Is it not true that the excerpts that the Chairman read of the proceedings and discussions that took place in the Senate were preliminary to the final consummation of the official action taken by the Senate in establishment of the Marshall Plan?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true that the history the Chairman has presented for the record about the Marshall Plan was a history in the legislative process that led to the passage of legislation in relation to the Marshall Plan itself?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true that this resolution does not involve any commitment of what the Government of the United States, both the executive branch and the Congress, are required to do in the future with respect to the implementation of the Alliance for Progress program?

Secretary RUSK. It does not substitute for what the Congress and the executive branch together must do in the future in these matters.

PROPOSED RESOLUTION IS NOT AN AUTHORIZATION

Senator MORSE. It is important in regard to the other points of view that have been presented here this morning, which I do not share, and which I do not think are an accurate account of the purpose of the President and of the purpose of the resolution, that I point out that this committee has already approved a program of the thoroughgoing review by the American Republics Affairs Subcommittee of the whole Alliance for Progress program. There is nothing in connection with the consideration of this resolution that in any way interferes or impedes that study.

I want to assure the Chairman and the members of the committee, and the Secretary of State, that the study of it will precede any authorization and any appropriations that will be subsequently asked for pursuant to Senate Joint Resolution 53 or other specific requests of the administration in the future. That is why I do not share the view of the Chairman, or, for that matter, the view of the Senator from Missouri, that any of us, by voting for this resolution, those of us who do, are committed to anything from the standpoint of our votes in the future to amounts or programs, for that will be dependent upon what the program is when it is submitted to us. This resolution does not authorize anything.

Let me speak hypothetically for a moment. Let us assume that the administration brings up a proposal in connection with tariffs, about which the Senator from Missouri asked a question. Suppose all the Latin American countries want us to adopt it, and we are satisfied that that proposal would do irreparable injury to the economic welfare and stability of our country.

Not a single person on this committee is under any obligation to vote for that proposal on the allegation that it was an outgrowth of the conference at Punta del Este that is going to be held by the heads. of state in April.

Secretary RUSK. I think that is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. Do you share my point of view in regard to that? Secretary RUSK. I do.

Senator MORSE. I think it is important because there has been so much talk here about a rubberstamp. What are we rubberstamping ourselves by way of commitments? Nothing, absolutely nothing. The resolution makes perfectly clear-and I want to repeat it-makes perfectly clear that it is all dependent, as far as our ultimate action is concerned, upon the program that is brought out from Latin America in consultation with the United States for future congressional action in accordance with our constitutional processes. The resolution says

so.

Secretary RUSK. And it does record a disposition to support good programs, if in your judgment they are good programs and are needed.

Senator MORSE. My next question is redundant, but it needs to be emphasized. The adoption of this resolution does not mean that we have authorized or committed ourselves to authorize "a Marshall Plan for Latin America," which was for Europe, the basis of all the discussion at the legislative level that preceded the adoption of the Marshall Plan, the excerpt from that discussion which was inserted in the record by the Chairman this morning; is that not true? Secretary RUSK. That is right, sir.

I think I should say for Latin American friends that our total aid since the war has now passed well beyond half the total of the Marshall Plan. So we do not want them to feel we are negligent here.

TONKIN BAY RESOLUTION NOT RELATED HERE

Senator MORSE. By way of light comment, I want to say to my Chairman, when he said no one quibbled about the language in the Tonkin Bay resolution, I did not quibble, I just refused to accept a single word of it. So I do not know what he means by saying none of us quibbled. Some of us just did not vote for it.

But, be that as it may

Secretary RUSK. I recall that, sir.

Senator MORSE. I see no relationship, no relationship whatsoever, between the Tonkin Bay resolution in which the Congress sought to authorize such military action as the President should decide in the interests of the country he thought ought to be exercised in Southeast Asia. That is the heart of the Tonkin Bay resolution. We are not authorizing the President in this resolution to commit us to anything or to take any action which he decides is in the national interest that would have the effect of binding this country in the future. Nothing in it would have the effect, as in Tonkin Bay, of authorizing or committing us, for example, to military action and, therefore, I say most respectfully, I think any reference to the Tonkin Bay resolution in connection with this context is a complete non sequitur; it has no logical relationship whatsoever to this resolution.

Secretary RUSK. Each step, sir, taken under this resolution or taken following this resolution would require action by the executive and in the usual way.

MEANING OF ADVISE AND CONSENT CLAUSE

Senator MORSE. Well, now, let me talk a bit about the consultation and the meaning of the advise and consent clause of the Constitution.

The ultimate congressional participation under the advise and consent clause is the formal action by the Congress after all sorts of forms of advice and consultation have been given.

Let us take the Cabinet room meeting the other day. The Chairman of the committee could not be there because of other matters. He would have been there, I am sure, if he could have been there. But we sat down there and we listened to the President and to you and to Ambassador Linowitz and Ambassador Bunker and others tell us what the objective of the resolution was, what the objectives were, why they thought it was necessary to strengthen our bargaining position at Punta del Este, and then each one there was called upon by the President to make comment, express his view in regard to what he thought of it at that stage, and it was made perfectly clear we were giving him our offhand opinion.

It is true that the great consensus of opinion was enthusiastic support of the objectives. As far as I could find out that still seems to be the great consensus. That does not mean that anything has been rigged, nor does it mean that there is no need for further discussion, nor does it mean that our final step under advise and consent in formalizing our position must take a particular form.

But the President said to us-he was quite frank about it in the Cabinet room-that there has been a great deal of talk about Members of Congress not being in on the takeoff or only on the crash landings. He made reference to that.

He made clear in the colloquy we had with him that he believed in consultation. I want to say something in the record about consultation.

CONSULTATION ON OAS CHARTER AMENDMENTS

You remember some time ago we were advised by appropriate officers of the State Department of the negotiations that were taking place in regard to amendments to the OAS Charter.

Secretary RUSK. Yes, I do, sir.

Senator MORSE. It was suggested that my subcommittee should hold a hearing with officers of the State Department. I invited all the members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and my Chairman came, as he is so cooperative in doing time and time again and, as a result of that conference the Chairman, Senator Hickenlooper, Senator Aiken, as well as myself, and I think Senator McCarthy, too, as I recall, we raised certain caveats. We expressed our disapproval of certain proposals that they had said they had tentatively committed themselves to. I am not going to quote anybody.

Secretary RUSK. I remember that very well, sir.

Senator MORSE. I am not going to quote anybody but only tell you what the result was. Those State Department officials knew as a result of a very pleasant, friendly, and very respectful conference we had together they were in for trouble if they brought up the amendments that they were tentatively considering, and tentatively seemed to give their approval to.

No one was more helpful than the Chairman. I want to say that Senator Fulbright, I thought, made some of the most helpful suggestions for the modification of those proposals. We all put in our oar, and pulled our strokes, and did the best we could to help the

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State Department change a bit the course of the ship of state in regard to that matter and, as a result, it was changed. The proposals were changed. Was that consultation under the advise and consent clause of the Constitution? Of course it was.

By that advise and consent, through the members of an appropriate committee of the Senate, the President and you, as Secretary of State, got the benefit of our advice. You waited, and apparently you came to the conclusion we made some sense, and the advice was followed.

Now, I could enumerate here more than a half dozen instances under the Johnson administration in which the President has called members of the Foreign Relations Committee, and sometimes members of other committees, into consultation because he wanted our advice. He has wanted to know what our attitude would be if certain courses of action were followed, completed within the historic meaning of the advise and consent clause.

Now, if it had gotten to the point where irreconcilabilities had developed between the individuals participating in those conferences so that we had to go to formal action in the Senate, we would have given him our advice and not our consent in some instances. In some instances we would have given him our advice and also formalized our

consent.

CONSULTATION DOES NOT HAVE TO BE FORMAL

So I want to say I do not accept the notion that consultation has to be formalized in regard to formal action under the Constitution.

On the contrary, throughout our history some of the best application of the advise and consent clause has been the consultation that has taken place without formal action. This is particularly true under President Johnson, although President Kennedy did it on various occasions-how well I know the consultation that took place before President Kennedy announced the Alliance for Progress program from the East Room of the White House.

What I am saying is the President has acted not only within the proprieties of his office but, I think, in keeping with his duties. I think that the Senate and the House have the responsibility of responding to him on this occasion because he is going to the Punta del Este conference.

ORIGINAL PROPOSAL FOR PUNTA DEL ESTE CONFERENCE

So I want to ask this question: Did we ask for this conference? Secretary RUSK. It was determined collectively by all the members of the Hemisphere. The original suggestion came from some of our Latin American colleagues.

Senator MORSE. The original proposal for this conference came from our Latin American allies, did it not?

Secretary RUSK. That is correct, sir.

Senator MORSE. When they made known that they would like to have a meeting of the chiefs of state, and that desire was made known to the President of the United States, do you agree with me that we would put ourselves in a very unfortunate position if we had said, "No, we are not going to meet with you?"

Secretary RUSK. I think if we had been the standout on that it would have created great difficulties. I think the fact that the Pres

ident was willing to consider coming gave the idea great impetus in the hemisphere. But there were a number of presidents who were anxious to see such a meeting take place.

LATIN AMERICANS SHOULD NOT FEEL NEGLECTED BY U.S.

Senator MORSE. Is it not true, Mr. Secretary, that there is some feeling in Latin America-I have always felt that they were too sensitive about it but I know it exists-in connection with its international aid program, the United States has sort of passed Latin America by and has given more attention to aid in other parts of the world?

Secretary RUSK. I think there is some of that feeling. I think also, Senator, that there is a feeling in Latin America that we, as a people, do not give them enough attention as such.

During these past months, for example, most of our headlines were about Vietnam and China and President de Gaulle or something else. This meeting of the presidents will dramatically bring to the attention of the peoples of the Hemisphere, including their own people, that very important things are happening in the Hemisphere; and this is important to our friends in Latin America.

Senator MORSE. Do you agree with me that the very public discussions we have had on this matter already in the Senate, in the House, in the House committee, in this committee, are going to have a salutary effect in Latin America in the preparation for this conference because these very discussions will leave no room for doubt about the reservoir of goodwill that exists in the executive branch of this Government and in the congressional branch of this Government in wanting to cooperate with all the nations of Latin America and their governments and their people, if they are willing to implement what we are all agreed upon at the time of the Act of Bogotá and the first act of Punta del Este? Is not this very advise and consent procedure that we have been following in connection with this resolution going to have a very salutary, affirmative effect in Latin America, leaving no room for doubt

Secretary RUSK. I have no doubt about that.

Senator MORSE (continuing). That we are not passing them by, and have no intention of passing them by, but we want to work put with them in the future programs of mutual help in carrying out the objectives of the resolution?

Secretary RUSK. I think that is a very important part of it, Senator.

MULTILATERAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Senator MORSE. I have only one final comment to make about a matter raised by the Senator from Missouri.

In fact, there was a time when the Chairman and I did not see eye to eye on this matter. He convinced me in the last two years that we ought to do more through these multilateral financial institutions in the administration of our various aid programs.

I also had been a strong supporter of the Inter-American Development Bank. It was one of the things that we unanimously, in my subcommittee, and later in the full committee, overwhelmingly supported. Under this resolution what we are saying to the President,