Thus, acting on the recommendations of the Air Coordinating Committee, the National Advisory Commission for Aeronautics, and Lovett and Royall, Truman established the President's Air Policy Commission headed by Thomas K. Finletter in July 1947. The air force meant to use this opportunity to gain support for its seventy-group strategic force. The world view that Symington brought to his testimony before the Air Policy Commission in December 1947 had been expressed by him just weeks after he became secretary of the air force. As for the chances of peace, he said:

The lack of progress is discouraging but we must not give way to despair. We must realize that the building and the maintenance of peace, requires [sic] more patience, more perseverance, and perhaps even more moral courage than does the conduct of war itself, for the issues involved are less clearly defined, and less dramatic than the objectives of war. 16

In December 1947, Symington told the Finletter commission that although the air force required an "exceedingly high priority" budget, restrictions would limit his service to a fifty-fivegroup force.17 The commission's report endorsed the air force's objective and predicted the Soviet Union probably would have an atomic capability by January 1953. Consequently, the report urged that national security be redefined and a new strategic concept featuring the seventy-group force be promulgated.18 However, the commission's report failed to confront issues that would soon plague the military establishment. The navyair force conflict worsened - the navy charging the commission had ignored naval aviation— and those advocating balanced forces, as opposed to seventy groups, increased their attacks.

On February 5, 1948, Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan announced plans to build a supercarrier. He gave assurances that the navy had no intention of taking over air force bombing responsibilities, but Symington and Spaatz remained convinced the navy was intent on building a strategic air force that would rival or

16 Address by Secretary of the Air Force Symington, Navy Day, Manchester, N. H., Oct. 27, 1947.

17 Members of the President's Air Policy Commission were Thomas K. Finletter, chairman, George P. Baker, vice chairman, Palmer Hoyt, John A. McCone, and Arthur D. Whiteside.

18 President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age (Washington, 1948), pp. 10-27.

usurp the air force's strategic mission. When the navy responded that it needed long-range, land-based patrol bombers for antisubmarine warfare, Spaatz replied that the air force's bombers were "capable of performing the long range sea search mission, including antisubmarine discovery and attack." 19

Truman's fiscal 1949 budget specified defense spending of $11 billion and a fifty-fivegroup air force, thereby ignoring both the Finletter commission and the Congressional Aviation Policy Board which had recommended the seventy groups. "We are more shocked," Symington wrote Forrestal, "than at anything that has happened since we came in Government." He cited rising congressional pressure in favor of the air force and a "common sense strategic concept as to how to get at Russia."' 20

Forrestal, thinking this controversy almost out of control, insisted the joint chiefs promulgate an agreement "about who does what with what weapons." In March at Key West, the chiefs agreed that strategic bombing was the air force's major responsibility but that the navy could attack inland targets and also would not be denied the use of atomic bombs. The navy was authorized to develop weapons considered essential but was not to build a strategic air force. Forrestal told the chiefs at Key West that he and the president had approved construction of the supercarrier that the navy had been counting on. The joint chiefs concurred primarily because Forrestal had presented them with a fait accompli. Was this a joint chiefs' endorsement? Forrestal and Adm. Louis E. Denfeld thought so. Spaatz and Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the new air force chief of staff, did not. Vandenberg subsequently declared the question of the supercarrier had not been discussed at the meeting for that reason.

Though a new executive order (9950, April 21, 1948) was promulgated, the dispute was exacerbated because the navy thought its future depended on the carrier while the air force believed the supercarrier and the navy's longrange patrol bombers threatened its primacy in strategic operations. Both services recognized that possession of the atomic mission would

19 Gen. Spaatz to James E. Webb, letter, Dec. 6, 1946, James E. Webb Papers, Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL).

20 Secretary of the Air Force Symington to Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal, memorandum, Dec. 16, 1947, Clark M. Clifford Papers, HSTL.

ultimately mean a larger share of the defense budget, but the Key West meeting seemed to reinforce the "balanced force" concept based on an almost equal distribution of the defense budget.

Symington's public speaking forays, advocating a seventy-group air force, disturbed Forrestal, who believed the controversy was undermining the defense establishment's programs and morale. He emphasized balance between the services and frequently said that in modern war any one segment could not be separated from the other two. The missions and operations of the services would have to mesh. The fifty-five groups, he said, provided a basis for strategic defense. However, Symington emphasized to Congress that air power should be in balance not among the services but with the Soviet air force. In April 1948, the House Appropriations Committee agreed sufficiently to vote an $822 million supplemental appropriation to the fiscal 1948 budget as a step toward a seventy-group air force. But the administration refused to spend this money.

Symington also told the House Armed Services Committee in April that a seventy-group air force was more important than universal military training, which Truman had favored, but which many Congressmen thought costly and unacceptable in an election year. Upset, Forrestal wondered whether Symington was planning a confrontation with the president, who by this time had become disappointed with the navy, the air force, and with Forrestal. Truman thought his secretary of defense, a conciliator rather than tough administrator, had lost control: "Forrestal can't take it. He wants to compromise with the opposition!" 21 Meanwhile, Symington wrote Forrestal that he had been put in an "impossible position" because he had to be consistent with his testimony to the Finletter group and, moreover, international crises had since developed — especially the Czechoslovakian coup-investing the air force's requirements with even greater urgency. Then, turning to something that had long bothered him, he reminded Forrestal that "nobody who ever served a day in the Air Force was . . . a member of your permanent top staff."22 The air force, Symington

21 Truman, Harry S. Truman, p. 407.

22 Symington to Forrestal, memorandum, Apr. 21, 1948, RG 340, NA.

also noted, "has great admiration and respect for the U. S. Navy. It has nothing but regret, however, for the present regime which has condoned these continuous attacks on its sister services."23 By the spring of 1948 Symington had concluded that the National Security Act should be changed. He thought the secretary of defense was overburdened and needed a civilian deputy, more staff, and also a military chief of staff to break deadlocks among the joint chiefs.24

Key West, Forrestal now realized, had not solved much of anything. According to Secretary Sullivan, the navy was willing to acknowledge the air force's primary responsibility for the strategic atomic mission while also insisting on its prerogative to use the bomb on targets of its own choosing. In July 1948 Forrestal met with General Vandenberg, who emphasized the air force should "be the sole source of authority on missions involving use of the A-bomb." He noted the nation could not afford "duplicative" programs.25 Forrestal held that both services were behaving in a psychotic manner: the navy convinced the air force wanted to control all aviation, the air force thinking the navy was attempting to grab the strategic atomic mission. Both men agreed that the issue required immediate resolution.

The next step toward a resolution was the Newport conference held in August 1948. For the interim, Forrestal and the chiefs agreed that the chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project would report to the air force chief of staff, something the air force had long desired, giving it operational control of the bomb. The term "primary mission" was clarified to mean each service in its major mission area would retain exclusive responsibility for planning, but for mission execution all service resources would be used. Thus, the air force was given primary planning responsibility for strategic bombing but in wartime would also call on the navy. To Forrestal, "the difficulty stems mainly from money. . . . Each service knows the magnitude of its own responsibilities. . . . The economy simply cannot stand fulfillment of

23 Symington to Forrestal, memorandum, June 9, 1948, ibid.

24 Symington to Ferdinand Eberstadt, attachment to letter, June 30, 1948, Clifford Papers, HSTL.

25 Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951),

p. 466.

Thus, acting on the recommendations of the Air Coordinating Committee, the National Advisory Commission for Aeronautics, and Lovett and Royall, Truman established the President's Air Policy Commission headed by Thomas K. Finletter in July 1947. The air force meant to use this opportunity to gain support for its seventy-group strategic force. The world view that Symington brought to his testimony before the Air Policy Commission in December 1947 had been expressed by him just weeks after he became secretary of the air force. As for the chances of peace, he said:

The lack of progress is discouraging but we must not give way to despair. We must realize that the building and the maintenance of peace, requires [sic] more patience, more perseverance, and perhaps even more moral courage than does the conduct of war itself, for the issues involved are less clearly defined, and less dramatic than the objectives of war. 16

In December 1947, Symington told the Finletter commission that although the air force required an "exceedingly high priority" budget, restrictions would limit his service to a fifty-fivegroup force.17 The commission's report endorsed the air force's objective and predicted the Soviet Union probably would have an atomic capability by January 1953. Consequently, the report urged that national security be redefined and a new strategic concept featuring the seventy-group force be promulgated.18 However, the commission's report failed to confront issues that would soon plague the military establishment. The navyair force conflict worsened - the navy charging the commission had ignored naval aviationand those advocating balanced forces, as opposed to seventy groups, increased their attacks.

On February 5, 1948, Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan announced plans to build a supercarrier. He gave assurances that the navy had no intention of taking over air force bombing responsibilities, but Symington and Spaatz remained convinced the navy was intent on building a strategic air force that would rival or

16 Address by Secretary of the Air Force Symington, Navy Day, Manchester, N. H., Oct. 27, 1947.

17 Members of the President's Air Policy Commission were Thomas K. Finletter, chairman, George P. Baker, vice chairman, Palmer Hoyt, John A. McCone, and Arthur D. Whiteside.

18 President's Air Policy Commission, Survival in the Air Age (Washington, 1948), pp. 10-27.

usurp the air force's strategic mission. When the navy responded that it needed long-range, land-based patrol bombers for antisubmarine warfare, Spaatz replied that the air force's bombers were "capable of performing the long range sea search mission, including antisubmarine discovery and attack." 19

Truman's fiscal 1949 budget specified defense spending of $11 billion and a fifty-fivegroup air force, thereby ignoring both the Finletter commission and the Congressional Aviation Policy Board which had recommended the seventy groups. "We are more shocked," Symington wrote Forrestal, "than at anything that has happened since we came in Government." He cited rising congressional pressure in favor of the air force and a "common sense strategic concept as to how to get at Russia." 20

Forrestal, thinking this controversy almost out of control, insisted the joint chiefs promulgate an agreement "about who does what with what weapons." In March at Key West, the chiefs agreed that strategic bombing was the air force's major responsibility but that the navy could attack inland targets and also would not be denied the use of atomic bombs. The navy was authorized to develop weapons considered essential but was not to build a strategic air force. Forrestal told the chiefs at Key West that he and the president had approved construction of the supercarrier that the navy had been counting on. The joint chiefs concurred primarily because Forrestal had presented them with a fait accompli. Was this a joint chiefs' endorsement? Forrestal and Adm. Louis E. Denfeld thought so. Spaatz and Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg, the new air force chief of staff, did not. Vandenberg subsequently declared the question of the supercarrier had not been discussed at the meeting for that reason.

Though a new executive order (9950, April 21, 1948) was promulgated, the dispute was exacerbated because the navy thought its future depended on the carrier while the air force believed the supercarrier and the navy's longrange patrol bombers threatened its primacy in strategic operations. Both services recognized that possession of the atomic mission would

19 Gen. Spaatz to James E. Webb, letter, Dec. 6, 1946, James E. Webb Papers, Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL).

20 Secretary of the Air Force Symington to Secretary of Defense James V. Forrestal, memorandum, Dec. 16, 1947, Clark M. Clifford Papers, HSTL.

ultimately mean a larger share of the defense budget, but the Key West meeting seemed to reinforce the "balanced force" concept based on an almost equal distribution of the defense budget.

Symington's public speaking forays, advocating a seventy-group air force, disturbed Forrestal, who believed the controversy was undermining the defense establishment's programs and morale. He emphasized balance between the services and frequently said that in modern war any one segment could not be separated from the other two. The missions and operations of the services would have to mesh. The fifty-five groups, he said, provided a basis for strategic defense. However, Symington emphasized to Congress that air power should be in balance not among the services but with the Soviet air force. In April 1948, the House Appropriations Committee agreed sufficiently to vote an $822 million supplemental appropriation to the fiscal 1948 budget as a step toward a seventy-group air force. But the administration refused to spend this money.

Symington also told the House Armed Services Committee in April that a seventy-group air force was more important than universal military training, which Truman had favored, but which many Congressmen thought costly and unacceptable in an election year. Upset, Forrestal wondered whether Symington was planning a confrontation with the president, who by this time had become disappointed with the navy, the air force, and with Forrestal. Truman thought his secretary of defense, a conciliator rather than tough administrator, had lost control: "Forrestal can't take it. He wants to compromise with the opposition!" 21 Meanwhile, Symington wrote Forrestal that he had been put in an "impossible position" because he had to be consistent with his testimony to the Finletter group and, moreover, international crises had since developedespecially the Czechoslovakian coup-investing the air force's requirements with even greater urgency. Then, turning to something that had long bothered him, he reminded Forrestal that "nobody who ever served a day in the Air Force was a member of your permanent top staff."22 The air force, Symington

21 Truman, Harry S. Truman, p. 407.

22 Symington to Forrestal, memorandum, Apr. 21, 1948, RG 340, NA.

also noted, "has great admiration and respect for the U. S. Navy. It has nothing but regret, however, for the present regime which has condoned these continuous attacks on its sister services."23 By the spring of 1948 Symington had concluded that the National Security Act should be changed. He thought the secretary of defense was overburdened and needed a civilian deputy, more staff, and also a military chief of staff to break deadlocks among the joint chiefs.24

Key West, Forrestal now realized, had not solved much of anything. According to Secretary Sullivan, the navy was willing to acknowledge the air force's primary responsibility for the strategic atomic mission while also insisting on its prerogative to use the bomb on targets of its own choosing. In July 1948 Forrestal met with General Vandenberg, who emphasized the air force should "be the sole source of authority on missions involving use of the A-bomb." He noted the nation could not afford "duplicative" programs. 25 Forrestal held that both services were behaving in a psychotic manner: the navy convinced the air force wanted to control all aviation, the air force thinking the navy was attempting to grab the strategic atomic mission. Both men agreed that the issue required immediate resolution.

The next step toward a resolution was the Newport conference held in August 1948. For the interim, Forrestal and the chiefs agreed that the chief of the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project would report to the air force chief of staff, something the air force had long desired, giving it operational control of the bomb. The term "primary mission" was clarified to mean each service in its major mission area would retain exclusive responsibility for planning, but for mission execution all service resources would be used. Thus, the air force was given primary planning responsibility for strategic bombing but in wartime would also call on the navy. To Forrestal, "the difficulty stems mainly from money. . . . Each service knows the magnitude of its own responsibilities. . . . The economy simply cannot stand fulfillment of

23 Symington to Forrestal, memorandum, June 9, 1948, ibid.

24 Symington to Ferdinand Eberstadt, attachment to letter, June 30, 1948, Clifford Papers, HSTL.

25 Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951),

P. 466.

all the requirements without the nation accepting very substantial deficit financing." 26 He believed that the immediate controversy had been ameliorated; worse was to come.

Worse came, and focused on the B-36 bomber, the means of atomic bomb delivery. The B-36 had had a checkered past. Development began in January 1941, was pursued on low priority during the war, and subsequently continued on General Arnold's authority despite setbacks and even though the Strategic Air Command's first commander, Gen. George C. Kenney, had criticized the plane's performance and potential. Kenney had believed the B-36 would never develop into a first-class bomber because it was slow and lacked protection for its huge fuel load. He preferred that money be spent to develop a jet bomber. Until a satisfactory jet was built Kenney wanted to rely on air-refueled B-50s and B-29s. In May 1948 he recommended that B-36 production be halted. Symington, however, stood by the project, and Spaatz and then Vandenberg supported development, agreeing that the B-36 was the best bet as an intercontinental bomber.

26 Ibid., p. 478.

The onset of the Berlin blockade coincided with the administration's adoption of a policy giving high priority to building an atomic deterrent force and made Kenney's position on the B-36 untenable. Symington and Vandenberg, much alarmed by Soviet action in Berlin and determined to build up SAC rapidly as the nation's major instrument of strategic deterrence, turned to Lt. Gen. Curtis E. LeMay. A driver and master tactician who held premier credentials as a bomber expert, LeMay was knowledgeable on atomic matters, and had backed the B-36. In October 1948 he replaced Kenney as head of the Strategic Air Command.

In December 1948, Vandenberg convened his top commanders and they decided that SAC's atomic force-which LeMay considered ill-trained-had to receive first priority. In early 1949, after LeMay called creation of an atomic force "the fundamental goal of the Air Force," a Senior Officers Board approved his proposal for more B-36 groups and canceled the purchase of other bomber, fighter, and transport aircraft. The air force made this decision knowing that Truman in January 1949 had decided to hold the defense budget to an