of the Ems dispatch as compared with that produced by the original was not the result of stronger words, but of the form which made this announcement appear as final, while the wording of Abeken would only have appeared as a fragment of negotiations still pending and to be continued at Berlin.

After I had read the condensed text to my two guests, Moltke remarked: "In this form, it has a different ring; it sounded before like a parley; now it sounds like a flourish in answer to a challenge." I went into details: "If in execution of the All-Highest's order I forthwith communicate this text which contains no alterations in and no additions to the telegram, not only to the newspapers, but as well by telegraph, to all our embassies, it will be known in Paris before midnight, and there, not only on account of its contents, but also because of the manner of its distribution, it will have the effect of a red rag upon a Gallic bull. We must fight if we do not want to appear in the rôle of the vanquished without a battle. Success depends essentially upon the impression which the origin of the war produces upon ourselves and others; it is important that we should be the party attacked, and Gallic conceit and excitableness will make of us the party attacked if through a European-wide publicity we announce, so far as we can do so without using the speaking-tube of the Reichstag, that we fearlessly meet the public threats of France.'

The durability of all treaties between great states is conditional as soon as it is put to the test "in the struggle for existence." No great nation can ever be induced to sacrifice its existence on the altar of faithfulness to contract, if it is compelled to choose between the two. The ultra posse nemo obligatur cannot be made ineffective through any contractual clause; nor can any treaty guarantee the measure of zeal and force by which the obligation is fulfilled when the private interest of him who is to fulfill the provisions of the treaty no longer reinforces the text to which he put his signature, and its earlier interpretation. Therefore, if changes occur in the currents of European politics, such as would make an anti-German policy appear salus publica for Austria-Hungary, self-immolation for the sake of faithfulness to treaty could be as little expected as was gratitude in the Crimean War, though the obligation was perhaps stronger than the provisions recorded on the parchment of a political treaty.2

International policy is a fluid element which under certain

1 Bismarck, Gedanken und Erinnerungen, pp. 439-440.

2

Ibid., p. 588.

circumstances becomes a solid for the time being, but in atmospheric changes reverts to its original state. In political treaties

which require the fulfillment of certain obligations, the clausula rebus sic stantibus tacitly is accepted. The Triple Alliance is a strategic position which, in view of the perils threatening at the time of its conclusion, was advisable, and feasible under the then prevailing conditions..

ܐ܂ ܂

The Triple Alliance which I originally sought to bring about after the Frankfort Peace and about which I had already sounded Vienna and St. Petersburg in September, 1870, from Meaux, was an alliance of the three emperors with the further thought of persuading monarchical Italy to join it, and directed to the struggle which, I feared in some form or other confronted the two European tendencies, which Napoleon called the Republican and the Cossack, and which, according to present concepts, I would designate on the one hand as the system of organization on a monarchical basis, and on the other, as the social republic to the level of which, either gradually or by leaps, the anti-monarchical development usually sinks, until the unbearable conditions created under its sway dispose the disappointed people to return, through violence, to monarchical institutions of a Cæsarean form. Since 1871 I have sought for immediate security against those struggles in the alliance of the three emperors and in the effort to secure a firm support in that alliance for the monarchical principle in Italy. . . .2

Treaties are scraps of paper. All depends upon the manner of turning them to account. Even an excellent weapon, in inexperienced hands, may cause more damage than good..

3

(h) Count Helmuth von Moltke (1800-1891) *

You have been kind enough to transmit to me the Manual which the Institute of International Law has published, and you wish my approval of the work.

In the first place, I fully honor the humane endeavor to alleviate the sufferings which war carries in its train.

4

Eternal peace is a dream, not even a beautiful dream; war is a

1 Bismarck, Gedanken und Erinnerung, pp. 596-597.

Ibid., pp. 569-570.

Chiala, Pagine di storia contemporanea (Torino, 1898), vol. 3, p. 498.

Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten des General-Feldmarschalls Grafen Helmuth von Moltke (Berlin, 1892), 8 vols. in 7.

part of God's cosmic system. Man's noblest virtues: courage and self-denial, loyalty to duty, and self-sacrifice even to the staking of his life, are developed through war. Without war the world would sink into materialism. I perfectly agree with that sentence of the preface which announces that advancing civilization will also improve warfare, but I go farther in believing that it alone, and not a codified military law, will be able to attain this goal.

Every law requires an authority to supervise and enforce its execution, and there is no such authority with regard to the observance of international agreements. What third state will take up arms because of two belligerents, one-or both-have violated the lois de la guerre? For such cases, there is no judge on earth. Success can only be expected from the religious and moral education of the individuals, from the sense of honor and from the sense of justice of the leaders who are a law unto themselves and act accordingly, in so far as the abnormal conditions of the war permit.

It cannot be denied that humaneness in the conduct of war has really kept pace with the general progress of morality.

One need but compare the lawlessness of the Thirty Years' War with the wars of modern times.

An important thing for the realization of the desired goal has been found in our day in the introduction of a universal military service which has incorporated the educated classes in the armies. To be sure, the rough and violent elements have also remained in them, but, they are not, as in former times, the only elements constituting the armies.

Two other effectual means remain in the hands of the governments, in order to prevent the worst excesses. On the one hand, the strict discipline introduced and maintained in the armies even in times of peace, and on the other, the administrative foresight for the maintenance of the troops in the field.

Without this foresight, discipline can be maintained in only a limited degree. The soldier who is exposed to suffering and privation, to exertion and danger, cannot be satisfied en proportion avec les ressources du pays; he must seize everything that is necessary to his existence. We cannot demand the impossible of him.

The greatest good in war is its quick termination, and to this end all means, not directly reprehensible, must be used. I can in no manner agree with the Déclaration de St. Pétersbourg that the "weakening of the hostile fighting power, etc.," is the only justified proceeding in the war. No; all auxiliary resources of the hostile

government must be seized: its finances, railroads, necessaries of life, and even its prestige.

With this energy, and yet with more moderation than ever before, the last war against France was waged. After two months of fighting the campaign was decided, and only when a revolutionary government continued it for four months to the detriment of its own country, did the battles assume an embittered character.

I readily acknowledge that the Manual defines in clear and short. sentences, in a higher degree than has been the case in former attempts, the necessities of war. But even the recognition by governments of the rules which it lays down, does not insure their execution. It has long since been a universally recognized usage of war not to fire at the bearer of a flag of truce, and yet this usage was repeatedly violated during the last campaign. No paragraph which has been learned by heart will convince the soldier that the unorganized population which (spontanément, that is to say, of its own impulse) takes up arms and from which he is not safe a moment by day or night, is not a regular enemy (§§ 2 and 43). Specific demands of the Manual are, to my mind, impossible in practice, for instance, the identifying of the fallen after a great battle. Other demands of the Manual would give rise to serious doubt if the insertion of "Lorsque les circonstances le permettent, s'il se peut, si possible, s'il-y-a nécessité, etc.," did not give them an elasticity without which the bitter earnestness of reality would break the chains which they impose.

In war everything must be looked at from its own distinct point of view; I believe that only those paragraphs of the Manual which refer essentially to the leaders, can become effective. The same is true of those parts of the Manual dealing with the wounded, the sick, the physicians and the sanitary materials. General recognition of these principles, as well as those in reference to the treatment of the prisoners would mark real progress towards the aim which the institute of international law is striving for, with such praiseworthy perseverance.

1

'Moltke, Gesammelte Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten, vol. 5, pp. 194-197. This was in reply to a letter from Professor Bluntschli, who, under date of November 19, 1880, wrote as follows:

Herewith, the undersigned has the honor, respectfully to transmit some copies of the Manual Les Lois de la Guerre sur terre, prepared and published by the Institute of International Law, in conformity with the Brussels Declaration, with the instructions recently issued by some European states and with scientific literature. The Commission has sincerely endeavored to harmonize the practices and the interests of the army with the necessary

(i) Adolf Lasson (1832-)1

We, especially in Prussia, are still under the immediate impression of events which, only two years ago, passed before our very eyes, and whose world-transforming importance is every day more and more revealed to the intelligent mind. At the same time everyone realizes the possibility that the great war movement has not even been brought to a momentary conclusion, and that the successes so suddenly obtained must first be secured through new tests. The iron age demands an iron generation.

2

If war is to be done away with, all states must in that case submit to the judgment of a higher court, that is to say, they must renounce being states. This would mark the end of the plurality of states; the universal state would arise and the whole of mankind, at least the civilized part of mankind, would be subject to it. Actual force would be resorted to only against the savages who might perhaps not be forced into the paths of civilization. Removal of war means therefore abrogation of all states and transformation of the whole of civilized mankind into a single political being.

Even as the necessity of doing away with war means the doing away with the plurality of the states, even so does the continuance of the plurality of the states mean that war is unavoidable. For a state cannot exist without a supreme will which wills for the entirety of the state; but between two wills of which each wills for itself, the conflict is ever imaginable and possible, and as long as two states differ from one another, that is to say, as long as they have no common law, no common judge, and are subject to no common compulsion, there is no other means to settle the conflict, except by mutual resort to force, that is to say, to war.

Force per se may be regarded as absolutely justified whenever recalcitrant arbitrariness will not submit to law; but force, before

principles of right and the needs of the civilian world, and to state the laws of warfare in a form fundamentally correct, and comprehensible to the plain mind of any layman and of the ordinary soldier.

The undersigned, and especially the reporter and the other members of the Institute of International Law, would feel much requited and very pleased, if the work, intended for practical use, were to meet with the approval of your Excellency. (Moltke, Schriften und Denkwürdigkeiten, p. 193.)

1 Das Culturideal und der Krieg, von Adolf Lasson (Berlin, 1868), and Princip und Zukunft des Völkerrechts, von Adolf Lasson (Berlin, 1871). 2 Lasson, Das Culturideal und der Krieg, p. 1.

8 Ibid., p. 5.