identified itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system based on that doctrine, and accepts military assistance from extracontinental Communist powers, including even the threat of military intervention in America on the part of the Soviet Union"; and Whereas the international Communist movement has increasingly extended into Cuba its political, economic, and military sphere of influence: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States is determined

(a) to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere;

(b) to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States; and

(c) to work with the Organization of American States and with freedomloving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for selfdetermination.

The CHAIRMAN. Our witness is Mr. Robert A. Hurwitch, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Mr. Hurwitch, you have a prepared statement, I believe?

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT A. HURWITCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY ROBERT L. FUNSETH, COORDINATOR OF CUBAN AFFAIRS

Mr. HURWITCH. Yes, I do. With your permission, if I could have Mr. Funseth along?

The CHAIRMAN. Certainly. Mr. Funseth, we are very pleased to have you.

Mr. HURWITCH. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am very pleased to have this opportunity to testify before the Committee on Foreign Relations, on Senate Joint Resolution 146, a joint resolution to repeal Public Law 87-733; and upon Senate Resolution 160, expressing the sense of the U.S. Senate with respect to U.S. policy toward Cuba.

1962 CUBAN RESOLUTION STILL REFLECTS U.S. POLICY

With regard to Senate Joint Resolution 146, as the Department has stated before, in letters of March 12 and June 3, 1970, it neither advocates nor opposes repeal of Public Law 87-733, since the executive branch does not depend on it as legal or constitutional authority for our policy toward Cuba. However, the Department would not wish this position to be misinterpreted.

The joint resolution was expressive of a common understanding of the legislative and executive branches at that time of the threat to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere nations posed by the Cuban Government's policy of interference in the internal affairs of these nations through support of subversive activities and by its military ties with the Soviet Union. The history of the actions undertaken by the Organization of American States (OAS) in response to this threat is well known to the committee.

In the Department's view, there has been no significant change in the basic conditions upon which U.S.-Cuban policy has been based in the years since 1962 that would warrant a change in U.S. policy.

Therefore, the Cuban resolution of 1962 still reflects U.S. policy toward Cuba.

ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

The essential elements of our policy toward Cuba were described as follows by President Nixon in his report to the Congress of February 25, 1971. At the time he said:

Cuba continues to exclude itself from the inter-American system by its encouragement and support of revolution and its military ties to the Soviet Union. The latter meanwhile attempted to expand its influence and its military presence.

We do not seek confrontations with any government. But those which display unremitting hostility cannot expect our assistance. And those which violate the principles of the inter-American system, by intervening in the affairs of their neighbors or by facilitating the intervention of nonhemispheric powers, cannot expect to share the benefits of inter-American cooperation.

We will work constructively to reduce the disruptive effect of such action. U.S. policy, therefore, derives from these principal considerations: Our national interest, our obligations as a member of the Organization of American States, our concern over Cuba's export of its revolution, and Cuba's military ties to the Soviet Union.

MILITARY TIES WITH SOVIET UNION AND ATTEMPTED SUBVERSION

With regard to the last, the crisis of October 1962, as well as the more recent developments last year at Cienfuegos, are illustrative of our concern about Cuba's present military ties with the Soviet Union.

You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that at Cienfuegos, Cuba permitted the Soviet Union to take new steps which could have afforded the Soviets the ability to again operate offensive weapons systems from this hemisphere. President Nixon stated on February 25, 1971, that this would have been contrary to the earlier undertaking between the Soviet Union and the United States following the missile crisis. Only after a period of discussion with the Soviet Union did we reaffirm our understanding and amplify it to make clear that the agreement included activities related to sea-based systems.

Cuba's open pursuit of a policy of attempting to subvert existing governments in the hemisphere, as well as its cooperation with Soviet military purposes, continue to constitute, in our view, a threat to the peace and security of this hemisphere. I wish to invite the committee's attention to the fact that, consistent with the above-described policy statement by the President, our concern is based upon external, not internal, policies and activities of the Cuban Government.

RESULTS OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

By refraining from steps that might assist Cuba and by strongly supporting the measures adopted by the OAS, the United States has not sought the overthrow of the present Cuban regime but rather sought the reduction of Cuba's capacity to export armed revolution and the discouragement of Soviet adventures in this hemisphere. As a result, Cuba has been deprived of substantial sums of hard currency which would otherwise be available to promote Cuban goals in Latin America, and some of the energy, money, and manpower now required

o keep the Cuban economy functioning would otherwise be available for support of subversive activities. Cuba today, due also in part to Prime Minister Castro's mismanagement, is not an attractive model ikely to stimulate emulation elsewhere in the hemisphere. Moreover, Cuba is a financial burden for the Soviet Union, costing the U.S.S.R. more than $1 million per day.

U.S. POLICY UNDER CONSTANT REVIEW

The Department wishes to assure the committee, however, that the above-described U.S. policy toward Cuba is under constant review to determine whether such policy toward Cuba continues to serve the complex of U.S. national interests involved, or whether some other policies might not serve better. Any such review would, of course, take into account our commitments in the OAS.

UNITED STATES AND CUBAN POLICIES CONCERNING CHANGE

We recognize, Mr. Chairman, that there is great ferment in Latin America. We know that modernization brings extensive and frequently unsettling change. We are not opposed to change.

I would recall that President Nixon, in his toast at a dinner honoring President Caldera of Venezuela on June 2, 1970, said:

*** all of us come from and were born to this world, our nations, through violent revolution. Now our charge and our task is to provide the means and the method through which those great changes that need to be made in the world, in our own countries and in the world can be made through peaceful change. Nor are we bent upon a policy that insists that others forgo their histories and traditions and arrange their societies to conform to ours. We firmly believe that our Nation which values a pluralistic society at home should in equal measure respect diversity abroad.

In this connection, I would also recall that President Nixon has stated that while we hope that governments will evolve toward constitutional procedures, we deal with governments as they are. Our relations depend not on their internal structures or social systems, but on actions which affect us and the inter-American system.

The Government of Cuba advocates change, however, through violent means. Cuba's policies encourage polarization within the many fragile societies of Latin America, and tend to lead to repressive regimes of the right or dictatorships of the left, when successful. Cuba's policies have also forced other nations of the hemisphere to divert a portion of the scarce resources they have available for development, to improve their internal security capability, including the purchase of arms, in order to counter Cuban influence. Illustratively, the then President of Colombia, Dr. Carlos Lleras Restrepo, a well-known liberal statesman, replied to a reporter's question in February 1970, as to whether he thought his country should follow Chile's example in seeking a normalization of relations with Cuba. At that time, and I quote, he said:

Chile is in the south and we are in the Caribbean. Colombia and Venezuela are countries which have been lashed by guerrilla movements, by urban interventions in our domestic matters. That is the source of Cuba's sanction. I do not believe Chile's position is the position of the continent and I consider it is Cuba that must change toward us and not the reverse. We have had to invest major sums to maintain public order because of the Cubans.

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Mr. Chairman, our consultations with our Latin American neighbors in the hemisphere suggest that the view of former President Lleras reflects prevailing sentiment.

EVIDENCE CONFIRMING VALIDITY OF U.S. POLICY

In its continuing review of policy toward Cuba, the Department sees no evidence of any developments that materially affect the twin foundations of U.S. policy. On the contrary, the most recent evidence confirms the validity of continuing this policy. Cuba continues to interfere in the internal affairs of other hemispheric nations by providing training in Cuba for urban and rural terrorists, by providing monetary and other material support to subversive groups and occasional direct participation by Cubans in insurgencies. On July 26 Prime Minister Castro openly took sides in the pending Uruguayan elections and drew a stiff rejoinder from the Uruguayan Government. His publicly expressed disappointment over the turn of events in Bolivia drew the reminder from the Bolivian Government that Cubans in 1967 and again in 1970 had blatantly interfered in the internal affairs of Bolivia, a nation that had experienced one of the most fundamental socioeconomic revolutions in the hemisphere in 1952, 7 years before Prime Minister Castro came to power. Last month, on August 27, Prime Minister Castro vigorously reaffirmed that he would not abandon his support for violent change in other nations of the hemisphere, and spoke of Cuba's intention to give material support to Bolivian guerrillas.

REDUCTION IN CUBAN SUPPORT FOR SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENTS

Despite Prime Minister Castro's renewed effort to project himself as a Latin American revolutionary leader, it is fair to say that in the period 1968-71 there seems to have been some falling off in the material support which Cuba provided to subversive movements in other countries. As has been previously testified before this committee, Cuban support has become more selective and there has been a shift from rural guerrilla warfare to urban terrorism. Cuban adoption of new tactics on subversion, however, does not mean that it has renounced support of violent revolution; neither does it represent an abandonment of other forms of subversion which we believe Cuba continues to regard as useful political tools.

An important factor accounting for some reduction in Cuban support is the fact that the measures adopted by the OAS to counter Cuban interference in the internal affairs of other countries have succeeded in weakening Cuba's capability to commit such interference. Cuba's long series of disastrous foreign adventures, culminating in the Che Guevara 1967 fiasco in Bolivia, had its effect as well. Finally, economic mismanagement at home matched the failure abroad. Prime Minister Castro said in August 1970, that if Cuba had not given full support to revolutionary movements in Latin America, it was in part because "we have not been able to." To abandon now these policies which hinder the Cuban Government's capability to achieve its objectives would therefore be neither prudent nor justified.

With regard to Senate Resolution 160, the Department of State notes that the proposed resolution is in two sections. I shall address comments to each.

FIRST SECTION OF SENATE RESOLUTION 160

The first section proposes that it be the sense of the Senate that the President take steps to review U.S. policy toward Cuba with the objective of beginning a process which would lead to the reestablishment of normal relations between the United States and Cuba. It appears to assume that a process leading to the reestablishment of normal relations between the United States and Cuba would serve U.S. interests and that such a process would meet with Cuban agreement. We do not believe this to be true. We believe that the resolution might be misinterpreted to imply that we are no longer concerned over Prime Minister Castro's policies of demonstrating hostility toward the United States, of exporting his revolution and of seeking ever closer military ties with the U.S.S.R. It could well enhance his prestige and lend him the stature on the international scene he seeks but does not enjoy. I believe it would also give an aura of legitimacy to the extremist movements supported by Cuba that seek violent overthrow of governments in Latin America. These are some of the pertinent political considerations.

From the economic standpoint, the United States has little, if anything, to gain. Arrangements have been made with a number of friendly nations to assure a reliable supply of sugar for the U.S. domestic market; therefore Cuban sugar is not essential as long as the present government remains in power. The absence of Cuban tobacco or the few other Cuban export products has also not had significant effect upon our economy.

Thus, from the standpoint of U.S. interests, unless the Cuban Government were to abandon its policies and actions which constitute a threat to the peace and security of the hemisphere, the benefits to be derived from normalization of relations with Cuba are not readily apparent, whereas the costs are clear.

U.S. policy toward Cuba is not, as I have stated at the outset, inflexible. Should the Government of Cuba abandon the policies by which it excluded itself from the family of American nations, the United States would, in consultation with the other members, review existing policies in the light of such new circumstances. The President said as much publicly on April 16 of this year. On April 19, Fidel Castro, in direct reply to the President's statement, declared that he scorned normalized relations with the United States. Several days later, on April 21, the New York Times editorialized:

His (Castro's) stance implies that continued hostility is in the interests of the Cuban people.

Castro's verbal supermilitancy can only be interpreted as a public attack upon and repudiation of the more conciliatory lines now being followed in Moscow and Peking. His words guarantee, unfortunately, that Cuban-American antagonism will continue. But he himself must now bear the responsibility.

We know of no basis for believing that Cuba, which forced the break in relations with the United States, would now welcome their reestablishment.

SECOND SECTION OF SENATE RESOLUTION 160

With regard to the second section of the proposed resolution, hemispheric policy toward Cuba, including that of the United States,