JOHN HAMMOND MOORE

Abraham Lincoln once warned against changing horses in midstream, presumably because the rider could get wet. Changing sides in mid-war could present even greater hazards. Italy's sudden capitulation to the Allies early in September 1943 and her decision to join the war against Germany opened a Pandora's box for thousands of Italian prisoners of war. Their country became a cobelligerent aligned with their captors. Some of their countrymen, once also POWs, took up arms against the Nazis, and in time Italian ambassadors were accredited to both Washington and London; yet, until long after the war was over the great mass of Italians captured in North Africa, Sicily, and southern Italy remained prisoners. Although some enjoyed special privileges, technically all were POWs and subject to whatever restrictions that unenviable status entailed.

The first contingents of Italian prisoners arrived in the United States soon after the tide began to turn against the Axis in North Africa. On June 5, 1943, the Pentagon announced that 36,888 enemy personnel were being held in twenty-one camps. These men, segregated by nationality and rank, included 22,110 Germans, 14,516 Italians, and 62 Japanese. At that time

1976 by John Hammond Moore

Italians were quartered in these camps: Atterbury (Indiana), Carson (Colorado), Clark, Fort Leonard Wood, and Weingarten (Missouri), Florence (Arizona), Ogden (Utah), Phillips (Kansas), Wheeler (Georgia), and Crossville (Tennessee). A New York Times reporter who visited Crossville noted that the Italians sang opera as they worked in the open fields. The younger men "laughed and chattered like schoolboys," although their officers tended to "stand about with scowls written on their faces." Like the German prisoners at the same camp, the latter were much more serious than the rank-and-file soldier.

Until Italy switched sides some three months later these POWs were treated like all others. Regardless of rank they were given 10 cents a day in canteen chits; officers received limited salaries, as did some of their American counterparts held by the Germans. No prisoner was to have United States currency in his possession; but, as numerous escape tales reveal, this rule frequently was disregarded.1 Any POW thought to be relatively trustworthy could

1 Chiefly because of the Italian Service Unit program organized early in 1944 and the freedoms it permitted, Italian prisoners who escaped proportionally outnumbered Germans. The peak number of POWs in America was 373,683 Germans and 51,071 Italians. Although several thousand escaped, few were at liberty for more than a few hours, and

volunteer for work and earn another 80 cents a day in credit to be used for an occasional beer, tobacco, candy, and toilet articles or held in reserve until peace came. This might mean working in camp or for private contractors cutting pulpwood, picking fruit and vegetables, or almost anything not directly related to the war effort. The Geneva Convention specifically prohibited war-related work and also required prisoners to maintain their own quarters without compensation.

Any labor, other than normal housekeeping chores, was classified as "volunteer'' duty, but post commanders made their policy quite clear: "no work, no eat." NCOs and officers did not face such pressures, although NCOs were required to do supervisory tasks and nothing prevented a POW, no matter what his rank, from volunteering at any time.

According to armistice terms signed in September 1943, all United Nations personnel held by Italy were to be released, but the status of Italians in British and American hands remained unclear.2 A short time later, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, Italy's new leader and, as his title "Duca a'Addis Ababa" indicates, conqueror of Ethiopia, concluded an oral agreement with Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower concerning use of POW labor; on October 11 the marshal issued a proclamation that was posted in all compounds. It was the firm intention of his government, he said:

to proffer the Allies all active collaboration in order to achieve the common objective of ridding our country of the residue of German troops still occupying a large section of our nation. It is therefore our duty to help the Allies in all services, excepting actual combat, but including those directly connected with bellicose activities, by constituting special service and labor units under the command of officers to be designated.

none committed acts of sabotage. On July 22, 1946, when the last group of POWs sailed for home, twenty-seven Germans and fifteen Italians still were at large. Several were arrested in later years, the last one a former German officer found operating an elevator at Chicago's Union League in 1959; however, it is possible that a few escapees are residing somewhere in the United States today.

2 For a brief summary of the treatment of Italian POWs, see George C. Lewis and John Mewha, History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776-1955 (Washington, 1955), pp. 93-100. See also Ralph A. Busso and Douglas D. Alder, "German and Italian Prisoners of War in Utah and Idaho," Utah Historical Quarterly 39 (1971):55-72, a rare attempt to learn, through personal interviews, what happened after the POWs went home. These authors discovered

Marshal Badoglio, shown here (right) reviewing troops in POWs in war work but later reversed his position.

Badoglio obviously thought all non-Fascist POWs soon would be released and organized into work battalions designed to aid the Allied

cause.

During those same weeks, following a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with British representatives stationed in Washington, Gen. George C. Marshall wrote Eisenhower, commander of United States forces in North Africa, suggesting that Italian prisoners might technically be handed over to the Badoglio government. Those loyal to the new regime would join CCC-like detachments under the command of their own officers; however, with the assent of Badoglio, Britain and the United States would retain physical custody of Fascist noncooperatives.3

Eisenhower's reply was a prompt and firm no. Release of the men could have a very several men who eventually returned to live in the United States.

3 Discussions by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and correspond

adverse effect, especially among the French. According to Ike, mail intercepts revealed they still were embittered by Mussolini's attack on their homeland in June 1940 and already were extremely critical of Allied treatment of POWS. In addition, liberating thousands of individuals now in North African camps would strain that region's fragile wartime economy and perhaps disrupt labor practices which, in his opinion, were working very well. Eisenhower noted that, on the basis of the Badoglio proclamation, the Allies considered any articles of the Geneva Convention prohibiting war-related work by POWs to be null and void. Thus they were using cooperative Italians throughout North Africa in various tasks. The Italians, Ike stressed, seemed to like the program so far, and the French had not protested.

ence with Eisenhower and Badoglio can be found in box 360,
Records of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, Record
Group 218, National Archives (hereafter cited as RG
NA).

Faced with this rebuff, the Pentagon decided to tailor stateside utilization of Italian POWS to conform with what was being done on the Mediterranean front; however, since Eisenhower was proceeding upon his oral agreement with Badoglio and certain assumptions deduced from the marshal's proclamation, the Joint Chiefs of Staff pressed for a more definite treaty or covenant. By early January 1944 they had worked out the details and forwarded their proposal to Badoglio.

Like Eisenhower, but with considerably more vehemence, the marshal also said no. On January 30, 1944, he outlined his principal objections: 1) For five months his government had tried to cooperate against the Germans as a cobelligerent but without success because of the attitude of the Allies. 2) The proposed agreement had no geographical limits. A United Nations member could use Italian servicemen anywhere and for any purpose, yet they remained POWs. 3) Those who refused to volunteer would be subject to employment by the detaining power as before. 4) Although the status of POWs remained unchanged, the Allies wanted to invalidate some provisions of the Geneva Convention protecting their rights. 5) The United States and Great Britain, according to the terms, could terminate the agreement without prior notice. Badoglio emphasized that this proposed arrangement could affect five hundred thousand of his countrymen directly and perhaps four million indirectly. Any government signing such a document certainly would be ousted, and he, for one, preferred to quit rather than agree to such terms. He suggested instead that a United States-British-Italian commission be formed to discuss the matter. A ranking member of the Allied Control Commission in Italy tended to agree with Badoglio, noting in a message to Eisenhower, "We are possibly asking rather too much of him."4

This behind-the-scenes debate dragged on for several months. The Allies, determined to retain control of a vast labor supply, were unwilling to release former enemy soldiers now in their hands. Badoglio refused to confirm in writing his oral agreement with Eisenhower because that would make him party to the contradictory policy of Britain and the United

4 Ibid.