Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstance and Choice in International Relations

actions Actor B C D affect agreements alliances allies altruism American analysis anarchic argue argument arms control arms race assessments behavior Britain British calculations capitulate chain store Chapter Charles Tilly choose common aversions common interests competition confront constant-sum contingent cooperation and conflict coordination crisis critical risk debate decision criteria determine deterrence dilemma of common discussion domestic political dominant strategy Duncan Snidal economic emerge ensure entail equilibrium outcome example existence expected explain firm foreign policy game of chicken game theory independent decision individualistic individuals international cooperation international politics international regimes international relations international system Journal of Conflict lead maximize military misperceived actor misperception missiles nations negotiations nomic nuclear options other's Polaris position Prisoner's Dilemma prisoners relationship relative relativistic result Richard Rosecrance rivals Robert Axelrod Robert Jervis self-interest situations Social Soviet Soviet Union strategic choice strategic interaction structure tion tional trade United University Press utility weapons World Politics York