138. J. David Singer, "Peace in the Global System: Displacement, Interregnum, or Transformation," The Long Postwar Peace, p. 84. On balance of power vs. hegemonic stability theories, see Jack S. Levy, "Long Cycles, Hegemonic Transitions, and the Long Peace," Ibid., p. 148: "Whereas balance-of-power theory hypothesizes that the threat of hegemony is a sufficient condition for a counter-coalition of other great powers and therefore for a general war, hegemonic theory hypothesizes that hegemony is a sufficient and perhaps necessary condition for the absence of a major war." On bipolar stability, see Oye, Cooperation Under Anarchy, Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 132-138, 163-176, and 192; Stephen Van Evra, "Primed for Peace. Europe After The Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter 1990-91, pp. 33-40; and Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 46.

139. Waltz, Theory of International Relations, p. 173. See also Gaddis, Cold War, pp. 151-152, and Steel, p. 110, who points out that despite costs, the cold war provided something for all major parties as it developed into "an eminently workable international system. It was predictable, economically manageable, politically useful, and militarily unthreatening." On the early use if not the first use of the term "superpowers," see Reynolds, p. 248, and William T. R. Fox, The Superpowers: The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union-Their Responsibility for Peace, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944. Fox's criteria still applies to the United States which demonstrated in the Gulf War "great power plus great mobility of power." Ibid., p. 21.

140. Milovan Djilas, Conversations With Stalin, trans. Michael B. Petrovich, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961, p. 114.

141. Seyom Brown, The Faces of Power, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, p. 217. On the two categories of alliances, see Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, "Alliances and the Preservation of the Postwar Peace: Weighing the Contribution," The Long Postwar Peace, p. 277-278.

142. During the tenure of such a quintessential hardliner as John Foster Dulles, for example, the East German and Hungarian revolts occurred without American action. The two notable exceptions were Korea and Cuba; but mixed signals certainly played a major role in both cases: the former because of the 1949 drawdown of American troops and the famous Dean Acheson speech to the National Press Club the following year; the latter because of U.S. inaction in the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

143. "Nuclear weapons did not cause the condition of bipolarity; other states by acquiring them cannot change the condition." Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 180. Nye, "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," pp. 371-402. See also Alexander L. George, "Factors Influencing Security Cooperation," U.S.-Soviet Cooperation, pp. 655-678;

Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989; and Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

144. Joseph Kruzel, "Arms Control, Disarmament, and the Stability of the Postwar Era," The Long Postwar Peace, pp. 266-267, and George, Farley and Dallum, passim.

145. On loose bipolarity, see Alexei Filitov, "Victory in the Postwar Era: Despite the Cold War or Because of It?", End of the Cold War, p. 82. Kegley and Raymond, p. 285.

146. Tucker and Hendrickson, p. 6; Steel, p. 111; and Cumings, p. 87. On the linkage of U.S. domestic attitudes, institutions and perceptions to the recreation of Germany and Japan, see Dallek, pp. 146-150. John Mueller has noted of Japan: "Without benefit of missile or bazooka it has obtained status, influence, respect and admiration; and it inspires emulation, envy and genuflection. If that's not power, who needs it?", Retreat from Doomsday, p. 223.

147. Ruth Leger Sivard, World Military and Social Expenditures 1989, Washington: World Priorities, 1989. See also Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "Explaining Great-Power Peace: The Sources of Prolonged Postwar Stability," The Long Postwar Peace, p. 8; Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "International Crisis and Global Instability: The Myth of the 'Long Peace'," Ibid, and Eliot Cohen, "Distant Battles: Modern War in the Third World," International Security, Vol. 10, No. 5, Spring 1986, p. 186.

148. Leonard S. Spector, The Undeclared Bomb, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988, p. 4. See also Reynolds, p. 248.

149. James A. Nathan and James K. Olwer, United States Foreign Policy and World Order, Boston: Little, Brown, 1986, p. 453. See also Gaddis, Cold War, pp. 196-197, and Strategies of Containment, pp. 28-29 and 59-61.

150. John H. Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," World Politics, Vol. IX, 1957, pp. 473. Herz elaborated on this in International Politics in the Atomic Age, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, and then reconsidered a decade later. "For the time being, or so it appears, it is not internationalism, 'universalism,' or any other supranational model that constitutes the alternative to the territorial, or nation-state, system, but genuine, raw chaos." John H. Herz, "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the the Future of the Nation-State," International Politics and Foreign Policy. A Reader in Research and Theory, ed., James N. Rosenau, New York: Free Press, 1969, p. 88.

151. Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," pp. 473-474.

152. Brian Jenkins, New Modes of Conflict, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1983, p. 17. See also Holsti, p. 272.

153. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr., Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed., New York: Harper Collins, 1989, p. 10. For the specific comparison of the ideal type of complex interdependence with the realist paradigm, see Ibid., Chapter 2. See also Gaddis, "International Relations Theory," p. 41.

154. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 94-95. The problem, Waltz emphasized, "is not to say how to manage the world, including its great powers, but to say how the possibility that great powers will constructively manage international affairs varies as systems change." Ibid., p. 210. See also Ibid., chapters 7-9; Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics, pp. 244-245; James E. Thomson and Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty," Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges, pp. 195-197; and Fareed Zakaria, "Is Realism Finished?" The National Interest, No. 30, Winter 1992/93, p. 28.

155. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, p. 94. See also James N. Rosenau, Turbulence and Change in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 15; Krasner, International Regimes, p. 2; and Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics," Neorealism and Its Critics, p. 15. For an attempt to create a theory of institutions with liberal implications based on premises that are consistent with those of political realism, see Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

156. Rosenau, Turbulence and Change in World Politics, p. 247. See also James N. Rosenau, "Interdependence and the Simultaneity Puzzle: Notes on the Outbreak of Peace," The Long Postwar Peace, pp. 309-313. In 1989, Rosenau termed the multicentric system as "complementary" rather than an "emergent new world order." Transitions, he conceded, must have continuity as well as change. "Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges," p. 12; and Werner Link, "Reflections on Paradigmatic Complementarity in the Study of International Relations," Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges, pp. 99-116.

157. Brzezinski, "Cold War and Its Aftermath," p. 47, and Hoffmann, "A New World and Its Trouble," p. 276.

158. See Gaddis, Cold War, Chapter 11, for the concept of what he refers to as the forces of "Integration" and "Fragmentation," and Rosenau, "Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges," p. 8, who develops a similar

concept which he refers to as "Centralizing" and "Decentralizing" tendencies.

159. Hamerow, pp. 210-225 and 300-309; Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989, pp. 254-255; and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power, New York: Basic Books, 1990, p. 188.

160. Nye, "What New Order?," p. 85. See also Brzezinski, Between Two Ages, p. 19, who believes that the more helpful image is von Laue's one of the "global city"—"a nervous, agitated, tense and fragmented web of interdependent relations...better characterized by interaction than by intimacy."

161. Ibid., p. 91, and Gaddis, Cold War, p. 199.

162. Asa Briggs quoted in Zakaria, p. 28.

163. Ibid. See also Thomson and Krasner, p. 195.

164. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," World Politics, Vol. XL, January 1988, p. 239. But also see Nye, "What New World Order?", p. 88.

165. Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World, New York: Basic Books, 1986, pp. 78-79 and 212-213. As Robert Jervis has pointed out, there is almost a circular logic in the liberal argument, with interdependence developing in part because of expectations of peace, while the economic benefits of close economic interdependence make peace more likely. "A Useable Past for the Future," The End of the Cold War, p. 260; Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 138-139; Gaddis, Cold War, p. 183; Gaddis, "Theories of International Relations," p. 42; and George, "Factors Influencing Security Cooperation," pp. 655-678.

166. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1990/91, Vol. 70, No. 1, Winter 1990/91, p. 24.

167. Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday, p. 257. See also Holsti, pp. 283 and 328. For the tendency to romanticize revolutionary violence, see Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam, New York: Vintage, 1972, pp. 589-590, in which she looks forward to the day when "the narrow flame of revolution" will "cleanse the lake of Vietnamese society from the corruption and disorder of the American War."

168. Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, p. 230, and A.F.K. Organski, World Politics, 2nd ed., New York: Knopf, 1968, Chapter 14. As early as 1981, Kenneth Waltz advocated the proliferation of nuclear capabilities to smaller powers as a key way to help them coexist in a self-help world. "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better," Adelphi Paper No. 171, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981. In 1990, he continued to advocate the gradual proliferation of nuclear weapons as a way to reinforce stability. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science Review, Vol. LXXXIV, September 1990, pp. 733-734. That same year, John Mearsheimer asserted that Europe could be stabilized with a "limited and carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons." "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," International Security, Vol. XV, Summer 1990, p. 54. For the idea of making Germany a nuclear power, see Richard Uleman, "Enlarging the Zone of Peace," Foreign Policy, Fall 1990. See also Gaddis, Cold War, p. 111, and Robert C. Johansen, "Do Preparations for War Increase or Decrease International Security?", The Long Postwar Peace, pp. 236-238.

169. Tucker, "1989 and All That," p. 228; Thomson and Krasner, p. 216; and Keohane and Nye, p. 249, who emphasized that they made no assumption that interdependence would lead to increased cooperation or have benign consequences. Interdependence, they pointed out, did not make power obsolete.

170. On the persistence of hegemony even after the demise of the original conditions that gave rise to it, see Keohane, After Hegemony, pp. 182-216. But see Susan Strange, "The Name of the Game," Sea Changes, pp. 253-255 and 258, who believes that American hegemony is not in decline, that there is, instead, a shift in the basis of American power, but not a loss of that power. See also Filitov, pp. 84-85.

171. Regimes are defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." Krasner, p. 2. See also Filitov, p. 86; Zakaria, pp. 28-29; and Kupchan, p. 131, who concludes: "When inter-state cooperation has already begun to emerge because of shifts in elite beliefs, and the Realist assumptions of a competitive self-help world are thus relaxed, a fertile ground exists for institutions to play a much more prominent role in shaping state behavior." But see Tucker, "1989 and All That," p. 229, who points out: "While a hegemonic power, if determined to do so, can impose a solution on the conflicts arising from interdependence, partners can only disagree."

172. Katzenstein, p. 292.

173. Owen Harries, "Fourteen Points for Realists," The National Interest, No. 30, Winter 1992/93, p. 109. See also Thomson and Krasner,