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clearly and diftin&tly announced, that the contracting parties reciprocally promife not to lay down their arms without the reftitution of all the dominions, territories, &c. which may have belonged to either of them before the war. That the date of this ftipulation was previous to their annexing the Auftrian Netherlands to France; and the notoriety of this ought, at the very moment when they had paffed that law, to have convinced them, that, if adhered to, it must prove an infurmountable obftacle to peace. I applied his maxim to the Weft India iflands, and to the fettlements in the East Indies; and asked him, whether it was expected that we were to wave our right of poffeffion, and be required ftill to confider them as in tegral parts of the French republic which must be restored, and on which no value was to be fet in the balance of compenfation. I alfo ftated the poffible cafe of France having loft part of what the deemed her integral dominions, inftead of adding to them,, in the courfe of the war, and whether then under the apprehenfion of ftill greater loffes, the government, as now composed, should confider itself as not vefted with powers fufficient to fave their country from the impending danger, by making peace on the conditions of facrificing a portion of their dominions to fave the remainder. M. Delacroix faid, this was ftating a cafe of neceffity, and fuch a mode of reafoning did not attach to the prefent circumstances. I readily admitted the first part of this propofition, but contended, that if the power exifled in a cafe of neceffity, it equally exifted in

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all others, and particularly in the cafe before us, fince he himfelf had repeatedly told me that peace was what this country and it's government wished for, and even wanted.

M. Delacroix, in reply, fhifted his ground, and, by a ftring of arguments founded on premifes calculated for this purpose, at temped to prove, that from the relative fituation of the adjacent countries, the prefent government of France would be reprehenfible in the extreme, and deferve impeachment, if they ever suffered the Netherlands to be feparated from their dominions; that by the partition of Poland, Ruffia, Auftria, and Pruflia, had increafed their power to a moft formidable degree; that England, by its conquefts, and by the activity and judgment with which it governed its colonies, had redoubled its ftrength-Your Indian empire alone, faid M. Delacroix with vehemence, has enabled you to fubfidize all the powers of Europe against us, and your monopoly of trade has put you in poffeflion of a fund of inexhauftible wealth. His words were, empire dans l'Inde vous a fourni les moyens de falarier toutes les puiffances contre nous, et vous avez accaparé le commerce de manière que toutes les richeffes du monde fe verfent dans vos coffres."

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From the neceffity that France fhould keep the Netherlands and the left bank of the Rhine, for the purpofe of preferving its relative fituation in Europe, he paffed to the advantages which he contended would refult to the other powers by fuch an addition to the French

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dominions. Belgium (to ufe his word) by belonging to France, would remove what had been the fource of all wars for two centuries paft, and the Rhine, being the natural boundary of France, would enfure the tranquillity of Europe for two centuries to come. I did not feel it neceffary to combat this prepofterous doctrine; I contented myfelf with reminding him of what he had faid to me in one of our last conferences, when he made a comparifon of the weaknefs of France under its monarchs, and its ftrength and vigour under its republican form of government. "Nous ne fommes plus dans la décrépitude de la France monarchique, mais dans toute la force d'une Republique adolefcente," was his expreffion; and I inferred from this, according to his own reafoning, that the force and power France had acquired by its change of government was much greater than it could derive from any acquifition of territory; and that it followed, if France, when under a regal form of government, was a very just and conftant object of attention, not to fay of jealousy, to the other powers of Europe, France (admitting his axiom) was a much more reafonable object of jealoufy and attention under its prefent conftitution than it ever had yet been, and that no addition to its dominions could be feen by its neighbours but under impreffions of alarm for their own future fafety and for the general tranquillity of Europe. M. Delacroix's anfwer to this was fo remarkable that I muft beg leave to infert it in his own words.—“ Dans le tems rezolutioneve tat ce que vous dites, my lord, etoit vrai➡rien n'egaloit notre puiffance; mais ce tems n'existe

plus. Nous ne pouvons plus lever la nation en masse pour voler au fecours de la patrie en danger. Nous ne pouvous plus engager nos concitoyens d'ouvrir leurs bourfes pour les verfer dans le trefor national, et de fe priver même du neceffaire pour le bien de la chofe publique."-And he ended by faying, that the French republic, when at peace, neceffarily mutt become the moft quiet and pacific power in Europe. I only obferved, that in this cafe the patlage of the republic from youth to decrepitude had been very fudden; but that still I never could admit that it could be a matter of indifference to its neighbours, much lefs of neceffary fecurity to itself, to acquire fuch a very extenfive addition to its frontiers as that he had hinted at.

This led M. Delacroix to talk of offering an equivalent to the Emperor for the Auftrian Netherlands, and it was to be found, according to his plan, in the fecularization cf the three ecclefiaftical electorates, and feveral bithopricks in Germany and in Italy.

He talked upon this fubjects as one very familiar to him, and on which his thoughts had been frequently employed.

He fpoke of making new electors, and named, probably with a view to render his fcheme more palatable, the ftadtholder and the dukes of Brunswick and Wurtemberg as perfons proper to replace the three ecclefiaftical electors which were to be reformed.

It would be making an ill ufe of your lordship's time to endeavour to repeat to you all he faid on this fubject; it went in subftance (as he himself confeffed) to the total fubverfion of the present conftitution of the Germanic body;

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and as it militated directly against the principle which both his majefty and the Emperor laid down fo diftinctly as the bafis of the peace to be made for the empire, I contented myfelf with reminding him of this circumftance, particularly as it is impoffible to difcufs this point with any propriety till his Imperial majefty becomes a party to the negotiation. I took this opportunity of hinting, that if on all the other points France agreed to the propofals now made, it would not be impoffible that fome increase of territory might be ceded to her on the Germanic fide of her frontiers, and that this, in addition to the duchy of Savoy, Nice, and Avignon, would be a very great acquistion of ftrength and power. M. Delacroix here again reverted to the conftitution, and faid that thefe countries were already conftitutionally annexed to France. I replied, that it was impoffible, in the negotiation which we were beginning, for the other powers to take it up from any period but that which immediately preceded the war, and that any acquifition or diminution of territory which had taken place among the belligerent powers fince it firft broke out, muft neceffarily become fubject matter for negotiation, and be balanced against each other in the final arrangement of a general peace. You then perfift, faid M. Delacroix, in applying this principle to Belgium? I anfwered, moft certainly; and I fhould not deal fairly with you if I hesitated to declare, in the outfet of our negotiation, that on this point you must enterain no expectation that his majefty will relax or ever confent to see the Netherlands remain a part of France.

M. Delacroix replied, he faw no profpect in this cafe of our ideas ever meeting, and he despaired of the fuccefs of our negotiation. He returned again, however, to his idea of a poffible equivalent to be found for the Emperor; but as allhe propofed was the alienation or the difmemberment of countries not belonging to France even by conqueft, I did not confider it as deferving attention, and it is certainly not worth repeating to your lordthip.

I need not obferve that all the equivalents propofed however inadequate to the exchange, were offered as a return for our confent that the Netherlands fhould remain a part of France, of course the admitting them in any fhape would have been in direct contradi&tion to my inftructions.

M. Delacroix touched very flightly on Italy; and in the courfe of our converfation did not bring this part of the fubject more into difcuffion.

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I must add, that whenever I mentioned the restoration of the Netherlands to the Emperor, I always took care it fhould be understood that thefe were be accompanied by fuch further ceflions as should form a competent line of defence, and that France could not be permitted to keep poffeffion of all the intermediate country to the Rhine; and I particularly dwelt on this point, when I held out the poffibility of admitting an extenfion of the limits of France on the fide of Germany. But as the French minifter no lefs ftrenuously oppofed the reftitution of the Netherlands to the Emperor than I tenacioufly infitted upon it, the further extention M 3

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of my clain could not of courfe become a fubject of argument.

I believe I have now, with a tolerable degree of accuracy, informed your lordship of all that the French minifter faid on my opening myself to him on that part of my instructions which more immediately relates to peace between Great Britain, his Imperial majefty and France. It remains with me to inform your lordship what paffed between us on the subject of our refpective allies.

On the articles referving a right to the court of St. Petersburg, and to that of Lisbon, to accede to the treaty of peace on the ftrict fatus ante bellum, the French minifter made no other remark than by mentioning the allies of the republic, and by inquiring whether I was prepared to fay any thing relative to their interefts, which certainly the republic could never abandon. This afforded me the opportunity of giving in the confidential memorial B. relative to Spain and Holland, and I prefaced it by repeating to him the fubftance of the first part of your lordship's, No. 12.

Although I had touched upon the fubject of the Spanith part of St. Domingo, when I had been speaking to M. Delacroix on the peace with France, yet as it did not become a matter of difcuffion between us till I came to mention the peace with Spain, I thought it better to place all that paffed on the fubject in this part of my difpatch; it was the only point on which he entered; but I by no means infer from his not bringing forward fome claims for Spain, that we are not to hear of any in the course of the negotiation; on the contrary, I

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have little doubt that many, and most of them inadmiffible, will be made before it can end. He, however, was filent on them at this moment, and confined all he had to fay to combating the idea that Spain was bound by the treaty of Utrecht not to alieniate her poffeffions in America. I had the article copied in my pocket, and I read it to him. He confeffed it was clear and explicit, but that circumftances had fo materially altered fince the year 1713, that engagements made then ought not to be confidered as in force now. I faid that the fpirit of the article itself went to provide for diftant contingencies, not for what was expected to happen at or near the time when the treaty was made, and that it was because the alteration of circumftances he alluded o was forefeen as poffible, that the claufe was inferted; and that if Spain paid any regard to the faith of treaties, the muft confider herself ás no less strictly bound by this claufe now than at the moment when it was drawn up. I went on by faying, that it did not, however, appear quite impoflible that point might be fettled without much difficulty; and that means might be devifed that his Catholic majefty fhould not break his faith, and both England and France be equally fatisfied. I then held out to him, but in general ternis, that either Spain might regain her poffeffion of St. Domingo, by making fome confiderable ceffion to Great Britain and France, as the price of peace, or that, in return for leaving the whole of St. Domingo to France, we fhould retain either Martinico or St. Lucia and Tobago. M. Delacroix liftened with a degree of

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attention to these propofals, but he was fearful of committing himself by any expreflion of approbation, and he dismissed the fubject of the court of Madrid, by obferving, that France never would forfake the interefts of its allies.

Our converfation on those of its other ally, Holland, was much longer, as the wording of the memorial inevitably led at once deep into the fubject.

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lefted poffeffion. You mean by this, faid M. Delacroix, the Cape and Trincomale. I faid they certainly came under that defcription, and I faw little profpect of their being reftored to the Dutch. M. Delacroix launched forth on this into a most laboured differtation on the value of the Cape of Good Hope, which he did not confider at all as a port de relache, but as a poffeffion which, in our hands, would become one of the most fertile and mot productive colonies in the eaft; and, according to his eftimation of it, he did not fcruple to affert, that it would ultimately be an acquifition of infinitely greater importance to England than that of the Netherlands to France; and, if acquiefed in, fhould be reckoned as a full and ample compenfation for them. He added, if you are mafters of the Cape and Trincomale, we fhall hold all our fettlements in India, and the islands of France and Bourbon, entirely at the tenure of your will and pleafure: they will be our's only as long as you chufe we fhould retain them. You will be fole mafters in India, and we thall be entirely dependant upon you. I repeated to him, that it was as means of defence, and not of offence, that thefe poffeffions would be infifted on, and that if the matter was fairly and difpaffionately difcuffed, he would find that they offered us a great additional fecurity, but no additional power of attack, even if we were difpofed to difturb the peace of that part of the world. If thefe, and perhaps fome few other not very material fettlements belonging to the Dutch, were to be infifted upon, and if he would be pleafed to enumerate

M. Delacroix affected to treat any deviation from the treaty of peace concluded between France and that country, or any refloration of territories acquired under that treaty to France, as quite impracticable. He treated as equally impracticable any attempt at reftoring the ancient form of government in the Seven United Provinces. He talked with an air of triumph of the establishment of a national convention at the Hague, and with an affectation of feeling, that by it the caufe of freedom had extended itself over fuch a large number of people. He, however, was ready to confefs, that from the great loffes the Dutch Republic had fuftained in its colonies, and particularly from the weak manner in which they had defended them, it could not be expected that his Majefty would confent to a full and complete reftitution of them, and that it was reasonable that fome fhould be facrificed; and he afked me if I could inform him, how far our views extended on this point? I faid I had reafon to believe that what his Majefty would require would be poffeffions and fettlements which would not add either to the power or wealth of our Indian dominions, but only tend to fecure to us their fafe and unmo

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