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took strong Calvinistic grounds on special Providence, and told the men that they need not dodge in the battle, since every shot and shell, and bullet, sped on its way under the guidance of a special Providence, and hit just where and just whom the loving Father, who watches the fall of the sparrow, and numbers the hairs on the heads of his saints, should direct.

A distinguished officer told me that during the battle of Malvern Hill he had occasion to report to General Jackson, and after hunting for some time found him and his staff under one of the heaviest fires he had ever experienced. Soon Jackson directed those about him to dismount and shelter themselves, and Dr. Dabney found a place behind a large and very thick oak gate post, where he sat bolt upright with his back against the post. Just then there came up Major Hugh Nelson, of Ewell's staff-a gallant gentleman and a devout churchman, who had heard Dr. Dabney's sermon, and whose theological views did not fully indorse its doctrine-and, taking in the situation at a glance, rode direct for the gate post of "Stonewall's" Chief of Staff, and giving him the military salute coolly said: "Dr. Dabney, every shot, and shell, and bullet is directed by the God of battles, and you must pardon me for expressing my surprise that you should want to put a gate post between you and special Providence."

The good Doctor at once retorted: "No! Major, you misunderstand the doctrine I teach. And the truth is, that I regard this gate post as a special Providence, under present circumstances.'

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Just before the opening of the battle two preachers who had come to see after friends in the army, ventured up to our front lines without realizing that they were liable to be under a heavy fire. But when the cannonade opened they discovered that they had duties in the rear, and started back in a brisk walk, which was finally quickened to a run through a wheat field, as the hurtling shells burst all around them. One of them was a very small man, and the other quite large, and as they retreated through the troops some wag of a fellow raised the cry, "Run little preacher-the big preacher'll catch you," and the rest at once caught up the refrain and sang it to an old negro melody as long as they were in hearing

"Run little preacher,

The big preacher'll catch you."

But, perhaps, the grimmest joke of the occasion was the one which General Lee got off at the expense of General Magruder-as gallant a gentleman as ever drew sabre, and one whose courtly manners won

for him the soubriquet of "Prince John." Magruder had been unfortunate the day before; his guide had misdirected him and he got up late and his attack was made at too late an hour to secure promised support. Yet he felt that his brave fellows, who had so long baffled McClellan at Yorktown, were capable of driving him from Malvern Hill, and he burned for the privilege of trying it again. Accordingly, about two o'clock in the morning, the day after the battle, he sought General Lee and said: "General, I came to submit a proposition to you. If you will allow me to charge those heights at daybreak with my whole command, I pledge you my honor as a soldier to carry them at the point of the bayonet."

General Lee replied with that quiet twinkle which always betokened something good: "I have no doubt that you could now do so, General; but I have one very serious objection to your making the attempt." "What is that? What is that?" exclaimed Magruder, who hoped to remove the objection, and saw glory and honor in the present opportunity. "I am afraid," replied General Lee, "that you might hurt my little friend Major Kidder Meade; our friends, the enemy, left some time ago, and he is over there reconnoitring."

The testimony of all the army correspondents, of citizens along the route, and of the officers of the Army of the Potomac themselves, is that the retreat to Harrison's Landing was very precipitate, and that the army arrived there in a very demoralized condition.

Stuart got possession of the heights which completely commanded the camps at Westover, and which, if occupied and entrenched by infantry and artillery, would have compelled McClellen to surrender at discretion all of the men he could not hurriedly send off on transports. General Stuart's "Notes on the War," on file in the archives of the Southern Historical Society, prove this. But it may be best to show it from Federal authority.

General McClellan wrote to the Adjutant-General, at Washington, on the night of the battle of Malvern Hill, as follows:

"My men are completely exhausted, and I dread the result if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops. If possible, I shall retire to-night to Harrison's Bar, where the gunboats can render more aid in covering our position. Permit me to urge that not an hour should be lost in sending me fresh troops. More gunboats are much needed."

The "Committee on the Conduct of the War" says in their report:

"The retreat of the army from Malvern Hill to Harrison's Bar was very precipitate. The troops, upon their arrival there, were huddled

together in great confusion, the entire army being collected within a space of about three miles along the river. No orders were given the first day for occupying the height, which commanded the position. Nor were the troops so placed as to be able to resist an attack by the enemy; and nothing but a heavy rain, thereby preventing the enemy from bringing up their artillery, saved the army there from destruction. The enemy did succeed in bring up some of their artillery, and threw some shells into the camp before any preparations for defense had been made."

"On the 3d of July the heights were taken possession of by our troops, and works of defence commenced, and then, and not until then, was our army secure in that position." [Extract from the "Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War" (United States Congress), part I, page 27.]

General Casey testified as follows:

"The enemy had come down with some artillery upon our army massed together on the river, the heights commanding the position not being in our possession. Had the enemy come down and taken possession of these heights, with a force of twenty or thirty thousand men, they would, in my opinion, have taken the whole of our army, except that small portion of it that might have got on the transports. I felt very much alarmed for the army until we had got possession of those heights and fortified them. After that it was a strong position." [Ibid, page 446.]

These heights would have been occupied and intrenched by our infantry and artillery, but Stuart-dashing, gallant, glorious "Jeb." Stuart could not resist the temptation of "stirring them up," and so soon as his advance cavalry squadrons reached these heights he sent for Pelham, the heroic "boy artillerist," and a section of his horse artillery, which he ordered to open on the camps. The confusion in McClellan's camps showed how completely these hills commanded them, but it at the same time showed McClellan that he must occupy those hills or all was lost. Stuart was momentarily expecting Longstreet, and resisted the strong force sent to dislodge him until Pelham had fired his last round, and then he learned to his chagrin that Longrstreet had again been misled by his guide and was six miles away. There was nothing left him but to withdraw, chuckling over the confusion he had produced in the camps of the enemy. General Lee's orders were for an immediate attack on McClellan's position, but Jackson, who reached the field first, decided, after a careful reconnoissance, that the position was too strong to be assaulted and took the responsibility to order a halt, which General Lee reluctantly approved.

Thus ended the seven days of battle. In General Lee's congratulatory order, dated July 7, 1862, he says:

"The General commanding, profoundly grateful to the only Giver of victories for the signal success with which he has blessed our arms, tenders his earnest thanks and congratulations to the army, by whose valor such splendid results have been achieved. On Thursday, June 26, the powerful and splendidly-equipped army of the enemy was intrenched in works vast in extent and formidable in character, within sight of our capital. To-day the remains of that confident and threatening host lie upon the banks of the James River, thirty miles from Richmond, seeking to recover, under the protection of his gun-boats, from the effects of his series of disastrous defeats. * * * * The immediate fruits of our success are the relief of Richmond from a state of siege; the rout of the great army that so long menaced its safety; many thousand prisoners, including officers of high rank, and the capture or destruction of thousands of arms, and fifty-one pieces of artillery. The service rendered to the country during this short but eventful period can scarcely be estimated, and the General commanding cannot adequately express his admiration of the courage and endurance and soldiery conduct of the officers and men. These brilliant results have cost us many brave men; but while we mourn the loss of our gallant dead let us not forget that they died nobly in defence of their country's freedom and have linked their memory with an event that will live forever in the hearts of a grateful people." * * *

General McClellan's famous 4th of July order was intended to keep up the courage and spirits of his troops; but there can be but little doubt that the Army of the Potomac fully realized that their "change of base" was compulsory, not optional, and that they were just now more concerned in providing for their own safety than in the capture of Richmond. On the other hand the Army of Northern Virginia felt that they were masters of the situation.

The Work of the Southern Historical Society in Europe.

LETTER FROM MAJOR SCHEIBERT.

We have several times had occasion to call attention to the fact that our PAPERS have been doing a most important work in giving our friends in Europe the material for vindicating the name and fame of our Confederate leaders and people, and in affording to those willing to do us ustice the means of doing so.

The following private letter from our gallant friend, Major I. Scheibert, was not intended for publication, but it is so interesting as illustrating the point to which we have referred, that we take the liberty of publishing it, and beg that our friend will excuse us:

Rev. J. Wm. Jones:

HIRSCHBERG PRUSSIA, 13th October, 1881.

MY DEAR SIR,-I hope you have not forgotten your old Southern friend; but I have not received the SOUTHERN HISTORICAL PAPERS since the month of April. You know how deeply I am interested in your PAPERS, and how I appreciate the valuable military study they afford me.

I am proud to say that the combined efforts of Heros Von Borcke and myself have brought it about that in the German-Prussian army nothing concerning the civil war in America is so in fashion as accounts of the deeds of Southrons.

Sherman and Grant, the pets of ten years ago, are forgotten, and Lee, Jackson and Stuart are now the favorite heroes of our officers.

Your friends will be interested by the statement that many of the Southern organizations have been a pattern for ours.

For the first time the cavalry has studied Stuart's movements, and General Von Schmidt, the regenerator of our cavalry tactics, has told me that Stuart was the model cavalry leader of this century, and has questioned me very often about his mode of fighting.

It will doubtless be of interest to you to know what parts of your HISTORICAL PAPERS I have translated, and commended to our German armies. Among them are the following:

General Early's "Relative Strength of the Confederate and Federal Armies."

McCarthy's "Detailed Minutiae of Soldier Life."

Stuart's Report of "Cavalry Operations in 1863."

Stuart's Report of the "First Maryland Campaign."

General R. E. Lee's "Report of the Chancellorsville Campaign."

Field Letters from Lee's Headquarters.

General Fitz Leee's Address on Chancellorsville.

Colonel. William Allan's Address on "Jackson's Valley Campaign," (with maps.)

." Lee and Gordon at Appomattox."

Hubbard's

lorsville."

"" paper on Operations of General Stuart Before Chancel

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