area should be measured in terms of cost, delay and diversion of manpower to the enemy.

Mr. Salisbury neglected to mention the military targets in Phu Ly. They include a railroad bridge, two military storage areas in different parts of the town, a barracks and adjacent military complex, a railroad yard, a control center and a long stretch of port facilities along the river.

Mr. Salisbury also failed to report the existence of several antiaircraft sites in and around the town.

Have you any comments as to those points?

Mr. SALISBURY. Well, I think this illustrates the difficulty of looking at the same situation from two different viewpoints.

ing

I saw Phu Ly on the ground, and I described it very accurately. Phu Ly is not much of a town itself. The railroad runs through it and, of course, it is the main railroad, it is obvious; the main highway, that is obvious, and it does have some, a couple of lines or maybe more of freight yards.

This is a one-track railroad, and you have to have slips so that the trains can bypass there.

There is a railroad bridge and a highway bridge there, and stuff does come down and is transshipped through that point. There is no doubt about that.

The real question is, and I do not think this is really, should be, much of a matter of argument between the Defense Department and myself, you try to take out these facilities and the town is narrow, the houses and everything built right along this track, it does not extend out very much this way, and when you come down to bomb it you are going to bomb some of those houses out, and in this case, this place has been bombed repeatedly, and there is just nothing left. Later on, I gather, there is a part of the town away from the highway, I do not think it was involved in our action at all, which has not been attacked, and where some of the houses still stand.

Well, I do not know what you make out of that one way or the other. The Defense Department says, "We had to do this." Maybe they did. Somebody else says, "Why didn't you hit the railroad outside the

town?"

The truth of the matter is they have hit the railroad outside the town a number of times. I do not have very much argument with them. I do not think they have much argument with me because the facts in this particular case fit each other pretty darned well. Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

PAMPHLET ON WAR CRIMES IN NAM DINH

Now, the Washington Post on January 1 had an article, "Salisbury 'Casualties' Tally with Viet Reds." I will read the first three paragraphs:

Civilian casualty figures in the bombing of Namdinh in North Vietnam— reported without attribution last week by Harrison E. Salisbury of the New York Times are identical to those in a Communist propaganda pamphlet issued in November.

The pamphlet, entitled "Report on U.S. War Crimes in Namdinh City" was prepared by the Committee for the investigation of U.S. imperialists war crimes in Vietnam of Nam Ha Province, October 1966.

The pamphlet is in English. Intelligence sources here, who have copies of it, said a North Vietnamese official distributed the pamphlet in November to foreign correspondents in Moscow.

What are your comments on that, sir?

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes. I commented on that a little earlier, Senator, when you were not here, but I will repeat the comment because it is a pretty simple matter.

These figures are identical with the ones I got, and they are identical because the source is the same. The sources are the communist officials at Nam Dinh. This comment was made at the time by Mr. Daniel, our managing editor, that the surprising thing would be if they put out different figures for me than they put out in some other connection. They obviously come from the same source.

Senator SYMINGTON. Then, in an accompaniment to this, it says that in the Salisbury piece datelined Hanoi, December 25, he includes this paragraph:

The cathedral tower looks out on block after block of utter desolation; the city's population of 90,000 has been reduced to less than 20,000 because of evacuation; 13 percent of the city's housing, including the homes of 12,464 people, have been destroyed; 89 people have been killed and 405 wounded.

On page 4 of the communist document distributed the previous November in Moscow it states:

During the 33 above said air attacks against Nam Dinh, they caused many losses in lives and property to the city's inhabitants, 89 persons were killed, among them 23 children, 36 women and 405 wounded, among them 61 women, 44 old men, and 41 children *

Have you any comments on that?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, that is merely an extension of what we were talking about before.

PHU XA CASUALTIES

Senator SYMINGTON. An accompanying note states that Mr. Salisbury says:

Those missiles were reported to have caused most of the Phu Xa casualties. The North Vietnamese cite as an instance the village of Phu Xa, a market gardening suburb possibly four miles from the city center. A village of 24 houses was reported attacked at 12:17 p.m., August 13 by a United States pilot trying to bomb a Red River dike. The village was destroyed and 24 people were killed and 23 wounded. The pilot was shot down.

Then the question how you knew there were 24 people killed. Did you visit Phu Xa, Mr. Salisbury?

Mr. SALISBURY. Yes. I inspected the site and these figures, as is apparent from that story, come from the people who live in that village. Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I ask unanimous consent that a pamphlet distributed in Moscow to foreign correspondents during a press conference last November 10, 1966 entitled "Report on U.S. War Crimes in Nam Dinh City" be included as a part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

(The document referred to appears in the appendix.)

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I hesitate to keep Mr. Salisbury longer. He has been very patient, and I know he must be weary, but I would like to ask one question about a matter. Had you finished? Senator SYMINGTON. I had not finished.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you said you had.

Senator SYMINGTON. I asked permission to include that document in the record at this point.

Senator GORE. I apologize.

Senator SYMINGTON. The Senator should never apologize to me. He knows of my high respect for him.

SAVING OF AMERICAN LIVES BY AIR ATTACKS

Mr. Salisbury, we have recent testimony before other committees that the air attacks in North Vietnam have saved many American lives "a great many" is one quote from one of the members of the Joint Chiefs; "hundreds" is the quote from another. This is my question to you.

If we stay in South Vietnam, should not the fact that we have saved hundreds of young American lives by these attacks over North Vietnam be considered as much as should North Vietnamese casualties? Mr. SALISBURY. Well, naturally.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

BOMBING PAUSE AND INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH

My next question. If the current worldwide campaign to stop these air attacks against North Vietnam should result in our agreeing to a bombing pause, shouldn't the people of Hanoi do something in return? For example, would it not be proper and right for them in turn to stop infiltration of troops into South Vietnam? How do you feel about that?

Mr. SALISBURY. Absolutely 100-percent agreed.
Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

CAUSE OF BOMB EXPLOSIONS IN CIVILIAN AREAS

You reported seeing houses destroyed. Many American pilots I talked with, and last month I talked to over 100 myself who were bombing North Vietnam, said that they saw North Vietnamese SAM missiles, quite a few of them, fall and explode in civilian areas. When you saw a house destroyed, could you tell whether it had been destroyed by a bomb, or whether it had been destroyed by one of their SAMS?

Mr. SALISBURY. You cannot always tell that, Senator, but you can sometimes make a judgment on it, on the extent of the damage.

The SAMs, of course, are extremely powerful things, and they destroy a large area around, usually cause a fire along with that.

In most of the areas I saw, the destruction was not of a magnitude that would cause you to suspect that it was a SAM, and in most areas, and I reported on this, I talked to the people who had been residents in the area and who had seen what had happened, and who have their account of it. That does not mean that their account was necessarily accurate, but at least it was supportive evidence in one direction or another.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

RIGHT OF U.S. PILOTS TO JETTISON BOMBS

Now, our pilots stated that when they are attacked by MIGs, their only chance of getting away is to jettison their bomb load, else they are overtaken and in all probability shot down, as many of them have been. Under such attack, do you believe they should have the right to jettison those bombs in order to save the plane and themselves? Mr. SALISBURY. Naturally.

Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you.

NORTH VIETNAMESE ANNOUNCEMENTS OF ATTACKS ON HANOI

Is it true that the North Vietnamese announce any attack within 25 miles of Hanoi as actually an attack on Hanoi?

Mr. SALISBURY. Not to my knowledge, Senator. I have not heard that.

Senator SYMINGTON. You have not heard that?

Mr. SALISBURY. No, I have not.

No, I had not heard that. It may be true but I had not heard it. Senator SYMINGTON. Did you hear any figure of proximity to the city which the North Vietnamese announce as an attack on the city itself?

Mr. SALISBURY. No. The only thing relating to that, that would bear on it at all is the announcement that they put on their loudspeaker system or their radio when planes are approaching, and if there is an announcement before the planes are overhead, and this seldom happens really because the planes come in so fast, they will say they are 25 kilometers or 30 kilometers out of Hanoi, and I would assume that meant right out of the heart of the city.

NEWS ARTICLES RELATING TO INFILTRATION FROM THE NORTH

Senator SYMINGTON. Without giving detailed figures, the hard estimate now of the reduction of infiltration in North Vietnam is a reduction of 25 percent in the first part of last year, and 50 percent of that latter figure later on.

In yesterday's Washington Post, an article stated there was a hard figure for August of 2,000.

Your paper this morning says, and I quote:

* competent military sources here also insist that North Vietnamese infiltration is continuing at the same high rate of about 8,000 a month that they claim was maintained in 1966 *

I checked today with the Defense Department. They say that the Washington Post figure is correct, and that the figure that the New York Times had this morning is wrong.

Would you comment?

Mr. SALISBURY. Gosh, no. I do not know anything about that at all.

Senator SYMINGTON. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that these two articles be inserted at this point in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

(The two articles referred to follow :)

[Editorial from the Washington Post, Feb. 1, 1967]

THE BIGGEST NEWS

(By Joseph Alsop)

The biggest news at the moment is not getting into the newspapers. There are two closely related items. On the one hand, Hanoi is actively sounding out the Johnson Administration, through diplomatic third parties, to discover whether the President will "stop the bombing to get talks."

Whether the President will be wise enough to insist on the essential quid pro quo for stopping the bombing, still remains to be seen. And it also remains to be seen whether Hanoi really wants negotiations, or merely desires a badly needed respite or breathing spell in which to reinforce the Vietcong units in the South and start the war all over again.

This move forward, from noisy propaganda to quiet diplomatic inquiry, is none the less a very big development. The reason for it can be easily discerned in the other big, as yet unnoticed piece of news. In brief, U.S. bombing of North Vietnam has now begun to produce precisely the strangling effect that it was designed to produce from the outset.

To be specific, the southward movement of North Vietnamese regular troops, to reinforce the Vietcong, has been reduced by no less than 75 per cent in the past six months. The Pentagon estimates of month-by-month infiltration in 1966 show many a peak and valley, on both sides of the dividing line. This is at the end of June, just after the bombing of North Vietnamese oil stores began. But the contrast between the first six months and the last six months is dramatic. In the first six months, the average rate of infiltration of northern troops into South Vietnam was just under 7,000 a month. But in the last six months, the rate of infiltration dropped to around 1,700 men a month, or one quarter of the former input.

One must say "around 1,700" a month because the U.S. Government is currently riven by a vicious insiders' debate about the exact figures for infiltration in November and December. (This kind of argument, it may be noted, can make the religious wars look like fun and games.) But the argument is merely about whether the right figure for these two months is in the range of 1,500 men or 2,000 men.

As this argument indicates, the formal estimate for each month is only made long after the month in question has passed into history. More time has to pass after that, before the ultimate dependability of the formal estimate is properly cross-checked by additional defector-interrogations, captured documents, agent-intelligence and the like.

Thus the figures for July and August infiltration, having been cross-checked, can now be regarded as pretty hard data. Rounded off, they show 2,700 infiltrators in July and 2,000 in August. The rounded estimate for September, only 1,400 infiltrators, is also hardening fast. The October estimate, well under 1,000. seems really too low to be hard. The problem of November-December estimates has already been covered.

There are two reasons why this incalculably important development, previously surfaced in part by Lloyd Norman in Newsweek, has received almost no attention. One is the idiotic information-policy of the McNamara Pentagon and the Johnson Administration.

The other reason is the equally idiotic conviction of the lower echelons in U.S. Headquarters in Saigon, that if they admit to making the smallest progress in the war, the civilians at home will instantly begin clamoring to "bring the boys home." Thus "possible" infiltrators, generally imaginary as the event has repeatedly proven, are included in the infiltration rates cited in Saigon. The fact remains that the very low Pentagon estimates of infiltration for the last six months of 1966 were produced by precisely the same process, and were based on precisely the same kinds of information, that produced the exceedingly high estimates of infiltration for the first six months of last year. The high estimates were used by opponents of the President's policy to prove that "the northern bombing does no good anyway." Logically, these people ought now to eat their words-although nothing, of course, could be more wildly unlikely.