Instead of separating the air, land, and sea forces, the National Security Act established the functions of the services in ambiguous terms. The navy now included only "such aviation as may be organic therein." "Naval aviation," the act stated, "shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof." The Marine Corps "shall include land combat... forces and such aviation as may be organic thereto." Moreover, "the Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, techniques, organization and equipment of naval combat and service elements; matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy." The new department of the air force would be “organized . . . primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations." 2

Although the act made no mention of strategic air forces, air power advocates wanted anything that flew to be part of the air force, such as a second air force they maintained the navy hid under the label "sea power." Marshall Andrews, a Washington Post reporter, was probably the first to call public attention to the "dangerous" air force plan of using its funds "to build up a strategic force at the expense... of everything else"- including defense. To him, at least, the air force revealed "a stubborn insistence upon its private concepts of warfare" and "a degree of irresponsibility toward its obligations to the other services which renders its motives suspect." 3 Meanwhile the army demanded control over anything that walked and accused the navy of trying to develop a completely integrated striking force that would operate independently of the other services. The navy countercharged by saying it would support the provisions of the National Security Act and that air power was the sum of that in the air force and in the navy.

During the debate over which of the services would have the different roles and missions and the funds to support them, the leaders of each service produced what were, in essence, lawyers' briefs to sustain their positions and to win favor with Congress and the public. As Truman's naval aide, Capt. Robert L. Dennison, put it,

261 Statutes at Large 495.

3 Washington Post, Jan. 23, 1949.

I think the basic difficulty with the Navy was the lack of understanding of what unification was all about. It hadn't been defined. . . . But what the hell was it? Was it a merger? Did it mean the loss of service identity? This was what the Navy was fearful of, a loss of identity. We didn't want to merge with any service, obviously, because they had different roles and different missions.4

Public opinion definitely favored the air force over the other services, as Gallup polls, one in 1948 and one in 1949, revealed. On the question of whether the air force, army, or navy should be increased, 61 percent favored the army, 63 percent the navy, and 74 percent the air force. In answer to the question of which service would play the most important part in another war, 74 percent thought the air force, 6 percent the navy, and 4 percent the army.5 Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan, of New Hampshire, had served successively since 1939 as an assistant to the commissioner of internal revenue, assistant secretary of the treasury, assistant secretary of the navy for air, and under secretary of the navy. He succeeded Forrestal as secretary of the navy when Forrestal became the first secretary of defense. Although he had witnessed carrier operations in the western pacific in 1945 and was impressed by their power and versatility, he had no intention, when he assumed his new office in September 1947, of having the navy assume responsibility for strategic bombing. Only after sharp questioning of his top advisers in October did Sullivan agree to ask for funds to build a supercarrier, the displacement of which, he said, "is dictated by the size, weight, and importance of the carrier aircraft of the future,"6 a description which to the air force meant heavy bombers capable of carrying the 10,000pound atomic bomb. He then telephoned the director of the Bureau of the Budget, James Webb, to ask whether it was necessary to clear the carrier with the other two services and with Forrestal. Webb did not think so. Sullivan stated that he "did not want to establish a

4 Adm. Robert L. Dennison, oral history transcript, Sept. 10, Oct. 6, Nov. 2, 1971, Harry S. Truman Library, pp. 17, 166-167.

5 George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, 19351971 (New York, 1972), 1: 719-720; 2: 791-792, 858-859.

6 John L. Sullivan to Sen. Harry F. Byrd, May 27, 1948, papers of the secretaries of the navy, General Records of the Department of the Navy, Record Group 80, National Archives Building (hereafter cited as SNP, RG 80, NA).

precedent by which everyone would be running in circles and accomplishing nothing but a sense of frustration." Moreover, he had telephoned Webb "because any letter to the Bureau of the Budget would merely be asking for trouble" and he "did not feel that any other service had any right to question the construction of the new carrier." 7

In late 1947 and early 1948, several assessments were made of the role of air power in national strategy. A congressional committee recommended a seventy-group air force while retaining carriers both for defense and offense.8 The secretary of the air force, W. Stuart Symington, a self-made businessman who had filled several administrative posts under Truman, had been one of the architects of the Strategic Air Command. A man with a mission and possessed of a combative spirit, he stuck

'H[enry] G. Beauregard [Office of the Secretary of the Navy] to secretary of the navy, Nov. 13, 1947, ibid.

8 John N. Brown to Lewis K. Marshall, Mar. 16, 1948, and Sullivan to Sen. Owen Brewster, Mar. 19, 1948, ibid.; Congressional Aviation Policy Board, National Aviation Policy, 80 Cong., 2 sess., 1948, Senate Report 949.

tenaciously, some said fanatically, to his decisions. Early in 1948 he told a presidential commission that he needed seventy first-line groups, including eight hundred heavy bombers. The commission, believing that the Soviet Union would acquire the atomic bomb by 1953, concluded "the military establishment must be built about the air arm," but it defined the air arm as the air force and naval aviation, adding that naval air should have parity with the seventy-group air force. While Symington raised the navy's hackles by hinting that tactical air would be an air force responsibility, Sullivan gave thought to "the problems of evaluation and unconventional [rather than purely strategic] types of warfare," thereby making it more difficult for the navy and the air force to reach agreement on how to implement the congressional committee and presidential recommendations. 10

President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age (Washington, 1948).

10 Beauregard to secretary of the navy, Nov. 1, 1947, SNP, RG 80, NA.

Despite an 11,000-mile flight by a navy Neptune patrol and antisubmarine plane and proof that it could be launched from a carrier, many Americans believed that the navy was useless against the distant and landlocked Soviet Union. A nuclear war-the only kind likely to be fought-would be over before any major military forces could be moved into battle, or so the public thought. Carl Spaatz, the air force chief of staff, also asked why a large navy was needed when no unfriendly power had one. Clearly the air force must be the predominant service because it alone was capable of massive retaliation. The navy should therefore give up its air arm-or about 30 percent of the navy-to the air force and accept its role as an auxiliary force conducting antisubmarine warfare and providing sea transportation.11

Among others, Sullivan, Forrestal, and the chief of naval operations, Adm. Louis E. Denfeld, believed that a fast-moving fleet would be an unprofitable target for atomic bombs. 12 Moreover, they opposed a strategy based upon a single weapon and delivery system, for it would stifle development of new weapons and techniques. They preferred balanced naval and air forces. The air force might attack; but the navy could be used defensively and offensively. It could occupy advanced bases, destroy enemy air power and communications, and even bomb the interior of Russia if necessary. A carrier could sail to within 700 miles of any target on earth. As Forrestal put it, "The atomic bomb does not give us automatic immunity from attack... nor does its possession guarantee victory if war should come." 13 A balanced strategy made good sense when the few atomic bombs available were stored in New Mexico and the

11 Capt. Fitzhugh Lee to secretary of the navy, Apr. 22, 1948, and Capt. L. A. Thackrey to secretary of the navy, ibid.; Aviation Week, July 7, 1949, p. 82, Oct. 20, 1949, p. 7.

12 "First Quadrant Bombing," ca. Jan. 1, 1949, SNP, RG 80, NA; Adm. Louis E. Denfeld to Drew Pearson, Feb. 19, 1949, Department of the Navy, Naval History Division, Operational Archives Branch, papers of the chiefs of naval operations (hereafter cited as CNO papers).

13 Sullivan to secretary of defense, Mar. 22, 1948, SNP, RG 80, NA; Carl W. Borklund, Men of the Pentagon: From Forrestal to McNamara (New York, 1966), p. 76; "Admiral Nimitz Sees Navy With Air as First Line," Army and Navy Journal, Jan. 10, 1948, pp. 473, 495.

longest-range air force bomber could not come within 2,000 miles of Moscow. 14

From March 11 to 14, 1948, Forrestal met with the joint chiefs of staff at Key West to decide upon service roles and missions. Navy representatives charged the Air University with teaching the doctrine of "One Air Force" and that the aircraft carrier was obsolete. They also alleged that the air force wished to stop development of light atomic bombs that navy planes could carry and hoped to monopolize the production of long-range missiles. In any event, the Key West agreement made strategic bombing the primary air force function and only a collateral function for the navy and the Marine Corps. The navy could thus attack all targets necessary to accomplish its mission. The agreement also approved a supercarrier and the navy's use of atomic weapons. 15 When Symington publicly challenged the capabilities of naval aviation, navy spokesmen replied that they could deliver atomic bombs more effectively than the air force,16 for the best strategic bomber, the B-36, which would not fly until mid-1948, had only a 4,000-mile range and Moscow was 6,000 miles away.

The manner of determining navy and air force costs was important and consumed a great deal of energy in both services. It is enough to note here that the cost of building a flush-deck carrier and an embarked air group was $124,468,000; that of developing and producing twenty-four B-36s and a necessary landing field was $155 million. Because arguments over dollars and cents went on interminably, Sullivan was advised by his naval aide, Capt. Fitzhugh Lee, to ask which weapons systems might be built by the United States that would be able to deliver atomic weapons to the Soviet heartland within five years. The answer was neither the B-36 nor any other strategic bomber, said Lee, for in five years

14 National Military Establishment, First Report of the Secretary of Defense, 1948 (Washington, 1948), pp. 9-12, 19, 64-66.

15 See Executive Order 9950, Apr. 21, 1948.

16 Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy, and Politics," Harold Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (Tuscaloosa, 1963), pp. 472, 480; Kenneth L. Moll, "Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1949: America's First Four Years" (Master's thesis, Univ. of Omaha, 1965); Thomas A. French, "Unification and the Military Establishment, 1945-1950" (Ph.D. diss., State Univ. of New York, Buffalo, 1972).

the plane used would be larger and more expensive than the B-36.17

Truman limited military strategy by setting defense budget ceilings. The fiscal year 1946 budget had been $45 billion; that for FY 1947, $14.5 billion; that for FY 1948, a mere $11.25 billion and a rebuff to those like Sullivan who wished to undertake a limited rearmament program as insurance during what could be a long cold war. Because the character of the budget cycle made it impossible for the joint chiefs to provide an integrated budget for FY 1948 and FY 1949, they had to wait until late 1948 to begin work on the FY 1950 budget; but Sullivan made it clear to Forrestal in February 1948 that Truman's cutting of funds for naval operations meant accepting a calculated risk that would result in a "one-shot Navy." 18 He also told Webb through Forrestal, "Only by the continuance of the building program can we avail ourselves of our technological advances, maintain our striking capabilities, and guard against attack.” 19

By favoring the air force in 1948, Congress appeared to approve strategic bombing as the primary strategy. With funds short, Sullivan had to delay his 1948 building program until 1949 and could allot only $6 million that year toward the supercarrier. Moreover, Webb would approve the carrier only on condition that Sullivan cease work on thirteen ships and transfer the unexpended funds to the carrier. Sullivan capitulated and also stopped certain conversion work in order to save the carrier.20 As he told the House Armed Services Committee, "I cannot tell you how very, very important everyone in the Navy feels that this [carrier] is."

// 21

Nonetheless, the air force insisted that Sullivan must have the carrier approved by it

17 Lee to secretary of the navy, Jan. 30, 1948, SNP, RG 80, NA.

18 Sullivan to Forrestal, Feb. 10, 1948, ibid. See also Forrestal to Sullivan, June 5, 1948, enclosing letter from Truman to Forrestal of June 4, 1948, and Sullivan to Forrestal, June 18, 1948, ibid.

19 Sullivan to James Webb via secretary of defense, Dec. 27, 1947, ibid.

20 New York Times, June 24, 1948; N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Aug. 25, Oct. 12, 1948; Edward Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress (Columbus, 1966), pp. 78-81.

21 U.S. Congress. House Armed Services Comm., Hearings, Navy Department Appropriations, FY 1949 (Washington, 1949), pp. 3, 131-132.

or by the joint chiefs. With a formal vote the joint chiefs approved it by three to one, the air force opposing.22 In summarizing the matter, Forrestal wrote that the navy believed "the Air Force wants to get control of all aviation" and the air force feared that "the Navy is trying to encroach upon [its] strategic air prerogatives." 23

Controversy heightened when the air force urged the Eberstadt committee of the Hoover commission, which was investigating national security, to merge naval aviation with the air force. The army wanted to relegate the navy to the role of escorting convoys. The navy declared that it had greater capability for strategic bombing than the air force, which lacked a bomber that could reach targets in the Soviet Union.24

Eberstadt had headed a navy committee that worked out disputes between the navy and the air force prior to the passage of the National Security Act. Believed to favor the navy, he was overwhelmed by navy arguments to retain his position and by air force and army arguments to take a neutral stand between the services. At hearings Eberstadt held, Symington argued that any capability the navy developed to drop the atomic bomb should be directed by the air force. Sullivan replied, "A unilateral development program toward achieving atomic weapon delivery systems restricted to one service would be unsound and fraught with gravest consequences." 25

Most of the navy's testimony was presented by the assistant secretary of the navy for air, John Nicholas Brown, and Vice Adm. Arthur Radford, vice chief of naval operations. Radford spoke mainly against "shortcuts to victory," the idea of pushbutton warfare, and the single weapon concept. To navy partisans, the B-36 was "a weapon of little value, one not

22 Gen. Carl Spaatz to Sen. Chan Gurney, May 24, 1948, SNP, RG 80, NA; "Carrier War," Aviation Week, May 31, 1948, p. 9.

23 Millis, ed., Forrestal Diaries, p. 466.

24 That the navy was looking to the future is clear. Its plans called for laying the keel of the supercarrier on Apr. 14, 1948, and delivery of the ship about Jan. 1, 1952. On Jan. 17, 1949, funded obligations for the carrier amounted only to some $4 million. Beauregard to secretary of the navy, Jan. 17, 1949, SNP, RG 80, NA.

25 Sullivan to Symington, Aug. 9, 1948, copies to Forrestal and Royall, ibid.

worth developing," and "the heavy bomber is the Maginot Line weapon that lulls us into defense lethargy."26 Officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and in the Department of the Air Force complained bitterly because of the navy's charge that the air force could not perform the missions assigned to it by the joint chiefs and the navy's assertion that the navy was not only capable of performing the air force function of strategic bombing but required to do so by the National Security Act. Sullivan nevertheless insisted that the navy would drop atomic bombs upon naval targets as a normal part of its primary function, although it would do so in support of the strategic plans of the joint chiefs and in coordination with the air force. If denied the right to drop such bombs, the navy would survive merely as a luxury item in the budget. In the next five-year period the conventional heavy bomber might well be made obsolescent by guided missiles, and the air force could not be sure that it would have overseas bases.

26 Chief of naval operations to distribution list, Oct. 29, 1948, ibid.; Hammond, "Super Carriers," pp. 488-489.

27 Symington to Sullivan, July 21, 1948, copy to Royall; Sullivan to Symington, Aug. 9, 1948, copy to Royall, SNP, RG 80, NA. See also W. John Kenney, under secretary of the navy, to under secretary of the air force, Nov. 16, 1948, ibid. 28 Sullivan had directed that a "complete, factual, and passive presentation" be prepared for submission to the Eberstadt committee and that all statements be sent first to his Committee on Unification and then to him for his personal approval. Sullivan to distribution list, July 29, 1948, ibid.