Security Council and the armed forces completely unprepared showed the dire need of improving intelligence and of bringing civilian foreign policy makers and military leaders closer together. The demands of the navy radicals for a continuous program of military readiness were proved correct, for June 1950 found the navy, Marine Corps, and army in a reduced-strength posture and the air force unable to furnish tactical air power in Korea until the navy could build bases for it and provide the necessary logistic support. While the Strategic Air Command could destroy large areas of the Soviet Union, that power had not deterred the North Korean attack, and the conventional components of American military power, including the carriers that the air force denigrated and the marines that Bradley said were unnecessary, were hard put to check on the ground a second-rate foe in a limited war. It was time to question the air force's philosophy of complete reliance on strategic air power. Conventional forces should be provided, for nuclear stalemate predicated the fighting of limited wars only. Perhaps it was time to substitute both land-based and waterborne nuclear missiles for manned bombers. Increased and improved efforts by the Defense

Department's Weapons Systems Evaluation Group were called for, and an end to the practice of funding the armed services only after all other claims on the treasury had been met. It was also important to eliminate the split papers and two-to-one votes by which the joint chiefs could veto the weapons needs of a particular

service.

The navy had lost the interservice battle during the years under review to the extent that its plans for a supercarrier had been scrapped and it had suffered drastic cuts in naval air and in the Marine Corps. When both naval air and the marines proved their worth in Korea, Congress authorized the building of supercarriers and in 1952 strengthened the Marine Corps. Sullivan had wanted to keep the National Security Act unchanged and to let the service secretaries and chiefs of staff work out their problems in a cooperative manner. Here he lost, for as Forrestal had seen and Johnson, supported by Matthews, demanded, cooperation could be enforced only by a secretary of defense empowered to direct and control the military services. The price of unity was thus the burgeoning of the Office of the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the services themselves.

The difficult, divisive political-military issues that erupted into rancorous public debate during 1947-50 were not born solely of the National Security Act of 1947. Their roots could be traced to the years between the world wars when Brig. Gen. William Mitchell-a zealous, foresighted airman- and others argued that the airplane would enable nations to avoid trench carnage. During those years the army's air corps had struggled for autonomy, tied to its contention that independent (strategic) air operations had become decisive. It had been a long struggle. The army airmen had had to proceed by bits and pieces, their claims, termed by some "military theology," untested until World War II. After the defeat of the Axis, army air forces leaders declared their longheld principles had been proved. But critics charged that strategic bombing had failed to achieve its objectives, that its cost was excessive, and that tactical air power had made the greater contribution to victory.1

Nonetheless, the army air forces entered the postwar years convinced that air power was the sine qua non for keeping the peace. Airmen had not forgotten the years between the wars, their perceptions sharpened by rejected claims. Even after World War II, they remained sensitive to wounds inflicted in the 1920s and 1930s and contentious about what they had accomplished in the war. For years considered by many to be visionaries, they had found in the war the test they had long anticipated. The Allied strategic air offensive had been instrumental in Germany's defeat.

When Japan capitulated without an invasion, the proponents of air power saw Gen. Henry H. Arnold's contention that a nation could be defeated primarily by conventional air power vindicated. In July 1945, Arnold's conviction that Japan- then under intensified attack by B-29s-could be persuaded to surrender prior to the scheduled November 1, 1945, American invasion of Kyushu lay behind his recommendation to President Harry S. Truman at Potsdam that the atomic bomb not be dropped. Arnold maintained that Japan could be knocked out of the way by October 1 by conventional B-29 attack.2

2 Margaret Truman, Harry S. Truman (New York, 1973), p. 273.

After the war, Arnold wrote that use of the atomic bomb against Japan had merely "provided a way out for the Japanese government" and that Japan could not have held out much longer because her air forces could no longer effectively oppose the B-29 offensive. The Americans' sustained bombing attacks had as their primary objective, Arnold emphasized, "the defeat of Japan without invasion." 3 The army air forces' commanding general wanted it recognized that the atomic bomb did not win the war; the decisive factor in Japan's defeat was the B-29 conventional bombing offensive. In the aftermath of victory, Arnold remained much concerned that the role of the powerful B-29 attacks would be neglected by history and future strategists: "I am afraid that from now on," he wrote to Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, commanding general of the U. S. Army Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific, "there will be certain people who will forget the part we have played." 4

World War II had demonstrated the American propensity to seek a technological solution to the problem of warfare with strategic bombing. The atomic bomb enabled the air force's leadership to make a quantum leap in arguing the case for an independent strategic air force. Army air forces leaders, ignoring Arnold's admonitions, thought their weapon had become indispensable, and they held that strategic bombing was the key to lowering the cost of victory. Future wars would be of short duration with no need for massed armies. Thus promising a short cut to military victory, the advocates of air power maintained that strategic air power should now be preeminent and strategy and budgets should reflect this new reality.

Following the war army air forces established two major objectives: to gain independence for their service and to nail down the atomic mission. Confident of public and congressional support, air leaders believed an independent air force would be achieved by the passage of a service unification bill. Riding the wave of enthusiasm for the army air forces in the wake of World War II, the air leaders were

3 Third Report of the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces to the Secretary of War, Nov. 12, 1945, p. 33.

4 Gen. H. H. Amold to Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, letter, Aug. 12, 1945, Gen. Carl A. Spaatz Collection, Library of Congress.

also confident of strong support for their goal of building an atomic air force. Led by Secretary James V. Forrestal, the navy resisted unification, anxious about an air force-army coalition. The navy feared losing its aviation, perhaps also the marines, and was generally concerned with retaining its position in the front rank of defense. The army, desirous of tactical air support and suspicious of the navy's objectives, favored a strong unification bill featuring a single chief of staff for the

services.

Military planning for postwar organization commenced before the war ended. In their initial planning the services sought what they thought they might require rather than-as Gen. George C. Marshall, the army's chief of staff, reminded them-what the Congress would approve in peacetime. Substantial ground forces, Marshall observed, could not be recruited and "having air power will be the quickest remedy." 5 He told Arnold that the air arm's contribution to winning the war had been crucial and that there would be no insurmountable obstacles to air autonomy. In late 1943, army air forces headquarters began sustained postwar planning, centered in the air staff's Post-War Division, which led subsequently to five major postwar plans, culminating in August 1945 with a plan for a seventygroup air force.

Meanwhile, Congress had been wrangling over several unification bills. President Truman was determined that the military would not revert to its prewar organization, that it should be unified, and that the air service should gain parity with land and sea forces. A student of military history, Truman had not come recently to these conclusions. “One of the strongest convictions which I brought to the Presidency," he recalled, "was that the antiquated defense setup... had to be reorganized quickly as a step toward insuring our future safety and preserving world peace." He thought Pearl Harbor suggested "that the tragedy was as much the result of the inadequate military system which provided for no unified military command, either in the field or in Washington,

"Quoted in Robert F. Futrell, "Preplanning the USAF: Dogmatic or Pragmatic?" Air University Review, Jan.-Feb.

1971.

"Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope (New York, 1956), p. 46.

as it was any personal failure of the Army or Navy commanders.' "7 Thus, Truman came to believe strongly that the commander-in-chief should have a coordinated defense department.

President Truman recommended three coordinate branches under a Department of National Defense. In 1947, after negotiations between the army air forces and the navy, Truman endorsed a compromise National Security Act which created a coordinated, rather than unified, national military establishment headed by a civilian secretary bereft of specified directive powers. The National Security Act of 1947 gave the army air forces its independence, but the legislation was not what any of the services really wanted. Gen. Ira C. Eaker, army air forces deputy commanding general, noted that the act legitimized four military air forces. The navy, wishing to retain land-based reconnaissance and antisubmarine missions, wanted each service's role and mission written into the act, but this idea elicited no support. After approving the act, Truman signed Executive Order 9877 that generally delineated the roles and missions of the three services.

Although Forrestal had fought hard against both unification and a single chief of staff, thus successfully directing the navy's case for a compromise act, Truman named him secretary of defense after Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson had turned the job down on the grounds that his financial situation made it imperative he leave government service. One of the first in the United States after World War II to become alarmed by what he considered the Soviet threat, Forrestal had warned against massive demobilization and had called for a strong military posture. He firmly believed that successful conduct of postwar foreign relations depended to a great extent on American military power. He brought to his new post what air force leaders judged to be a predominantly naval-oriented staff. Secretary of the Air Force Stuart Symington and General Spaatz, air force chief of staff, thought they would have to marshal all resources to compete against what they considered a "reactionary" view in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.8

7 Ibid.

8 Air Force Plans Review, June 11, 1953, A Short Summary of the Development of U.S. Air Power Since the End of World War II, OPD 373, Jan. 4, 1951, Records of Headquarters United States Air Force, Record Group 341, National Archives Building (hereafter cited as RG. _, NA).

The National Security Act did not, however, begin to settle responsibility for the atomic mission. Realizing that it was the key to securing the largest share of the military budget and counting on Congressional support, the air leaders determined to press their views publicly. Long before passage of the act, they had prepared for what they knew would be an intense struggle with the navy over missions and money. Such a fight was considered inevitable and had been so proclaimed before the end of the war by Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert A. Lovett, an official known for his circumspection. Under Symington's leadership, the air force mounted a heavy effort "to prevent Navy encroachment on the Air Force responsibility for strategic bombing operations."' 9 Based on General Spaatz's recommendation, Symington sought to obtain funding for a seventy-group air force. 10 Yet, though he felt keenly the need for a rapid military buildup, primarily of air atomic forces, Symington recognized that the defense establishment would have to compromise its requirements:

We must face the constant compromise between what military authority considers necessary on the basis of maximum security and what is finally decided as the minimum requirement on the basis of a calculated risk.

This must be the case, because the maintenance year after year of armed forces certain to be adequate to handle any emergency would be such a constant drain upon the American economy as to destroy the American way of life just as surely as would conquest from without.11

Like the army air forces, by the end of the war the navy had made plans for the postwar period that emphasized air and undersea forces. Naval air had become the most important combat element of the fleet, and the navy's leadership would soon be dominated by airmen intent on commanding forces that could deliver the bomb. In 1947 the navy began to design carriers that could launch atomic bomb-carrying aircraft.

Meanwhile, in May and June 1947, in executive sessions of the Air Board, the air leaders

9 Brig. Gen. William L. Ritchie to Gen. O. P. Weyland, memorandum, Dec. 22, 1947 (385.2, Dec. 15, 1947, sec. 1.3),

ibid.

10 Interview, Herman S. Wolk and Thomas A. Sturm with Sen. Stuart Symington, Feb. 14, 1972.

11 Address by Assistant Secretary of War for Air Symington to first annual convention of the Air Force Association, Columbus, Ohio, Sept. 15, 1947.

discussed the necessity of getting their views into the administration's foreign policy. Their plan was to persuade President Truman to establish a group similar to the Universal Military Training Commission "to consider the longrange air policy of the United States." 12 This desire to establish a presidential commission grew out of their conviction that air power was the prime instrument of American foreign policy. The air leaders agreed that a committee of highly respected civilians-not directly connected to the air force-appointed by the president "could exercise a tremendous effect and probably could result in achievement of a longrange air policy as part of the U. S. foreign policy." 13

At the same time, the Air Coordinating Committee, which included officials from the De

12 Minutes of Meetings, Fifth Meeting of the Air Board, Executive Session, June 5-6, 1947, Records of the Secretary of the Air Force, RG 340, NA. Members of the Air Board taking part in these deliberations were Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, Lt. Gen. Nathan F. Twining, Maj. Gen. Hugh Knerr, Maj. Gen. Follett Bradley, Maj. Gen. Edward P. Curtis, and Roy Alexander (Time, Inc.).

13 Ibid.

partments of State and Commerce, reported that 3,000 planes representing 30 million. pounds of airframe was the minimum required to keep the aircraft industry functioning (but not necessarily the minimum required to maintain a modern air force). This amount of airframe weight was not being provided. Therefore, the Air Coordinating Committee recommended to Truman that a commission be established to promulgate a national air policy.

This proposal was enthusiastically supported by Robert A. Lovett, who in July 1947 would become under secretary of state, and also by Kenneth C. Royall, under secretary of war, who would become secretary of the army in September 1947.14 Additional impetus for a national air policy was generated by the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics which, concerned that substantial money should be provided for aircraft research and development over the next ten years, recommended immediate formulation of such a policy.15

14 Ibid. 15 Ibid.