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On this point, now for the first time solemnly defined, theologians have been always, thus far, substantially agreed. A controversy has, however, existed among them as to whether the revelation itself forms a part of the motive of faith. Of course no one ever said that the sole authority of God in itself is sufficient. A revelation is evidently an essential condition for faith; hence the Council says "the authority of God revealing." The controversy is perhaps, to a great degree, verbal; but, in as much as the revelation, in itself and apart from the person revealing, has no weight whatever, it derives its whole moving force from being God's revelation.

10. It is defined (a) that, for the reasonableness of our faith, together with the interior helps of the Holy Spirit, God willed that there should be external proofs of the revelation, especially miracles and prophecies; and (b) that these proofs-miracles and prophecies-are most certain, and (c) suited to the understanding of all.

These definitions are opposed to errors that have been advanced, in different forms, in our own as in former times, some by infidel writers, some by Protestants, some, though rather obscurely, by Catholics.

11. It is defined that we are bound to believe, with divine and Catholic faith, not only those things which the Church, by her solemn definition, proposes to be believed as revealed, but also all that, "by her ordinary and universal teaching," she thus proposes.*

A section of the Jansenists held that the solemn definition of a General Council was, at least in certain cases, necessary in order that the faithful should be bound to believe. The present definition is, however, not so important in reference to this manifest error, as in reference to certain productions of Catholic writers, chiefly in what is called popular controversial theology.

12. It is defined (a) that God has endowed His Church with clear notes (evidences) of her divine institution, so that she can be known by all as the guardian and teacher of revealed truth; (b) that to the Catholic Church alone belong all the divinely established motives [especially miracles and prophecies] of the evident credibility of the Christian faith; (c) that the Church, by herself [i. e. abstracting from the aforesaid evident motives of credibility], possesses a great and permanent motive of

The definition is, in form, new; but, of course, not so the doctrine affirmed in it :-" Aliquid potest constitui de fide per Universæ Ecclesiæ consensum, quando omnes fideles conspirant in aliquo dogmate firmiter credendo, cum quo unanimi consensu non potest stare falsitas et deceptio: quia Deus assistit Ecclesiæ, ne tota decipiatur."-Lugo, de Fide, d. 1, n. 277.

credibility, and an indisputable witness of her own divine mission; this motive and witness consisting in "her wonderful propagation, her conspicuous sanctity, her exhaustless fruitfulness in all good things, her Catholic unity, her unconquerable stability."

Observe, you have here enumerated the four great notes of the Church-Unity, Sanctity, Catholicity, actual and potential ("Catholicitas facti et juris"), Apostolicity-the latter being included in the unconquerable stability.

13. For this reason, and also because God gives grace for perseverance in the faith, never deserting until deserted, it is defined that no one, having received the faith, can have a just cause (a) for changing it (b) or calling it in doubt (Can. iii. 6). From this definition it follows that invincible ignorance can never be pleaded for apostacy from the faith.

Chapter IV. Of Faith and Reason.-14. It is defined that there is a twofold order of knowledge, each distinct from the other, not only in their principle [source from which the knowledge comes], but also in their object [the truth known]. (a) They are distinct in principle; "because in one we know by natural reason, in the other we know by divine faith." (b) They are distinct in their object; "because, besides the truths which our natural reason is able to come to the knowledge of, there are other truths proposed to our belief, mysteries hidden in God, which we can know only through divine revelation."

15. It is defined (a) "that human reason, enlightened by faith, and seeking zealously, piously, and calmly, attains, by God's grace, some, and that a most profitable, understanding of mysteries . . but (b) can never attain a perception of them, such as it may attain of the truths which constitute its own proper object."

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16. It is defined (a) that, though faith be above reason, there can never be any real opposition between them; (b) and, as any such imaginary opposition arises, (i) either from the doctrines of faith being wrongly understood, (ii) or from holding false opinions as the dictates of reason; it is defined (c) that, therefore, every assertion contrary to faith is utterly false.

17. It is moreover defined (a) that the Church, as guardian of the deposit of faith, has from God the right and the duty of condemning science falsely so called; and (b) that, consequently, the faithful are absolutely bound to account as errors all such opinions as are known to be contrary to the doctrine of faith, especially if condemned by the Church.

18. (a) Inasmuch as reason proves the foundations of faith, and, enlightened by it, cultivates theological science; while

faith protects reason from error, and gives it manifold additional knowledge; (b) it is defined that, therefore, not only no opposition can exist between faith and reason, but each gives support to the other.

A perfect illustration of this definition is furnished in the treatise "de Deo ejusque attributis," in almost every page of which reason and revelation, their exquisite harmony, the support given by each to the other, are displayed with marvellous precision and force and beauty. In no other theological treatise is exemplified more strikingly the true saying, that the study of scholastic theology, blended with dogmatic, tends very powerfully to lift up the mind to high and holy thoughts; to draw it off from the things of earth and time, and pillow it on the bosom of the eternal serene. Of course the suitable dispositions are supposed, among which are mental aptitude, including a certain amount of imaginative faculty, and a keen relish for the study. To one who addresses himself to any study whatever, as a mere task, as a work to go through and have done with, that study, however in itself at once elevating and attractive, will be a mere burden, not elevating, perhaps depressing.

19. The Council moreover declares (a) that, in as much as the Church is neither ignorant of nor despises the benefits that men derive from human arts and sciences; (b) nay, in as much as she acknowledges that, as they come from God, the Lord of all knowledge, so, if rightly used, they, His grace assisting, lead to Him; (c) therefore, so far from opposing the cultivation of them, she, in many ways, aids and promotes it. (d) Nor does the Church forbid that these sciences should, each in its own sphere, make use of their own principles and their own method. (e) But, while recognising this rightful liberty, she carefully guards against (i) their imbibing errors, by opposing the divine teaching, (ii) or invading and disturbing the domain of faith, by transgressing their own limits.

These definitions constitute a complete body of Catholic doctrine on a subject that has become in our day of the highest importance-the proper provinces of Faith and Reason, together with the true and harmonious relations existing between them. The definitions are clear as they are complete.

20. At the close of the Canons corresponding with this Chapter, (a) it is defined that it is not enough to keep clear of heretical doctrine, but that those errors which approach more or less nearly to such doctrine are to be carefully avoided: (b) and the duty is declared of observing the Pontifical constitutions and decrees, in which such errors are condemned as are not expressly enumerated in the present Constitution of the Council.

First Dogmatic Constitution on the Church of Christ.-In the Introduction to the Chapters of this Constitution, the Council proposes to set forth the Catholic doctrine on (a) the institution, (b) the perpetuity, and (c) the nature or properties of the Apostolic Primacy. The definitions on the institution and perpetuity are given in the two first chapters, those on the properties occupy the third and fourth. Accordingly in Chapters I. and II. Of the Institution of the Apostolic Primacy in Blessed Peter, and of the Perpetuity of the Primacy of Blessed Peter in the Roman Pontiffs, it is defined, (21) in general terms, that the primacy, not of honour only, but of real and true jurisdiction over the universal Church was given by our Lord immediately and directly to S. Peter.

22. And that this same primacy is, by the same divine right, continued unceasingly to the successors of S. Peter, the Roman Pontiffs.

Chapter III. Of the Power and Nature of the Primacy of the Roman Pontiff.-The nature and compass of the primacy of jurisdiction, thus defined in general terms, is in this chapter evolved and specified in detail. Accordingly it is defined (23) that this jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff is ordinary and immediate.

24. And that all the members of the Church, pastors and people, individually and collectively, are bound in obedience to it, (a) not only in matters of faith and morals, (b) but also in whatever appertains to the discipline and government of the Church throughout the whole world.

For our non-theological readers it may be necessary to offer a few words of explanation on the phrases "ordinary jurisdiction" and "immediate jurisdiction." The meaning of these phrases will be best understood by briefly stating the two errors to which they are opposed. Several Gallican theologians formerly held that the Pope, though having jurisdiction in the whole Church and in every part of it, could not exercise this jurisdiction in the dioceses of other Bishops against their will, unless in some extraordinary case, as in that of urgent necessity; that, except in such case, he could not, for example, go into the diocese of another Bishop, and there, without reference to him, proceed to ordain priests, appoint to parishes, enact laws, &c.; that, in short, his jurisdiction, out of his own diocese of Rome, is mediate and not immediate. Of course the Pope never has interfered and never will interfere in the common every-day functions of Bishops, unless for some reasonable cause. But the full and strict right to act so and so is one thing; the prudent and salutary use of that right (of which the Pope is sole supreme judge) is quite another thing.

The Jansenists went much farther, and maintained a far more pernicious heresy, a heresy subverting the Church from her very foundation. They held that the whole ecclesiastical jurisdiction was given by Christ to the body of the faithful, and by them communicated to the pastors of the Church and to the Roman Pontiff himself; and that, consequently, the jurisdiction of the Roman Pontiff is delegated and not ordinary-not attached permanently and by divine right to his office. This error had been repeatedly condemned by the Popes, especially by Pius VI. in the bull "Auctorem fidei," issued against the synod of Pistoia, prop. 2 and 3.

25. It is defined (a) that, in virtue of this supreme jurisdiction over the universal Church,. the Roman Pontiff has the right of free communication with the pastors of the whole Church and with their flocks, in teaching and ruling them in the way of salvation. As a consequence (b) the doctrine is condemned which affirms (i.) that this communication can be lawfully impeded, (ii.) or that acts done by the Apostolic See, or by its authority, require for their validity any sanction of the secular power.

26. As a further evolution of the supreme jurisdiction, it is defined (a) that the Roman Pontiff is the supreme judge of the faithful; (b) that, in all causes that come under ecclesiastical adjudication, recourse may be had to his judgment; (c) and that, as there is no authority higher than his, his decision cannot be overhauled or judged by any one. (d) Wherefore, the opinion is condemned which asserts the lawfulness of an appeal from his decisions to an ecumenical Council, as to a higher authority.

Chapter IV. Of the Infallible Teaching of the Roman Pontiff.This definition, so long longed for, is given in words of as much clearness and precision as human language is capable of. It shuts out every possible evasion. The sacred doctrine is enshrined in an adamantine tabernacle, which no spear of man or devil can ever penetrate to the end of time.

27. (a) It is defined, (i.) as a revealed dogma, (ii.) that the Roman Pontiff, when speaking ex cathedrá, that is, when, as Pastor and Doctor of all Christians, he, by virtue of his supreme Apostolic anthority, defines any doctrine on faith or morals to be held by the universal Church, (iii.) is endowed with the same infallibility with which our divine Redeemer endowed His Church in defining any doctrine on faith or morals; (b) and that, therefore, such definitions of the Roman Pontiff are irreformable of themselves, and not from the consent of the Church.

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