Public Administration & Public Management: The Principal-Agent PerspectiveRoutledge, 21/08/2006 - 304 من الصفحات A perspective on the public sector that presents a concise and comprehensive analysis of exactly what it is and how it operates. Governments in any society deliver a large number of services and goods to their populations. To get the job done, they need public management in order to steer resources – employees, money and laws – into policy outputs and outcomes. In well-ordered societies the teams who work for the state work under a rule-of-law framework, known as public administration. This book covers the key issues of:
Public Administration & Public Management is essential reading for those with professional and research interests in public administration and public management. |
المحتوى
1 | |
1 The principalagent framework and the public sector | 29 |
2 Public principals and their agents | 48 |
3 The economic reasons for government | 77 |
4 Public organisation incentives and rationality in government | 100 |
Legality and rule of law | 125 |
The cambridge and chicago positions | 148 |
7 Public teams are different from private teams | 171 |
8 Public firms | 190 |
9 Public insurance | 212 |
10 What is public management policy | 228 |
Contracting in the public sector | 250 |
Bibliography | 263 |
Index | 281 |
طبعات أخرى - عرض جميع المقتطفات
عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
accountability adverse selection agency agent allocation analysed assets asymmetric information basic behaviour budgetary budgeting bureau bureaucracy Chicago School Chicago School economics chicken game citizens competition concept constitutional contract countries decentralisation decision-making democracy deregulation economic efficiency effort employed employees enforcement ex post federal game theory Hayek he/she his/her implementation incentives income institutions involved joint-stock companies legal–rational authority macro rationality market failure maximise meaning mechanism ment micro monitoring moral hazard OECD Osborne outsourcing pension system perspective players policy-making political politicians principal–agent framework principal–agent interaction private organisation private sector privatisation problem programmes public administration public enterprises public firms public management policy public organisation public policy public principal public sector reform public services public teams question regime regulation relevance risk rule of law social policies social security spontaneous order strategy tion traditional public transaction costs underlines Weber well-ordered society workfare