occurrences in human legislation is, to find foreigners, and citizens of other States, put upon a footing of equality with the citizens of the legislating State. The natural tendency of every government is, to favor its own citizens; and unjust preferences, not only in the administration, but in the very structure of the laws, have often arisen, and may reasonably be presumed hereafter to arise. It could not be expected, that all the American States, left at full liberty, would legislate upon the subject of rights and remedies, preferences and contracts, exactly in the same manner. And every diversity would soon bring on some retaliatory legislation elsewhere. Popular prejudices and passions, real or supposed injuries, or inequalities, the common attachment to persons, whom we know, as well as to domestic pursuits and interests, and the common indifference to strangers and remote objects, are often found to interfere with a liberal policy in legislation. Now, precisely, what this reasoning would lead us to presume as probable, actually occurred, not only while we were colonies of Great Britain, but also under the Confederation. The legislation of several of the States gave a most unjust preference to the debts of their own citizens in cases of insolvency, over those due to the citizens of other States and to foreigners.

§ 51. But there were other evils of a much greater magnitude, which required a National Government, clothed with powers adequate to the more effectual establishment of justice. There were territorial disputes between the States, as to their respective boundaries and jurisdiction, constantly exciting mutual irritations, and introducing border warfare. Laws were perpetually made in the States, interfering with the sacred rights of private contracts, suspending the remedies in regard to them, or discharging them by a payment or tender in worthless paper money, or in some depreciated or valueless property. The debts due to foreigners were, notoriously, refused payment; and many obstructions were put in the way of the recov

ery of them. The public debt was left wholly unpro

vided for; and a disregard of the public faith had become so common a reproach among us, that it almost ceased

to attract observation. Indeed, in some of the States, the operation of private and public distresses was felt so severely, that the administration, even of domestic justice, was constantly interfered with; the necessity of suspending it was boldly vindicated; and in some cases, even a resort to arms was encouraged to prevent it. Nothing but a National Government, capable, from its powers and resources, of overawing the spirit of rebellion, and of aiding in the establishment of a sound currency, just laws, and solid public credit, could remedy the existing evils.

§ 52. The next object is, "to insure domestic tranquillity." From what has been already stated, it is apparent, how essential an efficient National Government is, to the security of the States against foreign influence, domestic dissensions, commercial rivalries, legislative retaliations, territorial disputes, and the perpetual irritations of a border warfare, for privileges, or exemptions, or smuggling. In addition to these considerations, it is well known, that factions are far more violent in small than in large communities; and that they are even more dangerous and enfeebling; because success and defeat more rapidly succeed each other in the changes of their local affairs, and foreign influences can be more easily brought into play to corrupt and divide them. A National Gov

ernment naturally tends to disarm the violence of domestic factions in small states, by its superior influence. It diminishes the exciting causes, and it leaves fewer chances of success to their operations.

§ 53. The next object is," to provide for the common defence." One of the surest means of preserving peace is always to be prepared for war. One of the safest reliances against foreign aggression is the possession of numbers and resources, capable of repelling any attack. A nation of narrow territory, and small population, and moderate resources, can never be formidable; and must content itself with being feeble and unenviable in its condition. On the contrary, a nation or a confederacy, which possesses large territory, abundant resources, and a dense population, can always command respect, and is almost

incapable, if true to itself, of being conquered. In proportion to the size and population of a nation, its general resources will be; and the same expenditures, which may be easily borne by a numerous and industrious people, would soon exhaust the means of a scanty population. What, for instance, would be more burdensome to a State like New Jersey, than the necessity of keeping up a large body of troops, to protect itself against the encroachments of the neighboring States of Pennsylvania and New York? The same military force, which would hardly be felt in either of the latter States, would press heavily upon the resources of a small State, as a permanent establishment. The ordinary expenditures, necessary for the protection of the whole Union with its present limits, are probably less than would be required for a single State, surrounded by jealous and hostile neigh

bors.

§ 54. But, in regard to foreign powers, the States separately would sink at once into the insignificance of the small European principalities. In the present situation of the world, a few great powers possess the command of commerce, both on land and at sea. No effectual resistance could be offered by any of the States singly, against any monopoly, which the great European Powers might choose to establish, or any pretensions, which they might choose to assert. Each State would be compelled to submit its own commerce to all the burdens and inequalities, which they might impose; or purchase protection, by yielding up its dearest rights, and, perhaps, its own independence. A National Government, containing, as it does, the strength of all the States, affords to all of them a competent protection. Any navy, or army, which could be maintained by a single State, would be scarcely formidable to any second-rate power in Europe; and yet it would be an intolerable public burden upon the resources of that State. A navy, or army, competent for all the purposes of our home defence, and even for the protection of our commerce on the ocean, is within the compass of the actual means of the General Government, without any severe exaction upon its finances.

§ 55. The next object is, "to promote the general welfare." If it should be asked, why this may not be effectually accomplished by the States, it may be answered; first, that they do not possess the means; and secondly, if they did, they do not possess the powers necessary to carry the appropriate measures into execution. The means of the several States will rarely be found to exceed their actual domestic wants, and appropriations to domestic improvements. Their resources by internal taxation must necessarily be limited; and their revenue from imports would, if there were no national government, be small and fluctuating. Their whole system would be defeated by the jealousy, or competitions, or local interests of their neighbors. The want of uniformity of duties in all the States, as well as the facility of smuggling goods, imported into one State, into the territory of another, would render any efficient collection of duties almost impracticable. This is not a matter of mere theory. It was established by our own history and experience under the Confederation. The duties imposed upon the importation of goods by Massachusetts, were completely evaded or nullified by their free admission into the neighboring State of Rhode Island.

§ 56. But, if the means were completely within the reach of the several States, the jurisdiction would still be wanting, completely to carry into effect any great or comprehensive plan for the welfare of the whole. The idea of a permanent and zealous co-operation of all the States in any one scheme for the common welfare, is visionary. No scheme could be devised, which would not bear unequally upon some particular sections of the country; and these inequalities could not be, as they now are, meliorated and corrected under the general government, by other correspondent benefits. Each State would necessarily legislate singly; and it is scarcely possible, that various changes of councils should not take place, before any scheme could receive the sanction of all of them. Infinite delays would intervene, and various modifications of measures would be proposed, to suit particular local interests, which would again require reconsideration.

After one or two vain attempts to accomplish any great system of improvements, there would be a general abandonment of all efforts to produce a general system for the regulation of our commerce, or agriculture, or manufactures; and each State would be driven to consult its own peculiar convenience and policy only, in despair of any common concert. And even if it were practicable, from any peculiar conjuncture of circumstances, to bring about such a system at one time, it is obvious, that it would be liable to be broken up, without a moment's warning, at the mere caprice, or pleasure, or change of policy, of a single State.

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§ 57. The concluding object, stated in the Preamble, is, to secure the blessings of liberty to us, and our posterity." And surely nothing of mere earthly concern is more worthy of the profound reflection of wise and good men, than to erect structures of government, which shall permanently sustain the interests of civil, political, and religious liberty, on solid foundations. The great problem in human governments has hitherto been, how to combine durability with moderation in powers, energy with equality of rights, responsibility with a sense of independence, steadiness in councils with popular elections, and a lofty spirit of patriotism with the love of personal aggrandizement; in short, how to combine the greatest happiness of the whole with the least practicable restraints, so as to insure permanence in the public institutions, intelligent legislation, and incorruptible private virtue. The Constitution of the United States aims at the attainment of these ends, by the arrangements and distributions of its powers; by the introduction of checks and balances in all its departments; by making the existence of the State governments an essential part of its own organization; by leaving with the States the ordinary powers of domestic legislation; and, at the same time, by drawing to itself those powers only, which are strictly national, or concern the general welfare. Its duties and its powers thus naturally combine to make it the common guardian and friend of all the States; and in return, the States, while they may exercise a salutary vigilance for their own self