fiftance, on their part, impracticable.

General Jourdan made a refolute ftand upon that day. He defeated the Auftrian general, Stzaray; and would have totally deftroyed the troops under his command, notwithflanding his fkill and their bravery, had not the whole of the archduke's army arrived in time to relieve both him and Wartenfleben, who had not, conjointly, been able to make an effectual impreffion upon the French.

They again continued their retreat, harraffed by the Auftrians; who frequently experienced the fevereft checks, and were obliged to act with the utmost caution against an enemy, whofe inferiority of ftrength alone, procured them moft of their advantages. From the fixth to the fixteenth, feveral obftinate engagements took place between the Auftrians and the French, who routed two of their beft generals, Kray and Hotze, with confiderable lofs. But on the archduke's concentrating his force for a general attack, they withdrew from their pofts on the Lahn, on the feventeenth, and made good their retreat to the Sieg. It was performed with fuch order, and their countenance appeared fo firm and refolute, that the Auftrians, though they were fo much more numerous, did not judge proper to give them much moleftation, and fuffered them to retire with a lofs that was deemed inconfiderable, when compared with the means they had of rendering it much greater.

Thus ended an expedition, from which,at its commencement,the most profperous iffue was expected, and would probably have been derived, had thofe irregularities and depre

dations been duly reftrained, which were fo peculiarly unbecoming and impolitic in the republican and revolutionary army, and had those fupplies of men and of money been feafonably provided, on which the general entrusted with the expedition had confidently relied. The want of pecuniary remittances obliged him to have recourse to heavier exactions than were confiftent with the plan of conciliation, on which the French muft have been confcious, the prefervation of their popularity among the natives of Germany, and of that good will to their caufe, through which they promised themselves, and actually met with during fometime, a very friendly reception from the commonality chiefly depended, The want of reinforcements was a ftill more fatal injury to the enterprife. The extent of country, overrun rather than fubdued by the French, required a far greater force than that commanded by Jourdan, whofe operations were neceffarily ftinted, from the inadequacy of his ftrength to perform them, and whofe activity was perpetually retarded by the defect of means to give it proper fcope.

The loffes of the French, in this expedition, were very confiderable in foldiers and officers of the higheft defert and reputation in their fervice. None, indeed, but fuch could have contended with the far fuperior numbers of excellent troops continually starting up against them from every quarter; nor could have made good their retreat through the vaft tract of country they had to traverfe; their march through which was no lefs dangerous from the hoftility of the inhabitants, than from the indefatigable vigour of a purfuing enemy.

The

The greatest lofs that befel them, in this long and difficult retreat, was that of general Marceau, an officer of the highest character in his profeffion. In the retreat of the Sieg, on the nineteenth of September, while the French were cleaning the defiles of Altankircha, he was entrusted with the protection of their rear. He executed this talk in a masterly and fuccefsful manner. But as he was reconnoitring a wood, occupied by the enemy, he was mortally wounded. So great was the esteem and respect he was held in by the Austrians, that the archduke himself fent his furgeon to attend him; and after he was dead, ordered his body to be delivered to the French, and military honours to be paid to his memory by his own army, in conjunction with the French military.

General Marceau fell in the flower of his age: he had juft completed his twenty-feventh year. But his talents were extraordinary, and excited the firmeft perfuafion, that he would become one of the greatest commanders of the age. He was, by the generality of military people, reputed another Buonaparte. He had, like him, rifen by performing arduous and effential fervices, and was the favourite of the foldiery, who lamented his lofs as that of a friend and protector, as well as of a general in whom they placed the jufteft confidence.

Shortly after his retreat across the Rhine, general Jourdan became fo feriously indifpofed, through the inceffiant fatigue he had undergone during this laborious campaign, that he was obliged to refign the command of the army of the Sambre and Meufe, which was conferred upon general Bournonville, who

was at this time at the head of those forces denominated the army of the north. He had greatly diftinguifhed himself in the campaigns of 1792 and 1793. He fully maintained the reputation he had acquired; and, during the remainder of the campaign, kept the Auftrians continual in check, and defeated them in some very ferious engagements.

In the mean time, the archduke having freed the empire from one of the invading armies, now faw himfelf at liberty to attack the other with a far fuperior force, flushed with victory, and defirous to complete the fuccefs and honour it had gained, by compelling that army in the fame manner to abandon its conquefts in Germany.

Leaving a fufficient ftrength to make head against the French forces he had driven across the Rhine, he fet out at the head of a powerful army in queft of general Moreau, whom he doubted not to compel, as he had done Jourdan, to retire into France.

This refolute and fkilful officer was ftill contending fuccefsfully with general Latour, who commanded the Auftrian forces, and was extremely active in his endeavours to expel the French from Batavia; but Moreau was fuperior to him in every engagement. Finding it, however, impoffible to maintain his ground, in the heart of Germany, after the expulfion of Jourdan's army, againft the immense fuperiority of numbers that were on the point of affailing him, he came to the determination of moving back to the Rhine. He broke up his incampment before Ingolftadt on the 10th of September, and retired leifurely towards Neuburg, overcoming every obstacle in his way,

and

and defeating every corps of the Auftrians that attempted to oppofe him. Elated with the advantage they had obtained over him at Ingolftadt, from whence he had not been able to move without confiderable lofs, they hoped, by means of that fuperiority and ftrength which had rendered them fuccefsful, to have it in their power to moleft him as effectually in his retrograde motions. But the judicioufnefs of his arrangements was fuch, that moft of the encounters were to their difadvantage.

It was not, however, without the most extreme danger and difficulties, that he purfued his march. On reaching the Lech, Latour came up with him; an engagement enfued on the feventeenth, when the Auftrians were totally defeated and purfued as far as Landfperg, in Bavaria. Moreau then crofled the Lech, and proceeded through Ulm, in Swabia, towards the Black Foreft, on the confines of Switzerland. But he was fo closely preffed by Latour, that he was obliged to make a ftand at Steinhoufen, near that foreft, and give him battle. It took place on the last of September, and was fought with uncommon fury on both fides, that of the French efpecially, who faw no alternative between victory and ruin. They defeated the Auftrians, of whom they flew and took confiderable numbers, with feveral pieces of cannon. The corps of emigrants, under the duke D'Enghien, fon to the prince of Condé, fufferred greatly in this action, as they had done fome time before, in a conflict with the republican troops, that happened on the twelfth of September.

Notwithstanding this defeat, Latour remitted nothing of his efforts,

and, ftill confiding in the number and goodness of his troops, haraffed inceffantly Moreau's rear. This officer now perceived that he muft again rifk a general action, and that unless he again defeated the Auftrians who were neareft, they would speedily be joined by fuch numerous reinforcements, that all resistance would be vain. On the fecond of October, a felect body attacked the right wing of the Auftrian army, pofted between Bibarach and the Danube. After routing this, they advanced upon the centre, which was at the fame time vigourously affailed by the centre of Moreau's army. The conteft lafted fix hours, and was extremely bloody on both fides. At length the Auftrians gave way, and were fo completely defeated, that they retired with the utmost expe dition to a great distance from the field of battle. Their lofs amounted to hear five thousand men, killed and taken, twenty pieces of cannon, with feveral ftandards, and a quantity of ammunition.

This victory did not, however, liberate the French from the dangers that still menaced their march to the Rhine. Between them and that river was posted a numerous army, and ftrong bodies infefted their flanks and rear. They proceeded, however, with fuch firmnefs and judgement as to make their way through every impediment, to the Danube, which they croffed on the fixth of October, pushing the Auftrians before them. On the ninth, general Defaix, a very refolute and able officer, attacked the Auftrian corps commanded by generals Navandorf and Petrafch, and fully fucceded in keeping both in check, while the centre of the French boldly enterred the defile

called

called the Valley of Hell, from the frightful appearance of the rocks and mountains that hang over it on each fide, and in many places are hardly the fpace of thirty feet afunder. This valley extended feveral leagues; and at the opening that led out of it, a formidable body of Auftrians was ftationed. Moreau was duly fenfible of the peril he was about to encounter; but no other method remained to extricate him from the many difficulties that furrounded him. Latour, though repeatedly defeated, was ftill in great force. Anxious to regain his reputation, he exerted himself inceffantly whenever the leaft advantage seemed attainable. While this indefatigable enemy preffed upon his rear, every inlet on each fide of the valley was filled with troops, awaiting the moment of aflailing the flanks of the French in their paffage through it. To guard against this multiplicity of dangers, Moreau difpofed of his right and left'in fuch a manner, that the rear part of them protected his entrance into that valley, by facing the forces under Latour, and the van by advancing upon Navandorf and Petrafch on their refpective wings, obliged them to divide their strength and attention. Having made thefe difpofitions, the main body of the French proceeded in compact order along the valley, at the farther opening of which a defperate fight enfued with the Auftrians that guarded it.

But the French cleared their way; as did alfo the rear of their right and left, which marched through with little moleftation; and, having joined their refpective divifions, prefented altogether fo formidable a countenance, that the Auftrians, already disheartened by

their inability to prevent the passage of the French, did not attempt to attack them in the pofition they had taken after leaving the defile, nor in their march to Friburgh, where they arrived the next day.

This celebrated action took place on the twelfth of October. It completed the fecurity and fuccefs of one of the most memorable retreats recorded in the military annals of modern times. It covered with glory the troops that performed it, and the general that commanded them. Throughout the whole of his expedition, Moreau had difplayed confummate abilities. He had furmounted obftacles of every kind, and penetrated into the very heart of the empire. He had taken poffeffion of Augsburgh and of Munich, the capitals of Bavaria, and compelled the elector to fue for peace. Had not the ill-fortune attending Jourdan's army difconcerted his plan, it was highly probable that he would have marched into Auftria, and forced the emperor to accept of any peace that he could have obtained, difcomforted as he then was in every quarter, and deprived of any other means to fave himself from apparent deftruction.

In the mean time, it cannot be denied, that the light in which the French directory perceived and reprefented the expeditions of its armies into Germany, was a true one. The princes of the empire were detached from the coalition; immenfe fums were levied, which defrayed the expences of the invafion; and a powerful diverfion was formed in favour of the expedition into Italy.

But it ought equally to have been acknowledged, as above, that thefe expeditions contributed to remove the partiality entertained

for the French, from the minds of all the people in Germany, when they faw with how little reafon they had expected to be benefit ed by the fucceffes of thofe licentious invaders. Nothing lefs than their infamous conduct to the people, who had long viewed them with benevolence, and had received them with cordiality, could have effaced the impreffion which had fo univerfally taken place in their favour. The Germans now became convinced of their error, in expecting that a foreign nation would be fincerely folicitous to rid them of their grievances, and would not rather make use of the opportunity of rendering them fubfervient to their own purposes.

But that confequence of the forced retreat of the French from Germany, which politicians efteemed most deserving of confideration, was the immediate influence it had over the councils of the court of Berlin. While the French appeared irrefiftible, it harboured and undertook defigns of a nature tending at once to revolutionize the whole empire, and to exact the dominion of Pruffia equally on the fall of Auftria and the ruin of the fmaller ftates of Germany. The movements and fucceffes of the French in Italy and on the Rhine, and the establishment on the part of Pruffia of a great military force in Nuremberg, feemed to indicate a plan for furrounding the emperor, by a wide circle, at the fame time that they laboured for his destruction, by interior attacks. The French armies contracted more and more the quarters of the Auftrians on the Rhine; the pofition of the Pruffians, at Nuremberg, precluded the army under the archduke from retreating

by the way of the Danube, otherwife than through their connivance, which, according to the ufual policy of the court of Berlin, must be purchafed by fome important concef fion. In a word, according to human views, the abafement, if not the ruin, of the house of Austria feemed to be fast approaching; and the liberties of the inferior states already to have fallen. It was, therefore, with univerfal fatisfaction that Germany beheld the Pruffian monarch's affociates in these iniquitous defigns, disabled from giving him affiftance or countenance. The world indignantly beheld the affected moderation he affumed, by pretending to relinquish his ufurpations on the ground, that the inhabitants of the diftricts he had seized, would not confent to become his fubjects, nor the empire itself be prevailed upon to authorize him to accept of their fubmiffion. His ambition appeared altogether of a mean and contemptible kind. It was evident he would have facrificed his common country to ftrangers, for the fake of promoting fome paultry interests, the compaffing of which would never have indemnified him from the danger he must have incurred by introducing fo formidable and restless a people into Germany as the French. Their interference in its internal affairs would, in all likelihood, have been exerted without confulting his inclinations and interest, and might much more fhortly than he imagined, have been extended to his own concerns, in a manner that would have affected him most detrimentally, and afforded him ample caufe to repent of the fordid motives that had induced him to act against his country.

France, though difappointed in the great projects it had formed in