Herbert D. Riley, "colored everything [he] thought or did. Johnson ran hard for President all the time he was Secretary of Defense." 29 He was fifty-eight years of age in 1949. He had served as an army officer in France in World War I, helped to organize the American Legion of which he was national commander in 1932, and served as assistant secretary of war from 1936 to 1940. Although he had engaged in a running feud with the placid secretary of war, Harry H. Woodring-it was said that he "tried to cut Woodring's throat to get his job"-he had so improved the industrial preparedness of the United States that he may have shortened World War II by eighteen months. He had pushed the first big expansion of the army air forces and the development of the B-17. He had not, however, established himself in the affections and loyalties of the armed forces. Forced out of office by President Roosevelt, he had returned to law practice. Long active in Democratic politics, he had been particularly effective in raising campaign funds for Truman in 1948 and deserved reward. The reward he claimed and was given was the office of secretary of defense. As Riley put it, "Johnson viewed the military establishment in general and the Navy in particular as his personal and deadly enemy." 30 Moreover, his two ambitions were "to merge the Air Force and Naval Aviation. He planned to take Naval Aviation out of the Navy and put it in the Air Force. His plan was to take away the marines' uniform and put them in the Army." 31 Unlike Forrestal, who used a small staff and tried to get the services to cooperate, Johnson would build up a large staff and have the Department of Defense direct the services even if, as he said, he must crack heads together to hasten unification and enlarge the air force. He would show who was boss. Lastly, by saving from $1 billion to $1.5 billion per year in defense spending, he would have an excellent platform on which to appeal to the people during the presidential election year 1952. As his prime adviser on administration and organization he chose Joseph T. McNarney, formerly head of the ax-wielding McNarney board of budget deputies for the joint chiefs of staff.

29 Vice Adm. Herbert D. Riley, oral history transcript, U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., pp. 315-316.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., p. 345.

The fate of the supercarrier was uncertain until April 23, 1949, when Johnson, armed with a two-to-one vote of the joint chiefs against the carrier-the army chief of staff, Gen. Omar Bradley, having switched and joined the air force chief of staff, Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenbergviolated Sullivan's legal right to appeal the decision and canceled her building. Thoroughly infuriated, Sullivan conferred with Truman's naval aide, Capt. Robert L. Dennison, and various other men, and dictated a strong letter to the president, who had appointed him to office and who therefore should receive his resignation. Dennison called Charles Ross, Truman's secretary, who suggested that Sullivan write to Johnson instead. Sullivan did so, thereby not disturbing the excellent personal relations he had with the President.32 Asked whether "the major reason that Mr. Sullivan left [was] the cancellation of the carrier,” Dennison replied, "Yes." Did he think it was difficult for the service secretaries to go along with the policies of unification? Said Dennison, "No, I don't. Forrestal was very much for it. A good many of them could see that this was inevitable, but it got very emotional. Johnson was terrible. Anybody, he thought, who opposed the unification was just beyond the pale. He was just a criminal." 33

In resigning immediately, Sullivan told Johnson that the action "represents the first attempt ever made in this country to prevent the development of a powerful weapon system. The conviction that this will result in a renewed effort to abolish the Marine Corps and to transfer all naval and marine aviation elsewhere adds to my anxiety." 34 Although scrapping the supercarrier reduced naval air potential and left the air force supreme in strategic air, the air force even objected to modernizing old Essex-class carriers although it continued to modernize B-36s to give them greater range.35

When Rep. James E. VanZandt, a captain in the naval reserve, demanded an investigation into the procurement of the B-36 in which Johnson might be implicated as a director of its manufacturing company, Carl Vinson,

32 Dennison, oral history transcript, pp. 107-109, 172-173. 33 Ibid., p. 71.

34 Sullivan's letter was printed in major newspapers on Apr. 27, 1949.

35 Op-05B/BC to Op-09, May 23, 1949, CNO papers.

chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, allocated the task to himself. Meanwhile Truman had chosen as secretary of the navy Francis Patrick Matthews, of Omaha, Nebraska. Matthews idolized Johnson and supported additional unification. He was an attorney, banker, and businessman who had well served the USO during and after World War II. His knowledge of the navy, he confessed, lay in once having rowed a boat. When asked why he had been selected as secretary of the navy, Dennison replied, "John [L. Sullivan] was a Catholic so Johnson had the bright idea that politically it would be just great to get as Secretary a super Catholic, which Matthews was, in spite of the fact that he knew absolutely nothing about the Navy." 36

Even though Russia had exploded an atomic bomb in August 1949, Johnson decided to "economize" by not spending a total of $2.5 billion from the FY 1950 and FY 1951 budgets. For 1950 the joint chiefs requested $30 billion. Truman stood by the $14.4 billion ceiling, saying that was all that could be spared after funding domestic and foreign aid programs.

36 Dennison, oral history transcript, p. 15.

The air force complained that this division of the budget provided political rather than military balance. In reality, it was favored in order to support the air force if the need arose to counterattack Russia from European NATO bases. But it overlooked an important fact. Symington said that increasing the air force from fifty-five to seventy groups would cost about $880 million, whereas the expansion of the army and navy necessary to support that increase was estimated by the joint chiefs at $9 billion and by Sullivan and Forrestal at between $15 billion and $18 billion.

An example of interservice wrangling over force levels and budget may be of interest. Early in April 1948, in an executive session of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Symington stated that the air force would need 502,000 men by the end of FY 1950. He thought the army would need to increase its personnel by 15,000 at a cost of $43 million. The navy figured that to keep the army and navy "balanced" with an air force expanded to seventy groups would require approximately $5,442,000,000 in 1949 and $6,508,000,000 in 1950. Symington took the view that the Soviets

had an all-powerful army, the United States an all-powerful navy, and that his air force would tip the balance. Spaatz added that the air force planned to launch night bomber raids as far as the Urals, from bases in the United Kingdom, but admitted that daylight raids would fall short of Moscow. Sen. Wayne Morse pointed out that the air force ignored the need for a navy to provide and transport its logistic requirements and an army to defend its air base areas. Forrestal, Sen. Richard Russell, and Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower added that a jet air force consumed forty-five times as much fuel as the traditional air force and that while carriers were mobile the air force was immobile until its bases had been established and could be defended.37

A navy study of costs of building overseas bases for very heavy bombers revealed that a "Bradleyville" in the eastern Mediterranean would require 586,716 men and 1,069 merchant ships at a cost of $1,985,370,000. A "Symingtontown" on the north coast of the Indian Ocean would require the same number of men and ships but cost $2,165,000,000.38 In reply to Symington, the secretary of the army, Kenneth Royall, stated that the army would need to increase its numbers from 782,000 to 837,000 to service a seventy-group air force, but he disputed the $15 billion the joint chiefs believed the expansion would cost. After saying that he fully supported Forrestal's balanced program, Royall declared that if the air force asked for $1.8 billion more than the president allotted it in "an independent, uncoordinated budget," he would ask for an additional $2 billion. Bradley then pointed out the need to defend bases in the United Kingdom and elsewhere and contended that the army had a unilateral requirement whether the air force had fiftyfive, seventy, or some other number of groups.39 In the end, Johnson's cutting naval air 50 percent in FY 1951 made it impossible for the navy to support offensive air operations.40 Strategy therefore continued to be determined

37 Beauregard to secretary of the navy, Apr. 7, 1949, SNP, RG 80, NA. See also Lee to Sullivan, May 5, 1948, ibid., and George H. Faha in N. Y. Times, May 5, 1948.

38 Vice Adm. Robert B. Carney to secretary of the navy, June 3, 1948, SNP, RG 80, NA.

39 Beauregard to secretary of the navy, Apr. 13, 1948, ibid.

40 Sullivan to Sen. Kenneth McKellar, chairman, Senate Appropriations Comm., Feb. 2, 1949, ibid.

not by a review of military requirements but by imposed financial controls.

The National Security Act amendments of 1949, which Sullivan had opposed, became law when Truman signed them on August 10, 1949. Johnson's authority over the military departments increased as a consequence, and Bradley was added as chairman of the joint chiefs. At the same time Matthews recommended reappointing Adm. Louis E. Denfeld for another term as chief of naval operations. However, though the air force overwhelmed the nation with propaganda, Matthews kept navy public relations, as Capt. Walter Karig of navy public relations said, "on a par with garbage collecting." 41 Fortunately, Denfeld got Capt. Arleigh Burke to head a think tank called Op-23.

The hearings on the B-36 procurement program that Vinson held in mid-August cleared Johnson of conflict of interest but publicized VanZandt's new charges against him and the air force.42 Matthews ordered an inquiry into VanZandt's charges, which were based largely upon a pamphlet by Cedric Worth, a civilian aide to the assistant secretary of the navy. On September 10, a veteran naval aviator, Capt. John W. Crommelin, violated regulations by publicly backing Worth, stating that a "potential dictatorship" existed in the office of the secretary of defense. He further alleged that the air force sought to acquire all air power and dominate the defense budget and that two of the joint chiefs with a "landlocked concept of national defense" could always vote against the navy.43 As a result Vinson decided to investigate unification itself.

41 Capt. Walter Karig to chief of naval operations, July 25, 1949, CNO papers.

42 Vinson's agenda included the following points: 1) Was it a sound decision to have canceled the supercarrier? 2) Was the air force putting too much emphasis on strategic bombing and not enough on tactical aviation? 3) Should two of the armed services be able to decide on the weapons of a third by a two-to-one vote in the joint chiefs of staff? 4) Were VanZandt's charges true? 5) Identify sources of rumors and charges against the air force presumably coming from the navy and from steel contractors. 6) Evaluate the performance of the B-36. 7) Evaluate the roles and missions of the air force and navy, especially naval and marine aviation. Investigation of the B-36 Program, Hearings Before the House Armed Services Comm., 81 Cong., 1 sess., 1949.

43 F. P. Matthews to Adm. Thomas C. Kincaid, Aug. 25, 1949, SNP, RG 80, NA; N. Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1949.

In replying to Matthews's request that naval commanders comment upon Crommelin's statement, Vice Adm. Gerald F. Bogan agreed with Crommelin. He feared for the safety of the nation amid the "balderdash" that passed for unification at Washington, adding that morale in the navy was the lowest it had been during his thirty-three-year career.44 In endorsing Bogan's letter, Radford, commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet, noted that Crommelin reflected the thinking of most naval officers. Denfeld concurred with Radford in his endorsement but added that he supported unification even if sea power was not given proper recognition by the other chiefs of staff.45 On October 3 Crommelin leaked Bogan's letter to the press. Matthews thereupon told Denfeld that his usefulness as chief of naval operations had ended.46

After failing to have Radford's testimony to Vinson's committee kept secret, Matthews stated that navy morale was good except among aviators. While he stood by the navy in various instances, his ignorance of the facts and his fawning over Johnson drew ridicule from the naval officers in attendance. Radford declared that the B-36 had become a popular "symbol of a theory of warfare, the atomic blitz, which promises . . . a cheap and easy victory if war should come." He rejected the theory, adding that in selecting the B-36 the air force had made a billion-dollar blunder. Pushing the B-36 program without agreement by the army and navy undermined unification and prevented mutual trust and unified planning. Each service must be permitted to bring an experimental weapon through development, test, and evaluation stages-as the navy should have been allowed to do with the supercarrier.47 Most senior naval officers supported Radford and agreed with him that navy morale was low because of lack of confidence in the president and in the judgment of other mem

44 Vice Adm. Gerald F. Bogan to secretary of the navy, Sept. 20, 1949, SNP, RG 80, NA.

45 Texts of Documents in Naval Discussion," Army and Navy Journal, Oct. 8, 1949, pp. 139, 158, 164.

45 Denfeld, "Reprisal: Why I Was Fired," Collier's, Mar. 18, 1950, pp. 13-14.

47 U. S. Congress. House Committee on Armed Services, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, The National Defense Program: Unification and Strategy, Oct. 6-8, 10-13, 17-21, 1949 (Washington, 1949), Pp. 2-35, 29-107 (hereafter cited as Unification and Strategy).

bers of the unification team and because of the anti-navy "campaign of terror" being waged by Johnson, whom Matthews supported.48 Additional testimony brought out that Johnson had usurped congressional power by changing service appropriations, insufficient forces were being supplied for limited warfare, nonaviator as well as aviator naval officers were unhappy, no one weapon should monopolize strategy, and the Marine Corps feared the loss of its amphibious function to the army. By siding with the navy radicals instead of with his civilian superiors, Matthews and Johnson, Denfeld assured the end of his career.49 Dennison has provided an explanation on this point. He had been asked by Matthews to help Denfeld with the statement he was to make before Vinson's committee in order "to be sure, if I could, that Denfeld didn't say anything in opposition to the President's policy. Well, unfortunately, Denfeld, when he made this statement, threw in something on his own, and that was a remark to the effect that he endorsed completely everything that Arthur Radford had said. So instead of everybody getting mad at Radford, they got made at Denfeld." 50 "But," Dennison added, "this revolt of the admirals, it wasn't a revolt and it wasn't just the admirals. The whole Navy was questioning what the future held, what were the policies. Why? So it was a disturbing time." 51 Most disturbing to Matthews were the replies of general and flag officers of the navy to a questionnaire telegraphed to them by Rep. Sterling Cole, a member of the House Armed Services Committee who was a captain in the naval reserve. Cole asked whether they upheld Matthews or Denfeld. Matthews directed that replies be forwarded to his office. He learned that 117 of the navy's top leaders vigorously upheld Denfeld, that another 15 approved of Denfeld's position in general, and that 26 were noncommittal.

Unknown to the navy, the air force in May 1948 had detailed a committee of officers and civilians to make a study of the navy's capabilities, particularly of its aircraft carriers and carrierborne planes. Armed with a perceptive

48 Ibid., pp. 126, 201-236.

49 Ibid., pp. 349-396; Denfeld, "Reprisal," p. 62. 50 Dennison, oral history transcript, pp. 140-141. 51 Ibid., p. 169.

report from this committee,52 Symington testified before the Vinson committee that the navy's ideas had long been rejected. He refuted charges against the B-36 and stood by his strategic air bombing mission. Other air force spokesmen would restrict the navy to antisubmarine warfare and control of sea communications. After mistakenly stating that largescale amphibious operations would never be seen again, General Bradley revealed his partisanship by stating in strident tones that the navy included "fancy Dans" who instead of being team players would not play unless they could call the signals.53

The navy failed to prove at the hearings that strategic air bombing could not provide adequate national security-an impossibility without the test of war. Moreover, because Denfeld had been "disloyal" and civilian control over the military was to be maintained, Matthews determined that he should be transferred.54 In addition, Capt. Arleigh Burke, who had prepared most of the navy's testimony for the Vinson hearings, would not be promoted; angry with Burke, Johnson and Matthews violated the law and deleted his name from the list of those nominated for promotion to rear admiral. A hullabaloo followed. After Truman looked at the promotion list he asked Dennison, "Has any injustice been done?" Dennison noted that Johnson and Matthews had struck Burke's name and had reconvened the selection board and selected another officer for his place. Truman called Johnson and Matthews to the White House. In consequence, Burke's name was added to the list.55

Since the end of World War II, the navy had been forced to draw very heavily upon its material inventory and war reserves, yet its share of the $13.5 billion defense budget for FY 1951 was 11 percent less than in FY 1950. Johnson's statement that the budget provided "sufficiency of defense for the hour" notwithstanding,56 the navy had to drop men, stop

52 The document is NAFI 168.15-25, courtesy Dr. James N. Eastman, Jr., chief, Research Branch, Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 53 Unification and Strategy, pp. 397-499, 516-537.

54 See Matthews to Sen. Warren Magnuson, Jan. 4, 1950, SNP, RG 80, NA.

55 Dennison, oral history transcript, pp. 136-146.

56 Borklund, Men of the Pentagon, pp. 85-86; Capt. R. W. Ruble to Sullivan, Apr. 13, 1949, SNP, RG 80, NA.

operating ships, including heavy and light carriers, and undertake no new construction or conversion work. Squeezed financially for three consecutive years, it was being relegated to an antisubmarine role and could build only prototype ships.

Among its findings, which did not cover strategic bombing, the Vinson committee report, issued March 1, 1950, suggested that the Department of Defense be provided firm national policies with which the joint chiefs could undertake strategic planning. It noted the navy's demand for mobile, flexible forces tailored to perform given tasks. The air force was unbalanced in favor of strategic air power, and Johnson had erred in changing congressional appropriations and in canceling the supercarrier. Moreover, the air force and army members of the joint chiefs were held to be incompetent to judge for the navy which weapons were best fitted to control the seas, and when funds were available a supercarrier should be built.57

By May 1950, convinced that Johnson's "economizing" had cut into military muscle, Bradley and Vinson, among others, saw the need to adopt a steady rearmament program. Faced with the greatest crisis in the history of naval aviation, the navy demanded ships and planes suitable for the atomic age; and Symington's unwillingness to tolerate Johnson any longer caused him to resign as secretary of the air force. Meanwhile the navy had developed medium patrol bombers and carrier-based attack planes that could deliver atomic bombs from improved Midway-class carriers. Given $2 billion for new construction for FY 1952, including funds to replace "the only carrier the Air Force ever sank," 58 it verged upon breaking the air force monopoly on strategic air power. 59

After three years of unification the acid test was provided by the Korean War. The fact that the outbreak of the war caught the National

57 Unification and Strategy: Report of Investigation, 81 Cong., 2 sess. (Washington, 1950).

58 Denfeld, "The Only Carrier the Air Force Ever Sank," Collier's, Mar. 25, 1959, pp. 32-33, 46-47, 50-51.

59 Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York, 1962), p. 9.