About a year ago, we performed a study applying pilot functions as performed in airline operations to failure modes in missile system operation. We examined actual 1960 statistics of a major airline, and our subsequent reliability analysis concluded that the pilot's function decreased aircraft failures rate by a factor of 870. Comparing aircraft malfunctions with equivalent missile malfunctions that would have caused complete loss of a vehicle; that is, engine failure, et cetera, we determined that without the pilot aboard one major airline would have had only 14 percent of its original fleet surviving at the end of 1960. We have performed further studies aimed at identifying potential value in reusable launch vehicles. A sequence of 35 vehicle recovery events were analyzed comparing individual reliabilities for each event performed in an unmanned versus a manned system. These events covered 10 major vehicle subsystems such as engines, guidance, flight controls, hydraulics, et cetera. Our calculations showed that 12 times as many manned as unmanned vehicles would be recovered successfully. An analysis of Discoverer satellite recoveries attempted through the first quarter of 1961 revealed that 5 out of 12 orbiting satellites, intended for recovery, had successful recoveries. Examination of the seven losses indicate the causative malfunctions to be of the kind that manual backup has overriden successfully in recent experience on Mercury flights. Consequently, we are convinced that manned operation and maintenance of space vehicles will constitute a major long-term economy in the national space program. Therefore, we strongly recommend that a man-in-space capability continue to receive the highest priority to the end that this capability will be achieved at the earliest possible time. Now, I would like to discuss a concept which is a little further in the future. This concept, which has an impact on many diverse space objectives, is orbital basing by which I mean the placement in space of manned stations capable of serving as scientific laboratories and as mission support and control bases for both manned and unmanned operations. For missions requiring sustained patrol, frequent repetition, recurrent sampling, crew replacement and acquisition of scientific data under varying conditions, we believe that notable economies will result from basing semipermanent mission support stations in the orbital "theater of operations." The alternative, as we know today, is the launch from an earth base and recovery of the entire mission vehicle back to an earth-based support station. The orbital basing concept could employ a reusable launch vehicle or aerospace plane in the role of a scheduled cargo carrier. This reusable cargo carrier would be used to take the relatively small mission vehicles into orbit, to resupply the mother station, and to bring crews and mission vehicles back from orbit. Under this operational mode, the mission vehicles could remain relatively small since the sorties would be of relatively short duration and would not carry provision for reentry. They would stay in the orbital theater for sustained periods, and would attach to the mother station for refueling, pilot exchange, repair, and mission orders. Even the particular instruments carried could be exchanged for greater flexibility. Moreover, such an orbital base would provide an excellent point of departure for missions into deep space. The technical requirements for reliable orbital basing are effective life support systems; modular station structures; precision delivery, rendezvous, and docking of payloads; orbital refueling systems; interchangeable mission modules; and flight data integration display systems. All of these engineering requirements are basic to effective performance of any space mission vehicle, and many of them are currently under development. It would be possible, however, to direct their development even more effectively under an integrated program geared to orbital basing. With orbital basing, we would derive maximum utilization and service life from payloads which must be launched into space at considerable cost. Accordingly, we recommend that development of the orbital base be initiated at the earliest possible time in order to provide the maximum long-range space capability at minimum cost. I have mentioned the reusable or recoverable booster in connection with the orbital base concept. It also has considerable importance in other recurring missions. Estimates of direct launch expenses generally agree that it costs between $1,000 and $2,000 with today's launch vehicles to place 1 pound of payload in an orbit 300 miles high. The newest nonrecoverable boosters such as Saturn C-5 and 624A will provide a significant reduction in direct launch costs to about $300 or $400 per pound in orbit. Some concepts now under discussion, such as a single stage to orbit, offer still further reductions-perhaps to less than $100 per pound. Even at this rate our national space program will be very expensive. However, the concept of recovery and reuse carries a dramatic potential for economic savings providing the number of launches of a given vehicle is large enough. In fact, estimates have been made predicting direct launch costs as low as $25 per pound in orbit for several hundred launches. (See fig. IV.) 90751-62-11 FIGURE IV LAUNCHINGS | LAUNCHINGS Figure IV reflects what I believe you have already heard, that on an expendable launch vehicle if it costs a hundred for a hundred launchings fully reusable one would drop to about 68. For 500 launchings, down to 40 percent of the expendable launch vehicle cost. We feel that at the present time there is insufficient knowledge available to resolve clearly the cost competition between the various possible systems, that is, between expendable boosters, partially recoverable boosters recovering only the first stage, and fully recoverable boosters such as an aerospace plane. Specifically, we must know answers to questions such as these: (1) How many launches will be made over what period and what total payload must be launched? (2) What is the lowest direct launch cost that can be obtained with advanced expendable boosters? (3) What is the development cost of an effective reusable system? (4) Will the development of a near-optimum reusable launch system be a single step or a number of incremental steps? I might add as an aside that the cost of the propellant which will supply enough energy to put 1 pound in orbit is only about 35 cents, so that this presumably would be the end point, you couldn't do the job any cheaper than what the energy or the chemicals cost. Because of the very large sums involved in direct launch operations, we recommend that high priority be given to the determination of the relative costs of these various approaches so that the most economical system can be selected and development begun. In summary, I have cited several areas where cost savings may be accomplished-especially by the contractor-and I have identified several program objectives which I believe are fundamental to the development of a true space capability in an economical manner. The early accomplishment of these program objectives sets the stage for a practical drive into space, based on man and versatile systems which will not suffer from early obsolescence. These items obviously do not represent the total spectrum of possible cost-saving actions, but they are those of which I have some knowledge and experience. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Trimble. Mr. Karth? Mr. KARTH. No questions. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chenoweth? Mr. CHENOWETH. Mr. Trimble, I, of course, want you to know we in Colorado are very proud of Martin's operations. We feel they are making most substantial contributions to the whole space program. Mr.TRIMBLE. Thank you, sir. Mr. CHENOWETH. I want to compliment you on this very tremendous statement. It is certainly very well prepared. And you have presented some very challenging proposals here. I want to commend Martin on the fact that you are saving money, that you have been able to effect these cost-saving devices and programs. Do you think we can go further? Don't you think it is essential in this program, which is taking so much of our national income, that every manufacturer, every concern having any part of the missile program, exert every possible effort to save a dollar where possible? Mr. TRIMBLE. I certainly do. Mr. CHENOWETH. Would that be a fair challenge to make? Mr. TRIMBLE. Yes, I think that is part of the job of being a contractor, and I also think that at any one space in time we can always do better. Mr. CHENOWETH. You have been demonstrating with Titan II the improvements you have made over Titan I. You have commented on the great number of parts you have eliminated. Mr. TRIMBLE. We don't do all of that. Our Aerojet friends have had a hand in it. Of course, the Air Force folks were behind us all the way, too. Mr. CHENOWETH. What is the present status of Titan II, where are we? Mr. TRIMBLE. We fired four, and two worked and two didn't. Mr. CHENOWETH. Was that a success? Mr. TRIMBLE. Partially. It was not totally successful. Mr. TRIMBLE. Yes. We have only fired four and expect to fire quite a few more before we have that perfected. Mr. CHENOWETH. How long has Martin been in the missile program now? Mr. TRIMBLE. How long? Mr. CHENOWETH. How long? Denver, didn't you? You started before you went to Mr. TRIMBLE. I think our first rocket program was 1948, Viking rocket, which we did for the Navy. Mr. CHENOWETH. When did you establish the Denver plant? Mr. TRIMBLE. 1956. Mr. CHENOWETH. That is when you started your Titan operation? Mr. TRIMBLE. Yes. Mr. CHENOWETH. You are devoting all of your Denver operations to Titan now, are you-Titan II? Mr. TRIMBLE. Yes. Mr. CHENOWETHI. You feel that you are getting fairly close now to having Titan II in operational condition? Mr. TRIMBLE. Not Titan II. It has quite a way to go. Titan I is operational. Mr. CHENOWETH. On Titan II what would be your time estimate, roughly? Mr. TRIMBLE. I don't know. Mr. CHENOWETH. I don't mean to commit you. I was wondering what that would be. Mr. TRIMBLE. I don't know and I am not sure of the classification of the date. Mr. CHENOWETH. I don't care for anything that is classified. What would your observation be on our overall space and missile program now, Mr. Trimble, if you were making one? Do you feel we are making substantial progress? You can speak for the Martin Co. What is your observation on the whole overall picture? We hear so much about the Russians, what they are doing. I am concerned with what we are doing. Do you think we are going fast enough, too fast, spending too much, not enough. What would your observation be? |