RUSSIA

PURRED on by the desperate economic situation at home, the Bolshevist authorities during the month under review multiplied their efforts to obtain resumption of trade relations with the outside world. Owing to the alleged temperamental unfitness of Krassin and the other Bolshevist delegates to the Stockholm conference, and to Krassin's insistence on the inclusion of Litvinov— formerly Russian Ambassador at London —in the commission which it was planned to send to England on behalf of the Russian Co-operative Societies, the negotiations fell through. The British Government's refusal to receive Litvinov, expelled from England for subversive Bolshevist propaganda, remained unshaken, while France, on her part, declined to admit the Bolshevist contention that the debt of pre-war Russia should be eliminated from the present Government's obligations—a proposal tantamount to complete repudiation of the debt of 26,000,000,000 francs due France on existing bonds.

The discussions of the Russian problem at the conference at San Remo-described elsewhere in these pages-led to no definite result. The view of Signor Nitti, the Italian Premier, that a resumption of trade should be encouraged was favored in general terms by the allied Premiers, but each nation was left free to take the steps it deemed expedient. France was cool to the project, but both Lloyd George and Nitti expressed their belief that the opening of trade relations was desirable. It was stated, soon after the close of the San Remo conference, that a well-known Bolshevist official, M. Klishko, would visit England to discuss the question. Italy, on her part, opened negotiations with the Soviet ostensibly to discuss the question of an exchange of prisoners, but the plain words of Signor Nitti at San Remo

left no doubt of his intention to reopen trade.

The Soviet authorities, meanwhile, did not remain inactive. A special commercial delegation was sent on April 2 to Copenhagen, where they were joined by Krassin, and on April 23 an agreement was signed with international commercial interests looking to an early resumption of relations. At this time a general industrial and commercial conference, to meet in Copenhagen toward the end of May, was announced. Krassin's attempts to conclude trade relations with Sweden proved abortive. The efforts of Moscow to stir up American interest continued unabated. Through the office of L. A. K. Martens, self-styled "Ambassador" to the United States, an offer was made on April 25 to deliver at Reval $20,000,000 in gold for the opening of a trade credit in this country. Certain American business men, who had booked large orders with the Moscow Government through Martens, discussed this project enthusiastically, expressing resentment at their inability to fill these orders and regret that their European competitors were gaining advantage in the race for Russian trade. The American Commercial Association for Promoting Trade with Russia announced that it would at once send a new appeal to Washington to provide facilities for initiating active commercial relations.

The repatriation of British, German, French and Italian prisoners by Russia continued. The situation in Siberia generally remained unchanged, though a protocol was signed on April 29 between the Japanese, still in control of Vladivostok, and the Russian officials in that city which amounted to the practical elimination of the Russian forces in Far Eastern Siberia.* The alleged arbitrary

*By the terms of this agreement, which were at first resisted by the Russians, all Russian forces were to be withdrawn for a distance of 30 kilometers from the Japanese

zone.

acts of the Japanese military group in Siberia elicited a strong protest from the members of the Interallied Railway Commission to their respective Governments, in which they declared that the guarding and running of the railway lines was being interfered with by Japanese soldiers. General Semenov and the Japanese leaders were said to be working hand in hand. A strong current of anti-Japanese sentiment, however, was setting in, and the general situation gave the Japanese much ground for anxiety. Japanese residents in many towns of Far Eastern Siberia were fleeing to other points. Several hundred Japanese at Nikolaevsk were reported on April 19 to have been exterminated, and on this date the Nippon Government sent two warships and a military contingent. to rescue survivors. Because of Winter conditions, Nikolaevsk could not be reached; meanwhile, however, many Japanese residents were taken off at Alexandrovsk.

The Bolshevist armies, whose advance was so much feared by the Japanese, did not put in an appearance, and the distribution of Moscow's fighting divisions indicated that there was only one Soviet Army in the Far East (the Fifth Army), stationed west of the Lake Baikal region, which was controlled by the Siberian Social Revolutionaries, who in turn were in contact with the Japanese forces. Because of the strained situation and the danger to Japanese residents and property, the Tokio Government saw no immediate prospect of withdrawal. The main object of the Japanese occupationthe repatriation of the Czechoslovak soldiers still remained only partially accomplished. According to Japanese reports, it was important to complete this repatriation as soon as possible, inasmuch as the Czechs, who had long been exposed to Bolshevist virus, were displaying pro Bolshevist sympathies.

There was no confirmation of the report that Moscow's offers of an alliance with China, including support of her national claims against Japan and other foreign aggressors, had been accepted.

With the capture of the three Cossack armies reported on May 4 the whole

campaign against Denikin was virtually liquidated by the Bolsheviki. Denikin himself, after a stay of two days in Constantinople, sailed on a British warship to England. He arrived in London on April 19, accompanied by the children of General Kornilov, who met his death under the Kerensky régime. General Denikin was met by British officials, and England gave him a cordial reception. The question of the treatment to be accorded to his captured army was discussed greatly by Great Britain with the Soviet Government. The Soviet answer to Great Britain's first note was considered highly unsatisfactory, the Soviet taking the ground that there was no essential difference between the position of Denikin's soldiers and that of the Red Communists arrested in Hungary, and implying that Great Britain's intervention in the case of the latter would be expected in return for concessions in the case of the Denikin forces. Further exchanges were continuing.

Relieved of the Denikin menace, the Soviet Government was faced with new dangers in a coalition of the Poles with the Ukrainian forces commanded by Petlura. [For a description of this campaign, in which the Poles and Ukrainians met with considerable success, see the article on Poland.] This new military offensive by Poland in union with Petlura gave much cause for anxiety to the Moscow Government, and had the effect of cementing the bond between Poland and Finland and of deterring the Letts from following Esthonia's example in making peace with Lenin. A long wireless message received at Stockholm toward the end of April protested at Poland's new aggression and stated that the Soviet would not again warn Poland that all negotiations toward peace would be impossible while the Polish forces continued this offensive. Finland's determination to retain the North Russian Finnish territory now in her possession remained unchanged by Moscow's refusal to arrange a temporary armistice for the purpose of discussion.

The economic situation in Soviet Russia remained deplorable in respect to food and fuel shortage, epidemics, lack

Regarding the internal situation, Lenin, at the Ninth Communist Congress, advocated the concentration of power in the hands of one person. Trotzky's system of the military organization of labor was approved. The Soviet propaganda organization continued its world-wide efforts to distribute revolutionary literature. It was pointed out in the Swedish press toward the beginning of April that the Krassin mission should be looked upon with suspicion, and the statements of Zinoviev that all diplomatic negotiations aimed ultimately at the Bolshevization of Europe, and ultimately of the whole world, were pointed to as significant.

The State Department at Washington on April 18 gave out a memorandum through Secretary of State Colby which tended to show that the creation of a "World Soviet Republic" by international revolution was the common object of the Russian Communist Party, the Third Communist International and the Russian Soviets. This memorandum was prepared by D. C. Poole, Chief of the Division of Russian Affairs in the State Department, and all the material presented was from original sources, including the utterances of the Bolsheviki themselves, extracts from their party organs and from the official press, wireless messages from the Soviets, and the publications of the Third International.

defense upon her borders, varied by sporadic conflicts with the Finnish Red Guard, many of whom were Bolshevized Finns. The tendency of the Finnish Government was to make peace with Soviet Russia, but only on condition that the Finnish terms, which embraced frontier rectifications, the obtaining of an icefree port at Petchenga (north of Murmansk) and the taking of a plebiscite in East Karelia, be granted. This policy, as explained by the members of a Finnish political mission sent to England toward the beginning of April, was due to the sentiment that Russia was too powerful a neighbor to make it expedient to continue hostile relations, and also to the urgent necessity for Finland to have a larger food supply. In accordance with this belief Finland took steps late in April to open negotiations for an armistice; but the Soviet authorities, angered, it was said, by the failure of the Krassin commercial delegation to Sweden, refused to stop hostilities. Meanwhile Finland, strengthened by her understanding with Poland, refused to modify her terms, and the relations between the two countries assumed the nature of an impasse.

In Finland itself large labor meetings held on May Day resulted in the adoption of resolutions favoring a general strike. Serious rioting occurred the day Details before, with many casualties.

of the March elections, made available on May 2, showed that the Socialist elements of the Government were growing stronger and had recovered the ground lost after the Red and White terrors. Germany had presented a bill of 127,000,000 marks for assistance in the Finnish war of liberation. It was announced from Washington on April 17 that John Reed, the American magazine writer, had been in jail at Abo since his arrest on March 17 for stowing away on an Abo steamer and for being in possession of large sums of money and much Bolshevist literature of various kinds.

LATVIA

The Lettish negotiations with Soviet Russia, like those of Lithuania, made little headway. This was due partly to the strong showing made by Poland in

the military operations undertaken by that country against the Reds, and partly to the Lettish demands, which the Soviet representatives deemed excessive. The preliminary negotiations for both countries were being held at Moscow in the middle of April. The demands made by Latvia included, besides strategical guarantees, a guarantee of Latvia's independence and the rectification of the Lettish frontier; also an indemnity of 2,000,000,000 rubles for damage done in the war and for railway stock, bank funds, cattle and machinery which the Bolshevist troops carried away. The Letts also asked for a proportionate share of Russia's national gold fund.

The Bolshevist Government was opposed to compensation for war damages, regarding these as a war indemnity which should be waived on both sides. The Letts' claim to Russian national property they proposed to defer for later discussion. They also held that Latvia should give Russia the right to use her ports. By April 30 it had been agreed that Latvia should be independent and that she should take over part of the Russian national debt in exchange for a proportional share of the Russian gold

reserve.

The German Government, it was stated at this time, had agreed to pay the Lettish Government the sum of 150,000,000 rubles as an indemnity for damage done by the troops under General AvalovBermondt.

An unsuccessful attempt was made on the life of the Lettish Premier, M. Ulmanis, in April, in the City of Walk. The would-be assassin escaped. This was the third time that M. Ulmanis had been attacked.

LITHUANIA

Peace negotiations between Lithuania and Soviet Russia were agreed to on April 7. The negotiations began in Moscow on April 15. The independence of Lithuania was agreed to and a delimitation of Lithuanian territory on an ethnographical basis was mapped out. Lithuania insisted on a recognition of her claim to the towns of Vilna and Grodno. The whole question of the Lithuanian frontier dispute with Poland was a vexed one and could not be settled pending the continuance of the Polish offensive on the Soviet front. The temper of the Lithuanian population was dangerous, owing to food scarcity and unsettled conditions, and Bolshevist propaganda was said to be finding here a fertile field.

THOU

HOUGH the main issue before the San Remo Conference was the compulsion of Germany to disarm and to fulfill in other respects the strict letter of the Versailles Treaty, decisions were confirmed regarding the partition of Turkey, and especially the countries lying just to the east of the Mediterranean, which rank in historical importance with the collapse of the Byzantine Empire and the ascendency of the Turk in Europe. These decisions allowed the Sultan to remain in Constantinople, while stripping him of executive power,

internationalized the straits, gave Smyrna and its hinterland, as well as a strip of the southern coast of Asia Minor, to Greece; authorized Italy to retain the strip of this same coast occupied by its forces, delivered a mandate over Syria to France, a mandate over Mesopotamia to Great Britain, and recognized the existence of an independent Arab State, exclusive of the French Syrian protectorate and the new State of Palestine. This last arrangement was not at all to Arab liking, for Emir Feisal had formed far-reaching plans for

the erection of a Pan-Arab State, including Palestine, Syria and even Lebanon, under his own rule. But neither the claims of France nor those of the Zionists could be disregarded by the allied Premiers.

With regard to the three new republics of the Caucasus-Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan-little could be done at the San Remo Conference either in the way of transforming these "Balkan States of Asia Minor" into a bulwark and buffer-State for Great Britain's rule in Egypt, Mesopotamia and India, or in harmonizing the serious problems arising from conflict between these three uneasy neighbors, and from their relations with the ever-present Turk and the militant Bolsheviki of Russia. The impending invasion of the Caucasus by Soviet forces indicated a secret pact between Russia and Turkey, which had for its object the breaking down of the weak Caucasian barrier between them. By May 8 it was reported that Tiflis had fallen into the hands of the Bolsheviki, and that the seizure of Batum by local Bolshevist adherents was momentarily expected. The ultimate fall of the whole Caucasus region under the power of Moscow seemed inevitable.

ARMENIA

The situation in Armenia at the time of the sessions at San Remo may be sketched as follows:

Systematic massacres of Armenians by the Turks, Kurds and Tartars had so decimated the Armenian populations in Turkey that many districts had none left. The whole region that used to be known as Armenia, south of the Black Sea, was swept bare of these unfortunate people; 300,000 refugees had fled from the terrible massacres and were crowded on the soil of the Caucasus republic of Armenia, which has its capital at Erivan, and which is the only Armenia politically existent at present. No Armenian could cross the boundary of this little republic and return to his devastated home in Turkish Armenia without danger of death. [For a full account of this situation see article on Page 504.]

Before any decision could be taken by the Allies regarding Armenia, it was necessary to define and delimit its new boundaries. The problem was almost insoluble. Besides the enormous expense entailed in setting up a new Armenia large enough to defend itself, and in forming an army to drive out the Turks in those parts of it which, under the Armenian plans, should be embraced in their new national confines, it was seen to be imperative to afford Armenia constant protection against the aggressions of their Turkish and Tartar neighbors. Only a nation of great financial resources and great political idealism could venture to undertake such a problem in Armenia's interest. The British, French and Italian Premiers, realizing their own inability either to decide what the final borders of the new State should be, or to undertake to maintain them when delimited, passed the dilemma on to the United States. In a joint note to President Wilson they asked that the United States assume a mandate for Armenia, and that he draw the boundaries of the new republic as he should see fit.

Since this note was dispatched, new difficulties have arisen for the Armenians on the soil of their neighbor, Azerbaijan. The population of this Tartar republic are Turks by ethnology, religion and sympathy. They have long been hostile to the Armenians, and a serious quarrel has existed for some time between their Government and that of Armenia over the question of boundaries. The two nationalities in Azerbaijan are desperately intermingled. Armenian villages are found everywhere in the mountains; the Azerbaijani, corresponding to their later arrival as conquerors, occupy the plains. Conflicts between the two peoples have been constant; the Armenians have been attacked, beaten and in many cases massacred. The murder of a Tartar soldier at Shusha, following a street brawl which occurred in March, led to lynchings of Armenians in the provinces of Karabagh and Zangelour. When the official protests of the Armenian Prime Minister and the Britis' High Commissioner at Tiflis proved fruitless, the Armenian Army marched to Karabagh to