acquired for his country, in exchange for his fifteen and his two millions of dollars? He certainly obtained nothing for the two millions sent to France. This latter was a mere donation, or rather tribute, and so it was considered at the time, even by John Randolph.

If Mr. Jefferson was that abhorrer of duplicity, which he assumes to be, he would have told Congress, that the purchase of Louisiana was involved in difficulties; that it would lead the country into a war with both France and Spain; that he found himself in a very serious dilemma; that Spain, by fraud and force, was completely under the control of Napoleon; that if Congress would please to vote him a couple of millions to give to Napoleon it would pacify him, and that he would keep Spain from showing her disgust and enmity; and finally, that he should still seem to his countrymen to be the wise, the great, and the good Mr. Jefferson! He knew his Congress and the power of party too well to find it necessary to disclose such truths. It is highly probable that Mr. Jefferson thought this management honest and proper, because it promoted the great objects of his policy-it helped France- it hurt England it kept federalism down by keeping himself up.

LETTER LI.

OCTOBER 25, 1833.

LET it not be forgotten, that Mr. Jefferson began his presidency with the most gracious and conciliatory assurances, that we were all republicans, all federalists, and that universal peace and harmony were to prevail under his paternal auspices; nor forgotten that before the first year had elapsed, he denounced, in his smooth and ambiguous phraseology, the whole tenor of federal administration, and disclosed the intention of annulling and reversing, to the extent of his power, all that had been done. He conducts the government for eight years, retires devotes his remnant of days to the same course of denunciation of federalists and federalism and leaves, as his bequest to his countrymen, his testimony of the worthlessness and wickedness of his political

adversaries; and his assurances of his own honesty, ability, usefulness, and patriotism. Has he not thus invited a comparison between himself, and those of his countrymen, whom he would transmit to posterity, as destitute of every good quality which he arrogates to himself?

There is no part of Mr. Jefferson's administration in which his honesty and ability can be better tested, than in the course of measures which led to the "long embargo,” and by his perseverance in that extraordinary policy.

It may not be an easy matter to develope Mr. Jefferson's motives in this part of his political machinery. It is ever to be understood, that all Mr. Jefferson said and did had a double import; and that it is as difficult, as painful, to seek out his real designs. In this matter of the embargo, it is unavoidable, in showing the truth, to recur to some previous circumstances.

The state of this country, as affected by the conduct of the belligerents, was, no doubt, exceedingly embarrassing. Mr. Jefferson assumes, that he conducted honestly and wisely throughout. This is thought to be much otherwise, and this is the question to be tried.

The United States complained of England; First. That England interposed unjustly in the neutral commerce which the United States was authorized to carry on. This is a dry subject, and it would be uninteresting to go into details. Secondly. That the practice adopted by England of declaring ports, and even a whole coast, blockaded, when, in fact, no force was present to enforce the blockade, was unjust and oppressive to neutrals. Thirdly. The impressment of seamen from American vessels. This cause of complaint was much insisted on by Mr. Jefferson, who, nevertheless, cared very little about seamen or commerce, except for the

revenue.

It should be remembered, that the conflict between France and England was not one in which the parties had leisure to advert to the law of nations; nor to apply the principles which nations had respected in most of their wars. It was a conflict of destruction and extermination, in which England stood alone against the host of continental Europe.

Napoleon resolved, that there should be no neutrals in that warfare. What would a patriotic and wise administration of this remote and neutral country have done under

these circumstances? In 1806 Napoleon had pushed his conquests to the borders of Russia; he had converted Alexander from an enemy into an ally. Mr. Fox, the firm and undeviating friend of America, so far as he could be so consistently with duty to his own country, was at the head of the British ministry. England could never be in circumstances more favorable to an adjustment of all points in controversy. William Pinckney and James Monroe were plenipotentiaries in England. The treaty, made by Jay in 1794, had expired in 1804 by its own limitation. The United States had been prosperous under that treaty. Mr. Jefferson refused to extend or renew it.

Messrs. Pinckney and Monroe effected a treaty in 1806, on the two first points of difference, which they considered highly advantageous to this country. On the third, Mr. Jefferson required, that the American flag should protect all who sailed under it, well knowing that England never could concede this, without abandoning her maritime force; and, while this point was a sine qua non, that no adjustment with England could be effected. Yet Pinckney and Monroe obtained assurances from the British ministry, though not in the form of a treaty, which they deemed satisfactory. The treaty was sent over, dated December 31, 1806. The Senate were in session when it was received, and because the British had not therein conceded, that all English, Irish, and Scotchmen, and all deserters from the British navy should be protected by the American flag, Mr. Jefferson did not condescend to lay this instrument before the Senate, but took on himself to reject it and send it back.* Now, was this honest, or wise in Mr. Jefferson ? Does it or not show, that he was resolved, the parade of negotiation notwithstanding, to keep open the means of contention with Great Britain? And was not his motive to contribute to the universal dominion of Napoleon, in Europe, including prostrate England? And was it wise for a republic to extinguish, if it could, the only power that then stood between the hope of liberty and one universal despotism?

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"You com

* Jefferson to Monroe, March 10, 1808. vol. iv. p. 107. plain of the manner in which the treaty was received. Two of the "Senators inquired of me, whether it was my intention to detain them "on account of the treaty. I answered, it was not; and that I should "not give them the trouble of deliberating on it."

On the 21st of November, 1806, Napoleon, seated in the palace of the vanquished king of Prussia, at Berlin, issued his decree, by which he declared the British Isles in a state of blockade; and, consequently, that every American vessel going to, or coming from these Isles, was subject to capture. This decree appears to have slept for some months. The same decree provided, that all merchandise belonging to England, or coming from its manufactories, or colonies, although belonging to neutrals, should be lawful prize on land. This provision was carried into effect. This was the phenomenon of a monarch, terrible to be sure on the land, but without commerce, and with an inferior and humbled marine force, announcing destruction to the trade of an insular people, whose territories he could not approach.

Mr. Armstrong, minister of the United States in France, inquired of Champagny, French minister of foreign relations, (September 24, 1807,) what construction was to be given to this decree of 21st November; and whether it would "infract" the treaty between the United States and France? Champagny answered, (October 7th, 1807,) that "his majesty has considered every neutral vessel, going from Eng "lish ports, with cargoes of English merchandise, or of English origin, as lawfully seizable by French armed ves"sels." "The decree of blockade has been now issued "eleven months. The principal powers of Europe, far from protesting against its provisions, have adopted them." (All these powers had either become vassals or obedient allies of his majesty.) "They have perceived, that its "execution must be complete, to render it more effectual; " and it has seemed easy to reconcile the measure with the "observance of treaties, especially at a time when the infrac"tions, by England, of the rights of all maritime powers "render their interests common, and tend to unite them in "" support of the same cause."

The Berlin decree, then more than a year old; the inquiry of Mr. Armstrong, and the answer to it; and the proclamation of the British government, (cut from a newspaper,) recalling British seamen, and prohibiting them from serving foreign princes and states, dated October 16th, 1807, were all the documents sent to Congress, proposing an unlimited embargo. These showed "the great and unceasing dangers "with which our vessels, our seamen, and merchandise

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were threatened on the high seas, and elsewhere, by the "belligerent powers of Europe!"

It is true, that one of the senators from Massachusetts (whose conduct was afterwards publicly censured by resolves of the legislature, which induced him to resign) says in a public letter of 31st March, 1808, that the British orders (retaliating the Berlin decree) of 11th November, 1807, were not communicated to Congress, with the President's message on the embargo, but that they were published in the National Intelligencer on the 18th December, 1807, the day on which the embargo message was sent to Congress. It is unaccountable, that these orders were not communicated, if Mr. Jefferson knew of their existence. The newspaper was a sufficient authority for the proclamation, and must have been equally so for the orders. Can it be doubted, that the embargo was resolved on by Mr. Jefferson, before he knew of these orders? The senator alluded to had, about this time, a most extraordinary illumination as to Mr. Jefferson's purity and intelligence; and an equally extraordinary perception of the worthlessness and wickedness of eminent men, with whom he had long thought and acted. The sudden confidence inspired by Mr. Jefferson led this senator to say, in his place, on the embargo message; "The President has "recommended the measure on his high responsibility: I "would not CONSIDER; I would not DELIBERATE; I would 66 ACT. Doubtless the President possesses such further in'formation as will justify the measure." Thus it would seem, that this senator and a majority of both Houses, at the mere dictation of Mr. Jefferson, were ready, without any deliberation, to impose the greatest evil on this country, which could be imposed short of a ruinous and hopeless war.

No one who calmly considers this transaction can doubt, that it was conceived and executed for the purpose, and only purpose of enforcing, so far as this country could be useful to that end, the "continental system " of Napoleon.

Now, is Mr. Jefferson entitled to the gratitude and respect of his countrymen, for proposing and executing this political measure?

There are three views in which this subject is to be considered. First, as to France. The embargo was approved of by the government there, as a measure against the common enemy.