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"A Place to Which Tribute Is Brought": The Contest for the Federal Capital in 1783

KENNETH R. BOWLING

Despite the opposition of George Washing

ton, a prominent Fairfax County planter and land speculator, Virginia and her sister colonies agreed to hold the first continental congress at Philadelphia, then the largest city in British North America. Congress remained at Philadelphia for almost nine years, from September 1774 until June 1783. Twice during this period the British army drove Congress out of its capital, once to Baltimore, in 1776, and once to York, Pennsylvania, a year later. The ample accommodations of Philadelphia, its relative centrality, financial resources, and symbolic importance as the liberated capital brought Congress back both times despite protests from some members.

By December 1779, however, jurisdictional conflicts with Pennsylvania, interference in the affairs of the federal government by a variety of lobbyists and self-appointed politicians, the violent city mob, and the high cost of living, convinced most of the states that the seat of the federal government should be moved. The obvious problem was to find an acceptable site. Congress spent several fruitless months trying to choose among such places as Hartford,

1976 by Kenneth R. Bowling

Connecticut, Albany, New York, Princeton and Burlington, New Jersey, Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, and Fredericksburg, Virginia. In mid1780 Congress referred the difficult question to a committee headed by Robert R. Livingston of New York. The entire matter of removal quietly died there, and Congress resigned itself to the bond of its many-linked chain to Philadelphia. Livingston was not opposed to removal. On the contrary, he was one of the most strident voices urging it. In January 1782, while serving as Congress's first secretary for foreign affairs, he requested the New York legislature to instruct its delegates in Congress to introduce a motion for removing the capital from Philadelphia. Thus Livingston forced the removal campaign out of a stymied Congress and into the states. New York was not ready to act at first.

By 1782 and early in 1783, powerful new arguments for breaking the chain began to sway Congress. Some delegates believed that having Congress reside in Philadelphia was the key to the success of Robert Morris and those congressmen who supported the growth of the federal government at the expense of the states. But even with the aid of Morris's New England allies, who feared Philadelphia's luxury and commerce as a threat to republicanism

and the independence of Congress, Philadelphia's opponents lacked the seven state votes necessary for removal. Even if seven had wanted to remove, they could not have agreed on where to move. Nevertheless, on June 24, 1783, Congress left Philadelphia for Princeton, New Jersey, after a unanimous vote. An unusual combination of circumstances and motives produced this rare unanimity.

On June 21 soldiers of the Pennsylvania Line stationed at Lancaster and Philadelphia surrounded the state house-Independence Hall - to demand back pay and settlement of their accounts by the Supreme Executive Council of Pennsylvania, which was meeting in the building. It was Saturday and Congress as usual had adjourned for the weekend. Hearing of the alarm, Alexander Hamilton, a New York delegate, persuaded the president of Congress, Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, to summon the members to an emergency session at the state house. Congressmen quickly passed through the demonstrating soldiers and entered the building, but not enough arrived to form a quorum. Congress nevertheless asserted that its authority had been insulted by common soldiers and by the refusal of Pennsylvania to call out the city militia to protect the dignity of the federal government. That evening a quorum of seven states formed at the state house, and Congress unanimously resolved to move temporarily to New Jersey unless Pennsylvania took "adequate and prompt exertions" against the still-mutinous soldiers. The unusual unanimity resulted also from the longstanding desire of certain members to leave Philadelphia; from the desire of other members to take Congress to one of the nearby states that they represented; and from the desire of some members to assert the dignity, even the supremacy, of the federal government in hopes of obtaining much needed public support at a time when the news of peace threatened to end all but symbolic union.

Hamilton made it clear to John Dickinson, the president of Pennsylvania, that by "adequate and prompt exertions" Congress meant calling out the militia. Dickinson refused, preferring to settle the confrontation between Pennsylvania and its soldiers by negotiation. Consequently, just as the negotiations got under way, Congress left Philadelphia. The soldiers submitted to Dickinson and returned

to their officers even before Congress formed a quorum at Princeton.

To the surprise of the Philadelphians and some of the congressmen who had voted to leave temporarily, Congress did not retum, nor did it at all that summer despite the untiring efforts of Secretary of Congress Charles Thomson and other Philadelphians. It refused because the city's old enemies and the delegates who hoped to keep Congress in New Jersey or to attract it to New York, Delaware, or Maryland had enough votes to prevent the return. Never able to attract the seven votes needed to move from Philadelphia except during the mutiny, they were easily able to prevent seven of the sometimes eleven states that attended from voting to return. The temporary removal became permanent, at least until Congress chose a place of residence. Two weeks before the mutiny that question had been placed on the agenda for early October in response to action taken by the state of New York.1

Livingston had announced his intention to resign as secretary for foreign affairs at the close of 1782, claiming the high cost of living at Philadelphia as a major reason. Early in 1783, as Congress sought to replace him, he was closely involved with a group of men who were preparing to offer the town of Kingston, New York, eighty miles up the Hudson River valley, as the federal capital. Picturesquely situated on the Hudson below the Catskill foothills, the town, originally a Dutch trading post dating from 1615, had served at various times after 1776 as the seat of the New York Provincial Congress and legislature. The British burned the town at the same time they burned Livingston manor house a dozen miles north, which had the effect of intensifying Livingston's ties to the area and animating his intention to help it prosper.2

This introduction summarizes portions of my forthcoming book on selecting a site for the federal city, 1774-91 For Charles Thomson's partisan role as secretary of Congress, see Kenneth R. Bowling, "Goodby 'Charlie': The LeeAdams Interest and the Political Demise of Charles Thomson, Secretary of Congress, 1774-1789,"Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, 100 (1976): 314-335.

2 The Chevalier de La Luzerne to Joseph Matthias Gérard de Rayneval, Jan. 2, 1783, Correspondance Politique, EtatsUnis, vol. 22, microfilm, Library of Congress (LC); Livingston to the trustees of Kingston, Mar. 1, 1778, Christopher Tappen to Livingston, Mar. 11, 1783, Gov. George Clinton to

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George Town and Federal City, or City of Washington, drawn by George Beck, Philadelphia. Engraved by T. Cartwright, London, and published by Atkins & Nightingale, Philadelphia, June 1, 1801. Library of Congress.

"Whereas... it will promote the public weal of the United States of America, and the true interest of this corporation," resolved the town's petition to the state legislature requesting it to grant Congress whatever jurisdiction it saw fit. The Kingston Corporation promised to give Congress, free of cost, title to a square mile of land within the township. The legislature offered Congress the entire township for its use but with severely limited jurisdiction. Livingston, as well as Hamilton, was most displeased by the legislature's lack of liberality. He informed his friends at Kingston that Congress would never accept such a circumscribed grant. How the legislature could be so shortsighted as to offer less jurisdiction than it was willing to allow a private corporation he could not understand, particularly when the grant would be worth millions to the state. Congress responded to New York's offer at the end of May. It was too limited, but if the Kingston Corporation would donate nine square miles

Livingston, Mar. 19, 1783, Robert R. Livingston Papers, New-York Historical Society.

and the state would grant Congress exclusive jurisdiction over criminal matters, perhaps it would be advisable for Congress to move there.3 The French ambassador found it necessary to describe in some detail to his government at Versailles why the United States would choose such a secluded small town for its capital: Kingston would not expose Congress to the luxury and dissipation of a large commercial city and business could be completed more expeditiously and more secretly there. Besides, he asserted, many delegates thought that by residing at Philadelphia Congress had given too many advantages to the Pennsylvanians.4

3 Item 46, folios 1-13; Item 20, vol. 1, fol. 385, Records of the Continental and Confederation Congresses and the Constitutional Convention, Record Group 360, National Archives (cited henceforth as RG 360, NA). New York delegates to Clinton, Apr. 9, 1783, Edmund C. Burnett, ed., Letters of Members of the Continental Congress 8 vols. (Washington, 1921-38), 7:128 (cited henceforth as Letters of Congress); Livingston to Tappen, Apr. 2, 1783, Livingston Papers; Hamilton to Clinton, June 29, 1783, Harold C. Syrett et al., eds., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (New York, 1961-), 3:408. 4 La Luzerne to Rayneval, Apr. 4, 1783, Correspondance Politique, Etats-Unis, LC.

Fear of moving so far north stimulated the Virginia delegates to action. They had the able assistance of Thomas Jefferson who was in Philadelphia preparing to sail to Europe. It is likely that he and delegate James Madison planned Virginia's response to New York, thus beginning their long cooperative effort to locate the capital of the United States on the Potomac River. The Virginians consulted the two Maryland delegates, both of whom were residents of the Potomac watershed; and they agreed, first, that a more central locus than Kingston was better for the United States and, second, that their states should offer a tract of land near Georgetown on the Potomac. Congress would be likely to prefer such a site to Kingston, particularly if sufficiently ample jurisdiction were attached to it, the Virginia delegates informed Governor Benjamin Harrison.5

A conflict between Maryland's Potomac River and upper Chesapeake Bay supporters that was to divide the state throughout the fight, however, made it impossible for Maryland to join with Virginia in her offer. The Chesapeake Bay supporters knew that a capital located on either bank of the Potomac would be dominated by Virginia and believed that if the location of the capital of the United States were to benefit Maryland, it should be situated on the waters of the upper Chesapeake. Consequently, Maryland offered Annapolis to Congress before Virginia acted on the joint proposal.

The idea of inviting Congress to Annapolis had first been raised in November 1782 by a group of Baltimoreans who sought to move the state capital to their growing city. At that time "Aratus" (the name of a third century B.C. Greek statesman who confederated many of the principal cities of Greece) suggested to the Maryland legislature that it should grant the state house, the governor's mansion, and a liberal jurisdiction to Congress without cost. Annapolis was perfectly suited to be a political capital though not a commercial center, since the land about the town was suited only to growing vegetables, he argued. He further recommended that both the state and county

5 Virginia delegates to Governor Harrison, Apr. 10, 1783, in William T. Hutchinson, Robert Rutland, et al., eds., The Papers of James Madison (Chicago, 1962- ), 6:447-448 (cited henceforth as Madison Papers). See also fnn., ibid., pp. 243, 327, 448.

governments, in addition to all merchants not necessary to the support of the citizens, remove elsewhere because everyone knew how much Congress had suffered at the hands of politicians and merchants in Philadelphia. The only argument against making Annapolis the American Hague was that it had poor military defenses, but, "Aratus" concluded, Maryland, recognizing the value of the seat of Congress, could fortify the town.6

George Lux, former secretary of the Baltimore Committee of Correspondence and the probable bearer of the pseudonym Aratus, sent copies of the broadside to friends from the South and New England, omitting the middle states because they would be natural competitors for the federal capital. Lux sent three copies to Virginia congressman, Theodorick Bland, and asked him to show them to his colleagues and find out quickly whether Congress would accept an offer from Maryland. The state, he mentioned, was reluctant to make an offer that Congress might refuse. Annapolis was centrally located and the South was entitled to special consideration from New England because of the ravages it had suffered during the war. Maryland's constitution was stable and agreeable to all social classes, as opposed to the leveling, anarchy, and democracy, "the most horrid of all governments," prevalent in Pennsylvania. The executive officials of the United States and the foreign ministers could buy elegant houses in Annapolis more cheaply than they could build new ones. And not least of all there were the fish, oysters, and wildfowl for which Maryland was already famous. Lux's goal was not only the enhancement of Annapolis but also Baltimore because it would then become Maryland's undisputed commercial center.7

The Maryland legislature, dividing over the means of raising the necessary funds, postponed the matter until the spring of 1783 by which time New York had proposed Kingston. Late in May the citizens of Annapolis resolved to grant Congress three hundred acres, about

6 "Aratus" to the Maryland General Assembly, Nov. 9, 1782, Clifford K. Shipton, Early American Imprints 1639-1800, Readex Microprint (Worcester, Mass., 1955), imprint 44273.

[George Lux] to Theodorick Bland, Nov. 17, 1782, Charles Campbell, ed., The Bland Papers, 2 vols. (Petersburg, Va., 1843), 2:95-97. I am indebted to Edward Papenfuse of the Maryland Hall of Records for identifying Lux as the author of this letter.

one-half square mile, without cost. The legislature responded to Annapolis by offering Congress the state house, the governor's mansion, £13,000 with which to build a house for each state delegation, and whatever jurisdiction over the town and its inhabitants that Congress deemed necessary.8

News of Maryland's action reached Virginia early in June. It was a disappointment to the governor and several other influential politicians who agreed with Jefferson and Madison that an offer from the two states on the Potomac could not be matched by any other place unless Pennsylvania and New Jersey made a joint proposal for a site somewhere on the Delaware River. "The advantages that will derive to any State in which Congress shall establish the seat of its future sessions, will, we doubt not, be fully weighed by the Legislature," urged a published letter from a Virginian at Philadelphia, who recommended that Williamsburg be proposed. Virginia owned several large, elegant public buildings and considerable land at Williamsburg, which it had vacated when the state government had moved to Richmond three years earlier. Williamsburg's merits, the letter asserted, would counterbalance the New York and Maryland offers.9

At the end of June, Virginia granted Congress the capitol, the palace, all the other public buildings, and three hundred acres at Williamsburg, plus up to £100,000 to build thirteen hotels for the state delegations. In addition, the state offered Congress as much jurisdiction over a twenty five square mile district as the residents thereof would yield. If Congress preferred a residence on the Potomac over the one at Williamsburg, the state offered the same amount of money and land at any place on the river that Congress desired, with the question of jurisdiction left to the local inhabitants. It also agreed to purchase one hundred acres there for Congress to erect public buildings on. Keeping its options open, the legislature also promised to cooperate with Maryland should its legislature agree to a joint cession in the future. Virginia would make a cession directly across the Potomac from that ceded by Mary8 Item 46, fols. 15-26, 31-33, RG 360, NA; Pennsylvania Packet, July 17, 1783 (Philadelphia) Independent Gazetteer, July 5, 1783.

9 Edmund Pendleton to Madison, May 17, June 16, 1783, Virginia delegates to Harrison, May 27, 1783, Madison Papers, 7:50-51, 85-86, 151; Virginia Gazette, June 14, 1783.

land "freely leaving it with Congress to fix their residence on either side of the said river as they may see proper"; however, if Congress decided to erect its buildings on the north bank of the river, Virginia would donate only £40,000, leaving Maryland to supply the other £60,000.10

Governor Harrison urged the residents of Williamsburg and the surrounding area to reach an agreement on the terms of the jurisdiction to be offered Congress. "The advantages that will derive to the inhabitants of the city are so great that I doubt not their giving as ample jurisdiction as Congress would wish." The residents of the proposed site met, expressed their awareness of the advantages that would fall to the state and the district if it were chosen, and promised to make the residence of Congress so agreeable that Congress would never have reason to regret its choice. But because they had no idea of what extent of jurisdiction would satisfy Congress, they could only agree "to submit to any such jurisdiction as may be compatible with their political welfare, and worthy of generous minds either to demand or yield." Williamsburg's leaders asked Congress to state what jurisdiction it considered necessary. Governor Harrison sent a copy of the Williamsburg proceedings to Congress, observing to the state's delegates that they would learn nothing from it except "that we are still jealous of our Liberty and are unwilling to give up any part of it even to Congress." He urged them to have Congress come to some resolution of what jurisdiction it needed as speedily as possible so that the inhabitants of the proposed district would have their apprehensions removed. He also hinted that some of the people of Williamsburg feared that the presence of Congress would introduce too much luxury.11

Virginia's proposal to Congress did not arrive in time for Boudinot to transmit it to the states with the New York and Maryland offers

10 Item 46, fols. 55-58, RG 360, NA.

11 Harrison to Williamsburg Mayor William Holt, July 4, 1783, Governor's Letterbook, 1783-86, p. 165, Virginia State Library, as quoted in Julian Boyd, ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson (Princeton, 1950- ), 6:346 fn. (cited henceforth as Jefferson Papers); Pendleton to Madison, June 30, July 21, 1783, Harrison to Virginia delegates, July 12, 1783, Madison Papers, 7:205, 240, 218-219; Item 46, fols. 89-92, RG 360, NA.

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