belligerent operations. The Locksun, having been shown to have taken the part of a supply ship for The Geier, is, in the opinion of this Government, stamped with the belligerent character of that vessel, and has really become a part of her equipment. In this situation it is difficult to understand on what basis it would have been possible to distinguish between the two vessels, so as to intern the one and not the other. This Government, therefore, has taken what appears to it to be the only reasonable course, under the circumstances, and directed that both vessels be interned.'

The doctrine thus laid down in a case involving Germany was, upon the request of the German Ambassador, applied to Great Britain. Thus, in a note of December 21, 1914, addressed to Mr. Lansing as Counselor, the German Ambassador stated that "the British S.S. Mallina and Tremeadow, who served as tenders to British cruisers, now demand to be allowed to coal in Panama and to leave for Australia, alleging that they have ceased to be tenders of British warships." On this statement of facts the Ambassador called Mr. Lansing's attention to the fact that, "as far as can be seen from here, their case, in the principal points, is identical with the case of the German steamship Locksun." On the 23d of the same month Mr. Lansing as Counselor wrote as follows to the German Ambassador:

In reply to your note of the 21st instant, with reference to the British S.S. Mallina and Tremeadow, which you state have served as tenders to British cruisers, and are demanding coal in the Panama Canal Zone, I would advise you that these vessels have been considered by the Canal authorities as coming under Rule 2 of the President's proclamation of November 13 last in relation to the neutrality of the Panama Canal Zone, which accords to transports or fleet auxiliaries the same treatment as that given to belligerent vessels of war.2

SECTION 8. COALING OF WARSHIPS IN PANAMA CANAL ZONE

The proclamation of neutrality issued by the President stated the principles whose observance the United States would require from belligerents during the course of the war and the treatment which the United States would, in accordance with the law of Nations, accord to belligerents in appropriate cases. It was recognized that

'Official text, American Journal of International Law, Special Supplement, July, 1915, pp. 247-248. 2 Ibid., p. 209.

the Panama Canal Zone, although subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, required very special regulation in order that its neutrality might not be compromised and that it might not, by becoming a base of hostile operations, suffer, because of its geographical position, by the acts or operations of the belligerents. It was also recognized that the Republic of Panama was deeply interested in the regulations concerning neutrality which the United States might draft and promulgate concerning the use of the Canal during the war, and because of this fact a protocol was concluded by Mr. Lansing, then Counselor and Acting Secretary of State, with the Panama Minister to the United States. On October 10, 1914, after reciting the close association of the interests of their respective Governments and that the neutral obligations of both Governments as neutrals might be maintained during the war, the two Governments agreed upon the following article:

That hospitality extended in the waters of the Republic of Panama to a belligerent vessel of war or a vessel belligerent or neutral, whether armed or not, which is employed by a belligerent power as a transport or fleet auxiliary or in any other way for the direct purpose of prosecuting or aiding hostilities, whether by land or sea, shall serve to deprive such vessel of like hospitality in the Panama Canal Zone for a period of three months, and vice versa.1

Without an understanding of this kind a belligerent war vessel could enjoy the hospitality of the Canal Zone and immediately thereafter the hospitality of Panama, and the Zone as well as the Republic would be liable to be used as a base of hostile operations.

It was charged that this regulation operated to the advantage of Great Britain and to the disadvantage of Germany. Secretary Bryan's letter of January 20, 1915, puts the question on its proper basis as one of geography, which the United States could not control. Thus Mr. Bryan said:

By proclamation of November 13, 1914, certain special restrictions were placed on the coaling of warships or their tenders or colliers in the Canal Zone. These regulations were framed through the collaboration of the State, Navy, and War Departments and without the slightest reference to favoritism to the belligerents. Before these regulations were proclaimed, war vessels could procure coal of the Panama Railway in the zone Official text, American Journal of International Law, Special Supplement, July, 1915, p. 201.

ports, but no belligerent vessels are known to have done so. Under the proclamation fuel may be taken on by belligerent warships only with the consent of the canal authorities and in such amounts as will enable them to reach the nearest accessible neutral port; and the amount so taken on shall be deducted from the amount procurable in United States ports within three months thereafter. Now, it is charged the United States has shown partiality because Great Britain and not Germany happens to have colonies in the near vicinity where British ships may coal, while Germany has no such coaling facilities. Thus, it is intimated the United States should balance the inequalities of geographical position by refusing to allow any warships of belligerents to coal in the canal until the war is over. As no German warship has sought to obtain coal in the Canal Zone the charge of discrimination rests upon a possibility which during several months of warfare has failed to materialize.1

SECTION 9. FAILURE TO PROTEST AGAINST THE MODIFICATION OF THE DECLARATION OF LONDON BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT

Owing to the geographical situation of the United States it would only be indirectly or incidentally affected by breaches of neutrality in land warfare, whereas it was likely to be directly affected in its neutral rights in maritime warfare and to be called upon to maintain its rights as a neutral over belligerent vessels within its jurisdiction, to perform its duties as a neutral toward belligerent vessels and property within its jurisdiction, and to compel obedience to the laws of neutrality by its citizens and all other persons residing within its jurisdiction.

It was foreseen that difficulties would arise, as they had arisen when only two nations were at war, and that they would be many and complicated, given the number of belligerents and the extent of belligerent operations. The United States felt that it would be. highly desirable if the belligerents would agree upon a definite statement of maritime warfare. The United States expressed its willingness to be a party to such a statement for the purpose and during the continuance of the war, and suggested the Declaration of London, which was drafted by ten leading nations in conference at London during the winter of 1908-09-which had been advised and consented to by the Senate of the United States, and which the Government was willing to promulgate, not because it liked, much less approved, all the provisions of this document, but for the sake of

Official text, American Journal of International Law, Special Supplement, July, 1915, p. 265-266.

uniformity. Therefore, the Government of the United States, on August 6, 1914, proposed to the belligerents that they should, for the purposes of the war and during its continuance, accept and apply the principles of the Declaration of London. Great Britain and its allies were willing to do so with certain specified modifications; Germany and Austria-Hungary were willing to accept the Declaration as it was if their enemies accepted it in its entirety, as by Article 65 thereof the Declaration was to be accepted as a whole, not accepted in those parts which were favorable and rejected in those parts which were unfavorable. As Great Britain, on August 22, 1914, and subsequently its allies, refused to comply with the requirements of Article 65, the United States withdrew its proposals on October 22, 1914, leaving the operations of the belligerents to be conducted and to be tested by the law of Nations as derived from the usage and practice of Nations.1 Mr. Lansing's note withdrawing, on behalf of the United States, the suggestion, is so short and states in such clear and precise terms the policy to be followed and which actually was pursued by the United States, that it is here quoted in full:

1

Inasmuch as the British Government consider that the conditions of the present European conflict make it impossible for them to accept without modification the Declaration of London, you are requested to inform His Majesty's Government that in the circumstances the Government of the United States feels obliged to withdraw its suggestion that the Declaration of London be adopted as a temporary code of naval warfare to be observed by belligerents and neutrals during the present war; that therefore this Government will insist that the rights and duties of the United States and its citizens in the present war be defined by the existing rules of international law and the treaties of the United States irrespective of the provisions of the Declaration of London; and that this Government reserves to itself the right to enter a protest or demand in each case in which those rights and duties so defined are violated or their free exercise interfered with by the authorities of His Britannic Majesty's Government.2

Subsequently Great Britain, as the result of its experience, be

Secretary of State to Ambassador Page, Washington, August 6, 1914; official text, American Journal of International Law, Special Supplement, July, 1915, p. 1; British Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ambassador Page, London, August 22, 1914, ibid., p. 3; Chargé Wilson to the Secretary of State, St. Petersburg, August 27, 1914, ibid., p. 5; Ambassador Herrick to the Secretary of State, Paris, September 3, 1914, ibid., p. 6; Ambassador Gerard to the Secretary of State, Berlin, August 22, 1914, ibid., p. 2.

2

Proposal to adopt Declaration of London withdrawn by the United States on October 22, 1914, ibid., p. 7.

came convinced that other provisions of the Declaration were unacceptable as opposed to its interests, and from time to time excluded them, explaining that it did not issue the Declaration of London as such, but as a statement of certain principles of law which it was prepared to accept. It would, however, have been better if Great Britain had rejected the Declaration of London at the outset, adopting at the same time such of its articles, separate and distinct from the Declaration, as it intended to observe. In this way the Declaration would not have had any validity as such, confusion would have been avoided, and the opportunity would have been denied to Germany of charging Great Britain with the violation of the Declaration, which it had a right to repudiate, and of taxing the United States with remissness in not protesting against these violations.

Secretary Bryan was therefore justified in saying on this point:

As this Government is not now interested in the adoption of the Declaration of London by the belligerents, the modifications by the belligerents in that code of naval warfare are of no concern to it except as they adversely affect the rights of the United States and those of its citizens as defined by international law.'

And he was further justified by the diplomatic correspondence of the United States during the period of its neutrality in the statement that "In so far as those rights have been infringed, the Department has made every effort to obtain redress for the losses sustained."'1

SECTION 10. GENERAL UNFRIENDLY ATTITUDE OF UNITED STATES TOWARD GERMANY AND AUSTRIA

It is impossible to read the correspondence between the United States and Germany without being impressed by its uniformly kind and courteous tone, and without noting the stress laid upon the friendship to which appeal is constantly made, and which the American Government at that time apparently thought existed between Prussianized Germany and the United States. The reader experiences a shock, on turning from the German to the British correspondence, to note the

1Official text, American Journal of International Law, Special Supplement, July, 1915, p. 266.