then let the committee decide what to do. Now, when you finish making your statement I would like to have Mr. Kee, who has a resolution which was introduced some time ago, make a statement. A KELLOGG-BRIAND PACT WITH TEETH Mr. KEE, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Fulbright and I have discussed this matter and I think we are generally agreed upon the idea that something should be done by way of giving expression to our views. I just wanted to ask Mr. Fulbright-I agree with him and I take it That we all agree it would be unwise for us to attempt to agree upon any plan, but don't you think it would be wise to discuss a principle? In other words the principle that some machinery should be set up and we should agree upon that principle, that some machinery must be set up after the close of the war to enforce the maintenance of a permanent pence, In other words, to implement something like the Kellogg Briand Pact." Chairman BLOOM. That is, to put teeth in it? Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is my idea. And this country will participate in it if it is acceptable. Of course, we cannot say we will participate in anything. But we are genuinely, now, and are honestly defermined to try to make an international system work that does have force in it and that has teeth in it. CONGRESSIONAL ROLE EMPHASIZED Chairman BLOOM. Will the gentleman yield there? When you say "this country" do you think we should say "this Congress"? In other words, that the country will participate-but I mean the Congress itself, the Senate and the House, should be informed and also sit in so as to know what is going on and suggest what the Congress would like to do, Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes, Chairman BLOOM. Mr. Kee. Mr. Kee, I have been getting a tremendous number of letters, and I think all of you have the same kinds of correspondence upon the general idea of what should take place. But my idea in presenting my resolution was, if it was agreeable to the Members of Congress and to the committee, for us to present to the world a principle-if we can all agree upon that principle-that our Government will cooperate with the United Nations or any other sovereign nations who wish to join in the formation, after peace has come to the world, of machinery or an instrumentality to enforce the maintenance of permanent peace. Now, if we agree upon that principle, let the plan for the instrumentality be formulated at the conference table. Mr. Penstone. There is no reason after we have made that declaration we are free to examine that even before that and at least work ous a tentative p'an. But the timing seems to me very very important. why the Norland P Buy 3a Pesis of bugu 1928 2 radons pledged to Teluke bile but the agreement made to provision for sanctions As I gather from recent expressions of some others, they have the feeling we should let this sort of evolve. We will drift along because of the good will created by the food conference and then later an economic conference, and so on, and eventually the political-we will come around to that. Of course there is a difference of opinion. I am very decidedly against that. COLLECTIVE SECURITY NECESSARY FOR REAL SECURITY I think the question of security is so uppermost in most nations-in the interest of most nations-that in the absence of international security they will naturally begin to secure their individual security by building up armies and tariffs. That creates a situation which is against and prevents the evolution of any international political situation or organization. I think it should come first. It is the basis of stability of all these others. I do not think a country can stand alone and prevent wars and it will not be very effective unless it is within and backed up by machinery-law and order, so to speak. This is in our domestic life. I do not think many of our institutions would operate except with the backing of our Government and the police force, which really enforces order. Again, the decrees of our courts would not work properly without the ultimate backing of the Government, which is a political matter. Of course, they would like to avoid it because it is the most difficult, and the easy way out is always the acceptable way-and it is easy to avoid the political and let it go, but I think it is a disastrous approach, myself. I do not think it will evolve along to where we finally, just without any effort, find ourselves in a peaceful world. I do not think it works that way. I think the most difficult way is usually the most effective way, and that is to attack the political first or at least simultaneously. I do not know that it must be first, but certainly not left. until all the others are examined and then think, because of that, there will evolve a satisfactory system backed by force. I don't think it will be that way. WOULD ALSO ENHANCE SOVIET SECURITY I can see during this present period, they speak about Russia, and particularly Russia, who would feel compelled to look after her own security—not knowing to rely upon others, it would be of great importance to her if she could get all these strategic boundaries and, too, the Balkan countries-whereas if we had any reliance on a system, an international system, may be the importance of this would not be so great and it would be much easier to be arrived at satisfactorily. Mr. KEE. You do not believe Russia will be alone in that position? Mr. FULBRIGHT. What? Mr. KEE. Don't you believe Russia will not be alone in that position? Mr. FULBRIGHT. Why, yes; every country would feel that same way. We have to look after our own fences and each time they do The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization held its founding meeting at Hot Springs, Va., May-June 1943. The conference, called to deal with the wartime emergency in food production and distribution, was the first formal U.N. meeting on any subject. It called for the creation of a postwar world food agency. While no legislation was immediately involved, the State Department was seeking congressional support for its multilateral program, which met with committee criticism as well as support. Members voiced suspicions of the Department's attitude toward Congress and, in a different vein, of America's British and Soviet allies as well. Two years later, in July 1945, in reviewing the question of granting UNRRA relief to the United States' former enemy, Italy, still clearer echoes of the approaching Cold War can be detected in the committee's discussion. In considering various measures which would amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 (H.R. 4708, 81st Cong., 1st sess., and related measures), the committee showed a pragmatic administrative sense and a sensitivity to congressional prerogative in foreign affairs, but also a heightened awareness of the role of the United Nations in the U.S. Cold War policy. By July 1947 such Cold War concerns were quite pronounced, even in subcommittee hearings on technicalities of the United Nations' relation to the United States, such as procuring necessary supplies for the world organization (H.R. 4010, 80th Cong., 1st sess.), regulating the administration of the United Nations headquarters in New York City (S.J. Res. 144, 80th Cong., 1st sess.), and defining the diplomatic status of United Nations officials and delegates (S.J. Res. 136, 80th Cong., 1st sess., and related measures). As East-West tensions worsened, the committee's long-standing concern with the problems of postwar organization reflected the changed international mood, and it began increasingly to focus more directly on unilateral American and Western programs for meeting the challenges of the postwar world. PREVENTION OF FUTURE AGGRESSION AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE (H. Con. Res. 25 and Related Resolutions, 78th Cong., 1st Sess.) TUESDAY, JUNE 8, 1943 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Washington, D.C. The committee met in executive session at 10:30 a.m., Hon. Sol Bloom (chairman) presiding. Chairman BLOOM. The committee will kindly come to order. This meeting is called in executive session at the request of our colleague and member of the committee, Mr. Fulbright, and it is merely for discussion with reference to certain resolutions that were introduced at different times. Judge Kee has introduced one resolution 2 and Mr. Fulbright has also introduced a resolution, and there are others pending both in the Senate and in the House. You have before you many of the different resolutions that were introduced, including Senate Resolution 114.* 3 We will open the hearings with a statement by Mr. Fulbright to give you an idea of just why we are here and just what we want to consider, and to see what the committee wishes to do with reference to these resolutions we have before us. Mr. Fulbright, the committee will be very glad to hear from you now. 1 Members of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. 78th Congress, 1943-44: Democrats: Sol Bloom, New York, Chairman; Luther A. Johnson, Texas; John Kee, West Virginia; James P. Richards, South Carolina; Joseph L. Pfeifer, New York; Pete Jarman, Alabama; W. O. Burgin, North Carolina; Wirt Courtney, Tennessee; Herman P. Eberharter, Pennsylvania; Thomas S. Gordon, Illinois: Howard J. McMurray, Wisconsin; Will Rogers, Jr., California; J. William Fulbright, Arkansas; Mike Mansfield, Montana; and James A. Wright, Pennsylvania. Republicans: Charles A. Eaton, New Jersey; Edith Nourse Rogers, Massachusetts; Robert B. Chiperfield, Illinois; John M. Vorys, Ohio; Foster Stearns, New Hampshire; Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota; Bartel J. Jonkman, Michigan; Frances P. Bolton, Ohio; James W. Wadsworth, New York; Charles L. Gerlach, Pennsylvania; and Andrew C. Schiffler, West Virginia. Boyd Crawford, clerk. 2 H.J. Res. 70, introduced by Congressman Kee (W. Va.) on Jan. 25, 1943, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. For text, see appendix II, p. 273. 3 H. Res. 200, introduced by Mr. Fulbright on Apr. 5, 1943, and referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs; see appendix II, p. 278. It was superseded by his H. Con. Res. 24, introduced following this hearing, on June 9, 1943, and by H. Con. Res. 25, introduced June 15, 1943. S. Res. 114, sponsored by Senators Ball (Minn.), Hill (Alabama), Barton (Ohio), and Hatch (New Mexico), and known as the "B2H2" resolution, had been introduced Mar. 16 1943 and was still before the Foreign Relations Committee, where it was let to die after rigorous debate in form of S. Res. 192, introduced by Senator Connally. See the introduction to this transcript and appendix II, p. 279. STATEMENT OF HON. J. WILLIAM FULBRIGHT, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF ARKANSAS Mr. FULBRIGHT. Well, of course, I have no formal prepared statement. This is a problem of whether or not the Congress should take any action and is very interesting to a great many of us, I think. It seems to me that there is a great deal, of course, of difference of opinion as to the time of such action and the nature of such action. Mr. Mundt and I have argued this at some length in public one evening.5 My own ideas are the first thing that should be done is to determine the fundamental policy that we are to have in our foreign relations. That is, I conceive of our policy up to now as being that of nonparticipation in any international organization. I would take it, that is the starting point-taking up again after the last war-and we have not done anything of any clear-cut decisiveness contrary to that. So I think it is the attitude that has persisted up to now. Therefore, I feel we should participate in that fundamental decision. I do not think that at this time it is our place or function to develop all the details or the so-called blueprints of the postwar world. I think that is a matter which should come after the decision is made that we are going to participate at all. I think there must be, in a sense, that authority or expression of opinion. Speaking directly to my own resolution, I conceive that merely as an expression of opinion of this character, which I think is more representative of the people than any other agency in our Government, that we desire to participate in an effort to develop a workable international system. Chairman BLOOM. If you would not mind an interruption, Mr. Fulbright, when you refer to your own resolution you mean House Resolution 200? Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. Chairman BLOOM. Yes. I just want to get that in the record clearly. TO GENERATE OPINION FOR GENERAL PRINCIPLE Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is about the principal significance. I think it is just a starting point. I think it would have the effect of arousing the interest of the people and the Congress in this problem and it would have a further effect, perhaps, of reassuring the Senate, which is traditionally timid in such matters. I think it would have the effect of strengthening the executive in its ideas as to its decisions relative to the problems involving peace. Of course, there is plenty of room for a difference of opinion as to a particular resolution, but I do not see how there could be as to the general principle that some action along this line is needed. Otherwise we will drift along and do nothing until after the war is over, and I conceive we will do exactly what we did after the last war-and my principal interest is to avoid doing as we did at that time. " Congressman Karl E. Mundt (S. Dak.) introduced H.J. Res. 28, for the creation of a bipartisan Postwar Planning Commission, on Jan. 6, 1943. The bill was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, of which Mr. Mundt was also a member. He could not attend the present hearing. For Mr. Mundt's objections to H. Con. Res. 25 by Mr. Fulbright, which he found too vague, but which he nonetheless voted for in the House, see his remarks to the House in the Congressional Record, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 20, 1943, pp. 7675–76. |