APPENDIX 2 APPENDIXES TO HEARINGS HELD NOVEMBER 3, 1983 APPENDIX 1.-MISCELLANEOUS MATERIALS Letter from Professor George I. Davida, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, to Hon. Robert W. Kastenmeier dated October 28, 1983. Attachment: "American Council on Education, Report of the Public Cryptography Study Group," February 7, 1981. Letter from Jonathan Knight, Associate Secretary, American Association of University Professors, to David Beier, Esq., Counsel, House Committee on the Judiciary, dated October 31, 1983. Attachment: "American Association of University Professors, Government Censorship and Academic Freedom." "American Association for the Advancement of Science, Project on Secrecy and Openness in Scientific and Technical Communication," October 1983. Letter from William D. Carey, Executive Officer, American Association for the Advancement of Science, to Hon. Robert Kastenmeier, dated February 15, 1984. Letter from A. Bartlett Giamatti, President, Yale University, to Hon. Robert Kastenmeier, dated December 12, 1983. APPENDIX II.-ARTICLES AND PAPERS "American Civil Liberties Union, Free Speech, 1984: The Rise of Government Controls on Information, Debate and Association," July 1983. Relyea, "Shrouding the Endless Frontier-Scientific Communications and National Security: Considerations for a Policy Balance Sheet," 1 Gov't Information Q. 1 (1984). Gelbspan, "U.S. Tightening Access to Information" (3-part series), Boston Globe, January 22, 23, 24, 1984. Ehlke & Relyea, "The Reagan Administration Order on Security Classification: A Critical Assessment," 30 Fed. Bar News & J. 91 (1983). "American Association for the Advancement of Science, Scientific Freedom and National Security," June 1984. "Federal Restrictions on Research: Academic Freedom and National Security," Academe, September/October 1982 at 19. Gray, "Technology Transfer at Issue: The Academic Viewpoint", IEEE Spectrum, May 1982, at 64. Wallich, "Technology Transfer at Issue: The Industry Viewpoint," IEEE Spectrum, May 1982, at 69. Pyle, The Invasion of Privacy, 34 Proc. of the Acad. of Pol. Sci. 131 (1982). Kamen, "Appeals Court Upholds CIA Censorship of Article, "Washington Post, October 5, 1983. "National Security and Scientific Freedom," AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility Bulletin, September 1982. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Interim Report of the Committee on the Changing Nature of Information, March 9, 1983. Unger, "The Growing Threat of Government Secrecy," Technology Review, February/March 1982 at 31. R. Park, Scientific Freedom: Where Does Congress Stand? (unpublished paper). Chalk, "Commentary on the NAS Report," 8 Science, Technology, & Human Values 21 (1983). Rosenbaum, Tenzer, Unger, Van Alstyne & Knight," Academic Freedom and the Classified Information System," 219 Science 257 (1983). American Association for the Advancement of Science, Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, National Security and Scientific Communication (June 1982). W.D. Cooke, T. Eisner, T. Everhart, F. Long, D. Nelkin, B. Windom, E. Wolf, Restrictions on Academic Research and the National Interest (unpublished paper). Ferguson, "Scientific Freedom, National Security, and the First Amendment," 221 Science 620 (1983). Ferguson, "Scientific and Technological Expression: A Problem in First Amendment Theory," 16 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 519 (1981). Corson, "What Price Security?," Physics Today, February 1983, at 42. Pike, "When Science is Outlawed," Inquiry, March 29, 1982, at 21. Harvard University, Federal Restrictions on the Free Flow of Academic Information and Ideas, January 1985. THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MILWAUKEE/P.O. Box 784, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201 COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING AND APPLIED SCIENCE DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING AND COMPUTER SCIENCE October 28, 1983 The Honorable Robert W. Kastenmeier The House of Representatives 2232 Rayburn House Office Bldg. Dear Congressman Kastenmeier: This is in response to your inquiry regarding my experience with the government's classification power. In 1977 the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation filed for a patent on behalf of myself and a graduate student for a data protection device that resulted from research funded by the National Science Foundation. The research was unclassified and was based on materials publically available. In 1978 we were issued a secrecy order by the Commerce Department which, unknown to us at the time, had done so at the request of the National Security Agency. Upon careful reading of the secrecy order, we became concerned since the order contained penalties of two years in jail and $10,000 fine for unauthorized disclosure of the subject matter of the patent application, which, I would like to emphasize, was based on publically available material. Upon informing the University of the secrecy order, the Chancellor became quite concerned that the order infringed on academic freedom, not to mention the First Ammendment. After the resulting press coverage, the Chancellor communicated with the then Commerce Secretary Krepps and NSA director Admiral Bobby Inman. A short time later, the order was rescinded. In 1979 the Americal Council on Education undertook a study of the issue of publication of research in Cryptography and its relation to national security. The group, called the Public Cryptography Study Group (PCSG), met for about two years and in 1981 issued a report in which the majority of the members recommended a system of "voluntary" prior review. I dissented from this recommendation and issued a minority report in which I outlined my reasons for opposing what I saw as nothing more than censorship. The People of Wisconsin's Urban Engineering College Serving Milwaukee, the State and the Nation My opinion has not changed. I still oppose the system of prior review. My concern has grown as I have seen my predictions, that the government's interest in classification of research would grow to include other areas, come true. The secrecy orders and the PCSG's recommnedations raised issues that had a direct bearing on the Nation's political, scientific and economic health. More specifically, the secrecy orders and prior review raised questions regarding: 1. Constitutionality The secrecy order that was issued to us was for material that we had discovered without knowledge of classified information. The government seemed to regard this subject to be what some have called "born secret." Such concepts have no place in our democracy. 2. Impact on Basic and Applied Research Secrecy orders and censorship of results deemed by some in the government to be a danger to the national security would inevitably lead to the removal from the public domain of interesting results. There is no doubt that this would seriously harm the quality and direction of research. The PCSG's recommendations were equally disturbing. It was without any basis since the committee had no evidence to suggest that publications in cryptography were harmful to the nation's security. The committee did not consider the critical importance of cryptography in data protection. Our nation is changing. The most intimate details of our lives are being stored and manipulated by computers. Medical databases, credit files, insurance files, employment records are being constructed and connected to computer networks. These technological changes can potentialy destroy not just privacy, which is already gravely threatened, but freedom itself. It is difficult to conceive of freedom without privacy. Economically, our society is changing in such a way that our assets are no longer physical, but logical. Disks and not vaults are the repository for the new wealth. Wealth is being reduced to just "bits" and "bytes" in some computer. Electronic funds transfer would make it possible to move this wealth at unprecedented speeds. The need for protection technology was made abundantly clear in the reported Soviet evesdropping activities. More recently young computer buffs raided computer systems all over the country. What caused these weaknesses? In the case of cryptography, the government would not only not share its knowledge in data protection, but was now attempting to suppress information developed in the civilian sector. These actions clearly indicate that the blame for the vulnerabilities in our communication and computer rests with the government. 3. Effectiveness of Such Measures Even if one was willing to ignore all the other objections to suppression of information, there still remained the question of whether the actions would have the desired effect of denying the results to our enemies. There is no evidence that there is significant contribution to technology transfer to our enemies by publications of basic research. Studies have shown that technology transfer to our adversaries occurs through commercial exports from both the United States, Western Europe and Japan. What little impact from publications there may be has to balanced against the obvious benefits that this nation enjoys in just about every area of technology that we choose to pursue. We are clearly the world leaders in those areas that we are equipped to conduct research in. There are areas in which, some say, we are losing our lead to, not the Soviets, but the Japanese. The decline of investment in research has been well documented. It, therefore, should not surprise anyone if we lose our lead in areas that are underfunded. Our shortcomings are not due to lack of ability. Our problems have been the lack of national leadership to reinstate the resources necessary to maintain (or regain) our technological lead. In assessing our technological strengths and weaknesses, some comparisons are in order. Just how well are we doing compared to, say, the Soviets? It is interesting to note that in the non-defense R&D and production, we are clearly decades ahead of the Soviet Union. But when we consider nuclear weapons, government officials at the highest levels tell us that the Soviets are either equal to us (the prevailing view) or are slightly ahead. It thus appears that in an area where both we and the Soviets practice secrecy, the results are about the same! This is rather strange since one would expect that, in a field where we were practicing secrecy and thus denying the Soviets the opportunity to share in our advances, we would be ahead given our overall lead in technology. This implies that if we were to impose secrecy in other areas of engineering and science then what we can expect is that we will do about as well as the Soviets. Secrecy, it seems, has only thing one in store for us: mediocrity. It is also possible that if efforts to restrict the flow of information continue, then not only will they damage our research capability, but may very well start an "information war" with our friends. Finally I, like many others, am concerned about the inconsistency of my government's actions. The government sells the Russians wheat to help feed them and then turns around and tells us that we must not communicate among ourselves lest we help the Russians. Apparently the government believes that it can better protect us from the Russians if it keeps the Russian stomachs full and our minds empty. сс Sincerely, George I. Davida |