STATEMENT OF DAVID D. NEWSOM, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS; ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN A. ARMITAGE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF UNITED NATIONS POLITICAL AFFAIRS; AND ROBERT FARRAND, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. NEWSOM. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like to ask the permission of the subcommittee to have two colleagues join me here with the possibility of their contributing to questioning later. Mr. Robert Farrand of our Bureau of Economic Affairs which deals with metals matters, and Mr. John Armitage of our Bureau of International Organization Affairs dealing with United Nations matters in the Department.

Senator MCGEE. Very fine.

Mr. NEWSOM. Mr. Chairman, Senator Pearson, it is a privilege for me to meet with you here today, and to have the opportunity to follow the distinguished Senator from Virginia, to share with you and members of your subcommittee some thoughts on this difficult question of Rhodesia. Because this is my first appearance before your committee, Mr. Chairman, I should like to take a few moments to sketch in the broad outlines of our policy.

INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM INVOLVING RACE AND COLONIALISM

I welcome particularly this opportunity to present our views to you on the Southern Rhodesian situation. As in all international problems in which men differ, there is justifiable concern on both sides. There is occasionally, emotion on both sides. The Southern Rhodesian regime in this country as elsewhere, seeks to advance its

cause.

I should like, therefore, first to put the problem in perspective. What we are dealing with here is essentially an international problem, one involving the highly charged issues of race and colonialism. It is a problem without analogies, either to our history or to other world situations. It is one which must be approached on its merits, with our own national interests in mind, but with the objective of preventing a continuing unresolved and provocative situation in the heart of Africa. Such a situation would not be helpful to us or to our friends.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

To illustrate what the problem is, let me first touch on the history. Just as Rhodesia today occupies a pivotal position in south central Africa, so it earlier occupied the key role in the former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The Federation, organized in 1953, represented an effort by the British and the settlers and Africans in the area to link the three territories economically on a multiracial basis. But, despite the 1961 Federation constitution, which provided for procedures which would eventually lead to African majority rule, concern grew on the part of the Africans at the dominant role played in Federation politics by the white Southern Rhodesians. The Federation finally broke up in 1963 at the insistence of the two northern territories and with the reluctant acquiescence of the British, who granted independence to Zambia and Malawi the following year.

The British, while they also contemplated independence for Southern Rhodesia, continued to insist that it could only be granted after establishment of a legitimately multiracial system within which the African population could aspire to eventual majority rule. Negotiations between the British and the Rhodesians on this crucial point continued intermittently for almost 2 years, but the white minority, determined to maintain its economic and political dominance, refused to concede it. Finally, on November 11, 1965, Ian Smith announced Rhodesia's unilateral declaration of independence from the United Kingdom.

In the face of this act of defiance, and given the sense of outrage and betrayal expressed by Rhodesian nationalist leaders and independent African nations, there were strong demands for the use of force. The British Government, then and now the legal sovereign authority over Rhodesia, sought U.N. assistance in bringing the rebellion to an end. The British Government decided against the use of military force-a decision which we supported, but sought in sanctions an effective alternative.

Our policy since then, jointly with the British and other United Nations member states, has been to support measures other than the use of force designed to hasten an acceptable solution to this problem. We have actively supported the various U.N. measures to that end. We supported the Security Council resolution of November 12, 1965, condemning the Smith regime. We supported the December, 1966 Security Council resolution imposing selective mandatory sanctions, and equally strongly supported the resolution of 1968 making the sanctions comprehensive.

The sanctions, in our view, do not have a punitive intent. They are intended, not to cause hardship for actions already taken, but, in the hope that the sanctions, combined with other efforts, will influence the regime to change its policies and adopt as a basis for international acceptance the fundamental principle of eventual majority rule for the over 95 percent of the population which is black African.

Under the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 which provides authority for domestic enforcement of U.N. sanctions, President Johnson gave effect to these measures with Executive orders in 1967 and 1968. Barring a significant change in the Rhodesian situation, it remains our policy to endorse and support the economic sanctions now in force. The President and the Secretary of State reaffirmed this policy earlier this year.

While we have supported sanctions, enforced them vigorously ourselves, and worked to insure compliance by other nations, we have from the beginning opposed the use of force, either as a solution to the Rhodesian problem or the broader problems which effect southern Africa of which the Rhodesian problem is an integral part. On March 17 of last year, the same day we closed our consultate general in Salisbury, we vetoed a security council resolution which advocated the total isolation of Rhodesia and implied advocacy of the use of force.

OBJECTIVE OF SANCTIONS

Senator PEARSON. I don't understand that, Mr. Secretary. You say the sanctions do not have a punitive intent.

They just seek to influence the policies of the government. Do you mean that?

Mr. NEWSOM. Senator, I think the objective of the sanctions is a very important part of this whole picture, and the objective of the sanctions both in our view and in the British view is to provide a form of international pressure which seeks to resolve and, in a sense, to prevent a containing unresolved and provocative situation in the heart of south central Africa. We are not

Senator PEARSON. I don't quarrel with sanctions being punitive if sanctions are justifiable. But to say they have no punitive intent is to raise you go ahead. This is a matter of semantics, I suspect.

Mr. NEWSOM. Thank you, Mr. Senator.

Senator PEARSON. Continue, please.

Senator MCGEE. Let me see if I understand it because it does raise an important point if it is misinterpreted, that is, in the history of this question as it emerged. If I understand your remarks properly, the issue was joined between the British Government and the Rhodesians which left the British clearly the alternative of resorting to force. In the interests of avoiding the use of force and all of the bloodshed that that might entail in having other than a preagreed upon procedure toward independence, the British receded to a compromise, in which we cooperated; namely, to try to use sanctions to achieve the same goal. The goal is orderly procedure to independence. It is in that context that sanctions do not become punitive in the literal sense of sanctions normally applied, but are a substitute for the direct and outright use of force, which would include, I assume, the consequent bloodshed, if the procedure of change into independence that had been meticulously apparently worked out before hand was insisted upon. Is that the setting for which you use the phrase "not punitive"? Mr. NEWSOM. You have stated it very well, Mr. Chairman.

SITUATION AT TIME UNITED STATES SUPPORTED SANCTIONS

I am seeking to emphasize here, I think, two points which, I think, are very important to an understanding of the question. The first is to understand the situation which obtained at the time that we supported sanctions against Rhodesia. This was a time in which African opinion, and other international opinion, was very much concerned at the implications of the unilateral declaration of independence, concerned because, in the march toward a recognition of the right of African majorities to determine their own affairs in Africa, there has suddenly been a reversal as represented by UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence), and there were very strong demands which still reappear from time to time in the African nations for the use of force by the British against the Smith regime, an alternative which, as you have correctly stated, could have led to very serious tragedies in that part of the world.

Sanctions, therefore, were chosen consciously, and supported by us as another means to bring the pressure of the international community to bear in an effort to resolve this problem.

Shall I continue with my statement, Mr. Chairman?

Senator MCGEE. Yes.

Mr. NEWSOM. Measures of this kind which would go further than sanctions, in our judgment, would only exacerbate the problems already existing in that part of the world and would contribute nothing

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toward their solution. Despite pressures from some quarters, we will continue to oppose such measures.

SANCTIONS LESS THAN FULLY EFFECTIVE, BUT IMPOSE SERIOUS

CONSTRAINTS

It is a fact that sanctions have been less than fully effective. And they have thus far not brought about their principal objective: a change in policy by the Smith regime and a willingness on the part of that regime to reach a satisfactory negotiated settlement with Great Britain. A major cause has been the outright refusal of Portugal and South Africa to adhere to sanctions. A secondary cause has been the apparent inability of some other governments to enforce sanctions where their own nationals are concerned. We continue to cooperate with the U.N. Sanctions Committee in its efforts to bring about more uniform compliance with sanctions and are currently looking at possible ways of helping the committee perform its difficult job more effectively. For your information, there are now 110 cases of reported sanctions violations now before the Sanctions Committee, including 32 which deal with chrome ore.

Having noted some of the shortcomings of the sanctions program, and the fact that it has not yet achieved its goal, it must be quickly added that sanctions continue to impose very serious constraints upon the Salisbury regime, limit its options, and cause it continuing economic difficulties, despite obvious and understandable efforts on the part of the Rhodesians to portray it otherwise. Imports and exports are well below presanctions levels. Foreign exchange is extremely limited and the authorities announced last September that foreign exchange allocation controls, already tight, would be tightened still further. Deprived of many necessary imports, Rhodesia has had to improvise by setting up costly substitution industries constituting a major drain on foreign exchange. Lack of foreign exchange has also made it extremely difficult for the Rhodesian regime to obtain spare parts and necessary equipment replacements to support industry, agriculture, and transportation facilities, and this is, of course, one aspect of sanctions which has a cumulative effect over time. As a result, the railways and airlines are suffering. Agriculture has also been hurt. by sanctions. Overall agricultural production has declined since 1965. Deprived of the traditional British market for tobacco, now largely preempted by American competition, Rhodesia has been forced to subsidize the tobacco industry, to diversify its agricultural sector, and to seek new markets for new crops in violation of sanctions. It has been a costly process.

Rhodesia has had relatively greater success in the mining and minerals sector of the economy, but, in assessing the overall impact of sanctions, it is well to remember that exports from this sector accounted in 1965-the last year before sanctions-for only one-fifth of the total value of Rhodesia's exports.

S. 1404 INVALIDATES EXISTING EMBARGO ON CHROME ORE IMPORTS

Mr. Chairman, having reviewed the background to our Rhodesian policy, I would like to turn to the bill now under consideration. This proposed amendment to the United Nations Participation Act, what

ever its intent, would have the effect of invalidating the existing embargo on chrome ore imports from Southern Rhodesia so long as such imports are not prohibited from the Soviet Union or other Communist countries. Other than chrome ore, or chromite, to use the technical term, there is no other product or commodity, traditionally supplied us from Rhodesia, which would be affected by the proposed amendment.

U.S. WILL TO FULFILL INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS QUESTIONED

This proposal is contrary to U.S. policy interests. It would while providing relief with regard to one commodity-a commodity for which, I might add, relief can be justified not on the basis of national security interests but on the basis of relative price considerations-call into serious question our will to fulfill our international obligations.

We are not unmindful of the national interest which concerns those who oppose this legislation. Were the chrome situation indeed critical, we, too, would seek measures of relief. We do not now, however, consider it such; for us the overriding considerations are our internanational obligations and our desire to do nothing which would undermine movement toward an acceptable solution to the Rhodesian problem.

CHROME ORE SUPPLY REVIEWED BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH

The matter of chrome ore supply is kept under constant review within the executive branch. Our studies indicate that adequate supplies of chrome are available to American industry at the present time. Inventories of American industry increased last year, and imports and domestic consumption were virtually in balance.

Some months prior to the adoption of Rhodesian sanctions, the U.S. Government commenced the disposal of chrome ore and its equivalents from the stockpiles which had been found in excess of U.S. needs. Disposals of 885,000 short dry tons were authorized by the Congress in Public Law 89-415 of May 11, 1966, and are continuing. The Congress is now considering a bill, S. 773, which would authorize the release of an additional 1.3 million tons of chrome ore over the next 3 years. The administration, including the Office of Emergency Preparedness which is responsible for maintaining and reviewing stockpile requirements, supports this bill on the grounds that our current stockpiles of chrome ore do in fact exceed our national security requirements.

I would like to point out here, Mr. Chairman, that the intent, that the reason, for this bill has no relationship to the Rhodesian situation but it is, as my statement points out, with reference to the fact that we have determined quite independently of the Rhodesian problem that our stockpiles of chrome ore do in fact exceed our national security requirements.

With respect to U.S. imports of Soviet chrome ore

SUPPLY OF CHROME ORE REMAINING AFTER STOCKPILE REDUCTION

Senator MCGEE. May I just inject there again the statement that the Senator from Virginia made in his opening remarks; namely, that with