ideas when secret discussions of the Palestine problem took place in a subcommittee of the State Department's Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations. Austin found himself in the minority when he advocated a binational state in Palestine. The Senator argued with Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, who favored the creation of a Jewish state. Welles connected his plan with agreements and economic developments in surrounding Arab states that would permit the deportation of Arabs from Palestine to those states. 10

Austin's idea reflected deep study and yet a strange naiveté. Interestingly, it had great similarity to the controversial American proposal he later presented to the Security Council in March 1948. In 1942, Austin had wanted the Allies to take over Britain's Palestinian mandate "so that no selfish motives could interfere with the trusteeship necessary for the inauguration of a government strong enough to maintain itself." He believed the Allies' tutelage would create a "strong, free government, in which the Palestinians would all have equal opportunity, as Americans do in America." He went on to note that he strongly disagreed with those who claimed the Jews and Arabs would never consent to a binational state. Austin wrote, "I claim that the Jews and Arabs are cousins," and if an example of the maintenance of a free government was shown to them, their fear of each other would dissipate. Referring to his earlier study of the Near East, Austin stated that young Arabs and Jews of intelligence, who would be the leaders of their people when the issue was decided, convinced him that they had no doubts that they could get along with each other. However, he thought it necessary that a truly neutral third force help build a viable framework. But Austin conceded that few members of the committee agreed with him.11

These private conversations revealed Austin's concern and that of others in Congress

10 "Memorandum Re Meeting of Subcommittee on Political Problems of Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy," Aug. 29, 1942, Warren R. Austin Papers, Univ. of Vermont.

11 Ibid., Austin's 1942 "cousin" solution was broached in a secret session. In 1948, while publicly discussing the Arab-Israeli war before the United Nations, Austin made his most famous faux pas when he urged the Arabs and Jews to come together and "settle this problem in a true Christian spirit." Time, Feb. 5, 1951, p. 16.

and the State Department over the Near East embroilment. As noted, until late 1945, no overall review of the situation was undertaken nor was a coherent policy developed by the United States. Instead, as the war ended, public opinion imposed the issue piecemeal on the government. In addition to the party platforms of 1944, showing American sympathy for the plight of the Jews, a congressional resolution was introduced that year, favoring creation of a Jewish state. It was stopped only by recommendations from the War Department and the State Department on the ground that Arab reaction might hamper ongoing military operations. 12 Late in 1945, Austin was a member of the subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee that drafted a composite resolution offering the good offices of the United States to resolve the trying situation. But privately, he indicated that he was not in favor of the setting up of a Jewish state. 13

When the first session of the General Assembly opened in October 1946, the general course the government followed was intended to protect similar British and American interests in the Near East. If this meant alienating strongly Zionist groups in the United States, State Department officials were willing to take that risk. So when the British decided to turn the matter over to the United Nations, American policy required a cautious position at the special session in April 1947.14

Another important consideration justified this stance in the United Nations. The Near East imbroglio was part of the Cold War struggle that had so recently heated up. While Soviet and American attitudes toward Palestine appeared similar, the State Department had no intention of allowing the Soviet Union excuse or opportunity to exert its influence in the area. Stalin's negative reaction to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, his attempt to seize

12 John C. Campbell, The United States in World Affairs, 1947-48 (New York, 1948), p. 311.

13 "Report of the Subcommittee to Consider Resolutions on Palestine," Dec. 11, 1945, Foreign Relations Committee Papers, Records of the United States Senate, Record Group 46, National Archives; Austin to Irving Carpenter, Nov. 23, 1945, Correspondence File, Austin Papers; Congressional Record 79 Cong., 1 sess., Dec. 17, 1945, pp. 12165-12189.

14 Acheson to Truman, July 15, 1946, FRUS, 1946, 1: 414416; Acheson, telegram, Mar. 19, 1947; memo, Dean Rusk to Acheson, Apr. 3, 1947, Palestine reference file of Robert McClintock, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives (cited hereafter as McClintock File).

the Turkish Straits and to tear Iran apart in 1945-46, as well as the covert support for communist insurgents in Greece made American officials overly cautious about Soviet overtures in the Near East that might threaten United States interests there. The strategy of containment, enunciated publicly by President Truman in his hard-line speech of March 12, 1947, set the policy the United States would follow vis-a-vis the Soviets, in spite of any possible Soviet agreement with the United States on a proposed course of action. 15 J. C. Hurewitz has recently noted that containment "gave the United States an inclusive regional interest: that of hemming the Soviet Union in at its Middle East frontier." 16

Both Austin and his deputy, Herschel Johnson, represented the United States at plenary and committee meetings during the short special session held from April 28 to May 15. The delegates held to a constrained position in the special session, for they were under orders to put forward only the procedure for dealing with Palestine. "Substantive policy," the Department instructed, "can best be determined in our view after the ad hoc committee makes its report to the next regular GA session." 17 The meeting accomplished that objective when the Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) was established with instructions to investigate the present circumstances and to submit a report and recommendations to the second session of the General Assembly in September 1947.

However, creation of the committee was not easily accomplished because of a controversy over major power representation. Two similar resolutions were introduced. Both requested a

15 J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension (New York, 1969), p. 69: Ivan Spector, The Soviet Union and the Muslim World, 1917-1956 (Seattle, 1956), pp. 112-130; Yaacov Ro'l, "Soviet-Israel Relations, 1947-1954," in Michael Confino and Shimon Shamir, eds., The U.S.S.R. and the Middle East (New York, 1973), pp. 124-125; Loy Henderson, "American Political and Strategic Interests in the Middle East and Southeastern Europe," in John A. Kraft, ed., Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science 22 (1946-1948), pp. 451-459; Welles, We Need Not Fail, p. 75.

16 Hurewitz, Middle East Politics, p. 71.

17 Marshall to Austin, Apr. 7, 9, 1947, State Department Decimal File 501.BB/4-427; 501.BB/4-447, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives (cited hereafter by file number); memo, Loy Henderson, Apr. 15, 1947; memo, Acheson to Henderson, Apr. 17, 1947; memo of conversation with Austin, Apr. 18, 1947, McClintock File.

special committee and designated its objective. But the resolutions differed over the committee's composition. An Argentine resolution, supported by the Soviets, called for a committee composed of the five permanent members of the Security Council and six other members. The second resolution, proposed by the United States, sought a smaller committee and confined its membership to nonmajor countries. 18 The two arguments used by Austin and Johnson in supporting the United States proposalone, a smaller group would enhance the possibility of unanimous recommendations, and two, Britain, as a party to the issue, should be excluded along with other major powersmasked the main thrust of the American proposal. The United States was determined to keep the Soviets from intervening. 19 The Department believed such intervention would be inevitable if that nation was permitted representation on the committee of inquiry. Throughout the protracted debate, Austin and Johnson never revealed this motive. A compromise, in part favorable to the United States, finally resulted. It was based on an Australian resolution to establish a large committee of eleven members on which the major powers would not be represented. 20

Austin's report on the special session to Secretary of State George C. Marshall indicated his optimism toward solution of the Palestine situation. But he warned that little time remained before delivery of the UNSCOP report and in the interim the United States should develop its own tentative position that would aid the next regular session in reaching an early decision on a solution. Austin suggested as a working hypothesis that there should be a unitary, independent Palestinian state- neither Jewish nor Arab. His plan would authorize

18 Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 181.

19 Memo, Marshall to Truman, Apr. 17, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 5: 1070-1072; memo, Acheson to Henderson, Apr. 17, 1947, McClintock File; memo of conversation, Acheson, Henderson, Moshe Shertok, Apr. 23, 1947, File 867.01/4-2347; memo, Rusk to Acheson, May 27, 1947, File 501.BB/5-2747.

20 United Nations, Department of Public Information, Yearbook of the United Nations 1946-1947 (Lake Success, 1947), pp. 294-301; Jean Caldwell, "Zionist Pressure Groups and the Palestine Policy of the Truman Administration" (M.A. thesis, Univ. of Kansas, 1967), pp. 62-63; Campbell, United States in World Affairs 1947-1948, pp. 320-321. UNSCOP consisted of Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.

minimal yearly immigration based on the economic "absorptive capacity of the country." Preparations for independence were to take from five to ten years, during which the country would be administered under United Nations trusteeship, while various agencies of the world organization would furnish economic assistance. Austin told Marshall that he realized the difficulty of implementing the plan, but it was one which "should be the most appealing one to all reasonable people," including the Soviets, Arabs, and Jews.21 Austin's plan indicated that his ideas had changed little from those he held in 1936 and 1942 when he advocated a similar solution.

The special session generated other comments. Loy Henderson recommended a trusteeship solution similar to Austin's. Special Political Affairs officer Dean Rusk reported his concern about the Soviet position. He stated that the Soviets were left in an "excellent tactical position for the future" because they made "statements adroitly designed to gain credit for themselves both with the Jews and with the Arabs." A Department draft paper favored trusteeship for Palestine because the Trusteeship Council would handle the issue and the "Soviet Union has only one seat out of ten-a seat which it has not yet occupied."22 Obviously, the Cold War had crept into the Palestine issue and trusteeship would work in favor of the United States.

23

Marshall answered Austin's cable with encouragement after the Department drafted a working paper on Palestine. Its top-secret contents provided a solution that incorporated Austin's ideas as well as those of others.2 Nonetheless, the position elaborated was tentative; Marshall had not cleared it. By early July, three other plans for Palestine were developed, including one for a binational autonomous state and another one that suggested partition into two separate states. Near Eastern desk chief Loy Henderson recommended to Marshall that the United States position in

21 Austin to Marshall, May 22, 1947, File 501.BB Palestine/ 5-2247.

22 Memo, McClintock to Rusk, May 21, 1947, McClintock File; memo, Rusk to Acheson, May 27, 1947, File 501.BB/ 5-2747; "Possible Forms of International Machinery for Carrying Out United Nations Responsibilities Toward Palestine," June 3, 1947, McClintock File.

23 Marshall to Austin, June 13, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 5: 11031105; "A Plan for the Future Government of Palestine," June 4, 1947, ibid., pp. 1096-1101.

the upcoming General Assembly session favor a multinational community under a single, unified government. Furthermore, he suggested that one delegate of the American group be designated to concern himself solely with the Palestine problem. 24 Herschel Johnson was selected.

While the summer planning progressed, official government policy remained one of neutrality. President Truman issued a public appeal to Americans to remain nonpartisan on the subject, and the State Department ordered its diplomatic and consular officers at twenty critical posts to emphasize a neutral view, pending the UNSCOP report.25

UNSCOP gathered its evidence throughout the summer of 1947 and delivered a report to the Secretary-General in September. While a minority report representing the views of three member nations opted for creation of a federal state in Palestine, seven members of the committee recommended partitioning the country into Jewish and Arab states with an economic union for both areas. The report further recommended placing the Holy City of Jerusalem under international trusteeship and throughout the transitional period of two years, Britain was to administer the area under United Nations auspices.

To discuss the UNSCOP report, the Assembly designated its total membership to sit as an ad hoc committee. Three subcommittees were created to assist in its work: the first was to draw up a detailed plan based on UNSCOP majority recommendations, the second to draft a plan for a unitary Palestinian state, and the third to attempt to gain agreement between the Arabs and Jews.

The UNSCOP report created a problem for the State Department and its representatives at the United Nations. Should the United States now reverse its unofficial plans concerning a federal state and support the majority report? The government had to reach a decision soon, as Secretary Marshall's upcoming major speech to the General Assembly on September 17 would be expected to include some comment on the situation. A discussion took place among the American delegation in New York

24 Henderson to Marshall, July 7, 1947, ibid., pp. 11201123.

25 U. S., Department of State, Bulletin 16 (June 15, 1947), p. 1154; Marshall to Diplomatic Officers, June 13, 1947, FRUS, 1947, 5: 1103.

on September 15 with Marshall presiding. Other members present were Austin, Henderson, representatives Eleanor Roosevelt and John Foster Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State John Hilldring and Thomas F. Power, Jr., deputy secretary-general of the United States mission.26

The secretary pointed out the difficulty of the decision. Uppermost in his mind was the concern that American support for partition "would mean very violent Arab reaction." He believed that the United States "should avoid actively arousing the Arabs and precipitating their rapprochement with the Soviet Union in the first week or ten days of the Assembly." Yet, he noted, if America did not take a clear stand, he and the Department would be "severely attacked for 'pussyfooting.'" 27

Eleanor Roosevelt then asked if it was certain that the Soviets would oppose the majority report. Marshall replied that this was assumed because it offered such a fine opportunity for the Soviets to gain Arab friendship. Mrs. Roosevelt was not convinced. She believed the Arabs feared the Soviets more than the United States. Loy Henderson countered that he was convinced that the Arabs, for convenience, would work with the Soviets against their common enemy.2 28

Eleanor Roosevelt attempted to raise the whole question to a higher plane. She believed the overriding issue was whether to support "a report brought in by a United Nations committee, for the value of such support in promoting the success of the United Nations.” Marshall answered her, stating that merely voicing support for the report would not accomplish that objective. Rather, the United States must be prepared to implement its support by force if necessary. Henderson supported Marshall and also contended that those nations that signed the majority report were not responsible for its implementation. The burden would rest with the great powers.'

29

Austin agreed with Marshall. If the United States favored the partition plan, it then must

26 Minutes of meeting of U. S. delegation, Sept. 15, 1947, International Organizations File, Washington National Records Center (IO File, WNRC). Excerpts of the meeting are printed in FRUS, 1947, 5: 1147-1151.

27 Delegation meeting, Sept. 15, 1947, IO File, WNRC. For advice to Marshall, see "Comment on the UNSCOP Report" by W. A. Eddy, Sept. 13, 1947, McClintock File.

28 Delegation meeting, Sept. 15, 1947, IO File, WNRC.

29 Ibid.

prepare itself to support the position with force. He opposed partition; in prophetic commentary, he stated his belief that such a Jewish state would "have to defend itself with bayonets forever, until extinguished in blood." Nonetheless, Austin believed it wise for the United States to enunciate a clear position in Marshall's speech because the nation would "stand before the world as courageous and wise...." 30

Marshall's subsequent remarks on September 17 hinted that the United States gave special weight to the partition recommendation, but the final decision to support the majority plan was not made by Marshall until September 24. The timing for announcement of the position was kept secret; it depended on the course of general discussion in the United Nations committee, and the American plan was helped by a number of reservations designed to maintain flexibility. Marshall also decided that the Department should develop a switch position if a two-thirds vote for partition did not appear likely in the Assembly.31 Thus the door remained ajar for a future change in policy.

Truman later wrote about the decision to support partition. He said that his purpose was based on the historical consideration of maintaining the pledge made in the Balfour Declaration, as well as to relieve the misery of the victims of Nazism.32 Undoubtedly, the president's concern over the prestige of the United Nations was also a factor, along with the tremendous pressure exerted on him by Zionists.33 But he stated he was not convinced by the State Department's arguments for maintaining the status quo in the Near East.

34

30 Ibid. For confirmation of Austin's opposition to partition, see Eleanor Roosevelt to Truman, Mar. 22, 1948, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt Papers, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y.

31 Official Records of the General Assembly, 2d sess., 82d plenary meeting (GA 2/82, plenary), Sept. 17, 1947, p. 20; "U. S. Position with Respect to the Question of Palestine," Sept. 30, 1947, Palestine "Reference Book" of Dean Rusk, RG 59, NA; memo, Henderson to Marshall, Sept. 22, 1947; memo, John Hildring to Johnson, Sept. 24, 1947, McClintock File.

32 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs (New York, 1956), 2: 162. This is corroborated in Merle Miller's Plain Speaking (New York, 1973), pp. 215-216.

33 Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, p. 59; Ian Bickerton, "President Truman's Recognition of Israel" (M.A. thesis, Kansas State Univ., 1966), pp. 46-49; Caldwell, "Zionist Pressure Groups," pp. 64-68; Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), pp. 344-347.

34 Truman, Memoirs, 2: 162; Miller, Plain Speaking, pp. 215-216.

Objections within the Department to American support of the majority plan continued but were disregarded. On October 9, two days before Herschel Johnson officially announced United States support for the plan in the ad hoc committee, Secretary Marshall met with Austin, Johnson, Mrs. Roosevelt, Hilldring, Rusk, Charles Bohlen, Charles Fahey, and Paul Alling. While there was a consensus to support the decision to back the plan, most thought a two-thirds vote in the Assembly was not obtainable. But Marshall insisted that the United States should not pressure any state to vote for the plan. In the event the majority plan did not secure enough votes, a vague form of trusteeship was discussed as a contingency.35

A few days later, American policymakers were perplexed by the decision of the Soviet Union to back partition also. Ambassador Bedell Smith later commented on the shift from his Moscow post. He said he was convinced that the Soviets believed the European and Asiatic areas were considerably softer for Soviet exploitation than the harder Arab Middle East. He believed an alliance with the Arab states would gain little for the Soviets in the long run. But support of partition would enable them to secure "appropriate implementing measures" that would prepare the area for future Soviet activity. In addition, approval of partition might hasten British withdrawal, long a Soviet objective. Even more important, according to Smith, partition would allow penetration of covert Soviet aid and would incite both sides, thus threatening American and British interests. Furthermore, Soviet tactics were sufficiently flexible to permit reversal if events dictated it. Smith contended that the Soviets had nothing to lose by supporting the partition plan.36

For the Americans, the Soviet decision was unexpected and it considerably influenced the United States position in the subcommittee of the ad hoc committee that had the task of detailing a plan for the General Assembly. Representatives of the United States, the Soviet Un

35 Memo, Henderson to Robert Lovett, Oct. 6, 1947; memo, Harley Notter to Johnson, Oct. 7, 1947, Palestine "Reference Book" of Dean Rusk; memo, Gordon Knox to Johnson, Oct. 9, 1947, McClintock File.

36 Robert Lovett, memo of conversation, Oct. 15, 1947; FRUS, 1947, 5: 1183; Bedell Smith to Marshall, Nov. 14, 1947, ibid., pp. 1263-1264. See also Nadav Safran, "The Soviet Union and Israel, 1947-1969," in Ivo J. Lederer and Wayne S. Vucinich, eds., The Soviet Union and the Middle East, the Post World War II Era (Stanford, 1974), pp. 161-162.

ion, Canada, Poland, Czechoslovakia, South Africa, Guatemala, Uruguay, and Venezuela made up the subcommittee, which was chaired by Canada's Lester Pearson. Herschel Johnson sat as the American representative, while Austin remained in close contact with the proceedings and acted as liaison between the delegation and the Department.

The American position in the first subcommittee clearly indicated a perceived Soviet threat to inject itself into the situation. The American proposal sought direct transfer of authority from Britain to the two new Near Eastern states on July 1, 1948. A Soviet proposal called for an early termination of the British mandatary, followed by a one-year transitional period during which a commission authorized by the Security Council would administer Palestine.37 The Soviets were provided with a significant foothold through their place on the Security Council. Once the Soviet plan was announced on November 3, Department officials formulated a counterposition. The Americans believed the Russian proposal would not succeed because it relied on cooperation alone. Although its wording was nebulous, it gave the Soviets power over implementation through the Security Council. Subsequently, the Americans supported the idea of early independence, although they flatly refused to accept any plan that left the administration of Palestine under control of the Security Council.38

After prolonged drafting, a compromise prevailed in the subcommittee. The mandate would end August 1, 1948, and independent Arab and Jewish states would come into existence within two months after that. The Assembly would appoint a five-member commission composed of small powers, who would administer the mandate.39 Acceptance of this solution meant a diplomatic victory for the United States, inasmuch as the plan gave the United Nations commission the necessary authority to act. Without that power, circumstances in Palestine might deteriorate and open the way for unilateral Soviet penetration, on the 37 United Nations, United Nations Weekly Bulletin 3 (Nov. 18, 1947), pp. 655-657.

38 Memo, Gordon Knox to Johnson, Nov. 4, 1947, IO Files, WNRC; Gordon P. Merriam to Fraser Wilkens, Nov. 5, 1947, File 501.BB Palestine/10-2547; memos, Austin to Marshall, Nov. 7, 1947, File 501.BB Summaries/11-747; Nov. 11, 1947, File 501.BB Palestine/11-1147.

39 Memo, Green to Rusk, Nov. 15, 1947, Palestine "Reference Book" of Dean Rusk, RG 59, NA.