like this. In other words, from some questions asked of Mr. Eden 15 and Mr. Lewellin. I am of the opinion, British statemanship does not want any of our agreement at all. That might possibly be the answer. It does not want us messing around, the Congress of the United States or anybody, and if so, I quite agree with Senator Wadsworth that the ideal expressed in that resolution is almost general in the United States providing that you can do it at the right time. Now, my point is if, for instance, there is a tendency on the part of British foreign policy to work for a council of Europe and not having us messing around, then it is all the more reason we should do something of this kind. It is high time somebody spoke for the American people. Those are my reactions. I would like an answer to that if anybody can give it. What is the probable reason for Churchill not wanting us to resolute at all? Mr. MCMURRAY. Mr. Jonkman intimated that was an expression of official British opinion. I cannot answer that question but I can say this, I have been in touch over some years from other sources, people not necessarily holding public official positions but very close, that is, some reasonably high advisers to various branches of the British Government. They cannot speak, of course, for the British Government or for the opposition, but they do advise these men and I happen to know there is a great deal of interest among some of those menboth advisers to the Conservative Party and to the Labour Party in Britain-who are tremendously interested in a world-wide cooperative effort after the war. I do not say their views will prevail. I merely know what their views are and what they are advising, and their advice is asked. I do not say it is taken. I do not think we can say particularly of the British Government today-I defy anybody to say what the policy of the British Government in a postwar world is today, because it is a coalition government and consists of probably as many different ideas as there are men.

May I say off the record

[Discussion off the record.]

Mr. VORYS. Will the gentleman yield? I would like to put this slant on Churchill's expression and Eden's expression. There is one other possibility, and I think this is a fundamental possibility, that in dealing with us the British know that almost any suggestion they would make any definite suggestion they would make-would have between two and three strikes on it right at the outset. Therefore, they also know and we know, and I mean this is not mere surmise on my partI think I know what I am talking about-that, therefore, they are in a position that they have to wait until something definite comes from our side along this whole thing.

UNANIMOUS, NONPARTISAN COMMITTEE ACTION

And I would like to make just one further suggestion along that line, which I feel quite confident I know what I am talking about on that one; on this one there may be some disagreement among us, but I think that it applies somewhat in a similar way: the State Department, the President of our own country have been reluctant apparently

15 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden visited Washington in March 1943.

to light on any particular formula. I think for a somewhat similar reason that those who do not like the President and do not trust him very much and do not think well of his administration might be tempted to seize on anything, any specific thing and say, "Well, now, that is one thing we are against;" and therefore it seems to me that whatever comes up on the other hand-if some prominent Republican person would make some specific suggestion-then there might be those in the administration, there would be somebody in the administration might feel bound to say, "That is the one thing we are not going to do." Therefore, you boil down to where the thing, as much as we can do it, boils itself out of a committee that was constituted under our laws and traditions long before this particular thing came up and that, if it is possible to do so, can come forth to the public as a committee suggestion, as a nonpartisan suggestion, as a bipartisan suggestion, and if possible as a unanimous suggestion by those who represent apparently quite different points of view.

Mr. BURGIN. There are all kinds of postwar problems. He [Churchill] contends that winning the war is the first thing and we do not want to begin to squabble here with each other before the war is won. I heard him say-I think that is perhaps what he had in mind. I think that he was referring to the Ball resolution. I agree with you. Chairman BLOOM. Mrs. Bolton.

GRASS ROOTS' SUPPORT AVAILABLE

Mrs. BOLTON. I haven't very much to say, Mr. Chairman, but I do want very much to say this resolution of Mr. Fulbright's with the addition of the words "law and order" would seem to me to meet what is growing to be a very vital need here in this country. I have been for some months having a sort of clearinghouse process taking place in my office and in Cleveland to write in any ideas they might have about the postwar era and peace. It sums itself up very well in their need to know and to feel that we in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House and in the Congress are going to be big enough to consider world affairs from just this angle that we are not going to begin with a blueprint and a formula, but that we are going to say to the world that we know we have a place in it and we want to know what that place is and we propose to go about doing it. That would be very much of the feeling of my own district, which has 700,000 people in it of every known race and nation and ideology, and they would concur with the sense of security in some such resolution as this; whereas anything else which would immediately bring up all their differencesand which would immediately bring up all these things which probably Mr. Churchill, as Mr, Burgin suggests, may come we do not want to make probable.

But if we could, before the recess, pass what I agree with Mr. Wadsworth would be very advisable if it could be a concurrent resolution, we could come back after the recess with the sense that we have set up an ideal for our thinking processes; and we do not intend to permit a 4 months' considered agreement or contract of any sort to be put over on the world again but propose to have it come up from the roots of the people.

71-567-76

TIMING, STRATEGY, FORMAT

Chairman BLOOM. May I ask a question there? The only difficulty is, as has been explained here, if you bring out a concurrent resolution and they have a House resolution and bring it out on the floor, it is apt to be amended in such a way that you would not want to go back home to the voter.

Mrs. BOLTON. Maybe it won't come to the point of discussion on the floor.

Chairman BLOOM. You mean to report it?

Mrs. BOLTON. That is what I mean.

Chairman BLOOM. That is one thing.

Mrs. BOLTON. I am sorry if I gave that impression. Perhaps I used my words wrong. I did not mean that.

Chairman BLOOM. The thought in my mind—and I just want to make this inquiry especially to you, Mr. Wadsworth-do you think you would put some "whereases" into this resolution, whatever it is, explaining it? Of course, that would not go into the resolution as it is passed.

Mr. WADSWORTH. I would not. I think the "whereases" would be surplus.

Chairman BLOOM. It is just a thought. I would like to call on just a few of the members.

Mr. GORDON. I have not much to say; however, I believe that this resolution of Mr. Fulbright is really a timely one and I am in accord with the idea.

Mr. JARMAN. I just want to comment, I note this optimism about a recess. I hope it is well founded.

Chairman BLOOM. Mr. Schiffler.

CAUTION AGAINST ANGLO-RUSSIAN ACCORD

Mr. SCHIFFLER. I think we may just as well be realistic about this situation. I do not believe Mr. Churchill is going to tell us the entire British story. I think there is an agreement there today between Russia and Britain. Just how far that might go in the future control of European affairs I am not familiar with. I do not know. On the other hand I think our President is in a somewhat embarrassing position whereby he may not even dare project an idea of this kind. I agree with the suggestion of Senator Wadsworth that by the addition of the words "law and order" this resolution in its present form-reporting it out prior to the recess but not voting upon it and giving it very wide publicity—is the proper step.

And I believe that we as the leaders-we are the leaders, we are bearing the brunt of at least the financial operations of the world today; we bore them in the last war-I think we must assume some place in this world picture and assert that leadership with strength and courage. I admire Mr. Churchill for his capacity and for his ability to represent British interests. I think we might well do the same or at least set something out here, indicating we expect to have a voice in world affairs and not going to eternally participate in carnages the world over without having something to say as to how they shall be settled and not just end up as we did in the last war and probably

will in this unless some constructive steps are taken. Nothing will be accomplished and we are only laying the foundation for future wars. My opinion is to report this out with such slight addition as has been discussed and publicize it widely and making it a concurrent resolution would be very wise on the part of this committee.

Chairman BLOOM. Now we will go in order, if you don't mind, Mr. Fulbright, as there are others who want to be heard. Mr. Jonkman. Mr. JONKMAN. I just want to say in reply to what Mr. Vorys said, Britain has two strikes on her at the very beginning, but on the other hand, as Mr. Schiffler just said, they are ably represented. It depends a good deal upon what their attitude is; on the other hand they can also use it this way, "You want to buy this nice big ideal? All right, pay the price." She is sitting back.

EARLY AMERICAN INITIATIVE

Mr. SCHIFFLER. I might say this, Mr. Chairman, if we are going to do anything at all with respect to what the postwar world is, we must at least start to exercise that leverage today. We cannot wait until the war is completed and victory is achieved and then go in and ask for anything. I think we have to secure that leverage today. If we do not secure it today it will be lost and forever gone to us.

CONCURRENT OR JOINT RESOLUTION?

Mr. VORYS. I would like to make this suggestion for the thought of the committee. The suggestion has been made that this be a concurrent resolution. We go back to this one that was enacted here, which was approved April 1, 1941. Then the Monroe Doctrine was a joint resolution. It had this advantage, that although you could take a microscope and probably could not find any legislative force in the thing, yet you follow the pattern of having it approved by the House and the Senate and sent it to the President for his approval, and then when it is enacted it is indeed the enactment of the Government of the United States. The language of the Monroe Doctrine-leaving out the whereases was, "Resolved that the United States would not recognize a transfer" and so forth.

Now, it seems to me that if the House would have a perfect right to express their view by a House resolution, the Congress by a concurrent resolution can express its views. But if it were possible that when each one acts on something they then express their view, and if it is in a form that it can go further, then it is possible of a more united statement. If you have a resolution which is, we will say, patterned after this one, which no doubt received a great deal of study, and the statement, whatever it is-as to our broad ideals as to our foreign policy-were passed by the House, by the Senate, signed by the President, that would indeed be a very formal commitment as to a broad ideal and statement of policy, and if we left out on the other hand, left out the President by using the mechanism of a concurrent resolution-and in this thing I think we want to look under the bed for burglars and try and see all the bugs we can ahead of time-the question is whether it could be taken or construed as being an attempt by Congress to say something regardless of what the President thought.

STATE DEPARTMENT'S ROLE

Mr. WADSWORTH. I would have no objection to that procedure from the standpoint of the principle involved. But if it is to be made a joint resolution requiring affirmative action by the President to become effective, I imagine it would be the duty of this committee to send a copy of the joint resolution to the State Department.

Chairman BLOOM. Absolutely.

Mr.VORYS. I think it would be our duty.

Mr. WADSWORTH. That would be following the usual course. We would have to do that as a matter of common decency.

Mr. JARMAN. I think it is a good idea anyhow.

Chairman BLOOM. The Chair would not act upon any resolution without getting some advice.

Mr. WADSWORTH. If it should be done that way, I suggest it be done confidentially.

Chairman BLOOM. That is the only way.

Mr. JARMAN. I think so, too.

Mr. VORYS. So long as we, say, 25 of us, can show that the thing was introduced a long time ago, and so long as we can show that we share at least the responsibility for originating this thing and that it is not something that has been shoved into the committee. Not that there is any objection to the administration ordinarily requesting something, but in this sense, if we can make it clear it originated here and it has been submitted in advance, in the ordinary course, to the department and the department would no doubt want to take some pains to say, maybe say, "This is the kind of matter that is up to the Congress"-I do not know how they figure it out, but they say it. And so they go along and complain along the line of the idea, this is an attempt to put the administration on the spot or put the Senate on the spot or an individual on the spot. It is an attempt, as the Senator says, to grope around and find the highest common denominator we can as to our aspirations. I think it might have some advantage.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION FORMAT

Chairman BLOOM. The Chair would like to say then, I think if we really mean to try to pass this resolution-whether it is a concurrent or joint resolution-I think you would have a fair chance to pass it through as a concurrent resolution rather than as a joint resolution, because the way I understand it we are just reporting the views of the Congress. Now, if we are going to pass a joint resolution which is not satisfactory, you may find agitation may be brought up somewhere that we do not want this to be laid on the President's desk. I do not think it is going to add any weight to it at all by making it a joint resolution.

I think I did say "joint resolution" at the beginning. What I meant by that was to have it as an expression of the Senate and the House. I think by making it an expression of the Senate and the House without the President being compelled to sign it, that you are apt to pass it a great deal quicker than you would if it has to go to the President afterward. I would prefer to have it a concurrent resolution.