rages are committed even among the most civilized, simply, in the words of Mr. Spencer, because man 'partially retains the characteristics that adapted him for an antecedent state. The respects in which he is not fitted to society are the respects in which he is fitted for his original predatory life. His primitive circumstances required that he should sacrifice the welfare of other beings to his own; his present circumstances require that he should not do so; and in as far as his old attribute still clings to him, in so far he is unfit for the social state. All sins of men against each other, from the cannibalism of the Carib to the crimes and venalities we see around us, have their causes comprehended under this generalization.' "

Now, if all this be so, we cannot see why murder, or robbery, or any other crime, is not perfectly legitimate. If to the exercise of his "old attributes" in the struggle for exist ence " man owes his "survival" and his place among the fittest, in any degree, however small; and if there be nothing in man not produced by natural selection, we cannot see why he should not even now continue the exercise of these "attributes"; in other words, we do not see why any propensity, passion, or inclination originated by the agency of "natural selection," to the exclusion of all other agencies, cannot legitimately be exercised to the full extent to which "natural selection" has developed it. If man exercises these "attributes" simply in obedience to a law of nature, we should not if we could, nor could we if we would, resist them. If, indeed, these views of morality be correct, then might is right, the Decalogue a code against nature, civilization an abnormal condition for man, and barbarism his only true state.

So much for the atheism, material

of

ism, and fatalism, we do not say of Darwin-for we have reason to believe that that gentleman himself is none of these-but of Mr. Chapman's version of evolution. There is one very important point, however, on which Mr. Darwin, the man of science, and the compiler, Mr. Chapman, are at one-a point of very great consideration because of its bearings on revelation-the doctrine that the difference between man and the lower animals is not one "kind," but of "degree." We do not wish to argue this point here in full. What we wish to say is that men of the school of Darwin, etc., should be the very last persons in the world to make an assertion of this character, for the reason that they confine our knowledge to appearances, to phenomena. The question, however, whether man and the lower animals differ in "kind" or only in "degree" is not a question of phenomena or appearances: it is a question of noumena, of essence, of reality. We do not grant that even appearances warrant the assertion that man differs from the lower animals in nothing essential. There are appearances which forbid any such conclusion. But we maintain that, whether they so differ or not, Darwin and his school are, by the principles of their philosophy, estopped from asserting that they do or do not. They cannot say that the same phenomena imply the same noumena, the same accidents, the same essence, the same appearances, the reality, because, to assert the identity of nature of two things, both must be known in what constitutes their es. sence, whereas these men expressly say that of noumena, reality, or essence nothing can be known.

same

Mr. Chapman is more a disciple of Haeckel than of Darwin, and follows that gentleman in all his vaga

ries-a course well calculated to increase rather than decrease the amount of prejudice against what there may be of truth in Darwinism. Among the advocates of this, as of almost all theories, there are extremists. Our author seems to have gone to school to all of them, and swallowed all they told him, no matter how paradoxical, no matter how little proof to substantiate it. On the other hand, of all that has been said against pure Darwinism, not a word has been recorded by Mr. Chapman; and of those who, like Prof. Agassiz, do not agree with Mr. Darwin, or who, like St. George Mivart, have, as we think, dealt his theory blows from which it will not recover, he does not make the smallest mention. Yet it cannot be that Agassiz and Mivart are too small to be noticed by Mr. Chapman. Agassiz is too venerable a name in science to need any demonstration that his opinion on scientific matters is entitled to consideration. Mivart is, we take it, a younger man; yet, if he has not made himself an abiding reputation by what he has the modesty to call his "little book," the Genesis of Species, he has made a name which must live, if Darwin's, and Lyell's, and Huxley's do; since all these men have found in him a foe worthy of their steel-and the latter of the vials of his wrath.

We would not consider this article complete without a condensed his tory of the controversy between Mr. Huxley and Mr. Mivart, occasioned by the publication by the latter of his admirable work, the Genesis of Species. We give it here for this, as well as for the reason that it will serve as the best general answer it is in our power to give to Mr. Chapman and other writers of his charac

ter.

But first a few remarks on Dar

win's theory. It is only a theory, a mere hypothesis. Mr. Darwin does not pretend to have proved it himself; nor does his advocate, Mr. Huxley, who seems to have taken Mr. Darwin and the Darwinian theory under his special protection, pretend that it is proved.

Bearing in mind that the Darwinian theory is only a hypothesis, we must estimate its value as we estimate that of other hypotheses, viz., by its ability to account for all the facts of which it pretends to be the solution.

The Copernican system of astronomy, for instance, is only a hypothesis; yet, as there is no known astronomical fact absolutely contradictory to it, we accept it as true. If there were only one fact which it did not explain and could not explain; above all, if there were one fact at variance with the hypothesis, the hypothesis must give way, and the fact stand; for one fact is worth a thousand hypotheses, and one fact in cases of this kind, as Mr. Huxley says, as good as five hundred.

Are there, then, any facts which the Darwinian theory of development by natural selection should explain and does not ? Mr. Huxley himself says there is one set of such facts-the facts of hybridism; and, as we will presently see, there are a great many others.

To St. George Mivart, a scientist, but more than a scientist, a philosopher in a degree, somewhat of a theologian as well, and therefore a man of greater intellectual grasp than either Darwin or Huxley, we are indebted for the fullest presentation of the facts inexplicable by natural selection that has yet been given to the reading world. This that gentleman has done in his book before referred to, The Genesis of Species. One of Mr. Mivart's great inerits is that he accords to Mr. Darwin's theory its full meed of praise. He is a scientific man, and as such a good judge of its merits and demerits, therefore competent to acknowledge the one and point out the other.

We

are not at all prejudiced against Mr. Darwin or his theory. We agree entirely with Mr. Mivart that it "is perhaps the most interesting theory, in relation to natural science, which has been promulgated during the present century." Before pointing out, however, why it is the most interesting theory of the kind, let us see in brief what the Darwinian theory of natural selection is.

In the words of Mr. Mivart it may be stated thus:

1. "Every kind of animal and plant tends to increase in numbers in a geometrical proportion.

2. "Every kind of animal and plant transmits a general likeness with individual differences to its offspring.

3. "Every individual may present minute variations of any kind in any

5. "Every individual has to endure a very severe struggle for existence, owing to the tendency to geometrical increase of all kinds of animals and plants, while the total animal and vegetable population (man and his 'agency excepted) remains almost stationary.

6. "Thus, every variation of a kind tending to save the life of the individual possessing it, or to enable it more surely to propagate its kind, will in the long run be preserved, and will transmit its favorable peculiarity to some of its offspring, which peculiarity will thus become intensified till it reaches the maximum degree of utility. On the other hand, individuals presenting unfavorable peculiarities will be ruthlessly de

stroyed. The action of this law of 'natural selection' may thus be well represented by the convenient expression, 'survival of the fittest.' "

Now as to the series of facts which this theory throws light upon. Here they are as enumerated by Mr. Mivart. It explains :

1. Some singular facts "relating to the geographical distribution of animals and plants; as, for example, on the resemblance between the past and present inhabitants of different parts of the earth's surface.

2. "That often, in adjacent islands, we find animals closely resembling and appearing to represent each other; while, if certain of these islands show signs of more ancient separation, the animals inhabiting them exhibit a corresponding divergence."

3. That "rudimentary structures' also receive an explanation by means of this theory.

4. "That the singular facts of homology' are capable of a similar explanation."

5. That "that remarkable series of changes which animals undergo before they attain their adult condition, which is called their process of development, and during which they more or less closely resemble other animals during the early stages of the same process, has also great light thrown on it from the same source."

6. That "by this theory, and as yet by this alone, can any explanation be given of that extraordinary phenomenon which is metaphorically termed 'mimicry.'"

To explain in detail the exact import of each of these heads would carry us beyond the limits of a magazine article; and the reader who wishes for more minute and definite information on them we must refer to Mivart's own book, or to Darwin's Origin of Species.

Pass we now to those facts which

Our readers will readily understand that, if species, or rather individual animals, were originated by natural law, and if that law be "natural selection," the action of "natural selection" must be able to explain not only the production of the animal as a whole, but of its several organs, both when they have reached the point of maximum utility, and at all stages previous thereto.

Mr. Mivart shows that it does not accomplish this; that it does not account for "the incipient stages of useful structures, e. g. the heads of flatfishes, the baleen of whales, vertebrate limbs, the laryngeal structures of the new-born kangaroo, the pedicellariæ of echinoderms"; and thus he established his first charge on purely scientific grounds, as a scientist writing for scientists. The other charges are equally well sustained.

It would, however, require the rewriting of Mr. Mivart's book to follow him through all his facts and arguments, and we must beg again to refer the reader who would study the matter in detail, to the book itself.

Another series of objections brought forward by Mr. Mivart against the same theory is equally well sustained -objections that go to show that "it cannot be applied at least to the soul of man," as Mr. Darwin has applied it.

Here, again, every one will see that, if the human soul is not created by God, it, too, must have been gradually evolved from what, for lack of a more convenient term, though not without protest, we must call an animal soul, by the process of natural selection; and therefore there is nothing in man's soul which was not in the ape's -the same faculties, moral and intellectual, in kind, different only in degree. This question Mr. Mivart discusses in a separate chapter on "Evolution and Ethics."

The result of the discussion he thus sums up:

1. "Natural selection could not have produced, from the sensations of pleasure and pain experienced in brutes, a higher degree of morality than was useful; therefore it could have produced any amount of 'beneficial habits, but not an abhorrence of certain acts as impure and sin ful.

2. "It could not have developed that high esteem for acts of care and tenderness to the aged and infirm which actually exists, but would rather have perpetuated certain low social conditions which obtain in some savage localities.

3. "It could not have evolved from ape sensations the noble virtues of a Marcus Aurelius, or the loving but manly devotion of a S. Louis.

given rise to the maxim, Fiat justitia, ruat cælum.

5. "That the interval between material and formal morality is one altogether beyond its power to traverse." Mr. Mivart further shows "that the anticipatory character of moral principles is a fatal bar to that explanation of their origin which is offered to us by Mr. Herbert Spencer"; and "that the solution of that origin proposed recently by Sir John Lubbock is a mere version of simple utilitarianism, appealing to the pleasure or safety of the individual, and therefore utterly incapable of solving the riddle it attacks."

It is hardly necessary that we should dwell on these points. Our Christian readers need no demonstration of them. Knowing, on the one hand, what Christian morality is, and, on the other, what mere animal behavior, they must know the difference between them, and, knowing this difference, that by no possibility could the one be developed from the other, there being no oneness of kind in them.

Just here we would remark that, in addition to his other arguments, Mr. Mivart might have added that from philology against Darwinism, and with good effect. There are those who, from that science, argue the other way. But, in a series of able articles on "Darwinism and the Science of Language," the Rev. J. Knabenbauer, S.J., has shown that philology points to a diversity of origin for man and the lower animals.

He argues that the ultimate elements, the roots of all language, are expressive of general ideas. Now, general ideas are the products of the intellectual processes known as abstraction and generalization. Hence, before the formation of roots, before the beginnings of language, man was man, since he could abstract

and generalize. Hence, also, language is not a development of animal cries, nor man of the brute, since the brute can neither abstract nor generalize.

Finally, Mr. Mivart shows in his chapter on "Evolution and Theology" that evolution and creation by no means exclude one another; and that a Catholic-Mr. Mivart is a Catholic-may accept the theory of evolution, ancient writers of authority in the church having "asserted abstract principles such as can perfectly harmonize with the requirements of modern science," and, "as it were, provided for the reception of its most advanced speculations."

In support of this view, Mr. Mivart quotes from S. Augustine, S. Thomas, Cornelius à Lapide, and refers to the Jesuit Suarez, with the doctrines of all of whom it is perfectly consistent to hold that animal species were created only potentially, potentialiter tantum.

By that we do not mean to insinuate that the naked Darwinian theory is compatible with Catholic faith; but of this more hereafter.

It was not to be expected that Mr. Mivart, in his criticism on Darwinism, would meet with no opponents. He must have expected to be attacked from two quarters, and by two different classes of men: by those committed to the Darwinian hypothesis, in the first place; and, again, by those who value that hypothesis less for its scientific merit than for-as they suppose-its incompatibility with Christian doctrine, and the service they think it might render in the disintegration of the Christian societies. Among the latter we are compelled to class Mr. Huxley, who, if a very good scientist, is, notwithstanding, one of the most arrogant of men.

He replied to Mr. Mivart, and in his reply does neither more nor less