Those are all quotes now, and from James Monroe has been to consider any attempt on the part of non-American powers to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to the peace and safety And then we put in not only of this country but of the other American republics. To adopt the traditional language we had a lot of argument and debate about it, but the thing is historical and the important thing is that the Senate and House fussed around and finally we got this statement and there has never been since that time-there have been other reasons for that—any attempt to do the thing we were concerned about at that time. We were at peace at the time, but the danger was that in taking over countries abroad that had interests in South America, there might be an attempt to bring about a twist in the sovereignty. There has been no attempt to offend that. Now, it seems to me, if we were able to adopt something-it seems to me that the Fulbright resolution would be an easy one. Let us adopt an easy one-the easiest one we can all agree on-and get it going on its way so far as it can go, and then sit down and see what else we can study. That would be a swell technique. "LAW AND ORDER" AMENDMENT I would have this suggestion and then I am going to get off the floor; maybe we haven't come to this stage, but I would like to substitute a sentence from Judge Kee's resolution for an international machinery designed to secure and maintain law and order and peace, or lasting peace. I think that the words "law and order" as well as merely to go with peace would be appropriate, and that would be my thought as to the way to say the thing. I would like to have a vote to have a joint resolution. I mean we want to find out a sort of poll of the delegation here. I would vote to have an appropriately worded general statement like that, either a joint resolution or a House resolution, or to take a day or so here to get it up as merely a resolution of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House, and if it could be issued in that way so as to attempt-my hope though would be, we could take action on some sort of statement that would come out of this committee, I would hope by unanimous vote if that were possible before any recess, so that it would at least have the stamp of approval of this committee before a recess and would not be something that was pending in this committee. That would be my suggestion. MONROE DOCTRINE IN 1823 AND 1940 Chairman BLOOM. May I say this in answer to you, Mr. Vorys: The resolution you spoke of there with reference to this hemispherethat was a resolution that was submitted by the State Department at that time, for the reason that Hitler was going into these nations and into Holland and they, the State Department, were afraid if he went into Holland and the Government of Holland could not escape and go into exile, Hitler would get the administration over there to transfer to Germany certain possessions in this hemisphere, whatever they were, and in the other countries as well. I think it was Holland. And this resolution was suggested by the State Department so that if any transfer should be made by any of the subjugated nations this was notice to Germany that we would not recognize any such transfer. That was the reason. Mr. VORYS. That was something that was supposed to be. While they were nice diplomatic words, they were supposed to represent to us fighting words; if Germany attempted that, we would fight. I think it was meant to be a very strong and official restatement of the Monroe Doctrine. Chairman BLOOM. I think you will find the Congress in 1812-I know the Senate did; I am pretty sure it was a joint resolution, in 1812, 11 years before Monroe sent his message to Congress they practically had a similar resolution declaring what the intent of Congress and this Government was with reference to this hemisphere. That was 10 years before Monroe's message. Mr. VORYS. We had two legislative precedents. One in 1796 and one in 1811. Chairman BLOOM. Mr. Chiperfield. STATE DEPARTMENT'S OPINION Mr. CHIPERFIELD. May I ask you this question, Mr. Chairman? Has the State Department expressed any opinion as to the advisability of a resolution of this kind? Mr. FULBRIGHT. I have a letter. I have one. I will bring it at the next meeting. It is to the effect that anything of this nature would be helpful, the qualification being that it should be presented in such a way as to get the maximum support. In other words, the only reservation is, do you think we can get it by without too much trouble? I think that is what it comes down to. I think the attitude would be if we can get a unanimous report here and we feel it would pass the House with a good majority, they would like it. That is the way I interpret that letter. I will bring the letter. Mr. VORYS. Will the gentleman yield? Isn't this the situation there, that while we have a duty to consult and cooperate with the State Department, they might also feel in a matter like this, they have the duty to take the responsibility and not have this something that is a "must" resolution? Mr. FULBRIGHT. Oh, yes, I asked him 12 about that. He did not volunteer it. It was simply an answer to my request. He was not trying to butt into the thing. I was just examining what his attitude would be. [Discussion off the record.] LAW AND ORDER: ELIHU ROOT'S CRITIQUE OF CUMBERSOME LEAGUE Mr. WADSWORTH. I think the resolution of Mr. Fulbright is satisfactory in general. We might change a word but not the meaning. 12 Mr. Fulbright requested the views of the State Department in a letter to Under Secretary of State Welles on Apr. 9, 1943. The text of Mr. Welles' response of Apr. 13, 1943. appears in the committee's hearing on June 11, 1943, to be found in this subsection, p. 44. I have been hoping all along that someone in a responsible position of our Government, Congress or the executive branch of the Government would not set up a policy involving too many details. I know people are anxious to know what the conditions will be after we win. this war. I grope toward the ultimate solution. I am convinced, however, that if we conduct ourselves wisely with our allies, that it is up to the United States to take a very leading part in the readjustments that must follow the war, and I would not have the United States shirk that for 1 minute. I had some interesting experiences years ago about this or similar problems; and when John Vorys suggested that the language of Mr. Kee's resolution relating to law and order be perhaps inserted in Mr. Fulbright's resolution, I recollected the many conversations I had with Mr. Elihu Root when the League of Nations Covenant was before the Senate and that long debate. Mr. Root was a great believer in order under the law. He felt that Mr. Wilson had made a terrible mistake in pushing through a written contract until international law had been perfected and accepted by the nations and thereafter the nations agree to support the law, and he prophesied the failure of the League of Nations Covenant. It is rather a pity in my judgment that Mr. Hughes did not prevail at the time, when he was out of public office and was not in a position to be particularly influential.13 And if you will let me again reminisce, I think our mistake of 1919-yes, they are our country's mistake and Mr. Wilson's mistakewas due to the fact that by writing a contract in a period of 4 months they tried to make over the whole world. It could not be done in 4 months. We would have been in that league had Mr. Wilson agreed to accept the reservations. Our participation in it I think would not have made it survive with or without the reservations. I attempted to do too much in too short a time. Now Mr. Fulbright's resolution expresses an ideal and yet has a very practicable side to it as Mr. McMurray has pointed out. No nation can make itself, by its own single efforts safe. I too believe that. NEED TO CONVINCE PUBLIC ON ISSUE Mr. MCMURRAY. Don't you believe that however that is my opinion and your opinion and I think we are right. However, it is an opinion which is not yet generally held by the American people, and that is the job we have to face. Mr. WADSWORTH. I think it is held by perhaps a larger percentage than you think. But that is a small matter, a difference in percentages. So whether we make it a declaration of the committee-it has got to be given adequate publicity and later on perhaps after the recess to be presented to the House. I should hope it eventually comes forth in the form of a concurrent resolution, if it was passed by the House by a substantial majority; and I think it could be phrased as it is because it does not bind us to any definite steps which might prove, when the time came, completely unwise. Mr. MCMURRAY. One phrase, one clause can kill the whole resolution. 13 Even when as Secretary of State (1921-25), the jurist and statesman Charles E. Hughes was "in office," he could not persuade the Senate to approve a limited form of cooperation with the League of Nations. Mr. WADSWORTH. I think it should be sent to the Senate. If it is held as a House resolution, all right, then the House passes it and that is the end of it. Suppose the Senate some day later on passes its resolution: then you are in a nice predicament before the world and before our country. Whereas if we send it to the Senate-if we decide to present it to the House at all, which I think you should-the Senate has got to consider it. If they want changes in it they will be fixed up in conference and whatever comes out, if anything comes out, it will be the united expression of the two branches. Mrs. BOLTON. Will the gentleman yield for a question? LAW, ORDER, AND PUBLIC RELATIONS EFFORT Mrs. BOLTON. Am I to understand you are in agreement with John's suggestion of law and order? Mr. WADSWORTH. Yes, I am. That is a sort of tradition that has settled with me, which I have imbibed from one of the best minds I have ever met-Elihu Root's. That is merely a suggestion to go in there to make it plain to our own people and to the world that whatever length of time it will take-10 or 15 years after we have occupied Berlin and Tokyo-to work it out-it shall be on a basis of law and not on a hastily written contract like the League of Nations Covenant, which was done in 3 or 4 months' time, dragging 51 nations in it— and at least 30 of them were not fit to come in and did not know what they were coming into, when they got into it, and subsequently got into all kinds of trouble; and the people of the several nations were not ready. The cockney on the streets of London-although Great Britain gave complete adherence to the League-the cockney on the streets of London and the Britisher in general, when Italy attacked Ethiopia-and Ethiopia was a member of the League and Great Britain was pledged under article 10 to come to the defense of Ethiopia-the ordinary British citizen said, "Where is Ethiopia? I won't do it." Chairman BLOOм. And they could have stopped it at the time if they wanted to. Mrs. BOLTON. The people were not ready. Mr. WADSWORTH. The people were not ready for it. Mr. FULBRIGHT. On the question of time, it seems to me we are going into a recess now, and this is a question-I happen to know certainly— of how the campaign is going to be done; and there is a campaign under way for considerably more. There will be great publicity value and psychological value in an educational way, if something of this sort could be reported out-not voted on but voted out. That would be something specific. I would not want to do that though unless members of this committee took the trouble. You think it could be passed; I do too. I would like for everybody to spend a little time to verify that, asking the members that you anticipate might oppose it to see what their position is. That could be done in 10 days, easily. We could get a very accurate idea, I think, of what would happen to it and then report it out and leave it there over the recess. Mr. BURGIN. Is the object of your resolution to educate the people or the Congress? Mr. FULBRIGHT. Both. Mr. VORYS. Both. Mr. FULBRIGHT. Especially the Senate. GENERAL RESOLUTION PREFERRED Mr. WADSWORTH. May I call attention to the resolution of Mr. Randolph, by request, House Concurrent Resolution No. 5, and contrast that with the Fulbright resolution.14 Mr. Randolph's resolution goes into the last detail. There are 17 declarations of what shall be done. Why, you would have the darndest time. Out of 17 probably 15 are unwise; you can't tell. I think there is an ideal expressed in Mr. Fulbright's resolution and yet it has a very practicable side to it. I do think it does adequately express the intention of the House of Representatives at least to cooperate in establishing an appropriate international machinery. Now, what is to be appropriate we haven't the slightest idea. Mr. FULBRIGHT. We can't have at this time. Mr. WADSWORTH. We will have to figure it out. I look for a couple of years of military occupation of conquered countries and their being given an opportunity to reestablish a government which will command our respect and the respect of their own people and the respect of the United Nations and in a sense go through a period of probation, and if it turns out they intend to behave themselves and are able to behave themselves, then-to use a colloquial expression-"They can become a member of the club," but not until then. Now, it will take God knows how long. Mr. KEE. May I ask a question? PUBLICITY AND CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGY Mr. KEE. Isn't it your opinion that we, the committee, ought to agree on this resolution first, before we give it any publicity and agree upon its terms? I think the simpler we have it, the better it will be. Mr. WADSWORTH. I would not make it more than these five lines. Mr. KEE. But we should all agree on it before making it public and then, as Mr. Fulbright suggests, we can get pretty well the reaction of the Members of Congress. Mr. WADSWORTH. Before we proceed to do that I notice that Mr. Mundt is not here and Mr. Gerlach and some others. Chairman BLOOM. Mr. Jonkman has been waiting patiently to be heard. CHURCHILL'S MOTIVE UNCLEAR; BRITISH POLICY SUSPECT Mr. JONKMAN. It was not quite clear to me from the early part of the conversation as to what reason we thought Mr. Churchill might have for not wanting us to resolute at all. I am not bringing that question up for the purpose of being governed by what reason he had, but that might on the contrary be all the more reason to do something 14 See appendix II, pp. 276-277 for the texts of both resolutions. |