approximately $14 billion ceiling, thereby further limiting the air force to forty-eight groups. This fiscal 1950 budget, divided almost equally among the services, prompted Symington to compare it to throwing a piece of meat into a lion's den and letting the animals fight over it. 27

Though Forrestal, tired and frustrated, was apparently prepared to resign in May, Truman requested his immediate resignation in March 1949. He was replaced by Louis Johnson, who had served as fund raiser for the president's 1948 presidential campaign. Forrestal, the man in the middle of the services' conflict, had been under severe stress, and his friends and colleagues finally realized he had become afflicted with deep mental distress. After being hospitalized, he took his own life, the victim of an office that held great responsibility without commensurate power-a situation for which he had been partly responsible during the postwar reorganization that led to the creation of a national military establishment.

In April 1949 Secretary Johnson obtained the president's permission to stop construction of the supercarrier. The joint chiefs had voted two to one against construction, on the grounds that the carrier's main function would duplicate the air force's primary role-strategic bombing. Accepting this argument, Johnson, who thought the major Soviet goal was to provoke the United States to spend itself into bankruptcy, also decided against the carrier. Sullivan then resigned, alleging Johnson had not consulted either him or the chief of naval operations. The navy secretary thought a "renewed effort" would now evolve "to abolish the Marine Corps and to transfer all naval and marine aviation elsewhere.” 28

In the meantime, the navy had leaked material detrimental about the B-36 and its procurement that resulted in congressional hearings on B-36 procurement and defense strategy. In the strategy phase of these hearings, held in October 1949, the navy directed its main thrust against the air force's bombing effectiveness. Strategic bombing, navy spokesmen argued, could not in itself win a war. The air force,

27 Murray Green, "Stuart Symington and the B-36′′ (Ph.D. diss., American Univ., 1960), p. 322.

28 Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy, and Politics," Harold Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (Tuscaloosa, 1963), p. 495.

said Adm. Arthur W. Radford, commander of the Pacific Fleet, "paints a solution to the pressing problem of . . . national security as simple, plausible, and economical in lives and dollars. The real and complicated nature of the issues involved has been obscured. . . . They say in effect-do you as a taxpayer want a quick, cheap, easy war, or a long-drawn-out, expensive war?"29 Attempting to strike a sensitive nerve in the American polity, navy witnesses alleged strategic bombing to be immoral. Radford termed the B-36 a billiondollar blunder and said it could not bomb accurately and could therefore be used only for city bombing. "If you are in favor of the B-36," he said, "you are in favor of mass bombing." 30 It was also charged that the B-36 was vulnerable and thus not able to bomb Soviet targets. It had not been properly evaluated whereas the navy had been denied the opportunity to develop a supercarrier that could strengthen the nation's strategic capability.

At the hearings Symington countered that bombing was no more immoral than other forms of warfare. Vandenberg drove home the idea that general war could be deterred if the United States built credible strategic air forces. He emphasized that the air force had never claimed the B-36 to be invulnerable, only that it could reach targets without suffering unacceptable losses. And though the navy argued that strategic bombing was immoral, Symington observed it wanted carriers able to accommodate aircraft capable of delivering the atomic bomb.3

31

These events of 1949-the famous revolt of the admirals-failed to settle the problem of service roles and missions. It would take the Korean War, and the consequent expansion of all military forces, temporarily to paper over interservice disputes and also to expose the fallacy that a military budget over $14 billion would put the nation in economic jeopardy. This controversy demonstrated how volatile the fundamental clash of interests had become and the lengths to which those deeply involved

29 U. S. Congress. House Armed Services Comm., Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, The National Defense Program: Unification and Strategy, Oct. 6-8, 10-13, 17-21, 1949 (Washington, 1949), P. 51.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid., pp. 403-436, 451-515.

were prepared to go when their own conceptions of their major service missions were threatened.

Subsequently, the Hoover commission proposed to strengthen the National Security Act. Forrestal's tragic death and the protracted navy-air force struggle prompted the passage of amendments to the National Security Act in August 1949. These amendments enlarged and strengthened the Office of the Secretary of Defense and substantially downgraded the service secretaries' authority. Meanwhile, increasingly frustrated, Symington resigned, convinced that under Truman and Louis Johnson the air force (stymied with 48 groups) could not hope for an increase in its share of the budget. Even the Soviet atomic bomb test in August 1949, shattering America's atomic monopoly, had not made a difference in Truman's attitude. However, the air force was to expand substantially during the Korean War. Thereafter, with Eisenhower's New Look, the air force became acknowledged as the major instrument of nuclear deterrence. And, symbolic of this more quiescent time marked by larger defense budgets than were seen in 194750, on April 11, 1955, Admiral Radford, as chairman of the joint chiefs, received the William Mitchell Award from New York's Aviator Post 743 of the American Legion.

World War II, when each service had been covetous of the other's missions and responsibilities, had made the National Security Act all but inevitable. Many Americans, mindful of Pearl Harbor, agreed with President Truman that the "antiquated defense setup" had to be reorganized. Technological advance and what the services interpreted as penurious postwar budgets meant there would be disagreement over roles and missions. The Key West and Newport conferences changed little and can even be said to have intensified the struggle.

But human affairs are complex and unpredictable, often beyond control of the most dedicated and determined of men. Seemingly obvious victories do not always remain so and in time become less than triumphant. Battles once thought finished are often resurrected, to be fought again. In this case, institutionally the air force eventually got what it wantedindependence and a strong Office of the Secretary of Defense-but considering the tremendous erosion over the past quarter century in the services' ability to influence major military decisions, and the navy's securing a major share of the atomic mission, few historians would now claim that the air force gained a permanent victory over its service rivals.

By the close of the Eisenhower years the technology that had provided the military increasingly destructive weapons had now begun to deprive the services of authority and shifted power to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Indeed, in the sixties and seventies, the air force would come to conclude that the Office of the Secretary of Defense had arrogated excessive power. Once more, men had been fooled by history. It would not be the last time.

32 Eugene M. Zuckert, "The Service Secretary: Has He a Useful Role?" Foreign Affairs (April 1966), p. 460.

In the fall of 1948 the secretary of the army, Kenneth C. Royall, wrote the secretary of the navy, John L. Sullivan, regarding a joint armynavy-air force project to produce a motion picture entitled "Unification Today." The intent of the film was to show how well the services had progressed toward implementing the unification goals set out in the National Security Act of 1947. In the year since the movie had been proposed and a joint committee created to produce it, the scenario had been revised no fewer than six times. Yet each of the services continued to object to one part or another of the film. The air force felt that insufficient progress had been made toward unification and wished to delay work on the film until there were "more concrete examples available for picturization." For the army's part, Royall informed Sullivan that he was giving up and would recommend to Secretary of Defense Forrestal that the project be indefinitely postponed.1

This triviality is typical of the pettiness that not only the army but all of the services could descend to on occasion. At the same time, in view of the administrative mountains that had to be moved, the achievements made toward unification during this period testify to the ability of the leaders of the services to transcend their rivalries for the good of the military establishment. The army leadership was too often guilty of petty jealousies, sniping, and empire-building. But eventually it managed to sublimate its interests and contribute to the unified military system that emerged in the 1950s.

Passage of the National Security Act in 1947 placed the War Department in a unique and paradoxical position. Since the army was instructed to divest itself of its aviation components, it was being required to divide and unify simultaneously.

Before the unification act was signed, the army air forces had achieved almost complete operating autonomy. However, as stated in a War Department staff memorandum, "There remain numerous, major statutory functions and powers that eventually have to be transferred to the Air Force [for] . . . true departmental autonomy and authority to be obtained to the same extent as prevail in the Army and Navy." 2

2 "Unification," staff study, Oct. 21, 1948, ibid.

By the terms of the 1947 act (sec. 208e), the air force was not immediately granted equal status with the army and navy. Instead, the secretary of defense was to vest the requisite authority in the air force over a two-year span. In the meantime, the army would continue to provide administrative and support services.3

Considerable preliminary study, including the Hall Board study, the undersecretary of war's staff studies, and others, had been completed before passage of the act. The findings and recommendations were channeled to the deputy chief of staff of the army, Lt. Gen. J. Lawton Collins, and the deputy commander of the army air forces, Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg. Their work progressed so well that on September 15, 1947, their superiors, Generals Eisenhower and Spaatz, reported to Secretary Royall that they were in complete accord on more than two hundred basic matters concerning separation of the services.4 Royall then forwarded a copy of the matters agreed on to President Truman, offering them as evidence of the "cooperative spirit" with which the unification act was being implemented by the army and air force.5 Truman acknowledged receipt of the report from Royall, praising it in a handwritten note as "a record of cooperation." 6 While the divorce of the air force from the army was accomplished with comparative ease, Truman subsequently found the services remarkably uncooperative.

Interservice bickering was rife in the late forties. At one point the navy was incensed by an army staff study that suggested certain amphibious functions of the Marine Corps should be transferred to the Department of the Army. The reasoning behind this suggestion was that the army should assume responsibility for amphibious planning when beachhead operations were to be established to initiate combat by army personnel moving inland from

3 Ibid.

4 Eisenhower to Royall, Sept. 15, 1947, USAF, asst. vice chief of staff, Unification File, 1947-49, Records of Headquarters United States Air Force, RG 341, NA. See also C. P. Hall, "Areas of Agreement and Disagreement Relating to Unification," July 22, 1947, CSUSA-320, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs, RG 165, NA.

5 Royall to Truman, Sept. 17, 1947, USAF, asst. vice chief

of staff, Unification File, 1947-49, RG 341, NA.

6 Truman to Royall, Sept. 22, 1947, Truman Papers, Official File-1285D, Harry S. Truman Library (HSTL).

the beachhead.' The suggestion never received serious consideration and died-a victim of tradition.

In the fall of 1948 the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government conducted hearings on the military establishment as part of its work. From the secret sessions a story was leaked that the secretary of the army proposed to have the air force absorb naval aviation. Royall's actual proposal was somewhat different. Earlier, in a letter to Ferdinand Eberstadt, chairman of the commission's task force on the military, the secretary recommended that "the unsatisfactory dissension between the Air Force and the Navy be solved either (a) by combining Naval Air and Army Air into one department, or (b) transferring all air functions to the Navy."9 In an apparent response to the leak the navyrepresented by the assistant secretary for air, John Nicholas Brown, and the deputy chief of naval operations, Vice Adm. Arthur Radfordcharged that the air force was incapable of performing even its primary long-range bombing function. Radford claimed that the B-36 was ponderous and had too short a range to be effective against the Soviet Union. He argued for a flush-deck aircraft carrier capable of launching atomic bombers. When Forrestal learned of the navy's testimony he sent instructions to all of the services that any criticism of a sister service had to receive his approval before being made public. 10

By 1948 it was clear that the cross-service cooperation and interdependence anticipated in the unification act had not come about. Quite the contrary. The services were pitted against each other in what their leaders appeared to interpret as a struggle for survival and identity. In the major confrontations, such as those over the B-36 and the supercarrier, the air force and the navy were the real combatants; the army was an interested bystander, usually biased in favor of its offspring, the air force.

7 Carl W. Borklund, The Department of Defense (New York, 1968), p. 59; Paul Y. Hammond, "Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers: Appropriations, Strategy, and Politics," Harold Stein, ed., American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies (Tuscaloosa, 1963), pp. 495, 534-535.

Hammond, "Super Carriers," p. 488.

9 Royall to Eberstadt, Sept. 8, 1948, CSUSA-320, RG 319, NA.

10 Hammond, "Super Carriers," p. 488.

For example, writing to Eberstadt in September 1948, the army secretary argued that the navy alone was fighting true unification. "In my opinion," Royall wrote, "one of the inherent difficulties today is that, while the Army and Air Force accept to a considerable extent the interdependence of the services, the navy tries to insist upon a completely self-sufficient department." 11

During the first months of operation under the National Security Act of 1947 it became apparent from the controversy over aviation that the roles and missions of the armed services had to be more precisely defined than they had been in Executive Order 9877, issued in July 1947. The secretary of defense submitted a new draft of the order to the service secretaries and to the joint chiefs the following January, requesting their comments. 12 The army replied that the existing order and the proposed revision overemphasized the functions and organization of the navy and Marine Corps "to a much greater extent than was the case of the army and the air force." The revision, Secretary Royall said, "[contains language] which might be construed to extend naval functions clearly into the area of conflict with the other departments." He suggested that the joint chiefs of staff be allowed to determine roles and missions.13

The comments of the navy and air secretaries

11 Royall to Eberstadt, Sept. 8, 1948, CSUSA-320, RG 319, NA.

12 Forrestal to Royall et al., Jan. 20, 1948, OSD, D70-1-5, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, RG 330, NA. 13 Royall to Forrestal, Jan. 29, 1948, CSUSA-320, RG 319,

NA.

were in the same vein, leading Forrestal to conclude that unanimity was going to be "extraordinarily difficult" to achieve. A complex administrative stalemate evolved. The joint chiefs would have to agree on roles and missions before they could draft the strategic plans that Forrestal needed to prepare the Pentagon budget. 14 He instructed the joint chiefs to report to him by March 8. Any questions of service functions not resolved by then he would decide himself. 15 The joint chiefs reported to Forrestal their inability to reach agreement on the deadline. Rather than arbitrarily decide, as he had threatened, Secretary Forrestal assembled the military leaders (Admirals Leahy and Denfeld and Generals Bradley and Spaatz) for a conference at Key West, Florida, April 11-14. In this and later meetings, general principles outlining primary service functions were hammered out. Forrestal was finally in a position to recommend to the president that Executive Order 9877 be revoked and that the new definition of roles and missions be adopted. 16 Truman approved the recommendation on April 21, 1948.17 The army neither gained nor lost anything of consequence.

An army colonel briefed Royall on the results

14 Forrestal to Royall et al., Feb. 3, 1948, Clifford Papers, National Military Establishment, Misc., HSTL; Richard F. Haynes, The Awesome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief (Baton Rouge, 1973), pp. 110-111.

15 Forrestal to Truman, Feb. 27, 1948, OSD, D70-1-5, RG 330, NA.

16 Forrestal to Truman, Mar. 27, 1948, Clifford Papers, NME, Misc., HSTL.

17 Truman to Forrestal, Apr. 21, 1948, OSD, D70-1-5, RG 330, NA.