sioners finds that in so far as the interests of Poland and Russia are concerned there is no question, territorial, economic, or of any other nature, that cannot be settled peaceably by means of arbitration, concessions, or mutual agreement, as was done in the case of the negotiations with Esthonia.

The Council of People's Commissioners has directed the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to obtain from the coming February session of the Central Executive Committee for Russia the formal confirmation of the above outlined basis of the policy of Soviet Russia toward Poland by the highest official body of the republic.

The Council of People's Commissioners, for its Own part, believes that, through the present categorical declaration, it fulfills its duty regarding the peaceful interests of the Russian and Polish peoples. It entertains the confident hope that all pending questions between Russia and Poland will be settled through friendly agreements. (Signed)

ULIANOV-LENIN, President of the Council of People's Commissioners. TCHITCHERIN, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs.

TROTZKY, Military and Naval Commissioner.

PILSUDSKI'S VIEWPOINT

In an interview given in Warsaw on Feb. 9, General Pilsudski, Polish Chief of State, affirmed his belief that, despite their peace offer, the Bolsheviki were contemplating a new offensive against the Polish front. They were, he said, strengthening their forces daily and preparing to attack. He conceded that this was out of keeping with the conciliatory tone of the peace note, but explained it as an alternative in case the peace offer to Poland was rejected. He intimated, however, that if such an attack occurred the Polish Army would be equal to the task imposed upon it. Poland needed peace, but would not be intimidated according to the method followed in the case of Esthonia. As to the danger of the spread of the Bolshevist propaganda in case peace were made, he declared that the national sentiment of the country was so opposed to Bolshevism that there was little to fear on this score. One factor in the situation which Pilsudski was considering was the

enormous rise in prices in Esthonia following the Dorpat peace, due to the immediate export of Esthonian commodities to Soviet Russia.

Regarding the attitude of the allied Governments toward Poland's making peace, Lloyd George stated in Parliament on Feb. 19 that the question of peace or war was one that Poland must settle for herself. On the following day Pilsudski came out strongly in favor of making peace. His statement was in part as follows:

The moment to make peace with Russia has come, and it has come not only for Poland but for all the allied countries. Up to now no one has dared to tackle this immense problem. Only half measures have been attempted. Kolchak, Denikin and the rest have constituted a kind of ostrich's wing under which diplomacy has for long months been hiding its head. These half measures are useless and reactionary. It is impossible to revive old Russia by means of its former servants. One must find new methods. We must have courage to admit that a formidable change has come over Eastern Europe. The moment to have that courage has arrived, and we must set to work.

Poland proposes to the Allies to help them in the great task. We are not actuated by any ambition to play a great rôle, but only because, as Poland is the country most directly interested, it is right that she should take the initiative. We are therefore elaborating a plan which seeks to create a legal state of things in Eastern Europe. This plan will soon be submitted to the allied powers. Perhaps it will not be perfect in all its details. Some of its clauses will need to be discussed, but in any case our plan can be considered a basis for the final settlement.

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The Polish plan was not revealed, but it became known at this time that a Polish Peace Commission had been appointed, which was divided into three sections -military, financial and political-territorial. The Military Sub-Commission had for its task the fixing of the clauses of an armistice; the financial group was to fix the proportionate rights of Poland in the gold reserves of the former empire, and the political group was to establish the Polish territorial claims, and to draw up provisions devised to protect the interests of Poland's weaker neighbors. These commissions were holding secret sessions.

POLISH PEACE TERMS

The results of this activity became apparent on Feb. 24, when the Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Polish Diet framed a note to the Bolshevist Government containing a statement of the terms on which Warsaw would undertake peace negotiations with Moscow. The five following conditions were laid down:

1. Poland asks Russia to give up territories to the west of the frontier of 1772 so that the inhabitants may freely choose their political future.

2. Russia must recognize the independence of the Baltic countries and leave them free to conclude with Poland such treaties as they may decide upon.

3. Poland states she will not continue to concern herself with the Ukraine provided a stable government is organized there. 4. Poland will demand that the Bolshevist Government give sufficient guarantees against Bolshevist propaganda efforts in Polish territory.

5. Poland will demand from Russia a war indemnity for devastations committed by the Russian Army in Poland as well as for damages done to Polish citizens in Russia under the Bolshevist régime.

Various details still remained to be settled, and the pourparlers with Moscow continued. The Polish Government on March 3 proposed to the Soviet authorities that they should begin direct peace negotiations without the conclusion of an armistice. The ground for this demand was the Polish belief that if an armistice were agreed to the Bolsheviki would take advantage of the cessation of hostilities to concentrate troops and reinforce various weak points along the front. It was planned to submit the final peace proposals by wire to the French and British Premiers before they were transmitted formally to the Bolshevist Government.

On learning of Poland's intention to embody in her peace terms insistence on control of territories west of her old frontier, as it existed prior to the first Polish partition of 1772, the Committee of Ambassadors in Paris on Feb. 28 drafted a note to Poland calling the attention of the Warsaw Government to the fact that Poland's eastern boundary, as laid down by the Supreme Council on Nov. 25, 1919, lay far to the westward of the districts which Poland had occupied by her armed forces, and to which

she was now endeavoring to establish a permanent claim. The note also protested against the proposed holding of elections for members of the Warsaw Diet in districts east of the line laid down by the council.

BOLSHEVIKI OPEN OFFENSIVE

A general conference of Baltic States called to consider jointly the various peace offers made by the Soviet Government had been scheduled to open in Warsaw on March 8. Delegates were to be sent by Finland, Latvia and Rumania. In a statement signed by the Polish State officials the intention of pursuing the peace negotiations to their ultimate conclusion was reiterated. At this juncture, however, a new aspect of the situation arose with the sudden beginning of a strong offensive by the Bolsheviki on both sides of the Pripet region. The first blow, coinciding with a new attack on Finland, was struck about March 6. The Polish forces were said to be repulsing the enemy and inflicting heavy losses.

POLES TRIUMPH ON PRIPET

News of a complete Polish victory in the region attacked reached Warsaw on March 8. Polish forces under Colonel Sikorski had attacked Bolshevist troops in the vicinity of Mozir and Kolenkovitz, southeast of Minsk, the day before, and captured these two important railway junctions with much war material, including several armored boats on the Pripet River. One thousand Red soldiers and many officers had been taken prisoner. In an official communiqué it was stated that the attack was made in order to prevent further hostile operations by the Soviet Army, and also to disperse Bolshevist troops which had been concentrated behind the enemy lines. The official communiqué said:

This victory is a worthy answer to the Bolshevist policy of suing for peace and at the same time continuing attacks along the front.

Warsaw advices indicated that not since the capture of Lemberg a year ago have the Polish people been so elated as they were on receiving the news from

Poland wants peace and is willing to discuss it, but we refuse to be forced to that discussion by threats of the Red Army.

At first I thought the Bolsheviki would negotiate with us peacefully, without arrière pensée. I wished to enter the discussion with the same frankness and had no intention of taking advantage of our favorable position to support our arguments by force of arms. I did not want peace imposed by our guns and bayonets. Unfortunately, what I see of the Bolsheviki gives me the impression that they do not want a really pacific peace, but to force peace from us by the threat of their fists, as they did with the Esthonians. I am not a man to be treated like that. I, too, can talk strongly and can be enraged if there is an attempt to impose upon me by threats. I am convinced that Poland shares my feelings. We will not make peace under pressure of threats. We want either a pacific peace freely accepted or

war.

I am aware that the Bolsheviki are concentrating large forces on our front. But they are mistaken if they think to frighten us thus and offer us a sort of ultimatum. Our army is ready and I have full confidence in it. If it is threatened it can threaten in turn.

opinion of military experts that by cutting the Mozir-Kolenkovitz line, and thus separating White Ruthenia from Moscow, the Red forces had been dealt a decisive blow. The Polish exultation was increased by new victories won by the Polish troops in repelling attacks begun by the Bolsheviki north of Mozir on March 10; eight guns, an artillery park and a great number of prisoners were taken. The forces of the Red Army were retreating in disorder beyond the Dnieper, the right bank of which was in possession of the Poles.

KERENSKY'S REVELATIONS

At a lecture delivered in Paris on March 11 Kerensky, the former Russian Premier, made sensational revelations regarding secret agreements arranged between France, England and the Czar during the last days of the Romanov régime. France had demanded absolute ownership of the Sarre Valley and an indefinite military occupation of the left bank of the Rhine, and these demands had been acceded to, according to Kerensky, by Lord Milner, acting for

England, and by the Czar. Milner also agreed to the Czar's demand for the whole of Poland, including the Austrian and Prussian sections, despite his previous promise to accord that country autonomy; but M. Doumer, the French negotiator, declared that he must first consult his Government. Before the French answer came to Russia, the Czar had fallen; but when it reached Kerensky, who was then in power, it proved to be affirmative.

This revelation caused great excitement among the Polish correspondents in Paris, who at once cabled verbatim reports to Warsaw. It was said in Paris that Kerensky had made these disclosures in retaliation for the Allies' unwillingness to agree to his idea for settling the Russian problem by a policy of "hands off."

Ignace Jan Paderewski, the former Polish Premier, whose fall from power is said to have been precipitated by German-Austrian intrigues working through M. Bilinski, the Polish Foreign Minister, and a former Austrian official,

has retired to private life in his little home overlooking Lake Geneva. Interviewed in Paris early in March, he was reluctant to talk of the strenuous period through which he had passed, but expressed high hopes of the future of his country. "I am certain that an era of peace and prosperity has begun for Poland," he said, "and that I have not labored in vain." He declared that he would give no more concert tours, but would devote himself purely to musical composition. He was then at work on the composition of a Polish national anthem.

The Polish Legation at Washington announced on March 1 that negotiations for floating the bonds of a private loan for $50,000,000 to be raised in the United States for Poland had been concluded with the People's Industrial Trading Corporation of New York. No objections to the proposed loan had been made by the United States Government. The funds raised by this loan, the first to any of the States arising out of the war, were to be used by the Polish Government for purposes of reconstruction.

WRI

RITING in The London Star, James Douglas says: "History will reverse the judgment of journalism with regard to three great English statesmenMr. Asquith, Lord Grey and Lord Haldane. Already the process is visible. There is an impalpable shifting of opinion. Revoluation is in the air. The tempest of detraction is overpast. There is an uneasy silence that is a kind of remorse."

This judgment is confirmed by Major Gen. Sir Frederick Maurice, who in reLord viewing Haldane's new book, "Before the War," brings out strongly the point made by Mr. Douglas that the fate of the world trembled on a narrow margin of forty-eight hours and that "the organizer of victory who gave the world that margin was Lord Haldane." General Maurice says:

When, at Mr. Asquith's request, Lord Haldane, on Aug. 3, 1914, re-entered the

War Office, which he had left to become Lord Chancellor, to press the button and set in motion the machine he had created, that machine worked without the smallest hitch or friction, and by its means our Expeditionary Force was assembled on Aug. 19 just south of the French fortress of Maubeuge, ready to advance to Mons.

By its presence there in those numbers and at that time it foiled the first carefully prepared German plan of campaign, it saved Paris, and it saved the Channel ports. I will not say that had it not been where it was when it was Germany would have won the war, for I believe that the far were of Germany's defeat deeper, but, unquestionably, without it victory would only have been won at a cost far greater than that under which we are today groaning.

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Such is our debt to the man, recognized and honored by all soldiers, from Lord Haig downward, who know the facts, as the greatest Secretary for War within memory, a debt which, to our shame, has been paid by ignorant abuse and venomous slander.

HE reaction following the announced intention of the Council

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of Premiers to resume trade relations with Soviet Russia through the Russian Co-operative Societies without official recognition of the Soviet Government was prolonged throughout February and March. Despite the fact that the representatives of these societies in Paris, after their first confident assertion that the plan was feasible, admitted that the Soviet Government had not lent its sanction to the project, the Government leaders of the two chief allies reiterated their intention to carry it through, and declared that a way would yet be found to make it possible. That both Lenin and Trotzky were eager to bring about such a resumption was stated by both in interviews with Lincoln Eyre, correspondent of The New York World. The attitude of Trotzky may be summarized from these interviews as follows:

We recognize our need for outside help in setting Russia on its feet industrially and economically. It is a tremendous enterprise that may take ten years to accomplish. But Russla is rich in natural resources. The people who help us first will be the first to profit. Foreign capitalists who invest their money in Russian enterprises or who supply us with required merchandise will receive material guarantees of adequate character.

But the condition of the agreement will be such as to prevent its being made a means to strangle us under the guise of helping to regenerate the Russian people. The view that Germany will be admitted 66 on the ground floor" is absurd. Russia cannot possibly expect economic assistance from Germany, in view of that country's economic instability, due to her defeat in war. It is obvious that we must look to the victorious nations, to Great Britain, or still better, to America, for machinery, agricultural tools and other imports, which Russia's economic renaissance demands. The very countries that are now trying to throttle us are the ones

who have most to gain in getting on a trading basis with us.

Lenin's comment was as follows:

If peace is a corollary of trade with us, the Allies cannot avoid it much longer. I know no reason why a Socialistic Commonwealth like ours cannot do business indefinitely with capitalistic countries. Of course, they will have to have business relations with the hated Bolshevikithat is, the Soviet Government. This talk of reopening trade relations with Russia seems to us insincere, or at least obscure -a move in a game of chess rather than a frank, straightforward proposition that would be immediately grasped and acted upon. If the Supreme Council really means to lift the blockade, why does it not tell us of its intentions? The statesmen of the Entente and the United States do not seem to understand that Russia's present economic distress is simply part of the world's economic distress. Without Russia, Europe cannot get on her feet. In Russia we have wheat, flax, platinum, potash and many minerals of which the whole world stands in desperate need. The world must come to us for them in the end, Bolshevism or no Bolshevism. There are signs that this truth is now being realized. But Russia can be saved from utter ruin, and Europe also, only by quick action. And the Supreme Council is slow, very slow.

LLOYD GEORGE EXPLAINS Some light was thrown upon the allied policy by Mr. Lloyd George's statements in Parliament on Feb. 11. Taking up point by point the various arguments for or against the decision reached by the Government he finally shaped a line of reasoning which may be summarized as follows:

1. The horrors of Bolshevism are admitted. It is true that the treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a betrayal. Bolshevism is not democracy, but rule by a privileged minority. The first war on opinion was begun by the Bolsheviki themselves when they dissolved the National Assembly.