means represents the full importance of transportation in the increase of trade-union membership from 1913 to 1920. A very considerable part of the increases credited to the building and metal groups is properly ascribable to the transportation group. Unfortunately, no exact statement of the total increase which should be credited to transporation can be made. But it is within bounds to say that 1,000,000 of the total increase of two and a quarter millions since 1913 are to be found in transportation, and that of these about 700,000 are in the railway service. It is a significant fact also that in the railway service, taken as a whole, the great increase in membership has occurred since 1918. The increase in trade-union membership from 1919 to 1920, exceeding that in any other year, was, indeed, chiefly attributable to the rapid growth of trade unionism in the railway service.

In view of the large part played by the railroad unions in the increase of membership, the consideration of the probable immediate future of American trade-union membership may be approached best by dealing first with the railroad unions. This division of the question is justified, not only by the great relative increase in the membership of these unions, but even more by certain conditions peculiar to the railway service, which affect materially trade-union membership. In all the four great industrial groups—Building, Metals, Clothing, and Transportation, which, as shown above, contributed four-fifths of the total increase in trade-union membership from 1915 to 1920-the growth of trade unionism was greatly stimulated by direct governmental action. These were the war industries par excellence and the intervention of the government in one way or another to preserve industrial peace resulted in all of them in great increases in membership. The forms of governmental intervention which produced this result varied from industry to industry, but in all industries except transportation governmental intervention has ceased. Some account must be taken of the continuing effects of the activities of the government. It is possible that trade unionism has been given such an impetus in the clothing trades, for example, that it will for a time retain its stronger hold. But unless reinforced by some other factor, as, for example, restriction of immigration, there is no reason to believe that governmental intervention has produced in any of these industries, except transportation, permanent results. But in the railway service, the end of the war was not the end of governmental intervention. As

far as any one can now see, the system of judicial determination of wages and working conditions set up by the Esch-Cummins Act is a permanent institution.

The effects of the continuance of governmental control on the membership of the railway unions is twofold. In the first place, the membership of the unions is protected against the more important disintegrating influences of a time of depression. There can be no building up of non-union establishments and no diversion of work to non-unionists. There has been some loss of membership directly through unemployment, but this loss is easily recouped. The second effect of the continuance of government control has been the extension of certain rules which were a powerful force in some of the unions prior to governmental intervention in attracting and holding members. The outstanding feature of trade unionism on the railways until recently has been the high state of organization among the workmen making up the train crews, and to a less extent in the shops, and the low state of organization elsewhere. This difference is explicable partly by the fact that the members of the train crews are more necessary to the operation of the road, partly by the higher average intelligence of these workmen. Through the use of these elements of strength, the brotherhoods had won on all the roads the right to organize and to bargain collectively. Under the governmental operation of the roads and under the Labor Board, the right to organize and to bargain collectively has been given to all groups of employees, no matter how easily replaceable. But the right to organize alone would have produced far less significant results in an increase of membership than those actually attained. It is one of the curious although little observed phenomena of American trade unionism that the railway brotherhoods, although not availing themselves of the aid of the closed shop, have been able to bring into membership larger proportions of the men in their trades than any other unions of equal or even approximately equal size. The opponents of the closed shop, indeed, have occasionally called attention to the success of the brotherhoods, and have argued therefrom the uselessness of the closed shop as a means of gaining and holding members.

The explanation of the great success of the brotherhoods appears to lie in certain provisions in the agreements with the roads secured at a very early time. These provisions cover the subjects of discipline and promotion and operate to give every

member of the brotherhoods a direct personal interest in the activities of his union. It is a fact of common observation in the study of trade unions that those unions are strongest, other things being equal, in which the work of the union affects the member solely as an individual.

The desire to raise wages or shorten hours is a mass desire and in experience has proved less strong than the desire to resist unjust discharge or discrimination. Where a piece rate, for example, must be the subject of constant bargaining, the desire of the worker to put behind himself the strength of the union is apparently more effective than the desire to coöperate in raising the standard rate. In any group, a large number of men are willing to leave to their fellows the task of carrying on collective bargaining for those things the common benefit from which will accrue to the entire group, but very few men will refrain from group action where the end to be sought is peculiar, and individual to themselves. The coal miner who expects to find himself in a controversy with his employer over deadwork will join the union, although he might not do so if the only question likely to come up was the matter of the standard rate and there were no checkoff.

The National Agreements concluded between the railway unions and the Railway Administration contain in somewhat modified form the provisions as to discipline and promotion which for many years have been in the agreements of the brotherhoods. These provisions will prove a powerful force for holding membership.

If we turn now to the unions not included in the railway group the outlook is far less promising. In the clothing industries the restriction of immigration has lessened the danger of nonunion competition, but, broadly speaking, no essential change in condition has occurred.

Will the experience of the past be repeated? I have said above that since 1897 the recession in trade-union membership in no period of business depression has been more than ten per cent. Will the American unions emerge from the present industrial depression with no greater loss than this? Since the main difficulty in the retention of membership, apart from actual loss through unemployment, lies in the necessity for a readjustment of wages to the general level of prices, the gravity of the problem is determined primarily by the amount of the change in the general

level of prices. The rapid and great fall in prices has presented to the American unions a problem which differs markedly in degree from any which they have ever faced. The nearest approach was the period of deflation after the Civil War. But as trade unionism was unimportant in the United States at that time, the analogy is not helpful.

Prediction is hazardous, but there are indications in such reports of union membership as are available that the fall in tradeunion membership, with the exception of the membership of the railway unions, will far exceed the loss suffered in previous periods. How great the loss will be will depend largely upon the tactical skill with which the unions are managed during the period of depression.

Trade unions function best under a regime of static prices. The problems to be envisaged in a period of declining prices, and the conditions which must be taken into account, vary widely from union to union. Those unions which are protected by longtime arbitration contracts have least to apprehend. But where such contracts do not exist, the unions must face the issue of changes in wages, and a decision as to proper policy is extremely difficult to make. First to be taken into account is the power of the union to resist, and the factors to be reckoned here include the growth of non-union competition and the possible replacement of union men by non-unionists. Secondly, the union, in theory. at any rate, should consider the effect on the amount of employment of a change in wage rates. As to neither of these two sets of conditions is there available information which is even approximately exact enough for the purpose in hand.

But even more important than the lack of exact information is the reluctance of trade unions, especially of the rank and file, to guide their policies by purely competitive, economic considerations. The trade union exists in a world ruled by economic factors, but it has adopted as its ruling principle the dictum that labor is not a commodity. I do not raise the question as to whether that is a sound principle, but it is certainly a principle on which it is difficult to act in a period of falling prices and at the same time to preserve intact or approximately intact the strength of the unions.

MEMBERSHIP OF AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS, 1915-1920.

(00's omitted)

Unless otherwise indicated the data contained in this table were obtained from the reports of the American Federation of Labor. Figures in italics were obtained from the proceedings of the union or by correspondence with the central office of the union.