inclined to be somewhat doubtful as to whether this can be said to be true of trade unionism in the United States, and, if I understand Professor Barnett's implications, he shares somewhat this scepticism.

The first thing to which I want to call attention arises from the comparison between the rates of growth of trade unionism in the United States and the rest of the world of which I have just spoken. In the United States our strong unions have laid their emphasis upon efforts to secure recognition by employers and employers' associations and, when this has been obtained, have sought to accomplish their purposes by means of collective bargaining. On the whole, they have placed less emphasis upon labor legislation, except such legislation as was necessary to remove their legal disabilities, and they have constantly and successfully resisted the efforts of an aggressive minority of their members and of some of their friends outside the unions to have the trade union movement organize as a political party. In urging the pursuit of this non-partisan political program, trade-union leaders have doubtless had in mind the results of fruitless efforts of earlier and now defunct labor organizations which attempted to win their victories by direct political action.

I am not criticising American trade union leaders for refusing to organize a Labor Party. To win a political victory in the United States, a labor party would have to have the support of farmer votes; and in the United States, at least, land-owning farmers and agricultural tenants who hope to become land owners have not felt that their permanent interests were those of the city wage-earners. But that to which I am calling your attention is the fact that European trade unions which have pursued the opposite policy have increased their membership at a more rapid rate than have the American unions. The country with the largest trade union membership is Germany, where the number of members has grown from four and one-half millions in 1913 to an estimated thirteen millions in 1920. In Germany the trade unionists constitute the strength of the dominant socialist party, which, since the revolution of 1918, has had control of governmental administration. In Russia, with a trade union membership of nearly five and a quarter millions, we have had a trial-and apparently a failure of genuine Marxian socialism, the rule of the proletariat, which has had its power centered in the trade unions. Belgium, France and Italy, all with socialistic governments, show an increase in trade-union membership of from one hundred to two hundred per cent. Other Continental countries and some of the British colonies show an even more striking growth in the membership of the unions and correspondingly great political influence of the labor or socialistic parties.

I hope that none of my audience will get the impression from what

I am saying that I think there is any necessary connection between the growth of political power on the part of the trade unions and socialism. Those of you who are familiar with the political, industrial, and social environment of Continental countries know that there were ample reasons for the association of trade unionism and political socialism in those countries. It is also true that since the Socialist parties have come to the top in the political chaos which has followed the Armistice, they have, outside of Russia, at least, either willingly or of necessity so modified their programs that there is little of genuine socialism left in them. In fact, the striking thing about their demands and their accomplishments, as I shall presently point out, is that they represent those things which we have long associated with trade unionism rather than with socialism.

In Great Britain, where, in spite of a strong socialistic element in the political labor party, that party, now occupying the Opposition benches in Parliament, is trade union rather than socialistic in its composition and policies. While the Coalition of the older parties continues, the Labor Party is bound to remain weak in numbers; and it may not in the near future become one of the leading political parties, but the influence of the trade unionists in government circles is unquestionably great and is not likely to become weaker.

In all the leading European countries and in the British colonies, the trade union movement can point to some very definite and positive results secured by means of legislation. Perhaps the most important of these is the almost universal adoption in countries with socialistic or labor governments of the legal eight-hour day. The leading motive in this legislation is one which has been controlling in the history of trade unionism in all countries. It was not the industrial motive, namely, the idea that eight hours will lead to larger production than a working day of greater length, nor yet the health motive with which we are so familiar in our own hours' legislation, especially for women and children. It was rather the demand for leisure for the worker, or what the Manchester Guardian calls "the desire to have more range and choice and initiative in one's own life," which led to this rapidly attained result in the field of legislation. Other results of the participation of labor in politics in Europe have been the laws providing for the participation of labor in the management of industries, the rapid extension of social insurance, particularly unemployment insurance, and minimum wage legislation. Although labor has suffered severe defeats in the industrial field since the Armistice, in Europe as well as in America, the most notable of which is the now-admitted failure of the proletariat control of industries in Soviet Russia, these achievements of organized labor in Europe by way of the legislative route are in striking contrast with the failure of organized labor to attain

any considerable results in the United States since the signing of the Armistice, in spite of the great increase in the membership of the trade unions.

The reluctance of the trade union leaders in the United States to seek to secure some of their demands by means of legislation seems to me to be at least in part responsible for the failure of organized labor to impress upon the American social mind the importance of its task and a realization of the strength of the numbers behind it. It is only by means of legislation that the trade union movement can secure the effective coöperation of many influential persons and voluntary associations in the ranks of what is generally known as the "middle class" in the attainment of what are believed by such persons and associations to be legitimate social demands. I think that a careful study of the progress of the laboring class in this and in other countries will show that the most important and permanent results have been attained by means of legislation, and I think that the same careful study will show that, with few exceptions, in this country at least, the movement which resulted in the enactment of the most important labor laws originated outside the ranks of organized labor and for a time, at least, secured little interest and support from the trade unions. I believe this statement will generally hold true of child labor legislation, of factory legislation in general, of minimum wage laws, and of workmen's compensation legislation and other forms of social insurance. Sometimes the support of organized labor has been secured in the later stages of the passage of such laws and frequently their initiative or coöperation has been responsible for the effective enforcement of such laws, when the benefits of the legislation had begun to be realized. Generally speaking, however, I think it will be found true that organized labor in the United States has devoted its strength to the cause of collective bargaining. Like, doubtless, most of my auditors, I have long been a defender of the plan of collective bargaining as the most effective way of protecting the propertyless laborer in the making of the labor contract. It is, therefore, not doubt in my own mind as to the validity of the principle of collective bargaining or as to the need of strong trade unions as instruments and agencies for the accomplishment of this purpose which leads me to question the wisdom of American trade union leaders in giving their energies so exclusively to the pursuit of this one objective, while neglecting other members of the laboring class, and other modes of improving the condition of their constituents which have won great victories abroad.

If I am right in my belief that the American trade union movement has not secured either from employers or from the public at large that support for its policies and program which the strength of its

numbers would lead one to expect, I must add that I believe there is another and a more fundamental explanation for this failure. It is the claim of trade unionists that, if their associations are recognized as the agencies for making the labor contract, they are prepared to offer employers decided advantages in the way of quality of workmanship and in increased stability of the labor market which will more than compensate employers for their surrender of the privilege of dealing with laborers as individuals, and which will also carry with collective bargaining great advantages to the consumers.

The argument is a plausible one and it is a belief in such possibilities which has led most of us to the support of collective bargaining. It would seem, however, that by this time the advantages of collective bargaining would have so impressed themselves upon employers that the most astute ones would have been eager to secure these advantages for themselves. Yet we find that, outside those industrial groups in which Professor Barnett has just shown that trade unionism has been aided by peculiar trade conditions, collective bargaining has made strangely little headway with the employers in the United States. The big industrial corporations and the establishments in which large-scale operations are carried on are giving more attention than ever before to the establishment of those conditions which make for the efficiency of their laborers and the stability of their labor supply. Yet, with very few exceptions, the managers of such corporations and establishments have not been converted to the gospel of collective bargaining through the agency of the trade unions. Mostly, they have refused to recognize the unions as the representatives of their own employees and when they have seen the desirability of giving their own employees some representation in the management of the plants, as is now the growing practice in relation to those matters in which labor has chief concern, such managers have almost always preferred to deal with representatives selected by organizations of their own employees than to deal wth union representatives. In other countries, industrial representation of employees seems generally to come through the trade unions; and I am not claiming that the so-called "American plan" is to be preferred, or that it is the right method to secure genuine industrial democracy. But what I am asking is, Why have American trade union leaders failed in the course of an entire generation since modern trade union methods were adopted in this country to "sell" their wares to either the employers or the public?

Is not the failure due to the fact that both employers and the public have discovered that, when once the unions have obtained recognition and have established collective bargaining, they have preferred to push their advantages by monopolistic methods rather than by methods which would result in enlarged production and a lessening of

industrial strife? There is no time here to discuss the matter at length. We are all familiar with the methods for restricting production, by direct or indirect means, which are employed by nearly all the large unions-methods which recently brought a sharp rebuke from such a staunch friend of labor as Judge Landis, when he made his award in the arbitration case of the Chicago building trades. While such methods may be justified at times as weapons of defense in a class war, they can not be defended as socially beneficial or as part of a permanent policy any more than can the monopolistic price policies of the industrial combinations.

Surely, collective bargaining can be made to succeed without reliance on these monopolistic methods. If the unions are to regain the confidence of the public, which has, I think, been in some measure lost to them in recent years, they must do so by methods which are in harmony with a program for social and industrial efficiency. Possibly it is to be regarded as a welcome sign of an awakened conscience of the American trade union movement that at the recent Denver convention of the American Federation of Labor one of the resolutions adopted declared that "there are but two avenues to higher standards of living for our people as a whole-the elimination of waste and increased productivity.”

F. S. DEIBLER.-The paper of Dr. Leiserson contains many points of interest for the students of labor problems. His experience as arbitrator has given him an excellent opportunity to observe the development and operation of a system of government in industry. In presenting his topic, the first section-"The Goal of Trade Unionism" -is interesting enough in itself, but has little direct bearing upon the main theme which he later develops. However, if I may digress, as I think Dr. Leiserson has, to consider the points raised in this portion of his paper, I may say that I find myself in substantial agreement with his criticism of Hoxie's functional classification of Unionism, but I am accustomed to place a different emphasis on the point. The word "functional" as used by Professor Hoxie, is misleading. The terms which he uses, "business unionism," "up-lift unionism," "revolutionary unionism," and "predatory unionism," are quite descriptive and extremely useful, but are descriptive of methods used by unions rather than of functions performed. The function of Unionism is to protect and promote the economic interests of the workers as workers. The most radical I. W. W. may claim this common purpose as his goal alongside of the most conservative trade unionist—and yet the methods of attaining these ends may be as widely separated as those of the "business" union and the "revolutionary" or "predatory" union. am correct in my distinction, unionism may be unitary from the point