I am constrained to observe, however, that those who drafted this Convention succumb to the temptation to which those of us who serve in the Senate all too frequently fall. They talked too much in the Preamble. The Preamble makes references to the Forced Labour Convention of 1930, the Slavery Convention of 1926, the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery of 1956, the Protection of Wages Convention of 1949, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The only one of these Conventions or Declarations which the Senate has ever ratified is the Slavery Convention of 1926. I doubt very seriously whether the Senate will ratify this Convention unless this ratification is accompanied by a reservation which states in emphatic words that the action of the Senate in ratifying the Convention on Abolition of Forced Labour shall not constitute an express or implied approval or ratification by it of the provisions of the Forced Labour Convention of 1930, the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery of 1956, the Protection of Wages Convention of 1949, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is unfortunate that those who drafted the Convention referred to these other Conventions and particularly that they referred in such strong terms to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. With kindest wishes, Sincerely yours, SAM J. ERVIN, Jr. AUGUST 12, 1966. Re Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery. Mrs. GLADYS A. TILLETT, Charlotte, N.C. DEAR GLADYS: At long last I have had an opportunity to complete my study of the above-named Supplementary Convention. I am constrained to say that I would be very reluctant to vote for its ratification for reasons which I shall presently state. Article VI of the Constitution provides that "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." This constitutional provision clearly provides that any Treaty of the United States nullifies State laws inconsistent with it. Moreover, it contemplates that any provision of the Treaty which is inconsistent with the prior Act of Congress supersedes such prior Act of Congress. It is these considerations which make many members of the Senate question the wisdom of ratifying some of the Conventions prepared under the auspices of the United Nations. The Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery outlaws debt bondage, serfdom, and certain aspects of slavery. In addition it obligates the States bound by its provisions to undertake to prescribe by law certain standards relating to the marriage contract. Provisions relating to debt bondage, serfdom, and certain aspects of slavery appear in articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. All of the provisions relating to debt bondage, serfdom, and slavery, except those set out in article 5, fall within the domain of Congress and are substantially covered so far as Acts of Congress are concerned by the statutes relating to peonage and slavery which appear in sections 1581 through 1588 of Title 18 of the United States Code, and the statutes relating to peonage and the slave trade which appear in sections 1351 through 1364 of Title 46 of the United States Code. Consequently, these provisions of the Supplementary Convention are in accord with existing national laws and do not require any further legislation on the part of Congress. Article 5 of the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery relates to a subject matter which lies within the jurisdiction of the several States of the Union, and would not invalidate any existing State laws because the State laws relating to assaults and maims are in harmony with them. The provisions of the Supplementary Convention relating to marriage are found in subsection (c) of Article 1 and Article 2 of the Supplementary Convention. Their subject matter likewise falls within the domain assigned to the States by our constitutional system and the laws of the various States are in complete harmony with these provisions. For the reasons stated above, the provisions of the main body of the Supplementary Convention are not objectionable. Indeed, they are most praiseworthy. I am much concerned by the fact, however, that the preamble to the Supplementary Convention makes reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which has never been ratified by the Senate; the Forced Labor Convention of 1930, which has not even been submitted to the Senate for ratification; and the action taken by the International Labor Organization in regard to forced or compulsory labor, which has never been approved by the Senate. While the State Department takes the position that the reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and these other unratified agreements do not have any impact upon the United States or upon any of the States, its views to that effect are not authoritative, and for that reason do not settle the matter. Article 10 of the Supplementary Convention expressly provides that the ultimate power to determine the interpretation or application of the Supplementary Convention is vested in the International Court of Justice, which could conceivably rule that ratification of the Supplementary Convention by the Senate would either expressly or impliedly constitute an approval or ratification of these unratified Declaration and Conventions and actions. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains a number of provisions which can be reasonably construed to conflict with the provisions of our Constitution separating the powers of the Federal Government and those of the States, to nullify various existing national and State laws, and to impose upon the Nation and the States various vague obligations which they have never heretofore been willing to assume. It is not possible for the Senate to place this matter beyond dispute by a Reservation declaring that its action in ratifying the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery is not to be construed as an approval or ratification of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This is so because article 9 of the Supplementary Convention provides in express terms that "no reservation may be made to this Convention." For these reasons, I have many misgivings concerning the advisability of the administration pressing for the ratification of the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery. With all good wishes, I am SAM J. ERVIN, Jr. AUGUST 29, 1966. Re: The Convention on the Political Rights of Women. Mrs. GLADYS AVERY TILLETT, Charlotte, N.C. DEAR GLADYS: As I have pointed out in a previous letter, Articles I, II, and III of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women, which are the really important parts of the Convention, are in complete harmony with Article XIX of the Constitution of the United States and various Federal statutes implementing the same. Although Articles II and III are applicable according to their terms to public offices established by national rather than state law. Articles I, II and III are also in harmony with the laws prevailing in all of the 50 states. Owing to the fact, however, that treaties constitute "the supreme law of the land" and take precedence over state laws and prior acts of Congress. I am troubled by the reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and a general recitation in the Preamble to the Convention and also by the possibility that the International Court of Justice, which is given the jurisdiction of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention by Article IX, might eventually hand down the decision at variance to what we conceive to be the meaning of the Convention. For these reasons, I think that any resolution of the Senate advising and consenting to the Convention should recite in express terms that the Senate advises and consents to the Convention on the Political Rights of Women subject to the following reservations: (1) Notwithstanding the reference to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights contained in its Preamble, the act of the Senate in advising and consenting to the Convention on the Political Rights of Women is not to be interpreted to be advising or consenting to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which the United States of America has never ratified. (2) The recitation in the Preamble of the Convention on the Political Rights of Women "that everyone has a right to take part in the government of his country, directly or indirectly, through freely chosen representatives, and has the right to equal access to public service in his country" is not to be interpreted to alter or limit in any way the existing powers of the United States of America and the several states to prescribe qualifications for voting and qualifications for office holding which are applicable to men and women alike. (3) The Court of International Justice shall not have jurisdiction to place any interpretation upon the Convention on the Political Rights of Women inconsistent with these reservations. I take the liberty of sending a copy of this letter to Senator J. William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Sincerely yours, SAM J. ERVIN, Jr. Ambassador GOLDBERG. It goes without saying that I have studied his views very carefully. I have very high regard for Judge Ervin, and his basic point-he has found essentially nothing in these conventions which inherently he objects to. I think this is a fair summary. He has, however, expressed a viewpoint about some aspects of these conventions, and his basic viewpoint is this: He notes that the convention, these conventions, in their preambular paragraphs, contain references to the Universal Declaration of Rights of the United Nations and certain ILO conventions which we have not adhered to, and he raises the question of whether these references in some way commit us and ratification by the Senate would commit us to these documents. That is the basic-as I read Senator Ervin's letter, and you have read them that is his basic approach toward these matters. STATUS OF PREAMBLULAR PARAGRAPHS I would like to make a comment about the references which are referred to, which are in preambular paragraphs, and I would state first of all that they are not operative paragraphs. They do not relate to the to our obligations as a treaty power. They are preambular; they reference; they do not incorporate into the substantive part of the conventions we are considering these documents. Senator DODD. Would that be true in any contractual situation? Would a preamble to a contract not be considered as having bearing on the other parts of the contract, if you were sitting on the Supreme Court and such a question arose? Ambassador GOLDBERG. No, I think contractual things, depending upon the wording of the preambular paragraph, might be different. But the wording here is so clear-take note of that I must say from my experience at the United Nations, this is a common occurrence, and here, too, is accepted by all States as not incorporation by reference. Senator DoDD. Yes, I understand that. I want to be sure I understand you. There is no well-founded principle of law that says that a preamble will not be taken into consideration when a court is construing a contract. Ambassador GOLDBERG. Yes. Senator DODD. But a court may say that this particular preamble does not have bearing on the agreement of the parties. 75-719-67- 4 Ambassador GOLDBERG. And I think it is quite clear that this one does not. But there is a more fundamental Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me, Senator Clark. I think this discussion is very important-I think this goes to the heart of one of the basic questions in this convention on the abolition of forced labor. It does not say "having noted." In the next to the last paragraph in the preamble, it says: Having decided upon the adoption of further proposals with regard to the abolition of certain forms of forced labor or compulsory labor constituting a violation of the rights of man referred to in the Charter of the United Nations and enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. I think that Senator Ervin tries to get at that--which is not like "having noted." It is a statement that we have "decided" that this is involved in the human rights declaration. Then the next sentence says "having determined that these proposals shall take the form of an international convention." I think these sentences confuse the whole connection between the preamble and the text of the convention itself. Ambassador GOLDBERG. Senator, the decided provision, that is in a different category, but that is a convention to which we are a party, and we have no problem with that. Having decided therefore that the convention of 1926 which remains operative that we are a party to, and that presents no difficulty for us since that is the convention to which we are a party. STATUS OF UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS The references that Senator Ervin was worried about-he was not worried, I think, too much about that one because we are a partyhe was worried principally, as I read his letter, about the universal declaration of human rights, and I want to make a statement about that. Senator HICKENLOOPER. That is why I referred to that. Senator HICKENLOOPER. The words "and enunciated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," tie right into that "having decided" clause. Ambassador GOLDBERG. Yes, but I should like now to make a state ment. Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thought it was well to discuss it at this point. Ambassador GOLDBERG. I think so, and very important. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Excuse me, Senator Clark. Senator CLARK. That is all right. Ambassador GOLDBERG. The declaration of human rights is not a treaty. It was a declaration. It is not a treaty obligation of any country. Senator CLARK. What is the difference? Ambassador GOLDBERG. The difference is this-and I would illustrate it by a problem which we will have before your committee very shortly, and on which I will testify on March 7, on the space treaty. The United Nations adopted in 1963 a declaration of legal principles governing operations in space. Now that is a declaration. It did not become binding upon member states until we negotiated at treaty which we have now done, and it will not be binding as a treaty until ratification is completed." A declaration is an expression by the United Nations of the desirability of certain standards, certain Senator CLARK. Did we join in the declaration? Ambassador GOLDBERG. Yes, we joined in the declaration. Ambassador GOLDBERG. A letter of intent, an expression that this is desirable. But it is not-it is at best a moral obligation as distinguished from a legal obligation. Senator CLARK. Mr. Ambassador, let me interrupt for a moment. I would wonder whether it was as strong as a letter of intent. You are familiar with the procedures in Government contracts whereby large sums of money are committed on the basis of letters of intent which are not actually binding contracts. I would suggest to you for comment that this declaration is not as strong as a letter of intent. Senator DODD. I did not mean to be technical about it. Ambassador GOLDBERG. I understood Senator Dodd to mean what I meant, not in that technical term. A declaration is a statement that the United States views with favor these rights and Senator CLARK. But it is not putting any money on the line. Ambassador GOLDBERG. And subject to its constitutional processes and subject to the development of a binding treaty which we would adhere to. THE SEI FUJII CASE Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Ambassador, I do not want to ask you about a case out of the clear sky unless you have looked it up. Are you familiar with the Sei Fujii case in California? Ambassador GOLDBERG. Fujii, no. If you would tell me a little bit about it, maybe I am. Senator HICKENLOOPER. I cannot tell you too much about it. It was a case involving the question of whether a Japanese under certain circumstances could own land out there. Ambassador GOLDBERG. Yes. Senator HICKENLOOPER. And it seems to me that one of the turning points in that case was a declaration of human rights and it was, it may have been, used in supporting a decision there, which would indicate that the declaration of human rights rose a little higher than a pious declaration. Ambassador GOLDBERG. Yes. Senator DODD. Maybe I could amend what I said or put it another way. Why not say it is an expression of interest? Ambassador GOLDBERG. I did not recognize the name, but I now remember the case. Senator HICKENLOOPER. My Japanese pronunciation is not very good. Ambassador GOLDBERG. Yes. As I recall it, however, that case involved, and many arguments were made to us, even when I was on the Court, the human rights provisions of the U.N. Charter. Those provisions are not self-executing provisions. They would require action on the part of the Congress, the President and this body, to become operative. There was nothing, as |