THE SCOPE OF PSYCHOLOGY,
Mental Manifestations depend on Cerebral Conditions, 1.
Pursuit of ends and choice are the marks of Mind's presence, 6.
THE FUNCTIONS OF THE BRAIN, .
Reflex, semi-reflex, and voluntary acts, 12. The Frog's nerve-
centres, 14. General notion of the hemispheres, 20. Their
Education-the Meynert scheme, 24. The phrenological con-
trasted with the physiological conception, 27. The localization
of function in the hemispheres, 30. The motor zone, 31. Motor
Aphasia, 37. The sight-centre, 41. Mental blindness, 48. The
hearing-centre, 52. Sensory Aphasia, 54. Centres for smell and
taste, 57. The touch-centre, 58. Man's Consciousness limited to
the hemispheres, 65. The restitution of function, 67. Final
correction of the Meynert scheme, 72. Conclusions, 78.
ON SOME GENERAL CONDITIONS OF BRAIN-ACTIVITY,
The summation of Stimuli, 82. Reaction-time, 85. Cerebral
blood-supply, 97. Cerebral Thermometry, 99. Phosphorus and
Thought, 101.
Due to plasticity of neural matter, 105. Produces ease of
action, 112. Diminishes attention, 115. Concatenated perform-
ances, 116. Ethical implications and pedagogic maxims, 120.
The theory described, 128. Reasons for it, 133. Reasons
against it, 188.
Evolutionary Psychology demands a Mind-dust, 146. Some
alleged proofs that it exists, 150. Refutation of these proofs, 154.
Self-compounding of mental facts is inadmissible, 158. Can
states of mind be unconscious? 162. Refutation of alleged proofs
of unconscious thought, 164. Difficulty of stating the connection
between mind and brain, 176.
objectionable bypothesis, 180.
The Soul' is logically the least
Conclusion, 182.
Psychology is a natural Science, 183. Introspection, 185.
Experiment, 192. Sources of error, 194. The 'Psychologist's
fallacy,' 196.
Time relations: lapses of Consciousness-Locke v. Descartes,
200. The unconsciousness' of hysterics not genuine, 202.
Minds may split into dissociated parts, 206. Space-relations :
the Seat of the Soul, 214. Cognitive relations, 216. The Psychol-
ogist's point of view, 218. Two kinds of knowledge, acquaint-
ance and knowledge about, 221.
Consciousness tends to the personal form, 225. It is in con-
stant change, 229. It is sensibly continuous, 237. 'Substantive'
and 'transitive' parts of Consciousness, 243. Feelings of rela-
tion, 245. Feelings of tendency, 249. The 'fringe of the
object, 258. The feeling of rational sequence, 261. Thought
possible in any kind of mental material, 265. Thought and lan-
guage, 267. Consciousness is cognitive, 271. The word Object,
275. Every cognition is due to one integral pulse of thought,
276. Diagrams of Thought's stream, 279. Thought is always
selective, 284.
THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF SELF,
The Empirical Self or Me, 291. Its constituents, 292. The
material self, 292. The Social Self, 293. The Spiritual Self, 296.
Difficulty of apprehending Thought as a purely spiritual activity,
299. Emotions of Self, 305. Rivalry and conflict of one's different
selves, 309. Their hierarchy, 313. What Self we love in 'Self-
love,' 317. The Pure Ego, 329. The verifiable ground of the
sense of personal identity, 332. The passing Thought is the only
Thinker which Psychology requires, 338. Theories of Self-con-
sciousness: 1) The theory of the Soul, 342. 2) The Associationist
theory, 350. 3) The Transcendentalist theory, 360. The muta-
tions of the Self, 373. Insane delusions, 375. Alternating selves,
879. Mediumships or possessions, 393. Summary, 400.
Its neglect by English psychologists, 402. Description of it,
404. To how many things can we attend at once? 405. Wundt's
experiments on displacement of date of impressions simultaneously
attended to, 410. Personal equation, 413. The varieties of
attention, 416. Passive attention, 418. Voluntary attention, 420.
Attention's effects on sensation, 425 ;-on discrimination, 426;—
on recollection, 427;-on reaction-time, 427. The neural pro-
cess in attention: 1) Accommodation of sense-organ, 434.
2) Preperception, 438. Is voluntary attention a resultant or a
force? 447. The effort to attend can be conceived as 8
resultant, 450. Conclusion, 453. Acquired Inattention, 485.
Conception defined, 461. Con-
Abstract ideas, 468. Universals,
The sense of sameness, 459.
ceptions are unchangeable, 464.
473. The conception of the same' is not the same state' of
mind, 480.
Locke on discrimination, 483. Martineau ditto, 484.
taneous sensations originally fuse into one object, 488. The
principle of mediate comparison, 489. Not all differences are
differences of composition, 490. The conditions of discrimina-
tion, 494. The sensation of difference, 495. The transcendental-
ist theory of the perception of differences uncalled for, 498. The
process of analysis, 502. The process of abstraction, 505. The
improvement of discrimination by practice, 508. Its two causes,
510. Practical interests limit our discrimination, 515. Reaction-
time after discrimination, 523. The perception of likeness, 528.
The magnitude of differences, 530. The measurement of dis-
The problem of the connection of our thoughts, 550. It
depends on mechanical conditions, 553. Association is of objects
thought-of, not of 'ideas,' 554. The rapidity of association, 557.
The law of contiguity,' 561. The elementary law of association,
566. Impartial redintegration, 569. Ordinary or mixed associa-
tion, 571. The law of interest, 572. Association by similarity,
578. Elementary expression of the difference between the three
kinds of association, 581. Association in voluntary thought, 583.
Similarity no elementary law, 590. History of the doctrine of
association, 594.
THE PERCEPTION OF TIME,.
The sensible present, 606. Its duration is the primitive time-
perception, 608. Accuracy of our estimate of short durations,
611. We have no sense for empty time, 619. Variations of our
time-estimate, 624. The feeling of past time is a present feeling,
627. Its cerebral process, 632.
Primary memory, 643. Analysis of the phenomenon of mem-
ory, 648. Retention and reproduction are both caused by paths
of association in the brain, 653. The conditions of goodness in
memory, 659. Native retentiveness is unchangeable, 663. All im-
provement of memory consists in better thinking, 667. Other con-
ditions of good memory, 669. Recognition, or the sense of famil-
iarity, 673. Exact measurements of memory, 676. Forgetting,
679. Pathological cases, 681. Professor Ladd criticised, 687.
PSYCHOLOGY is the Science of Mental Life, both of its phenomena and of their conditions. The phenomena are such things as we call feelings, desires, cognitions, reasonings, decisions, and the like; and, superficially considered, their variety and complexity is such as to leave a chaotic impression on the observer. The most natural and consequently the earliest way of unifying the material was, first, to classify it as well as might be, and, secondly, to affiliate the diverse mental modes thus found, upon a simple entity, the personal Soul, of which they are taken to be so many facultative manifestations. Now, for instance, the Soul manifests its faculty of Memory, now of Reasoning, now of Volition, or again its Imagination or its Appetite. This is the orthodox 'spiritualistic' theory of scholasticism and of common-sense. Another and a less obvious way of unifying the chaos is to seek common elements in the divers mental facts rather than a common agent behind them, and to explain them constructively by the various forms of arrangement of these elements, as one explains houses by stones and bricks. The 'associationist' schools of Herbart in Germany, and of Hume the Mills and Bain in Britain have thus constructed a psychology without a soul by taking discrete 'ideas,' faint or vivid, and showing how, by their cohesions, repulsions, and forms
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