NASA's needs in developing experiments was organized by Newell early in 1959 into a more systematic and formal arrangement through creation of working groups of university scientists to prepare instrument packages for satellites and space probes. Authorization was received in January 1959 to proceed with the formation of such groups. Efforts began almost immediately to gather some of the nation's top astronomers to plan experiments. By the middle of March a working group on lunar exploration under a NASA manager was issuing invitations for scientists to participate. A press release announced on March 21, 1959, the formation of two space science working groups, one on orbiting astronomical observatories and another on satellite ionospheric beacons. The lunar explorations group had been expanded to include interplanetary probes. 58

The scope of the working groups' activities was ambiguous. It was unclear whether they were to assist in formulating broad policy or were to lend NASA assistance of a more technical nature. Newell at first seemed to expect the scientists to generate ideas and plan experiments, with systems groups to be established to assemble satellite instrument packages. Two months later, however, the groups were described as including scientists, engineers, and others helping to construct and test equipment and payloads, and the function of the groups was to insure that projects were carried out rapidly and effectively. At a scientific symposium in April 1959 Newell explicitly stated that the working groups would not be advisory groups but that each would be associated with a specific project for the life of that project. In contrast to Newell's description, the working groups were reported by Dryden to be involved in relatively long-range projects; they were composed mainly of university scientists and their first objective was to collect information.59 In August Newell attempted to clarify the situation. His original concept, he wrote, had been that of working groups of engineers and scientists assisting a project manager in preparing a scientific payload, the group to

58 Staff conference report by Newell, Jan. 27, 1959; Newell, memo to Glennan, Jan. 21, 1959; Newell to Maurice Ewing, Columbia University, Mar. 13, 1959; draft of NASA press release, Mar. 21, 1959, all in Newell Papers.

59 Miscellaneous notes by Newell, Jan. 20, 1959; Schilling to Irwin Hersey, Mar. 16, 1959; draft of NASA press release, Mar. 21, 1959, all in Newell Papers.

be formed after the project had been decided on. But the lunar group had been formed before its project was firmed up, and unexpected delays left the group free to consider longterm suggestions. The value of contact between NASA and leaders in the scientific community became apparent during this period.60

It appears that during 1959 apprehension over admitting university scientists into the policymaking levels of NASA's science program was quieted by the happy results of the somewhat accidental admission of the lunar exploration group. Newell was favorably impressed with the working group's reaction to NASA. The members appeared satisfied with NASA's activities, appreciative of various problems and the factors influencing decisions, and willing to accept NASA's final decisions, decisions that might be based on factors unknown to them. The working groups seemed to be an effective means of maintaining contact with the scientific community, while keeping the control of the scientific research program in NASA's hands.

Another issue concerning the relative authority of NASA and university scientists centered about the question of grants from NASA to universities for space science research. In March 1960 Newell conferred with Dr. Samuel Silver, the director of the newly created Space Sciences Laboratory of the University of California at Berkeley. Newell indicated considerable interest in the laboratory and a desire to receive specific proposals for research. Silver, however, evidently had in mind a broader role for his laboratory. He stated that he would prefer that the particulars of experiments be left to individual experimenters (Silver was objecting to too close supervision from the Space Science Board, but his comment could also apply to NASA), and he inquired whether NASA would consider financing construction of a central facility for the Space Sciences Laboratory and contributing toward maintenance of the university's computer facilities. Silver was concerned over the fragmentation of his laboratory's planning, which a steady source of support would help solve. Newell, however, was determined to keep planning under NASA's control, and he preferred to limit financial aid to items contracted for as part of specific projects.61 Again

60 Newell to Silverstein, Aug. 26, 1959.

61 Newell, memo, Mar. 16, 1960.

in October of 1960 Silver attempted to obtain funds from NASA to provide the Space Sciences Laboratory with greater flexibility, but NASA again insisted that it be tied to specific proposals. NASA suggested use of multi-year contracts to provide more flexibility, and Silver replied that, although he still thought general support more desirable, he would turn his attention to generating specific proposals. 62

The pressure from the university community was considered by scientists within NASA as understandable and legitimate, and a compromise was suggested that would benefit both the universities and NASA. Large university laboratories could seriously disturb a university's other activities and might lead to the granting of doctorates for work done at the level of a skillful technician rather than for creative research. Departmental and interdepartmental grants, however, would serve to deflect the pressure from the universities into more beneficial channels. Such grants would also provide a means for NASA to furnish the universities with the continuing support they needed without committing NASA as greatly as the creation of laboratories would. Newell wanted to avoid developing an irreversible pattern of contracting that could result from a situation in which established groups could not be readily dropped. To insure that its

62 Newell, memo, Oct. 28, 1960.

support of basic science was related to space research, NASA needed to keep some degree of control over the research it supported.63 While the awarding of university grants became one of the areas of greatest change in NASA policy after the new administration started in 1961, there was at first a strong opposition within NASA to a large buildup of university laboratories.

Following its creation in 1958 out of the predominately technologically-oriented National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics whose ability to manage a national space science research program was questionable, the new National Aeronautics and Space Administration moved quickly and decisively to bolster its capabilities and to seize the initiative. Within two years NASA had built up its own staff, primarily through wholesale transfers of programs from the military and had enlisted the assistance of university scientists under a form of organization that retained substantial authority for NASA rather than delegating it to the scientists themselves or to another organization such as the National Academy of Sciences or an industrial contractor. By 1960 NASA was well able to direct American achievements in space during the ensuing decade.

63 Robert Jastrow, Beltsville Space Center, to Newell, Mar. 8, 1960; Newell to Dryden, Mar. 24, 1960; Newell, memo, Nov. 10, 1960, all in Newell Papers.

ERIC FEAVER

In January 1891, less than a month after the

battle of Wounded Knee, the commanding general of the United States Army, John M. Schofield, made a remarkable suggestion to the secretary of war, Redfield Proctor. Schofield proposed "that 2,000 young Indians be enlisted in the Army and organized into troops and companies, to be incorporated into the existing regiments." He believed such action would stabilize Indian reservations by providing restless, dissatisfied braves with useful employment and would help mold the Indians from savages into civilized, responsible American citizens.1

Proctor relayed Schofield's remarks to President Benjamin Harrison, "with my full concurrence therein.” 2 President Harrison probably responded favorably, for on March 9, 1891, the adjutant general issued General Order no. 28, outlining the purpose and extent of an Indian enlistment program. The stated purpose echoed General Schofield's view. And the project was to embrace all western Indians, including most

1975 by Eric Feaver

1 John M. Schofield to Redfield Proctor, Jan. 22, 1891, 1222, AGO, 1891, Records of the Adjutant General's Office, 1780's1917, Record Group 94, National Archives (cited hereafter as RG 94, NA).

2 Proctor to Benjamin Harrison, Jan. 26, 1891, ibid.

western regiments.3 In an earlier memorandum the adjutant general estimated that if every designated regiment based west of the Mississippi recruited a full fifty-five-man Indian unit, there would be eight cavalry troops and nineteen infantry companies added to the army, comprising 1,485 Indian soldiers.4 That represented a significant number of soldiers in an army that numbered less than 25,000 regulars.

For a year the War Department had been weighing whether to enlist Indians. Without question the idea was prompted by the Ghost Dance phenomenon that spread through western Indian tribes late in 1889 and early in 1890 and which received strong support among the once mighty and still proud Teton Sioux. Inspired by Sioux emissaries of the Paiute Indian prophet, Wovoka, fired up Indians on Sioux reservations took up the Ghost Dance. According to the disciples of Wovoka, if the Sioux faithfully performed the dance through the winter of 1890-91, the white man's bullets would no longer harm them. In the spring the earth would swallow up the white man, deliver the Indian from his reservation chains, and restore to him the land of his ancestors.5

3 General Order no. 28, Mar. 9, 1891, ibid.

4 Adjutant general, memo, Jan. 27, 1891, ibid.

5 James Mooney, The Ghost Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890 (Chicago, 1965), pp. 1-45, 60-87.

That was a compelling promise an abused and outraged people desperately grasped. Unfortunately, white settlers in areas surrounding the Sioux reservations feared that the dancing warned of renewed hostilities. Sioux Indian agents demanded that it cease. Many Indians refused to comply. The agent at Pine Ridge panicked. In mid-November 1890 he rushed off a hysterical note to the commissioner of Indian affairs. "Indians are dancing in the snow and are wild and crazy," he reported. We "are at the mercy of these dancers. . . We need protection, and we need it now." He demanded military assistance.6

So stimulated, the Indian Bureau called upon the army to restore order. By late November 1890 troops under Brig. Gen. John R. Brooke confronted dancing warriors at the Pine Ridge and Rosebud agencies and kept a watchful eye on other reservations. On November 28 the adjutant general wrote to Maj. Gen. Nelson A. Miles, Brooke's immediate superior, that Proctor had authorized him to enlist "for service in the present emergency" Indian companies and troops "the whole not to exceed twenty (20) troops and companies of sixty (60) men-in all twelve hundred (1200) men.'' 8

The army's thinking was obvious. If it could enlist dissident Sioux, it might quench the Ghost Dance movement. Its motives, however, ranged beyond ending the present emergency. Schofield thought the Indians would welcome the opportunity to be soldiers. He believed that "there is in their mind no employment [more] worthy of an Indian brave than that of a soldier." The army should exploit that predisposition and assert military control over recalcitrant Indians in peacetime, as well as in emergencies that the Indian Bureau seemed unable to handle. Many army bureaucrats agreed. They feared that their role in the west would cease when the Indians no longer posed a threat to peace. Long jealous of the Interior Department's control of the Indian Bureau and Indian affairs, they questioned the ability of civilians to assimilate Indians. They reasoned

6 Daniel F. Royer to commissioner of Indian affairs (CIA), Nov. 15, 1891, CIA, Annual Report (1891), p. 128.

7 Ibid., pp. 128-129; Mooney, Ghost Dance Religion, pp. 88-98; Robert M. Utley, The Last Days of the Sioux Nation (New Haven, 1963), pp. 60-133.

Adjutant general to Nelson A. Miles, Nov. 18, 1890, 1222, AGO, 1891, RG 94, NA.

9 Schofield to Proctor, Dec. 8, 1891, ibid.

that the enlistment program would attract Indian braves, whom the army could then discipline into accepting white civilization.

Events moved too rapidly for Miles to do much. The tragedy at Wounded Knee closely followed the adjutant general's directive. And although the Ghost Dance phenomenon ebbed away, the army did not drop the enlistment idea. In January and February 1891 officers traveled throughout the Sioux reservations seeking recruits to serve "for five years as foot soldiers to accompany the First Infantry to California." They failed. The recruiters reported that to a man no Sioux wished to be separated from his family or his ponies and that he could receive better pay, remain near his home, and keep his horses by enlisting in traditional fashion for six months as a scout.11

Undaunted, the army broadened the idea. The Adjutant General's Office launched attempts to recruit among all western Indian tribes, not just the Sioux and decided that it would not compel Indian recruits to serve any great distance from their tribes without their consent. Further it reduced the authorized number of Indian scouts from 1,000 to a mere 150 for the entire army. 12 Two days before the army issued General Order no. 28 Schofield remarked that "so novel a proposition as the enlistment for a term of years as regular soldiers, rather than as scouts for a short period, could not be expected to be at first acceptable to the Indians." But he insisted that the general order be issued to give the plan "a full, fair and persistent trial, so that the country may know whether or not a reliable Indian contingent can be secured for the regular military service." 13

So began the curious, short-lived experiment in military acculturation in the fading years of the frontier west. It was an idea fostered by the army's command bureaucracy that would quickly antagonize field commanders charged with implementing it, encounter stiff Indian resistance, and challenge the authority of the Indian Bureau. Yet the plan reflected the high command's missionary belief that this was an

10 1st Lt. Willis O. Clark to camp adjutant, Pine Ridge Agency, Feb. 17, 1891, ibid.

11 2d Lt. Guy H. Preston to regimental adjutant, 1st Inf., Feb. 18, 1891; 2d Lt. J. C. Byron to camp adjutant, Pine Ridge Agency, Feb. 24, 1891; Col. William Shafter to assistant adjutant general, Div. of the Mo., Feb. 24, 1891, ibid. 12 General Order no. 28, Mar. 9, 1891, ibid.

13 Schofield, memo, Mar. 7, 1891, ibid.