unauthorized leaks of security information: O All government employees and contractors with access to Sensitive Conpartments Information would be required to sign a contract agreeing to prepublication review of their writings for life. This would involve some 128,000 government employees. The massive use of polygraph examinations was to identify those government employees who might be expected to leak information. As many as one half million government employees would be subject to polygraph examination. O Contacts between those who have access to highly classified information and the media were to be restricted, although the mechanism for this was never spelled out. 4 While the reliance on the polygraph seems strange in the light of recent studies attacking its validity, the most serious consequence of the Directive from the perspective of the science community is the disincentive for scientists to serve in government. Most of our leading scientists and engineers have at some point in their careers served the government in positions that required access to highly classified information. It is not clear how many would undertake such service if the consequence involved censorship of their writings for life. Following hearings before the Senate Government Affairs Committee, Senators Charles Mathias (R-MD) and Thomas Eagleton (D-MO) introduced an amendment in the Senate to the State Department Authorization Bill barring the lifetime censorship provisions of the prior review contract, except for CIA and NSA employees. The amendment carried easily. In the House, hearings were held by the Committee on Government Operations Subcommittee on Legislation on the National Security chaired by Jack Brooks (D-TX). Brooks later introduced the Federal Polygraph Limitation and Anti-censorship Act of 1984. Faced with this mounting criticism from Congress, the White House suspended implementation of NSDD 84 but stopped short of actually withdrawing it. The record of Congress on issues of freedom of scientific communication is murky. What is clear is that the science community has failed to convince to Congress or the Administration of the essential role of free communication in scientific or technical progress. The exchange of results and ideas is such a natural part of scientific research that few scientists are able to trace the origins of their inspirations. The task is now to explain that somewhat wild process to non-scientists. References 1. Committee on Sciences, Engineering, and Public Policy, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy of Engineering, Institute of Medicine, Scientific Communications and National Security (National Academy Press: Washington, D.C., 1982). 2. Mitchel B. Wallerstein, "Scientific Communication and National Security in 1984" Science, 224 (1984), 460-466. 3. Robert E. Marshak, "The Peril of Curbing Scientific Freedom, " Physics Today, 37 (Jan. 1984), 192. 4. Scientific Validity of Polygraph Testing: A Reseach Review and Evaluation (Office of Technology Assessment: Washington, D.C., 1983); D. T. Lykken, "Polygraphic Interrogation," Nature, 307 (1984), 681-684. New York Chichester Brisbane Toronto Singapore Cosponsored by the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, and the Commentary on the NAS Report Rosemary Chalk The National Academy of Sciences' report Scientific Communication and National Security presents an attractive but incomplete solution to a political problem that contains irreconcilable social choices. It also provides an interesting example of how a "technical fix" can be used in the interactions of science and politics. The report emerged from a process in which a select group of scientists and policy-makers translated politically divisive issues into a set of cost-benefit questions based on unstated assumptions. Those questions were then substituted for the policy conflict itself and, in the process, changed the terms of the debate. The report emerged from the discussions of a nineteen-member panel chaired by Dale Corson, President emeritus of Cornell University. Appointed by the National Academy of Sciences. (NAS) in May 1982, the panel met several times during Summer 1982 with governmental officials and with representatives from various scientific and educational groups. Initially commissioned as a one-year study, the final report was prepared and published about six months after the panel was formed. The panel was charged by the NAS to examine the various aspects of the application of controls to scientific communication and to suggest how to balance competing national objectives so as to best serve the general welfare. Rosemary Chalk is an Exxon Research Fellow for 1982-83 in the Program in Science, Technology, and Society, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and is on leave as Program Head of the Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, American Association for the Advancement of Science, Washington, DC 20005. The original goals therefore were to identify the various social interests at stake in the scientific communication/national security debate ("to balance competing national objectives"), to formulate a set of objectives which would promote the national interest in this debate ("best serve the general welfare"), and to suggest ways in which alternative forms of information controls would promote or weaken the common good. Political debate on these issues has centered on competing views over how U.S. national security interests should be fostered and protected. One school of thought-represented primarily by those associated with scientific and educational interests-argues that openness is an essential feature of our national strength, and that openness should be protected even though the United States might "lose control" over state-of-the-art information in selected scientific or technical fields. Those who share this concern believe that openness in science is both an end in itself—part of traditional American respect for freedom of speech-and a means to enhancing greater scientific productivity and creativity, economic growth, and education. These factors in turn not only contribute to the advancement of military strength but also independently foster a broader foundation for national security. Those who advocate controls primarily persons with ties to the defense and/or intelligence communities—argue that that without military strength there is no national security and that increased attention should be given to maintaining U.S. control over advanced technology. To foster military superiority, therefore, the Federal government should restrict (and certainly should not aid) the transfer (or "leakage") of advanced technologies or information about those technologies to adversary nations. From the perspective of the advocates of control, even though state-of-the-art 1983 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Science, Technology, Human Values, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp. 21-24 (Winter 1983) CCC 0162-2439/83/010021-04501.80 |