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who have kept a lurking sort of tenderness for him that they dare not show openly, but which they cherish in their hearts, just as they hide his photographs in a secret recess of their drawers. Farmers of this class, who are outwardly under the control but inwardly independent of the Bond, know very well that Mr. Rhodes is their best friend, and that he will always help them, because in helping them he will work for the good of the country. The one great mistake which is always made in South African affairs is the failure to differentiate between the Bond, who will never accept English rule or supremacy, and the reasonable part of the Dutch population, who only want to live peacefully, and who deplore the race hatred as much as we do. They see the situation as it really is, not with the eyes of the Jingoes of their party. The latter insist that the present war has been brought about by English desire for the possession of the Transvaal gold fields. They are absolutely wrong in this pretense, as well as when they imagine that the securing of funds for needy British citizens, by acts of Parliament and secret service grants, with substantial personal bonuses, is the final ambition of Mr. Rhodes. Absurd as they are, those opinions are professed by the rank and file of the Bond party, though not shared by a considerable part of the Dutch population-a fact which alone would be sufficient to prove that the words Dutch and Bond are not synonymous.

To explain fully Mr. Rhodes's power in South Africa, it would be necessary to look back on the growth of the Imperial policy as applied to the Transvaal, but that would lead us too far. It is sufficient to say that he undoubtedly contributed to its expansion by developing Rhodesia, running a telegraph wire from the Cape to Cairo, negotiating a railway, and tracing a thin red line almost unbroken from North to South of Africa. It was then that he became the idol of Imperial England, which has proved itself now so ungrateful to him; and it was then that Mr. Chamberlain began to watch his flowing tide, whilst at the same time giving his attention to the Transvaal policy. The external relations of the Transvaal were controlled by England, which was responsible for its security from attack; but the disquieting symptom in the general situation was that Krüger required an extensive police force extensive, inasmuch as his internal policy was irritating to people unaccustomed to oppression. The undercurrents of communication with Germany which have played such an impor

tant part in Transvaal politics were taken as one with Germany's recent history and her colonial ambitions in Africa. Krüger's armaments were known to be immensely in excess of his internal requirements, and his burghers, who must not be confused with the Cape Dutch, openly talked of war with England at the favorable moment. The taxation was enormous, and the revenues were materially devoted to arming and intrigue. Any British Governor or Consul who, years ago, failed to read the writing on the wall must have been diplomatically insane. The chief difficulty of the Imperial Cabinet was to convince the nation of their danger, and one of the reasons why the Bond so bitterly hate Mr. Rhodes, and why England ought to support him, is that he saw that, under the profession of great loyalty, the aim of the Afrikander policy was to disguise its real ambition. This policy was largely successful, played as it was for all it was worth through the medium of Mr. Labouchere, Dr. Clark, and even Mr. John Morley. A curious illustration of this fact is the following incident which was related to me by a member of the Cape Legislative Assembly. He was talking to a rich farmer, a member of the Bond, in one of the districts where most of the inhabitants have joined the Boers. The farmer was repeatedly affirming the loyalty of the Afrikanders in general and himself in particular to the English Crown, when suddenly as the conversation drifted on to the battle of Spytfontein, which had just been fought, he confidentially remarked: "There is just one point I am a little uneasy about; I am afraid the Boers have not enough cannons!"

Such men hate Mr. Rhodes, not because he betrayed them, as they say, when he raided Krüger, but because he is a great Englishman and a still greater Imperialist; and public opinion in England ought never in judging him to lose sight of this fact. But, curious to say, at the same time this Imperialism, which is well known and everywhere accepted in South Africa, gives Mr. Rhodes a certain popularity amongst the Dutch whose social policy and hatred of the English are incongruous. While professing their hatred of England, they hail with delight the marriage of one of their daughters to an Englishman, boast of the connection, and tell you with a feeling of pride, when they can do so, "This is my daughter; she is married to an Englishman"; and there seems to be something omitted when they say so, such as: "And there is therefore nothing for you to despise, inasmuch

as she is your national equal." It has always seemed to me (of course, I may be mistaken) that the principal reasons of the race hatred are: (1) the English look down on the Dutch, who in turn hate them for doing so; so much is this the case that, while it is among the Dutch themselves a half compliment to remind a man that he is an Englishman, it is a half insult to tell another that he is a Dutchman; (2) the English opinion of the native; this was the originating cause of the Transvaal and Free State Republics, and without it there would be no war to-day; (3) the religious gulf between the two races. The language question is probably another factor, but I do not think it is a material one. The position of nominal subordination to England accounts for a peculiar feature of this hatred, in that it is directed against the English as a nation and not as individuals. This explains why Mr. Rhodes is still popular amongst some Dutch, just as it explains why, although these Dutch are hostile to Great Britain, they would yet fight with her against a European nation that would try to assume a footing in South Africa. I am sure that, if only Mr. Rhodes were allowed a free hand, one of the chief results of the war would be the early disappearance of race hatred. It is not lightly that I make this statement, and I was certainly of the opposite opinion six months ago, but I have since convinced myself that I was wrong. The Dutchman of South Africa, and in this word I also include the Transvaal Boer, will always submit when he once fully recognizes the superior strength of his master. When convinced of it, the Boers will accept the inevitable, and, in making the best of it, probably discover all the advantages to be derived in time from the new conditions in which they find themselves placed. It is for this reason that I firmly believe that a really Imperial settlement, such as the one Mr. Rhodes came over to England to advocate and urge on the Government, would mean a consolidated and highly prosperous South Africa.

What would his rôle be in case this dream of his, a united South Africa under the British flag, came to be realized, which we must all hope will happen soon? It is difficult to foresee. The man is so great that if God granted to him that fulfilment of his hopes, possibilities would be opened to him which his own energy and tact alone would limit. The English would bow down to him, as to the man who first brought under their notice this new accession of power for their country, and the Afrikanders would

give way to the secret leaning they have always had toward him. His chief difficulties would be the existence of the Jingoes of both the South African League and the Bond, and one of his greatest problems would be to win back the moderate Dutch to true allegiance to the English Crown. It would not be so difficult as it at first seems. The Boers love an idol. Remove Mr. Hofmeyr's influence by proving to them that he had not their interests so much at heart as they imagined, destroy the glamour of the Transvaal, and what is left but Mr. Rhodes, the only real power in South Africa, the only man whose personal influence over his fellow creatures will withstand any kind of attack? Men like the Schreiners, Moltenos, Merrimans, and all the present Bond leaders, are but tinsel statesmen to the Afrikanders. They are of themselves. But Rhodes, the Imperialist, the man in whom thousands of people in England as well as over the whole world believe is the magician they will yet follow, and statesmen in England ought not to overlook this fact nor intrench themselves behind the Raid to condemn a man whose help they cannot afford to lose in the settlement of affairs in South Africa.

Apart from these considerations, Mr. Rhodes has got another important asset in his favor; that is, the present position in which the Bond is placed. It can only exist as a paramount factor in the Cape Parliament, and cannot afford to play a losing game. Once its power is broken its end is not far distant. Mr. Hofmeyr has built its organization on almost personal lines; he has no possible successor amongst the men of his party, and several of its rank and file have been only elected by very narrow majorities, which may easily dwindle into minorities if too many rebels are disfranchised, as undoubtedly will be the case after the war is over. For the present they have the upper hand, and they try to keep it in stirring up public opinion against Mr. Rhodes by saying that he is the creator of the present race hatred of the English which prevails amongst them; but that is only an excuse, as the feeling existed long before Mr. Rhodes was born. It founded the Transvaal sixty years ago, and it has caused the present trouble.

The reason of the Bond's animosity against Mr. Rhodes is that they thought they had converted him to their way of thinking, and they have never been able to forgive him for having left them in that belief, and omitted to take them into his confi

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dence at the time of the Jameson raid. But years go on, and in time when Mr. Hofmeyr will have been removed from the sphere of African politics, which must necessarily occur, the Bond itself, if it still exists, will look with more lenient eyes on the "Colossus" and not hold back to the bitter end, as it now says it will do.

The Dutch both in the Cape Colony and in the Transvaal, coming more and more in contact with the English, will naturally turn to Mr. Rhodes for at least material, if not political, support. He has so identified himself with South Africa that no one living in it will ever dream of turning in its needs toward any one else. Governors only represent a distant authority; besides, they are changed. Mr. Rhodes is always there, and, as all are aware, never fails to redress, if he can do so, the wrongs of those who come to him in their need.

As for the Bond, it is doomed to languish and disappear. It is more than probable that the Cape Progressives will win the next election by a small majority. Mr. Rhodes will then be obliged, whether he likes it or not, and whether the Government at home likes it or not, to assume the Premiership. And public opinion in England ought not to forget this, or to attack in such an unjustifiable way as the "British Officer" of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW does, a man who, very soon, perhaps, will become a responsible Minister of the Crown, and the representative of Imperialism in South Africa--the representative of an intelligent Imperialism, an Imperialism backed and supported by all the different parties in the country, an Imperialism which shall give itself the task of peacefully absorbing the Dutch into the English element, indueing the former to work in conjunction with the latter for the establishment of a new policy on purely Imperial lines. And one must not object that this would be impossible on account of the Jameson raid. The last word has not yet been spoken with regard to the raid, and perhaps time will show that Mr. Rhodes was in this sad business just as generous as he was imprudent, just as ready as he ever is, when he thinks it necessary for his country's welfare, to sacrifice his person in order to screen its prestige-even when that prestige is embodied in the person of Mr. Chamberlain, who is always as willing to disavow anything or anybody he believes to be compromising to himself, as he is forgetful of services rendered to him in the past.

When once the Progressive party has succeeded in command

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