which the final Charter received near unanimous consent in the Foreign Relations Committee and in the full Senate, which approved ratification of the Charter, 89-2, on 28 July 1945.12 THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE AND THE POSTWAR UNITED NATIONS Although the House of Representatives does not participate in the treaty ratification process, its own constitutional obligations in matters of postwar organization hardly ended with approval of the Charter. The committee had made its principal early contribution to the permanent United Nations by establishing the workable bipartisan endorsement of such an organization in the Fulbright resolution in 1943 (H. Con. Res. 25, 78th Cong., 1st sess.), which also helped launch serious public discussion on the subject. Legislative implementation of the United States participation in the United Nations (S. 1580, 79th Cong., 1st sess.) had to be considered by the House as well as the Senate. In December 1945 the committee and the House thus passed directly on some of the more contested features of the United Nations Charter, including the military prerogatives of the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, the committee readily consented to recommend approval of the formal invitation by the government for the United Nations to locate its headquarters in the United States (H. Con. Res. 75, 79th Cong., 1st sess.). In July 1943 the committee studied the draft agreement for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, which would provide multilateral aid to countries that had suffered under Axis subjugation. The Foreign Relations Committee voted 20-1 to approve the Charter after its hearings aired lingering criticisms, particularly on the issues of compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court and the question of possible American military commitments under the terms of the Charter. U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. "Charter of United Nations," Hearings, 79th Cong., 1st sess., July 9-13, 1945 (revised print; Washington, 1945). While no legislation was immediately involved, the State Department was seeking congressional support for its multilateral program, which met with committee criticism as well as support. Members voiced suspicions of the Department's attitude toward Congress and, in a different vein, of America's British and Soviet allies as well. Two years later, in July 1945, in reviewing the question of granting UNRRA relief to the United States' former enemy, Italy, still clearer echoes of the approaching Cold War can be detected in the committee's discussion. In considering various measures which would amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (H.R. 4708, S1st Cong., 1st sess., and related measures), the committee showed a pragmatic administrative sense and a sensitivity to congressional prerogative in foreign affairs, but also a heightened awareness of the role of the United Nations in the U.S. Cold War policy. By July 1947 such Cold War concerns were quite pronounced, even in subcommittee hearings on technicalities of the United Nations' nation to the United States, such as procuring necessary supplies for the world organization (H.R. 4010, 80th Cong, 1st sess), regulating the administration of the United Nations headquarters in New York City (S.J. Ros 144 8% Cong. 1st sess), and defining the diploMarie status of United Nations ofields and delegates S.J. Box TA SOT Cong, is ew, and related measures. As Fast Wordens worsened the comme sling standgames with the problems of poster organization moformal ale elegend mod and it le ་་་ ེ་མ ོས་ོ meeting the denges PREVENTION OF FUTURE AGGRESSION AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE (H. Con. Res. 25 and Related Resolutions, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.) TUESDAY, JUNE 8, 1943 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D.C. The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., Hon. Sol Bloom (chairman) presiding. Chairman BLOOM. The committee will kindly come to order. This meeting is called in executive session at the request of our colleague and member of the committee, Mr. Fulbright, and it is merely for discussion with reference to certain resolutions that were introduced at different times. Judge Kee has introduced one resolution 2 and Mr. Fulbright has also introduced a resolution, and there are others pending both in the Senate and in the House. You have before you many of the different resolutions that were introduced, including Senate Resolution 114.* We will open the hearings with a statement by Mr. Fulbright to give you an idea of just why we are here and just what we want to consider, and to see what the committee wishes to do with reference to these resolutions we have before us. Mr. Fulbright, the committee will be very glad to hear from you now. 1 Members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 78th Congress, 1943-44: Democrats: Sol Bloom, New York, Chairman; Luther A. Johnson, Texas; John Kee, West Virginia; James P. Richards, South Carolina; Joseph L. Pfeifer, New York; Pete Jarman, Alabama; W. O. Burgin, North Carolina; Wirt Courtney, Tennessee; Herman P. Eberharter, Pennsylvania; Thomas S. Gordon, Illinois: Howard J. McMurray, Wisconsin; Will Rogers, Jr., California; J. William Fulbright, Arkansas; Mike Mansfield, Montana; and James A. Wright, Pennsylvania. Republicans: Charles A. Eaton, New Jersey; Edith Nourse Rogers, Massachusetts; Robert B. Chiperfield, Illinois; John M. Vorys, Ohio; Foster Stearns, New Hampshire; Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota; Bartel J. Jonkman, Michigan; Frances P. Bolton, Ohio; James W. Wadsworth, New York; Charles L. Gerlach, Pennsylvania; and Andrew C. Schiffler, West Virginia. Boyd Crawford, clerk. 2 H.J. Res. 70, introduced by Congressman Kee (W. Va.) on Jan. 25, 1943, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. For text, see appendix II, p. 273. 3 H. Res. 200, introduced by Mr. Fulbright on Apr. 5, 1943, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs; see appendix II, p. 278. It was superseded by his H. Con. Res. 24, introduced following this hearing, on June 9, 1943, and by H. Con. Res. 25, introduced June 15, 1943. S. Res. 114, sponsored by Senators Ball (Minn.), Hill (Alabama), Barton (Ohio), and Hatch (New Mexico), and known as the "BH2" resolution, had been introduced Mar. 16 1943 and was still before the Foreign Relations Committee, where it was let to die after rigorous debate in form of S. Res. 192, introduced by Senator Connally. See the introduction to this transcript and appendix II, p. 279. STATEMENT OF HON. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARKANSAS Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, of course, I have no formal prepared statement. This is a problem of whether or not the Congress should take any action and is very interesting to a great many of us, I think. It seems to me that there is a great deal, of course, of difference of opinion. as to the time of such action and the nature of such action. Mr. Mundt and I have argued this at some length in public one evening. My own ideas are the first thing that should be done is to determine the fundamental policy that we are to have in our foreign relations. That is, I conceive of our policy up to now as being that of nonparticipation in any international organization. I would take it, that is the starting point-taking up again after the last war-and we have not done anything of any clear-cut decisiveness contrary to that. So I think it is the attitude that has persisted up to now. Therefore, I feel we should participate in that fundamental decision. I do not think that at this time it is our place or function to develop all the details or the so-called blueprints of the postwar world. I think that is a matter which should come after the decision is made that we are going to participate at all. I think there must be, in a sense, that authority or expression of opinion. Speaking directly to my own resolution, I conceive that merely as an expression of opinion of this character, which I think is more representative of the people than any other agency in our Government, that we desire to participate in an effort to develop a workable international system. Chairman BLOOM. If you would not mind an interruption, Mr. Fulbright, when you refer to your own resolution you mean House Resolution 200? Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. Chairman BLOOM. Yes. I just want to get that in the record clearly. TO GENERATE OPINION FOR GENERAL PRINCIPLE Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is about the principal significance. I think it is just a starting point. I think it would have the effect of arousing the interest of the people and the Congress in this problem and it would have a further effect, perhaps, of reassuring the Senate, which is traditionally timid in such matters. I think it would have the effect of strengthening the executive in its ideas as to its decisions relative to the problems involving peace. Of course, there is plenty of room for a difference of opinion as to a particular resolution, but I do not see how there could be as to the general principle that some action along this line is needed. Otherwise we will drift along and do nothing until after the war is over, and I conceive we will do exactly what we did after the last war-and my principal interest is to avoid doing as we did at that time. Congressman Karl E. Mundt (S. Dak.) introduced H.J. Res. 28, for the creation of a bipartisan Postwar Planning Commission, on Jan. 6, 1943. The bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, of which Mr. Mundt was also a member. He could not attend the present hearing. For Mr. Mundt's objections to H. Con. Res. 25 by Mr. Fulbright, which he found too vague, but which he nonetheless voted for in the House, see his remarks to the House in the Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 20, 1943, pp. 7675-76. Chairman BLOOM. Your principal interest, then, would be to avoid not doing anything? Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is the thing to avoid; just to do nothing. So that is one reason why I tried to simplify my own resolution-because I felt the simpler it is and confining it to an expression of what I feel is the fundamental policy-that that is the least that we could get that means anything, and yet it is more likely to be acceptable at this time and it is not a commitment to any specific plan. I do not think we can get one. I am not sure I would want a commitment now because I conceive of that to be worked out after you have the fundamental policy determined. Then it is an evolutionary process. We have had so little experience in this, I think it would require the very careful study of a group similar to that group which worked out our own Constitution. After all, that was not worked out in open meeting of the Congress. It was worked out behind closed doors, so to speak, by a committee of the most intelligent leaders of our Nation. I have a feeling that would be the next step, but to start with that and say we have to have a blueprint before we do anything, before we even decide we want to participate-I do not think you could get much interest. There is no provision or authority, it seems to me, for that procedure. I feel now is the time because it will take a long time to develop anything that would be acceptable-and our opinion as to how long the war will last, of course, you all know it varies all the way from a year to 5 years. No one can tell. Certainly, even if we passed this resolution today and proceeded with all earnestness, we would not develop anything very concrete inside of a year, I don't thinkpossibly two. TO REASSURE SENATE AND PUBLIC I think the psychological effect of the passage of such a simple resolution would be very great on the people and particularly on the Senate. The Senate, as you know-their 114, the Ball resolution-has merely bogged down. My information is they do not expect any action whatsoever before the recess and, if course, we do not know what to expect after that. And even if we should take the position, this is a matter for the Senate because of their power to approve treaties, I think that still it would have a greater significance in reassuring some Senators and in converting other Senators-those who are on the fence, so to speak-that that is the sentiment of the people. I conceive of this more as an expression of the people's desires as regards the postwar international participation by this country. That seems to me the principal significance of any action we can take at this time. Chairman BLOOM. Judge Kee. Mr. KEE. Will the gentleman yield right there? Mr. FULBRIGHT. There are all angles to this which could be discussed, and I do not purport to be able to outline all of them in this initial treatment. Chairman BLOOM. Of course, as you know, Mr. Fulbright, when we talked over this matter at the time, it was suggested we would allow all of the resolutions to be considered in executive session and 71-567-76-3 |