initiate such action. The Secretary of State is hereby instructed to forward to each Senator and Representative of this State in Congress a copy of this resolution.

(Signed) SHERMAN ADAMS,

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

(Signed) ANSEL N. SANBORN,

Approved May 18, 1943.

President of the Senate.

(Signed) ROBERT O. BLOOD,

Governor.

Mr. STEARNS. I think perhaps that second clause is asking a little more of us than we are constitutionally entitled to perform, but it indicates the temper of the people in my district.

There is just one other thing I would like to say to start off this discussion. I hope and I think it is a very good thing to meet and discuss these things. I hope we are going to have quite a good deal of discussion arriving at a meeting of the minds.

SIMPLE IDEA BEST FOR MASS APPEAL

As a concrete statement, I would like to say the resolution offered by Mr. Fulbright has a good deal of appeal to me for one specific reason. When President Coolidge was given an honorary degree by Amherst College he was described as a master of adequate brevity. I think Mr. Fulbright's resolution-if we find it covers all the points, I think its brevity is very strongly in its favor. It is something that can be put on a post card. It is something that can be put in a box in a newspaper. It is something that can be given the widest possible circulation with a minimum of trouble. Even the readers of the picture papers would be capable of reading that much. That is all I want to say.

BOTH HOUSES MUST ACT FOR BEST EFFECT

Chairman BLOOM. The Chair would like to say that Mr. Fulbright's resolution is a House resolution. From the beginning, if you remember, the Chair made the statement that the Senate and the House should get together. Whatever resolution we are going to adopt, it should be adopted by both branches of Congress because your resolution, which you just read, says "the Congress." Now, if the House should adopt that resolution, and the Senate does not go along with that resolution, I do not think it would have the same effect upon the public as it would if it was a joint or concurrent resolution. I stated many months ago I would like to see the Senate and the House get together. As you all know, the Senate today has many resolutions and they are fighting with each other. I mean Senator Gillette, and Senator Connally, and Senator Hill, and the whole group of them do not seem to be able to get together and agree upon what should be done. I have felt right along that the Senate and the House should adopt one resolution and put in that resolution what the Congress would like to do and then let us go ahead and work on that. But if we work on one resolution and the Senate comes along with another resolution, and they are divided on that, I do not think it is going to have the effect and the result that we are all looking forward to achieving. That is my only thought on this thing.

PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL'S VIEW

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. May I ask Mr. Fulbright a question? When Churchill was here in executive session,8 I somehow or other received an impression that Churchill said that a resolution of this character was not necessary. Am I wrong in that conclusion?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I discussed that at great length with several of their people. They maintain positively he did not have the Ball resolution in mind at all. And if you recall the way Senator Vandenberg asked that question, it was in connection with asking if the resolution was regarded as necessary for the prosecution of the war, and then he said, "Not at all." Then, true, he drifted on to a broader statement. They say in the first place, if Churchill had had in mind or been conscious of a pending resolution in the Senate, he would never express an opinion on that in any case. And the next thing they say, they knew that he was he had interpreted that question as meaning whether or not a resolution reaffirming our stand in the winning of the war and the prosecution of the war was necessary. Mr. Llewellin, who was there at the time, and I talked to Ambassador Halifax. The Secretary knew all about it, and he said that."

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Thank you very much.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. He did not intend it to relate to that particular resolution at all. He did not have it in mind.

HOUSE'S EXAMPLE AS SPUR TO INDECISIVE SENATE

But I would like to say a little about the point about the Senate's having a joint resolution. In the first place, in my discussion the Senate led me to believe they are very jealous of their functions of foreign affairs. They would not at all accept anything we originated as being of much influence over there. And I talked to them about this, about this resolution, and so on. Well, they always want us to sort of lie back: After all, this is a Senate affair-which I do not subscribe to at all. They seem to be unable to get anywhere. It has bogged down over there. It seems to me an expression by us would not only be beneficial in other ways, but it might urge or spur the Senate on to a little action. I thought about that at considerable length. I know they will not accept anything we do as a sort of guidance to them, but if we pass this they might get on and bring out their own and then they might be able to get together. But I do not believe, if we pass a joint resolution, the Senate over there will pay any attention to us.

Mr. KEE. Don't you think it will spur them to action by passing a joint resolution here and sending it over to them?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes; I think that is true. Anything we pass would spur them to action, but I do not think a joint resolution would spur them a bit more than a House resolution. I think in either case they would not accept it and would bring out their own.

Prime Minister Churchill visited the United States for consultations with President Roosevelt May 11-26. 1943. Mr. Churchill addressed a joint session of Congress on May 19 and met on May 20 with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Committee on Foreign Affairs in a private briefing.

Col. John Jestin Llewellin was British Minister of Aircraft Production (1942). Minister Resident in Washington for Supply (1942-43), and Minister of Food (1943-45). "The Secretary" to whom Mr. Fulbright refers is presumably the British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Halifax, who had formerly been his country's Foreign Secretary.

Chairman BLOOM. Not if they decide in advance on it. My thought was, if we could get together-in other words, if we had a subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee and get Senator Connally to have a subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee, and then if we could agree on some form of resolution, we could then introduce that.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I cannot imagine, if they cannot agree among themselves, how they would ever agree. That would seem unendurable if we have to wait until they agree.

Chairman BLOOM. We have not asked them yet.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They have been trying to agree for over 2 months on their own resolution and they can arrive at no agreement amongst themselves.

Chairman BLOOM. It is merely a suggestion. It is up to the committee to do what they want to do.

SENATE BACKGROUND TO CHURCHILL'S COMMENT

May I say this with reference to Mr. Churchill: Wasn't the question asked by Senator Vandenberg with reference to resolutions of that kind to be introduced-if any resolution could be introduced or should be introduced, and Mr. Churchill said "no" to that? I do not think he was referring in any way to any resolution that had already been introduced in the Senate or in the House.

Mr. JARMAN. I got the opposite impression. I got the same impression Mr. Chiperfield did. We may be wrong. But as a background of that I think this will explain to Mr. Fulbright as a background of my impression-I had the realization, we had a resolution over there introduced by four members, none of whom is a member of the Foreign Relations Committee and naturally that Foreign Relations Committee is not going to take it. They are going to have it come out of their own committee. That is just as natural as for us to take one of the resolutions of our committee instead of this fellow Merrow here,10 or whoever it is, that introduced one of these resolutions. And Gillette, I thought, asked the question. Was it Senator Vandenberg who asked the question?

Chairman BLOOM. Senator Vandenberg asked the question.

Mr. JARMAN. I got the same impression that Chiperfield did. We may be wrong, I reckon. I guess it is true Mr. Churchill would not have commented directly on a resolution pending. I guess that sounds reasonable.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Immediately after the meeting I discussed it with Llewellin. He was there seated at this end and he said it was very unfortunate no one else pursued that. Of course, I would like to have done so, but the meeting broke up before it got down to several of usbut he said positively he knew that was a misinterpretation. He saw, however, it was subject to that interpretation at the time.

Mr. JARMAN. Yes; I guess you are right. He would not have discussed and would not have intentionally discussed a resolution pending before the Congress. I did get that very definite impression. Mr. FULBRIGHT. We were all conscious of it and he was not. Chairman BLOOM. Mr. Vorys.

10 Congressman Chester Earl Merrow (N.H.) was first elected to the 78th Congress. He became a member of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the 79th Congress.

A

Mr. VORYS. I think we are all entitled to form our own conclusions from what Mr. Churchill said. He opened up by saying, "Ask_me questions and don't worry about making them embarrassing," and so forth. I know that Senator Vandenberg intended his question to be aimed at the Ball resolution, and I think that Churchill's answer was directed to that and any later explanations may have been made to relieve any embarrassment. I do not think, however, that Churchill's expression on that is binding on this committee or anyone else.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Whatever he did say, what difference does it make to us?

Mr. JONKMAN. Didn't he make it clear when Senator Vandenberg asked him, "Do you want us to resolute at all?"

CHURCHILL'S MOTIVATION AND MEANING

Mr. VORYS. He was very categorical and sweeping. However, that is a very interesting command and an expression of a point of view which I understand, but which I do not agree with. I think it is a point of view of those who would be in power and with a terrible responsibility and are afraid that something would come up to kick over the apple cart, and so forth.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VORYS. Yes.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. I did receive that impression. He did not feel it was necessary to pass such a resolution.

Mr. VORYS. Yes. I think he was just taking in the Ball resolution and an amendment that might have something to do with the Polish border and any other kind of resolution which would be a paper assurance of postwar support. He meant we do not need that sort of thing because your actions will speak louder than your words.

Mr. WADSWORTH. Isn't it a fact the Polish border was injected in that very discussion and had a lot to do with his answer?

Mr. VORYS. Senator Vandenberg did say, "Suppose we put in an amendment—we have a lot of Poles in our district-saying we would or would not agree to a certain disposition of the Polish border." I think Churchill's answer was that would be disastrous or something like that. I think those were his very words and he was obviously talking about an amendment to something that was hypothetically then pending and Churchill was with his hair down commenting on things that he had been asked, "What do you think about having our Government do this or that?" and he just let fly as he did. I think it was rather a privilege for us to hear him do it.

I think his views should bear great weight, but I do not think they should be controlling. We are a little different from the British in this, that we have a sort of tradition of wanting to have it in the book, the written word; the written commitment is the way we go about things. Now, we may have done it too much but we have of course, an enormous influence in this written Constitution behind us.

RECENT PRECEDENT FOR HOUSE INITIATIVE: RE-AFFIRMATION OF MONROE DOCTRINE

Now I want to remind the committee, I think we ought to remind ourselves and the country, that having the Congress resolute on mere

statements of foreign policy is not a new departure. We have a precedent and I just got Mr. Crawford [the committee clerk] to bring it to us. It seems to me this is quite significant. It has a gosh-awful title: "A joint resolution approving nonrecognition of the transfer of any geographic region in the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power, and providing for consultation with other American republics in the event that such transfer should appear likely." That is the brief form of the title. Another brief form would be to say, "Reaffirmation of the statement of the Monroe Doctrine." And that went through this committee back in 1940. Now, it went through this committee finally by unanimous vote, as I remember. It passed the House either under suspension or by unanimous consent. There were some objections, and rather strenuous objections from certain of those who are high in the councils of the Republicans, that those of us on the committee had permitted this matter to come up in that way so that there could not be debate about it. It went to the Senate. It was held up until Senator Pittman's death.11

Chairman BLOOM. You know why that was-because of the difference as to whether it should read "this hemisphere" or "Western Hemisphere."

Mr. VORYS. It is interesting as showing the effect of this senatorial and congressional jealousy. It was held up until Senator Pittman's death because two or three words had been changed and he would be darned if the House was going to rewrite something that had to do with foreign affairs.

WORDING PROBLEM RECALLED IN MONROE DOCTRINE RE-AFFIRMATION

Chairman BLOOM. If the gentleman would not mind an interruption there, I would just like to give you the facts because you were one of the principal culprits in the matter. You wanted, which was correct, the words, "this hemisphere" and the resolution was passed the same way excepting for one amendment changing "Western Hemisphere" to "this hemisphere."

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. VORYS. Yes.

Mr. CHIPERFIELD. When this bill was passed by the House originally, it contained express provisions-I am sure Mr. Schiffler remembersconcerning South America, to which he and I and several others strenuously objected. When this bill was finally passed by unanimous consent, those provisions were taken out which we had objected to and that was one of the reasons why the opposition ceased.

Mr. VORYS. There was a preamble. The thing was rewritten and whereas there had been a very long preamble about various things in South America, these were the words of the preamble that was adopted unanimously by the House and finally by the Senate:

Whereas our traditional policy

11 H.J. Res. 556 and S.J. Res. 271, 76th Congress, 1st sess.. "Approving nonrecognition of the transfer of any geographic region in the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another power and providing for consultation with other American Republics in the event that such transfer should appear likely." An item presented to the House under suspension of the rules can be debated but not amended.