Constitution; but, as affording the best key to the true interpretation thereof. For it may well be presumed, that the language used will be in conformity to the motives, which govern the parties, and the objects to be attained by the Instrument. Every provision in the instrument may therefore fairly be presumed to have reference to one or more of these objects. And consequently, if any provision is susceptible of two interpretations, that ought to be adopted, and adhered to, which best harmonizes with the avowed intentions and objects of the authors, as gathered from their declarations in the instrument itself.

§ 46. The first object is, "to form a more perfect union." From what has been already stated, respecting the defects of the Confederation, it is obvious, that a further continuance of the Union was impracticable, unless a new government was formed, possessing more powers and more energy. That the Union of the States is in the highest degree desirable, nay, that it is almost indispensable to the political existence of the States, is a proposition, which admits of the most complete moral demonstration, so far as human experience and general reasoning can establish it. If the States were wholly separated from each other, the very inequality of their population, territory, resources, and means of protecting their local interests, would soon subject them to injurious rivalries, jealousies, and retaliatory measures. The weak would be wholly unable to contend successfully against the strong, and would be compelled to submit to the terms, which the policy of their more powerful neighbors should impose upon them. What could Rhode Island, or New Jersey, or Delaware, accomplish against the will, or the resentments, of the formidable States, which surround them? But, in a more general view, the remark of the Abbe Mably may be appealed to, as containing the result of all human experience. "Neighboring states (says he) are naturally enemies of each other, unless their common weakness forces them to league in a confederative republic, and their Constitution prevents the

that secret jealousy, which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves, at the expense of their neighbors.'

$47. On the other hand, if the States should separate into distinct confederacies, there could scarcely be less than three, and most probably, there would be four; an Eastern, a Middle, a Southern, and a Western Confederacy. The lines of division would be traced out by geographical boundaries between the slave-holding and the non-slave-holding States, a division, in itself, fraught with constant causes of irritation and alarm. There would also be marked distinctions between the commercial, the manufacturing, and the agricultural States, which would perpetually give rise to real or supposed grievances and inequalities. But the most important consideration is, that, in order to maintain such confederacies, it would be necessary to clothe the government of each of them with summary and extensive powers, almost incompatible with liberty, and to keep up large and expensive establishments, as well for defence as for offence, in order to guard against the sudden inroads, or deliberate aggressions of their neighbors and rivals. The evils of faction, the tendencies to corrupt influence, the pressure of taxation, the necessary delegation of arbitrary powers, and the fluctuations of legislation, would thus be immeasurably increased. Foreign nations, too, would not fail to avail themselves, in pursuit of their own interests, of every opportunity to foster our intestine divisions, since they might thus more easily command our trade, or monopolize our products, or crush our manufactures, or keep us in a state of dependence upon their good will for our security. § 48. The Union of the States, "the more perfect union" of them, under a National Government, is, then, and for ever must be, invaluable to the whole country, in respect to foreign and domestic concerns. It will diminish the causes of war, that scourge of the human race; it will enable the National Government to protect and secure the rights of the whole people; it will diminish public expenditures; it will insure respect abroad, and confidence at home; and it will unite in one common bond the in

§ 49. The next object is, "to establish justice." This, indeed, is the first object of all good and rational forms of government. Without justice being fully, freely, and impartially administered, neither our persons, nor our rights, nor our property, can be protected. Call the form of government whatever you may, if justice cannot be equally obtained by all the citizens, high and low, rich and poor, it is a mere despotism. Of what use is it to have wise laws to protect our rights or property, if there are no adequate means of enforcing them? Of what use are constitutional provisions or prohibitions, if they may be violated with impunity? If there are no tribunals of justice established to administer the laws with firmness and independence, and placed above the reach of the influence of rulers, or the denunciations of mobs, what security can any citizen have for his personal safety or for his public or private rights? It may, therefore, be laid down as a fundamental maxim of all governments, that justice ought to be administered freely and fully between private persons; and it is rarely departed from, even in the most absolute despotisms, unless under circumstances of extraordinary policy or excitement. Doubtless, the attainment of justice is the foundation, on which all our State governments rest; and, therefore, the inquiry may naturally present itself, in what respects the formation of a National Government would better tend to establish justice.

In

§ 50. The answer may be given in a few words. the administration of justice, citizens of the particular State are not alone interested. Foreign nations, and their subjects, as well as citizens of other States, may be deeply interested. They may have rights to be protected; wrongs to be redressed; contracts to be enforced; and equities to be acknowledged. It may be presumed, that the States will provide adequate means to redress the grievances, and secure the rights of their own citizens. But, it is far from being certain, that they will at all times, or even ordinarily, take the like measures to redress the grievances, and secure the rights of foreigners, and citi

occurrences in human legislation is, to find foreigners, and citizens of other States, put upon a footing of equality with the citizens of the legislating State. The natural tendency of every government is, to favor its own citizens; and unjust preferences, not only in the administration, but in the very structure of the laws, have often arisen, and may reasonably be presumed hereafter to arise. It could not be expected, that all the American States, left at full liberty, would legislate upon the subject of rights and remedies, preferences and contracts, exactly in the same manner. And every diversity would soon bring on some retaliatory legislation elsewhere. Popular prejudices and passions, real or supposed injuries, or inequalities, the common attachment to persons, whom we know, as well as to domestic pursuits and interests, and the common indifference to strangers and remote objects, are often found to interfere with a liberal policy in legislation. Now, precisely, what this reasoning would lead us to presume as probable, actually occurred, not only while we were colonies of Great Britain, but also under the Confederation. The legislation of several of the States gave a most unjust preference to the debts of their own citizens in cases of insolvency, over those due to the citizens of other States and to foreigners.

§ 51. But there were other evils of a much greater magnitude, which required a National Government, clothed with powers adequate to the more effectual establishment of justice. There were territorial disputes between the States, as to their respective boundaries and jurisdiction, constantly exciting mutual irritations, and introducing border warfare. Laws were perpetually made in the States, interfering with the sacred rights of private contracts, suspending the remedies in regard to them, or discharging them by a payment or tender in worthless paper money, or in some depreciated or valueless property. The debts due to foreigners were, notoriously, refused payment; and many obstructions were put in the way of the recovery of them. The public debt was left wholly unprovided for; and a disregard of the public faith had become so common a reproach among us, that it almost ceased

to attract observation. Indeed, in some of the States, the operation of private and public distresses was felt so severely, that the administration, even of domestic justice, was constantly interfered with; the necessity of suspending it was boldly vindicated; and in some cases, even a resort to arms was encouraged to prevent it. Nothing but a National Government, capable, from its powers and resources, of overawing the spirit of rebellion, and of aiding in the establishment of a sound currency, just laws, and solid public credit, could remedy the existing evils.

§ 52. The next object is, "to insure domestic tranquillity." From what has been already stated, it is apparent, how essential an efficient National Government is, to the security of the States against foreign influence, domestic dissensions, commercial rivalries, legislative retaliations, territorial disputes, and the perpetual irritations of a border warfare, for privileges, or exemptions, or smuggling. In addition to these considerations, it is well known, that factions are far more violent in small than in large communities; and that they are even more dangerous and enfeebling; because success and defeat more rapidly succeed each other in the changes of their local affairs, and foreign influences can be more easily brought into play to corrupt and divide them. A National Gov

ernment naturally tends to disarm the violence of domestic factions in small states, by its superior influence. It diminishes the exciting causes, and it leaves fewer chances of success to their operations.

$53. The next object is," to provide for the common defence." One of the surest means of preserving peace is always to be prepared for war. One of the safest re

liances against foreign aggression is the possession of numbers and resources, capable of repelling any attack. A nation of narrow territory, and small population, and moderate resources, can never be formidable; and must content itself with being feeble and unenviable in its condition. On the contrary, a nation or a confederacy, which possesses large territory, abundant resources, and a dense