The Philosophy of Mind: An IntroductionCambridge University Press, 1986 - 282 من الصفحات This is a straightforward, elementary textbook for beginning students of philosophy. The general aim is to provide a clear introduction to the main issues arising in the philosophy of mind. Part I discusses the Cartesian dualist view which many find initially appealing, and contains a careful examination of arguments for and against. Part II introduces the broadly functionalist type of physicalism which has Aristotelian roots. This approach is developed to yield accounts of perception, action, belief and desire, and the emerging theory of the mind is compared at each stage with rival historical and contemporary views. In Part III the functionalist approach is further explored in giving analyses of sensation, thought and freedom of will. The discussions throughout are exceptionally clear, and the writing uncomplicated, to make available to the students a wealth of detailed argument in the philosophy of mind. |
المحتوى
Introduction | 3 |
Arguments for Dualism | 16 |
Descartess Argument | 31 |
Difficulties for the Dualist | 45 |
Assessing the Dualist Theory | 62 |
Towards a Better Theory of the Mind | 69 |
An Aristotelian Framework | 71 |
Perception and SenseData | 85 |
Assessing the Functionalist Theory | 177 |
Sensation Thought and Freedom | 191 |
Sensations The Phenomenological Theory | 193 |
Sensations Functionalism and Consciousness | 207 |
Thinking | 223 |
Reasons and Causes | 237 |
Causality and Freedom | 252 |
Chronological Table | 269 |
Perception and the Acquisition of Beliefs | 103 |
Action and Volition | 119 |
Two Theories of Belief | 135 |
The Function of Beliefs | 152 |
Functionalism and Folk Psychology | 163 |
Guide to Further Reading | 270 |
Bibliography | 275 |
279 | |
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عبارات ومصطلحات مألوفة
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