Government upon American backing.

On one point both the Front and the North were agreed. This was that the Front was the only legitimate representative of the people of the South and that

no settlement of the war could be expected without direct United States dealing with the Front.

"Anyone who has anything to discuss in connection with South Vietnam" said Mr. Tien, "must discuss it with the Front. The North cannot speak for the South."

Premier Dong said the same thing and asked how the United States expected to settle the war unless it was willing to negotiate with the Front.

"The National Liberation Front must be represented at the conference table," Mr. Tien said. "Later on, the Front and the North will have to have discussions of reunification on the basis of equality."

DIFFERENCES ILLUSTRATED

Neither North nor South suggested any means for reconciling the divergent economic and political platforms on which they stand. The North stands for a system of Communist organization of the economy in which industry and commerce are run and directed by the state and agriculture is organized on a collective basis.

The South stands for a mixed economy in which there would be both socialized, or state-run, elements and private and cooperative elements, something on the order of the systems of Cambodia and Burma.

The political policy differences are equally marked. The North bases itself on membership in the so-called camp of socialism, the Communist world bloc.

The South proposes a policy of nonalignment, without adherence to any bloc, either Communist or non-Communist. It seems to envisage itself as a possible member of a neutralist bloc of states that would include Cambodia, Laos, Burma and Indonesia.

How these two policies could be reconciled in a reunified Vietnam is difficult to imagine. Either one or the other presumably would have to be given up or the two segments of Vietnam could not be rejoined.

The party basis of North and South is also different. The North has a tightly integrated Communist party. True, there are a few so-called nonparty men in government posts, but the leadership of the Communist party is supreme.

The Front represents a coalition of Communist and non-Communist parties and groupings in which the Communists are a minority. It is believed, however, that because of superior ability, cohesiveness and leadership the Communists dominate the Front. They say, however, that they do not intend to pre-empt political leadership of the South and that the Front will go on after the war with a diversity of membership.

REDS MAY SEIZE POWER

This, too, would seem to make a coalition difficult unless the Southern Communists simply seized power for themselves as has happened in past coalition governments, particularly in Eastern Europe immediately after World War II. In population the South has 14 million people, the North 19 million. Both areas are mixed, however, since possibly one million Northerners took refuge in the South after the Communists came to power in Hanoi. Many thousands from the South went North at that time.

Con

The North and South have been separated politically for 12 years now. tact between the two areas is physically cut not only by the war but by restrictions established by both sides. Persons from one region are not permitted to visit the other. No direct mail service is provided between South to North.

The only way families can communicate is through third countries. The only way members of separated families can be reunited is by being smuggled across the frontier or arranging a meeting outside either North or South-a difficult matter in wartime.

In these circumstances the first step proposed by both the Front and the North is the restoration of trade, visits, travel, mail and similar facilities between North and South.

No steps beyond that have been publicly proposed by either side. If a well thought-out or coordinated plan for reunification existed, it would undoubtedly be publicized. Both the North and the Front insist no such plan has been drafted.