Dr. YORK. Well, I think I can get the dates fairly close and that is that it was late, it was in October of 1958 that each of them said that they would stop by the end of October and would not start unless the other one did but that the moratorium was to be for 1 year. That is beginning on November 1, 1958. I think I have the date correct. It started off inauspiciously because the Russians did test on the 1st of November and again on the 3d of November. Perhaps they had some kind of technological difficulties and their test series spilled over into this period, but then they stopped. There followed attempts to convert the moratorium into a treaty, but they did not succeed; they were hung up over technical side issues, the very same questions we are talking about today, a big hole to hide things in, hiding in earthquakes. None of those ideas are new. They came out of the fertile minds of those who opposed a test ban treaty, and then it was the very end of December 1959, after the treaty had been in effect for almost 14 months

Mr. CHAYES. Not the treaty, the moratorium.

Dr. YORK. The moratorium had been in effect for 14 months which was, 2 months longer than the year we had agreed on in the first place. Then one day, I think it was the 29th of December, if one wants to check it out, that President Eisenhower said the United States is no longer bound. I think the very next day Khrushchev in some kind of a news conference said the Soviet Union is no longer bound. They each put it in slightly different terms. If I am not mistaken Eisenhower said we will not begin testing without prior notice. He did not even put it on the question of whether they tested or not but said they would not test without prior notice. The Soviets said they would not begin testing unless the West began testing first and that is why the French question is so important. It may only have been an alibi. I am not saying that is the real reason the Russians went into a test program, but they said we will not test unless the West tests first and the French did; so you could say the French broke the moratorium even though they were not formally a party to it. But by that time no one was formally a party to a moratorium of any kind.

RESUMPTION OF SOVIET TESTING

Senator COOPER. When did the Soviet Union resume its tests? Dr. YORK. I am sorry?

Senator CooPER. You said

Dr. YORK. The moratorium continued for almost 3 years. Senator CooPER. But then there were a series of tests afterwards. Dr. YORK. Then they began testing in September 1961. They tested again in 1962, and I am not sure when they stopped, but it was several months before the treaty was signed in 1963. There had been no tests several months before the treaty was signed. So there are roughly 2 years in between during which they and we conducted a number of tests, underground, atmospheric and so on.

JAPANESE AND CANADIAN PROPOSALS AT GENEVA

Senator COOPER. Mr. Farley said that Japan and Canada had made some proposals at Geneva or at Vienna?

Mr. FISHER. Geneva.

Senator COOPER. They were resisting it, the Soviets. Do you know what the nature of those proposals was?

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Mr. FISHER. I think it would be better to have that supplied by Phil Farley. My own understanding, however, is that it may be something in the nature of a threshold, ban big underground tests. That has been kicked around from time to time in the administration and in private. At one stage of my life I supported it myself. I think we have long since passed that point now and they always tend to couple with threshold treaty, what is your threshold 4.0, with some sort of moratorium, contrary moratorium, beneath it and that gets a little fuzzy. That is the area, I think, they were exploring, whether that might have been worthwhile in 1967, it might have been reasonable difference on it. I think it would be a diversion now. I think it would be a diversion from the main track.

Senator MUSKIE. I intended to ask Mr. Farley about that and I neglected.

Senator COOPER. I did, too.

Senator MUSKIE. Thank you very much, gentlemen, for very helpful testimony.

Our final witness for the morning is Mrs. Jo Pomerance of Connecticut.

STATEMENT OF MRS. JO POMERANCE, COCHAIRMAN, TASK FORCE FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN

Mrs. POMERANCE. I am grateful for this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to submit for the record more than 2 dozen statements and resolutions of nongovernmental organizations or their officers in support of a comprehensive test ban. This impressive compilation of public opinion has been gathered by the task force for a nuclear test ban of which I am cochairman. The task includes many leading scientists, arms control experts, and representatives of citizens' groups. (The information referred to is in the committee files.)

Among those submitting statements are such prominent organizations as the League of Women Voters, the United Nations Association-U.S.A. (New York chapter), the National Council of Churches, the Federation of American Scientists, the National Student Lobby, Another Mother for Peace, and the United Automobile Workers. The task force for a nuclear test ban was formed with the single purpose of helping keep the appropriate members of government and the public informed of the facts about nuclear weapons testing and the need for a test ban. We are encouraged by the extensive support for the test ban of which the attached statements are evidence.

DANGER OF NUCLEAR TESTING TO CHILDREN

Because of the shortage of time, there is only one other matter which I will mention. I want to submit for the record a statement from Dr. David Inglis, professor of physics at the University of Massachusetts and a physicist with the Argonne National Laboratories. Dr. Inglis says:

The effects of low levels of radiation on large populations are difficult to establish with confidence, but the cumulative impression of several investigations, some of them individually controversial, adds up to the indication that the low levels of radiation caused by venting from underground tests over the areas of a few nearby States cause some infant mortality and malformation, the amount of which is uncertain.

Mr. Chairman, the danger of nuclear testing to children and to the unborn is only one of several compelling reasons for a ban on underground tests. It is important to note, however, the new evidence now available to show that infants, particularly in the prenatal state, are more sensitive to the effects of radiation than had previously been thought. The comment on this question by Dr. Inglis, cited above, is of particular interest, since Dr. Inglis is a prominent scientist of established reputation who has studied nuclear weapons' tests for many years. In addition, several recent studies by leading nuclear physicists and medical authorities support the conclusion that underground tests that vent radioactivity--it is estimated one out of four vent can cause cancer, especially in children and malformation in the prenatal stage.

STUDY ON EFFECTS OF RADIOACTIVE VENTING ON POPULATION OVERDUE

The Atomic Energy Commission has not conducted a full-scale study to measure the extent of injury caused by the possible 68 U.S. underground tests that vented since 1963 despite the urging of many scientists that they do so and release their findings. After nearly 10 years of underground testing, we believe the time is long overdue for an objective study on past and future effects of radioactive venting on our population, particularly on infants and embryos. Included in this study should be an evaluation of the consequences to health of further leakage of the 90 billion gallons of radioactive waste from weapons' fabrication plants stored in tanks throughout the country. A National Academy of Sciences report, long suppressed by the AEC, states that none of the agency's waste disposal practices meet Academy safety standards. Unless we limit arms production and conclude a test ban, the accumulation of this lethal waste under dangerous conditions will continue.

We believe the President should appoint an impartial scientific panel to immediately organize a comprehensive medical investigation.

Among the experts who have recently completed studies on this question which would be evaluated by such a panel are Drs. Harold Rosenthal and Barry Commoner, of St. Louis, Morris DeGroot of Berkeley, Samuel Leinhardt and Ernest Sternglass of Carnegie-Mellon University.

While this study should not delay the early negotiation of a test ban treaty, the result may present evidence that a test ban is essential to health as well as to world peace and our national security.

Thank you very much.

(Mrs. Pomerance's prepared statement follows:)

MAY 15, 1972.

STATEMENT BY MRS. JO POMERANCE, CO-CHAIRMAN, TASK FORCE FOR A NUCLEAR TEST BAN

Mr. CHAIRMAN: I am grateful for this opportunity to submit for the Record the more than two dozen statements and resolutions of non-governmental organizations or their officers in support of a comprehensive test ban. This impressive compilation of public opinion has been gathered by the Task Force for a Nuclear Test Ban of which I am Co-Chairman. The Task Force includes many leading scientists, arms control experts and representatives of citizens' groups.

Among those submitting statements are such prominent organizations as the League of Women Voters, the United Nations Association-USA (New York Chapter), the National Council of Churches, the Federation of American Scien

APPENDIX

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN RESOLUTIONS-STATEMENT OF SENATOR HUBERT H. HUMPHREY FOR THE HEARING OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ARMS CONTROL, U.S. SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MAY 15,

1972

Mr. Chairman: As a cosponsor of both of the pending resolutions (S. Res. 273 and S. Res. 230) supporting the comprehensive termination of all nuclear weapons testing, I urge the Committee's prompt and favorable action on them.

It is particularly fitting that the Committee hold hearings on these resolutions today, just before the President's scheduled trip to Moscow. We have reason to believe that the President intends to sign an agreement which is the product of long and extensive negotiations at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. While this agreement should represent valuable advances in arms control, it will by no means represent all we should accomplish. It is appropriate, therefore, that the President pursue further the issue of CTB during his Moscow discussions.

A comprehensive test ban is the next step in the limitation of armaments development. A decade after the Limited Test Ban Treaty banning above-ground testing, in the development of which I was privileged to participate, we now have the seismology to monitor beyond natural borders a comprehensive treaty banning underground tests as well.

Senate approval of the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) resolutions now before it can help to mobilize support for new and promising initiatives and improve the chances for an agreement at the Geneva Disarmament Conference.

The Committee will recall that in 1963 there was widespread support in the United States and internationally for an end to all nuclear testing, both to protect the environment and to slow down the arms race. The failure to reach a comprehensive test ban was in large part a result of the importance attributed to on-site inspection to enforce any agreement. The United States and the Soviet Union could not agree on inspections and finally compromised in a Limited Test Ban. President Kennedy wisely decided to agree to a limited treaty banning atmospheric and other testing but not underground tests, and I championed that proposal in the Congress. The Treaty included a pledge, however, that the signatories would continue to work towards ending all nuclear weapons tests.

That pledge was repeated in the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, and indeed was a point insisted upon by the non-nuclear nations as a condition for their agreement to renounce the nuclear path.

Since the time that the first pledge was made, there have been major advances in seismic technology which would appear to answer the earlier objections that a comprehensive test ban would require no-site inspections. I discussed the significance of these scientific developments, reported in the Woods Hole Report of July, 1970, during Senate debate early last year on the Amchitka Island nuclear explosion test. The papers presented in that report, sponsored by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, all referred to technological progress made in our detection equipment. Indeed, according to Mr. Evernden who made the opening presentation, we can now distinguish accurately between earthquakes and explosions down to levels as low as 4.0 on the Richter scale, and with some reliability even at lower levels. The significance this was on the control of weapons development is extremely important. Very few tests can now go undetected and such undetectable tests probably would not aid significantly in the development of new nuclear weapons. An agreement to ban all underground testing is, therefore, both feasible and practical at this time.

The Administration, however, continues to insist that on-site inspection is a necessary element of any CTB. I believe that the reluctance on the part of our government to take the initiative in promoting a CTB is most unfortunate, especially considering the fact that major government agencies have reported privately to the White House that the new seismological capacity we now have no longer makes our on-site inspection demands necessary or meaningful. I would

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