Mr. SALISBURY. Well, that is a subjective question, Senator. I do not believe we did, frankly.

Senator LAUSCHE. All right. That is all. Thanks very much. Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, may I make a brief observation? The CHAIRMAN. The Senator is recognized. Senator Gore. Senator GORE. Many people make a misjudgmennt with respect to Castro. I remember, for instance, that he was invited to address a national convention of newspaper editors and publishers here in Washington to which I was invited, and which I attended. Erelong many people, including the senior Senator from Tennessee, were disillusioned. The CHAIRMAN. I would like to make a statement, too. You have just seen one of the principal reasons for major difficulties in conducting this committee.

Senator Case.

CONSEQUENCES OF CESSATION OF BOMBING

Senator CASE. Mr. Chairman, to carry on with questions that were asked before, if we stopped the bombing, then what do we do?

First, would you comment on the suggestion that if we stop the bombing it would not have the effect desired but would rather tend to prolong the war? I have heard some people estimate it would add two years to the resistance, because it would strengthen the North Vietnamese in the view that they were gaining more by not negotiating than by negotiating.

Now, this is a matter of subjective judgment. I would like to have your subjective judgment about it.

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, my guess is that if you stopped the bombing and nothing happened, there is no negotiation, there is no reciprocal move on their part, you have not advanced the situation very far except in one area which we have not mentioned here, and this is in the area of world public opinion.

I think there is very little doubt that around the world public opinion does not support the U.S. bombing policy. There are even people in this country who do not support it.

If the bombing were halted and no reciprocal move were made on the part of North Vietnam, I think they would be subjected to enormous pressure. That pressure, I believe, would come not only from the western world, it would also come from within the communist world, from Eastern Europe and from the Soviet Union to shove them into negotiations, to shove them into taking some reciprocal step to match our move.

I cannot guarantee that would happen, but it seems logical to me that such a thing would happen so that while from the military standpoint, or viewed only in military terms, there might be some slight loss by stopping the bombing, there might be an enormous gain diplomatically and in the direction of moving this war toward a solution.

I

I think there is, however, even another plus in that direction. believe, without being able to prove it, that Hanoi is ready to begin to talk business with us. I believe that if the bombing were halted, they would take a reciprocal step, and we would then move into the negotiative period.

My own concern in that event would be, not that we get into negotiations, but that we not get into negotiations before we know what we are going to negotiate, and I think before the bombing stops, before anything happens, there should be exploration to see whether there can be worked out some terms for a settlement.

Senator CASE. I personally agree with you down to the ground that neither side will come to the negotiation table in public, certainly, until it has explored thoroughly and has a pretty good idea where it is going to end up.

Like everyone else here, I assume we are doing our very best to find out in private whether this is possible, and to explore all possibilities. If I did not believe this, I would insist on throwing this Government out tomorrow. Of course, it may not be doing as well as it should.

OBJECTIVE OF SEIZING AND HOLDING TERRITORY

Now there have been other people who have suggested that we can win the war by the bombing, and that in any event we have got to think seriously of either winning the war or getting ourselves out of Vietnam.

What is your view on this? I think it was the view of Mr. Reischauer the other day, and others have suggested, that we should seriously pursue the matter of seizing and holding territory and go into this in a way that would be pursued until we had achieved our objective of an independent free South Vietnam.

Mr. SALISBURY. I find myself not in any disagreement with the objective of seizing and holding territory if by that we mean establishing large areas over which the South Vietnamese Government, not ourselves, but the South Vietnamese Government exercises effective control, possibly with some protection from ourselves.

But for us ourselves to seize and control territory and turn this into islands protected by Marines all the way around the outside, does not seem to me the route to follow toward political health and stability in South Vietnam.

It may create an isolated situation which you can protect, but the longer run gain seems to me to be minimal.

Now, maybe that is all we can hope for. Maybe we have to live with a series of hedgehogs or something like that in South Vietnam. I suspect we can do better. I suspect that we can do better along the route of negotiation. I suspect we may even find it possible to negotiate ourselves a viable government in South Vietnam.

This sounds maybe far out at this time, but I would like to see it explored a lot further before giving up that possibility.

Senator CASE. I would fully agree with this, and my point was that assuming we do not find they are not willing to negotiate, that our optimistic thoughts about this are wrong, we will have to do something, and this seems to me the only feasible thing that can be done. I am not talking about enclaves now, but talking about the systematic effort to see that this country is free.

ATTITUDES OF THE NORTH VIETNAM MAN IN THE STREET

Have you from this past trip or from your earlier experiences, or perhaps from both, any evidence that you regard as factual, as opposed

to impressions or assumptions, as to the actual attitude of the man in the street in North Vietnam about the war, the United States, the Hanoi regime, China, and the Chinese?

Is the hostility of the Vietnamese to China still strong and a fact? Please tell me about these things.

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, on China, I can answer quite clearly because so many people mentioned China to me without my mentioning China to them, and through this always runs the strain of national and patriotic antagonism toward China.

China is their hereditary enemy. Their greatest victories, with the exception of Dienbienphu, have been scored against the Chinese. They are proud of them. They talk about them and they leave no doubt in their mind that they have this antagonism toward them.

They do not want the Chinese in, taking over their country. There is no doubt about that. And the same attitude is expressed by the small man and the big man.

Now, so far as their attitude toward their government is concerned, I did not find people saying that they thought Ho Chi Minh was a great man, or their Government was a great one, but I found them expressing sentiments of resolve and of support for the program of their government, of resistance to the United States, of fighting for the unity, the independence, and the sovereignty of their country, which they believe is threatened by this war, and they support overall the objective of reunification of the two parts of the country.

I do not think you would find much disagreement among the ordinary Vietnamese between those people and their government on these points.

IGNORANCE ABOUT WESTERN WORLD IN GENERAL

Now, in another area, I found them excessively ignorant, and this is so far as the United States is concerned, or the western world in general.

Unfortunately, the few impressions that they have of what the West is like come to them through their years of being subjected to colonialism under the French, and they are very apt to transfer to the present images from the past that they acquired from the French, and they think of the United States in terms of the way they used to think of France.

Now, some of these images are very damaging to them because they give them a very imperfect idea of what the world is about or what the United States is about. They think of us as a much weaker country than we actually are, because they think of us in terms of the France that they knew in 1946 or something like that.

They are apt to come to the wrong conclusion about what we would like to do with their country.

For example, they find it inconceivable that we do not want to turn all of Vietnam into another colony such as the French had, and when I told them what I really believed, that there is nothing in Vietnam that we want, because there is not much that is worth anything, they are appalled at that idea, because they think their country is very valuable, and they think it would be very natural that we would want to take it over because it is stuffed with all sorts of goodies. When I said to them, "Look, if we ever take this country over it would

cost us ever so much more than we could possibly put into it," they did not know what I was talking about because they do not know of a country that is based on the kind of economy and with the productivity that we have.

So this is certainly a difficulty in trying to get into realistic talk with these people because they do not see us really for the kind of power we are, nor do they see the outer world, really, very well.

Their contacts are limited. They are rather ignorant people. They do not even know other communist worlds very well. So these are the impressions that I get of the kind of ideas that these people have.

SETTLEMENT BASED ON A DIVIDED VIETNAM

Senator CASE. Just one more question. Is it your opinion that it would be impossible to negotiate a settlement on the basis of a division of the country?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, I do not think that is impossible. I think it would be difficult, but I think it could be done.

Senator CASE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cooper.

EFFECT OF CESSATION OF BOMBING ON NEGOTIATIONS

Senator COOPER. Mr. Salisbury, you have just said, in response to one of Senator Case's questions, that you believed that if bombing of North Vietnam were stopped that there be a reciprocal action upon the part of the North Vietnamese. I know this is difficult, but may I ask if that opinion is wholly subjective, or is it based upon your talks with Vietnamese officials?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, it is not wholly subjective. I would say probably the easiest way of answering that is that this is my interpretation of some of the things that I was told.

Senator COOPER. You said before that bombing had actually unified the people and stimulated them to make plans to continue the war.

Would you say that if this bombing should be stopped, that it might not have the effect, too, of making them believe that they were stronger than at the beginning of the war?

Mr. SALISBURY. This is certainly something that we would certainly have to risk-the possibility that they would draw this deduction.

However, as I said before, if the bombing were halted in anticipation and in foreknowledge that some move would be coming from their side and that we were moving into a negotiation, then I do not think that this consideration would be necessarily a very important one.

INTERVENTION OF CHINA IF NORTH VIETNAM ENGAGES IN NEGOTIATIONS

Senator COOPER. I was very much interested in your statement that if the North Vienamese should actually move toward negotiation there was a danger that China would intervene because China wants so much to continue the war.

Is the view held in Hanoi that the Chinese might actually intervene? Mr. SALISBURY. It is held in Hanoi, it is held by some of the Vietnamese, at least, and it is very strongly held by Eastern European com

munist diplomats and by some of the Russians with whom I have spoken.

Senator COOPER. What do you mean by intervention? Would there be an effort to overthrow the government in Hanoi?

Mr. SALISBURY. Specifically that, yes.

Senator COOPER. You are not talking about an actual intervention of Chinese forces.

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, it might take both forms. You might get the effort at a coup d'etat in Hanoi coincident with a movement of Chinese volunteers, as they would call them, into the country.

Senator COOPER. A statement is often made of the long history of warfare between Vietnam and China and the desire of the Vietnamese people not to be taken over by the Chinese. Is that correct, in your view?

Mr. SALISBURY. Absolutely 100 percent correct, yes, sir.

VIET CONG REPRESENTATIVE IN HANOI

Senator COOPER. Are there Vietcong representatives in Hanoi ? Mr. SALISBURY. There is a representative, I think they call him at delegate or something like that, of what goes by the formal name of the National Liberation Front in Hanoi, and I had a rather extensive interview with this man.

Senator COOPER. Does the Government of Vietnam treat him as a representative of another government?

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes. He is treated as a diplomat, and his embassy or his mission is regarded as an embassy.

Now, whether this goes over into all of their intimate contacts, it is impossible to tell just on the basis of discussion with either side. But it is my impression from talking with him and looking up the structure which has been set up in, well, in recent-the last year or two, by the Vietcong or the "Front" as they are more properly called, which involves a whole series of these embassies in not only-not only in communist countries but in some of the African countries as well, that that "Front" organization is moving in the direction of becoming an actual government. They do not have diplomatic representation at their headquarters, wherever that may be, in the south, but they are establishing diplomatic contact and they are acting more and more as though they were a government and not just a guerrilla movement.

RISKS IN CESSATION OF BOMBING

Senator COOPER. If this war continues, of course, that means greater and greater loss of American lives, and there will be some risk, of course, in stopping bombing. But would you say that in the long run it would be a lesser risk to stop bombing than to continue it, with the possibility of a greater and greater and greater loss of American lives? Mr. SALISBURY. I would think that the advantages lie with halting the bombing, yes.

EFFECT OF GENERAL DE GAULLE'S VISIT

Senator COOPER. One other question: What effect, if any, did the visit of General de Gaulle have in Hanoi ?