significant. It would have been evidence they were attempting to make some sort of propaganda, using one set of figures for me and another one in a propaganda pamphlet. The figures were the same in both cases.

STANDARD OF LIVING IN HANOI

The CHAIRMAN. You described to some extent the life in North Vietnam as relatively simple. Is it very, very difficult for the ordinary people in Hanoi?

Mr. SALISBURY. I do not think it is very, very difficult for them. It would be very difficult for Americans in Hanoi because we are accustomed to a different standard of living. These people are people who have lived at a very miserable level really for years and years. It is a little poorer now than it was a year ago. They made apologies. They said, "Our girls do not look so pretty this year because their clothes are getting shabby and they are not eating as much as they should." They do not look as though they were too well off.

Having traveled as I have for many, many years in some of the poorest communist countries of the world, Mongolia and Albania and places like that, eastern Siberia, I would say that the people are certainly still living on a standard which is perhaps above the standard of the poor communist countries, but it is a low standard of living, no doubt about that.

SERVICE AS REPORTER IN COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

The CHAIRMAN. In that connection, how long have you served in the communist countries as a reporter.

Mr. SALISBURY. I first went to the Soviet Union in 1944 during World War II. I was there for about eight months. I went back for the Times in 1949, and I was there for five years. I have been back to the Soviet Union three or four times on trips. I made trips on reporting expeditions through all of the communist countries of Eastern Europe, and all of them now of the Far East, with the great big exception of China, and the smaller exception of North Korea.

CONDITIONS IN HANOI

The CHAIRMAN. Do they have a curfew in Hanoi ?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, they do not have a curfew, but they are on one of the most difficult schedules of living hours that I have had to confront in a long time. They get up at 5 a.m., and the stores open at 5 a.m. Many of my appointments were at 6 a.m. They go to bed about 9 in the evening.

Now, I guess they always have been an early-rising town, but these are specially early hours because they want to have the shopping and the various activities which involve a congregation of people in numbers over before daylight, the reason being that our bombing operations do not begin until after daylight in most cases, and so that the risks of having concentrations of people are lower at those hours. A great deal of their activity now goes on at night, that is so far as movement of supplies and gathering of supplies and things of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

How are the conditions in Hanoi, is it safe to walk about the streets at night?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I walked about the streets at night without any problem. It is dark and you are apt to fall into one of these air raid shelters they have along the side.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you likely to be held up and mugged and murdered? I just wondered how their conditions are compared to ours. [Laughter.]

Mr. SALISBURY. I think there are dangers there, but I did not hear of any muggings.

The CHAIRMAN. You heard of no muggings?

Mr. SALISBURY. Not a single one.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any rioting in the shops?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, in fact I don't think there is much there to loot.

The CHAIRMAN. Nothing in the shops. Is there relative discipline? Mr. SALISBURY. Yes, it seems to be quiet and orderly. The only activity you know is normal street activity such as you would find in an Asian city but not as much of that at night.

I saw some interesting things that happened at night. I saw one evening a large throng of people, there must have been 200 of them, with their bicycles and they were congregated in a street and I didn't know what they were doing there until I came up and I saw there were two great trucks loaded with new bicycles there in the street and these people were turning in their old ones for new ones.

I think the bicycles are issued on a kind of a ration, you have to pay for them but you also have to get the authority to see to it that the people working in a particular shop or living in a particular apartment get them.

That was an interesting thing to see.

They are great moviegoers.

The CHAIRMAN. Are they Chinese bicycles or their own?

Mr. SALISBURY. Chinese bikes.

IMPORTANCE OF BICYCLES

The CHAIRMAN. You mentioned the importance of bicycles. Why don't we concentrate on bicycles instead of other items, bridges, and so on? You said they couldn't possibly survive without bicycles. If they only have one or two plants, that might be a major objective. Mr. SALISBURY. Well, it sounds very sensible, Senator, and I really don't know the answer to it.

The CHAIRMAN. Does the Pentagon know about this? [Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't you tell them about the bicycles?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I wrote a story in which I pointed this out very sharply. I said what I had heard was that the best present you can give your girl in Hanoi is a new bicycle gear because they are in very short supply, and indeed that is what you-a fellow does give his girl if he can get ahold of one.

I also said if they could figure out some way to disable the bikes in North Vietnam the war would be over tomorrow.

The CHAIRMAN. Bicycles play the same role as hairspray does in Saigon.

Mr. SALISBURY. I wouldn't be surprised.

NORTH VIETNAM'S DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE FIGHTING

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say in North Vietnam there is any appearance of discouragement? You describe their being in bad shape and so on, but do you feel a sense of discouragement and readiness to give up?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, I did not feel that they were ready to give up. On the contrary, they act and talk very tough. They constantly are talking about fighting on ten, twenty years, something of that kind.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you explain to me why they are so stubborn in their refusal to give up? Why don't they give up and accept our aid? We have offered them aid. What makes them so stubborn?

Mr. SALISBURY. They don't trust us.

The CHAIRMAN. Why not? You know we are trustworthy people. Mr. SALISBURY. I certainly do.

The CHAIRMAN. Why don't they trust us?

Mr. SALISBURY. They say that we haven't given them any reason to cause them to trust us thus far, and that so far as they can see we are trying to knock them out, we want to exterminate them and if that is what our intention is they judge us by our acts rather than our deeds rather than our words-and they say, "You keep on fighting us harder, dropping more bombs. We just don't think you are as peaceful as you Say you are."

The CHAIRMAN. This bothers me. I don't quite see why they are so misguided, why they don't accept the fact we are good people.

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, all I can say, Mr. Senator, is that they don't know many Americans. They don't see them, except they see these airplanes coming over and dropping bombs on them, and they have a feeling that we have evil intentions toward them as a result of that. The CHAIRMAN. It is very unreasonable of them, isn't it? Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I think so.

BOMBING CAUSES NATIONAL UNITY

The CHAIRMAN. I don't understand why the bombing over there creates such unanimity. You stated that in your written statement as well as later. It seems to me it would discourage them. When we have riots in Watts, riots in Chicago, and so on, that doesn't unite us. Why should it unite the Vietnamese?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, to take that question very seriously-
The CHAIRMAN. Well, it is a serious question.

Mr. SALISBURY. I think it is a very serious question.

I am absolutely certain that if the bombs were coming down from the air and they were being dropped on us, let's say, by the Chinese and the Russians, that this Nation would be unified as it has never been before. I just don't have any doubt about it. I saw this happening in England when the Germans dropped bombs on them, and, as I say, I was not in Germany when we and the RAF were bombing in Ger

many, but I heard the very same sort of reaction occurred. This is human nature.

The CHAIRMAN. If you are so convinced of that as others have been, explain to me again why we are doing it. It apparently is to our disadvantage to do it.

Mr. SALISBURY. You know, I can't really explain that because I didn't—I am not the author of that policy and I just don't think it is a very sound one to begin with. I think it is one in which there are diminishing returns. On balance, I think that it probably works against us. So it is difficult to say why we do it, unless one adopts the explanation that we started doing it, and we don't like to admit that perhaps it was a wrong idea.

The CHAIRMAN. The administration is unwilling to admit it was a mistake, is that your view?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, it could be.

DISADVANTAGE TO UNITED STATES IF CHINA ENTERS THE WAR

The CHAIRMAN. You seemed to feel it would be a great disadvantage to us if China entered this war. In view of her present difficulties, why do you think it would be a disadvantage to us when obviously we have the power to destroy China?

Mr. SALISBURY. We do have the power to destroy China.

The CHAIRMAN. Why is it to our disadvantage for them to enter the war?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think that is a very complicated question.

We have the power to destroy China, but we have the power only if we utilize nuclear weapons to do this. It seems to me that there is no more grave question that could be put before this Nation than the decision to use nuclear weapons; to use them in a great power conflict. Regardless of the fact that Russian and China are completely at sword's points and almost on the verge possibly of war, if we were to embark on a war with China or China were to enter this war and we would then begin to fight back, as I say, with nuclear weapons, I am not at all convinced that the Soviet Union would not come to China's aid. The Soviet Union unfortunately does possess nuclear weapons, and the prospect of a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and this country is one which appalls me.

The CHAIRMAN. It seems to me this is what is involved in this whole matter and is a question that everyone wishes to avoid discussing. You did discuss it in your written statement, but I think it ought to be brought out into the open and discussed. You have seen statements in our press advocating our bombing them back into the stone age. Haven't you seen that?

Mr. SALISBURY. I certainly have seen that, and I would say that if it were a matter of-if you are talking about straight bombing such as we are doing in North Vietnam, it certainly is possible to bomb North Vietnam back to the stone age. It isn't a very great distance there, you know.

The CHAIRMAN. It is possible?

Mr. SALISBURY. It is possible.

The CHAIRMAN. It doesn't serve anybody's advantage.

Mr. SALISBURY. I don't think it serves anybody's advantage. No, I do not.

CHINESE PHILOSOPHY TOWARD THE U.S. FORCES IN ASIA

The CHAIRMAN. Are you familiar with the statement which appeared in the Peking Peoples Daily? I think it is a rather ominous statement. It is taken from the August 30 issue and I quote:

"... To be quite frank, if the United States imperialism kept its forces in Europe and America, the Asian people would have no way of wiping them out. Now, that it is so obliging as to deliver its goods to the customers' door, the Asian people cannot but express welcome. The more forces United States imperialism throws into Asia, the more will it be bogged down there and the deeper will be the grave it digs for itself.

"... The tying down of large numbers of United States troops by the Asian people creates a favorable condition for the further growth of the anti-United States struggle of the people in other parts of the world. With the people rising to attack it, one hitting it at its head and the other at its feet, United States imperialism can be nibbled up bit by bit."

In view of your experience there, I will ask you to comment on this. Mr. SALISBURY. That is a very effective description of the basic Chinese philosophy regarding the United States, the basic Chinese idea for the ultimate conquest of the world by the Chinese kind of communism.

The Chinese have stated this many times. That is one quotation. You could easily cite a dozen or twenty more in which they expound this often to the extent of thousands of words.

Their idea is that the more they can engage the United States and its forces in the more different places, particularly in backward and remote parts of the world, the more they tie us down, the more they wear us down, the more they weaken our system the more they prepare us for the ultimate slaughter which they think is going to happen. They literally believe their kind of communism is going to someday dominate the world, not only our world but Russia's world and the European world as well and they think this is the way to start out on that road.

This is the reason why, were Hanoi to start tomorrow publicly to negotiate with the United States, you would find the Chinese moving to intervene in that situation radically. They not only would cut off the supply route to Hanoi, cut off their own supplies, cut off Russian supplies, I am convinced that they would attempt to move through their supporters within the Hanoi Government to try to subvert the Hanoi Government and bring them over to the Chinese line.

UNITED STATES INTENTIONS IN ASIA

The CHAIRMAN. Pursue that a little further: Is there any validity in their idea that this is the only way to destroy the United States? In other words, in doing this, in submitting our men and materials into a fight in Asia, is it playing their game or is it our interests? In other words, take the other side of that argument, if we did not do it, then there would be no way for them to accomplish their purpose? Mr. SALISBURY. They have made that quite clear.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your view about it? Is this a feasible undertaking for us to conquer Asia?