Senator MUNDT. There is no question, in my opinion, that in approaching peace things can best be done in secret. I think there have been some counterproductive results from our open effort oftentimes to say, "It looks like we had enough, and you have had enough, and let's sit around the table."

It seems to me that the oriental mind might conclude that, "We are winning the war because you are going to ask for some kind of settlement." I think you have to relate this to the psychological reactions of the people over there. But surely I would expect, and certainly hope, that those who properly should make those approaches are making them, especially right now. This would seem to be a time when normally smart and astute individuals, and I am sure they have them at the head of the Government in Hanoi, would be worried about the future as far as their assistance from China is concerned.

So I raise the question not thinking that you would know more than we would as to whether it is being done, but as to whether you have any reason to believe it is not being done.

Mr. SALISBURY. I do not have any reason one way or the other. I share your hope entirely.

Senator MUNDT. Thank you.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore.

THE TEN-MINUTE RULE

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I have found the report of Mr Salisbury, whom I have known and respected for a long while, very interesting and informative. I shall refrain from asking questions.

I would like to observe that the question of a ten-minute rule is not in effect in the committee. This matter was put to the committee in my motion which the chairman submitted to the committee as a whole. The motion was tabled with only a vote of four in support of the proposition, so that each member was left to his own self-discipline. I feel that since my distinguished colleague, Senator Lausche, thinks that a point of view not yet expressed would add to the balance of the hearing, I would ask unanimous consent that I may yield to him. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Senator LAUSCHE. Thank you very much. I am glad the Senator from Tennessee did make the statement that it was the conclusion that each of the Senators ought to voluntarily impose upon himself the tenminute limitation rather than have it done by rule. I will try to stay within the ten-minute limitation.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield for an observation? Actually the questioning has been less than ten minutes, on the average, of every member since we began, so I take it that all the Senator really objects to is, not the time, but the nature of my questions.

Senator LAUSCHE. No, not at all. I sat for two hours and 50 minutes two days ago listening to the Chairman and others, and I never did get to utter a single word.

Senator GORE. I yielded. Go ahead.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am just answering the Chairman.

Senator CASE. We are here to hear Mr. Salisbury in any event.
Senator LAUSCHE. Yes, I would like to hear Mr. Salisbury.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR U.S. ACTIONS IN VIETNAM

What do you recommend that we should do, Mr. Salisbury?
First, do you recommend that we should pull out?

Mr. SALISBURY. I certainly do not recommend our pulling out, Senator.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, if you do not recommend that we should pull out, do you subscribe to the theory of General Gavin that we should stay there in enclaves?

Mr. SALISBURY. I am not terribly enamored of the enclave theory. Perhaps, in the end, if the war goes on and on and on, and there are no results, and the fighting continues, and everybody get worn out, maybe we have to go back and retreat to the Indian fort, maybe so. I would hope there might be some other solution.

Senator LAUSCHE. Do you recommend that we stop bombing the north, their military installations and strategic areas?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think, in general, that I would say that this might be a good move. I think that the situation is a little bit more complicated at the moment. I think maybe that is not the most important thing to do at this precise moment, but I am sure that it would not be adverse to our interests if we did do it.

ATTACKS ON UNITED STATES MILITARY

Senator LAUSCHE. What would be your comment about the arguments that are made that it would be unfair to our military men entrenched in South Vietnam to allow them to sit there waiting for attacks chosen as to time and place by the enemy without our Government doing anything to stop the influx of material that is used to destroy them?

Mr. SALISBURY. I would be very sympathetic to the view of the military not wanting to sit with folded hands while the enemy increases its strength. I think this is just plain commonsense.

Senator LAUSCHE. But it is also good plain commonsense for a decent, honest American to say that he will not tolerate our men sitting there like ducks on the open water to be knocked out with the enemy choosing the time and place when the attack will be made? Do you subscribe to that?

Mr. SALISBURY. I subscribe to it except for one thing, if you will permit me to say it, and that is the enemy usually does choose the time for attack. Unfortunately, this is the rule of war. He decides, not

you.

The question involved here is, I think, a double one. Do we stop bombing out of the blue without any assurance that they are going to do anything else? I would say, no, that we have a right to know if we stopped the bombing what move they are prepared to take.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am very grateful to you for your objectivity in this matter, for it is my belief that we have explored every source available, hoping to find some means to stop the shooting. It is the persistence and the unwillingness of Ho Chi Minh and his colleagues to enter into any discussions that will bring the shooting to an end.

AVENUES TO NEGOTIATIONS WHICH SHOULD BE EXPLORED

What avenues would you explore beyond those that have been explored by the United States in trying to bring about a negotiation?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think there are avenues that exist right today which can be explored, which may actually be in the process of being explored, Senator. I do not know that I entirely agree with your thesis that we have always made the gestures toward a negotiation and they have always rebutted them.

In a war things get extremely complicated. You get an atmosphere on either side of suspicion and distrust which is only normal. I think when two fellows are slugging at each other they do not have much confidence in the other fellow, and I do not know why they should.

So it is awfully hard to stop a war. It is fairly easy to start a war, but it is awfully hard to stop when, particularly when, both combatants are still in the ring, they can still fight and we can still fight. So it is pretty hard to get that kind of thing stopped.

I believe that it would be possible to stop it now. I hope to God it is possible to stop it before any more people get killed in this war, and I think there are explorations that can be undertaken by ourselves and by the other side which would lead to a solution. At least, the explorations ought to be undertaken.

HO CHI MINH'S INSISTENCE ON NLF PLAN

Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Salisbury, how would you overcome the firm position taken by Ho Chi Minh that there must be a reformation of the Government on the plan of the National Liberation Front, and only on that plan?

Mr. SALISBURY. I would discuss this matter

Senator LAUSCHE. You are familiar with what I have in mind? Mr. SALISBURY. Oh, yes, I am very familiar.

Senator LAUSCHE. And you know that Ho Chi Minh says that the South Vietnamese Government must be reformed on the basis of the National Liberation Front program? You are familiar with that? Mr. SALISBURY. Oh, yes, I am.

Senator LAUSCHE. Has he yielded at all with respect to that proposal?

Mr. SALISBURY. There has been no public change on that proposal, but it is my impression, and this is a subjective one, but I think it may be accurate, that there is less hardness on that particular point than you might imagine.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, we are in complete accord. And, although I frequently disagree with the President, I am obliged to say that, in my opinion, he has explored every source that he thinks might bring Ho Chi Minh to the negotiation table. If there are other sources, they ought to be suggested to him. I think they will find a favorable reception.

Now, I want to just put some questions concerning the full credit that should be given to you in your testimony, and this is no reflection upon your purpose to try to help.

HOW MR. SALISBURY ENTERED NORTH VIETNAM

How is it that you got into North Vietnam?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I believe there are two or possibly three factors involved in that.

The first thing had to be some change in the position of the Hanoi Government to admit in foreign correspondents, particularly from the West.

I think they must have arrived at a conclusion some time in the course of last year, probably as much as six or eight months ago, that they were going to embark on this course.

I think they had to decide on who they were going to admit. They had, to the best of my knowledge, probably 28 or 30 applications from various correspondents.

I think, in all honesty, that when they decided to admit an American correspondent they first thought of the New York Times. I think it was a natural thing for them to think of.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Mr. SALISBURY. It is the most influential paper in the United States. [Laughter.]

They wanted the number one. They did not want Avis. So they decided on the Times.

Well, there were two applications in from the Times, one from me, and one, as I mentioned earlier, from Mr. Topping.

Senator CASE. They took number one again, didn't they? [Laughter.]

Mr. SALISBURY. But I had pestered them more. I really had been at them from all kinds of angles, and I think that is why they picked me. I might be wrong.

Senator LAUSCHE. I read somewhere within the last two or three weeks your statement that it was the belief of Ho Chi Minh that the New York Times exercised the greatest impact upon the minds of the public in the United States. Did you make some such statement? Mr. SALISBURY. No, I did not make that statement, but I might support it. [Laughter.]

Senator LAUSCHE. That is exactly the point that I wanted to get to.

HERBERT MATTHEWS' ARTICLES ON CUBA

Did the Matthews' visit to Cuba induce you to try to make a scoop in North Vietnam?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, I do not think so. It never entered my mind. Senator LAUSCHE. Just let me follow this. The New York Times did write extensively about the heroism of Castro, did it not?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I do not know that I would describe Mr. Matthews' articles in exactly those terms. We wrote a lot about Castro, there is no question about that.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, you wrote three stories about Castro, and some people have said that the New York Times gave Castro to the United States.

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, somebody made a cartoon once parodying a cartoon that we used to run to boost our classified ads, saying, "I

got my job through the New York Times," and they had a picture of Castro there. I do not think that was true. [Laughter.]

Senator LAUSCHE. I want to quote from one Matthews' article:

The personality of the man (Castro) is overpowering. *** Here was an educated, dedicated fanatic, a man of ideals, of courage of remarkable qualities of leadership.

Maybe you cannot say whether or not this was in the Matthews' article?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, I am terribly sorry, Senator, but I cannot because I have not seen them for years and years.

Senator LAUSCHE. I quote again:

I could not claim, myself, at the time to have had any idea of the terrific impact my

That is, Matthews'

story was going to have, or the chain reaction it was going to set up in the whole of the Western Hemisphere.

Do you think that his stories had that impact on the Western Hemisphere?

Mr. SALISBURY. I think he exaggerates a little bit.

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, all right. Here is Matthews again:

I was always in touch with the rebels in the Sierra Maestra and with the civic resistance. No Cuban came to New York without seeing me or trying to see my associates.

Do you know whether that was said?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, but, Senator, just from the

Senator LAUSCHE. Just answer it.

Mr. SALISBURY. Excuse me, but I wonder if you could tell me what you are reading from.

Senator LAUSCHE. I am reading from quotations from the Matthews' articles taken out of the New York Times.

Mr. SALISBURY. But that does not sound as though it could have been one of his original pieces because it does not relate to the Sierra Maestra, does it?

Senator LAUSCHE. Then I just want to quote-this is not by Matthews:

Be it said in fairness to the New York Times, whose stories and editorials helped to make Castro and his movement acceptable to as yet undecided Cubans and all of the liberals and progressive opinion throughout the United States. Did you or didn't you do that?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I did not. [Laughter and applause.] The CHAIRMAN. I must say it is against the rules of the committee

Senator LAUSCHE. Did the New York Times do it?
Mr. SALISBURY. I do not think so.

The CHAIRMAN. May I have order in the chamber. It is entirely against the rules of the committee to demonstrate your approval or disapproval of the proceedings here, and I must ask you not to demonstrate regardless of how provocative it may be. [Laughter.]

Senator LAUSCHE. Well, did the New York Times do it because of its tremendous influence on public opinion?