In the Altstoetter case, as in the Krauch case, the tribunal treated defense counsel more liberally. They were permitted to see large numbers of case files and other records in the archives of the special court in Nuernberg, although the Altstoetter case was one of the earlier cases, tried from January to December 1947 at a time when East-West relations had not yet deteriorated to the point reached during the Berlin blockade a year later. The prosecution did not object to the defense request to examine its files, and the defense was also given permission to conduct a supervised search through the rich resources of the Berlin Document Center.27

26 Ibid., p. 1441.

27 See the application by defense counsel, and action thereon, for defendant Oswald Rothaug to research records in the

In the Weizsaecker case the defense was frequently permitted to examine documents of the prosecution at Nuernberg and to use documents elsewhere. 28 The defense was allowed to scrutinize records of the various Nazi ministries- those of the Auswaertige Amt in Berlin, for example, and many other document collections in Berlin.29 The records of the Hermann Goering Works were studied in the British zone of occupation by counsel for Paul Pleiger, former manager of the works, and many prosecution documents were made available to a number of defense counsel.30 In fact, the documentary wealth of the defense was so great in this longest of the thirteen Nuernberg trials that the prosecution asked that it be given access to the

Nuernberg Special Court, July 11, 1947, Altstoetter case, official court file, pp. 1643-1644.

28 The requests and usually affirmative action thereon may be found in the official court file of the Weizsaecker case. 29 See the application by defense counsel, and action thereon, for defendant Hans Lammers to research records in the Berlin document depositories, June 17, 1948, Weizsaecker case, official court file, pp. 2882-2884.

30 See the application by defense counsel for defendant Pleiger to research records of the Hermann Goering Works in the British zone of occupation, Apr. 14, 1948, ibid., p. 1494.

defense records. Ironically, the tribunal denied this request.31

The foregoing account shows that there was a great deal of difference in document-handling procedures as practiced by the various tribunals at Nuernberg. The judges themselves were of considerable importance in evaluating these differences and assessing the degree of fairness to the defendants. Judges Robert M. Toms, from Michigan's third judicial district, Fitzroy D. Phillips, from North Carolina's thirteenth district, Michael A. Musmanno, from the court of common pleas in Pennsylvania, and John J. Speight, admitted to the bar of Alabama, adjudicated the Milch and Pohl cases. In addition, Judges Musmanno and Speight were on the bench in the Ohlendorf case. Their rulings and interpretations of document-handling procedures were often more rigid and disadvantageous to the defendants than were those of other judges. Among the latter were Judges Wennerstrum, Shake, and William C. Christianson, from the Supreme Court of Minnesota, who presided over the Weizsaecker case. These three former state supreme court members interpreted document-handling procedures so liberally as to put the defense in a much more advantageous position.

31 See the prosecution application for access to defense documents, July 22, 1948, ibid., pp. 3232-3237.

The policies regarding documents, as practiced by the tribunals in the SS and ministries cases, thus appear to belong to two different worlds. In the SS cases procedures were sometimes harsh on defendants whose counsel did not have the same free access to the holdings of the collection centers which the defense had in some other cases, particularly the Weizsaecker case. The defendants in the SS cases were thus more dependent on the Defendants Information Center and on the documents the prosecution was willing to share with them, putting them at a distinct disadvantage.

Although one might say then that this account of document-handling procedures at Nuernberg strongly suggests that greater leniency in document procedures in the IMT and SS cases might have resulted in better defenses and less severe sentences, considering the crimes charged, there is no absolute assurance that even the most liberal procedure would have produced exonerating records. The prosecution's greater control of documents in the earlier cases, acting under rules similar to adversary proceedings, tainted the trials. Yet despite these flaws the procedures devised at Nuernberg pioneered the massive use of records as court evidence with large groups of defendants. In the face of the terrible hatreds engendered by the inhumanities of the Second World War, the tribunals succeeded in dispensing, essentially, justice.

EDWIN A. THOMPSON

Criticism of the policies of federal agencies concerning the security classification of government records coupled with the controversial leak of the Pentagon Papers undoubtedly influenced the drafters of Executive Order 11652, signed by President Richard M. Nixon on March 8, 1972. The order, entitled “Classification and Declassification of National Security Information and Material," grew out of a study commenced in January 1971 by an interagency committee chaired by the then assistant attorney general, William Rehnquist. The principles underlying the order are that "The interests of the United States and its citizens are best served by making information regarding the affairs of Government readily available to the Public" while at the same time recognizing that some information "must be subject to some constraints for the security of our Nation and the safety of our people and our allies." To accomplish these broad objectives, the executive order, among other things, provides stricter regulations for the security classification of documents and mandates systematic review and declassification by the archivist of the United States of all records over thirty years old. Guardian of most of the millions of pages of historically valuable classified documents, the archivist was given this function in the belief that his more objective view of classified

records would overcome the tendency of originating agencies to withhold information.

Because classified documents are scattered throughout record groups administered by all custodial divisions of the National Archives, including the General Archives Division at the Washington National Records Center in the Maryland suburbs and presidential libraries, Archivist of the United States James B. Rhoads elected to establish a separate division within the Office of the National Archives and charged it with the operational responsibility for the required systematic review of all classified records over thirty years old. The Records Declassification Division was launched in October 1972 with two review branches, one in the National Archives building and one at the records center, consisting of just under a hundred staff archivists and archives technicians reviewing the classified material.

The new division's initial responsibility was the systematic declassification of the nearly two hundred million pages of classified records created before 1946 by the end of 1975. To begin effectively, Dr. Rhoads called together representatives of all the major government agencies that were the originators of classified records, or the successors of the originators, in order to secure authority for the National Archives to rapidly declassify the greater part

of these documents. Some agencies, such as the State and Defense Departments, which had well-established programs for the release of records, were readily able to provide comprehensive guidelines for declassification. Others, such as the General Services Administration and the Commerce and Interior Departments, heirs to the records of many defunct wartime agencies, were unfamiliar with broad record declassification procedures and had no one on their staffs familiar with the retired records. After consultation with staff specialists in the National Archives, the agencies also developed and provided to the archivist comprehensive declassification authority. Still others, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, responsible for the records of its predecessor, the Office of Strategic Services, while ultimately issuing guidelines, nonetheless participated in and closely monitored the declassification activity on records of their interest. Several of the major departments that originated classified information also detailed declassification specialists to work along with the Declassification Division's personnel and provided ready assistance and rapid coordination of the items identified as potentially sensitive under their guidelines. Especially notable contributions were made by specialists of the army, navy,

and air force.

The first major review projects were the records of the Army Service Forces and the wartime records of the Department of State. Although the Department of the Army and the State Department had no interest in protecting the vast majority of papers among those records that they originated or controlled, it was necessary to locate documents in their records from other agencies for which declassification authority did not exist and those few documents with particular sensitivities that agency guidelines specified required review by the responsible agency specialists. As additional declassification authority was obtained from agencies, only a few significant and basic problem areas developed. The first was identifying and separating sensitive sources and methods of intelligence that require continued protection, a second was information relating to the making and breaking of secret codes, a third area concerned chemical and radiological warfare, and a fourth was information originated by foreign governments and international organizations. In the first three cases,

consultation was required with the agencies that originated or had primary subject matter interest in the documents to determine if release was possible. In the last case some very helpful declassification guidance was provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for most of the foreign military information, and the State Department, for documents of a civil, diplomatic, or political nature originated by our wartime allies, and many such documents have consequently been declassified.

The basic working unit in the review branches is a team of reviewers under the direction of an archivist. Initially, a survey of the security-stored record series is carried out to determine if a page-by-page review of the documents is necessary. When a review is required, a team reviews the records, tabs documents that require further action, and lists them on worksheets. Through training and on-the-job experience, the reviewers soon learn to distinguish problem documents from those that are declassifiable under the various guidelines. Once the review is complete, the problem documents are removed from the box, a withdrawal notice is put in their place, and they are segregated in a specially marked archives box and provided continued security protection. A special label is then attached to the original box, indicating that its contents are completely declassified. Entire files identified during the original survey as containing no potentially sensitive information may be quickly labeled as declassified, and these become immediately available for research. Individual documents from the declassified boxes are marked only when reproductions are made.

Continuous liaison is maintained with agencies having original or final jurisdiction over these older classified documents. Whenever possible, agency representatives are invited into the division's work areas to make determinations on the spot as to whether potentially sensitive documents can be declassified. If so, they are promptly returned to their places in the file. If not, information on sensitive items is referred through channels to the head of the agency, who is required under the executive order to submit a list of those documents that require continued protection to the archivist of the United States. Thus far less than one percent of the documents reviewed are being withdrawn for continued national security reasons.

When all work is completed on a file, the custodial branch is informed which records in its charge are completely declassified and provided basic information on the documents withdrawn as requiring continued security protection. Further review of the withdrawn documents will take place when a researcher requests a further determination, or when the responsible agency determines further review is required before it can be declassified.

The Records Declassification Division has completed the review and declassification of nearly two hundred million pages of records since its establishment three years ago. About 90 percent of these pages date in the period between December 7, 1941, and August 14, 1945. With few exceptions nearly all of the pre1946 classified records now accessioned into the archives of the United States as permanently valuable have been systematically reviewed as required under Executive Order 11652.

The National Archives takes pride in the declassification accomplishments. This threeyear effort has already resulted in several hundred millions of pages of valuable historical material becoming more readily available to research. But this is only the end of the first phase. The thirty-year review requirement prescribed in the executive order requires an ongoing program. The next objective is to accomplish the declassification of pre-Korean War records by 1980, while at the same time completing the review of the remaining World War II files still under agency control, whether in their custody or in federal records centers. Most of this material has already been identified and is awaiting historical evaluation to determine if it should be permanently preserved or may be destroyed.

From its beginning the NARS declassification program has been given full support by the White House, the Congress, the executive departments, and, most important, by the Interagency Classification Review Committee (ICRC), the arm of the National Security Council charged with oversight of the entire national security information program. The acting chairman of the ICRC for the past eighteen months has been Archivist of the United States James B. Rhoads. Personally dedicated to the professional principles of preservation of valuable sources of history and to service to scholarship, the archivist has been uniquely able to

ensure that the government supports the principles of maximum openness and narrowly limits the number of items that remain classified and thus unavailable to public research on national security grounds.

Researchers are reminded that the removal of the national security protection requirement does not mean that declassified records are totally unrestricted. Access is still governed by the Freedom of Information Act and the restrictions imposed by agencies under various laws. These restrictions may preclude release of certain types of information. Further information on these restriction problems and about the records themselves may be obtained from the Military Archives Division and the Civil Archives Division, for records that are in the National Archives building; and from the General Archives Division, for records that are at the Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland.

Details of significant record series reviewed and declassified can be found in the "Declassified Records" section appearing regularly in Prologue. The following is a list of the record groups whose pre-1946 classified files have been reviewed in whole or in part: