there was some evidence suggesting that Seward had been informed about the raid before it was executed. Henry J. Raymond, editor of the New York Times, wrote to Seward that a certain Colonel Folker (perhaps Forbes) "did not say in explicit terms that he had told you of the intended inroad at Harpers Ferry," though it appeared that he had conveyed that impression. 36

The committee subpoenaed Seward because he had been seen conversing with Hugh Forbes, an envoy of Brown's, outside the Senate chamber in the spring of 1859. Forbes had traveled to Washington to solicit funds from Seward. At first the New York senator expressed willingness to subsidize Forbes, thinking his request was for a charity case. Seward had the reputation of being an easy mark for handouts. But as the conversation turned to the subject of Brown and nuances of another militant antislavery effort, Seward cut Forbes short. He turned down the request on the grounds that to honor it would be improper conduct for a United States senator. Throughout the whole debate in the Senate over Mason's resolution and during the tenure of the committee, Seward cooperated and honored every demand it made of him. He became so complacent that more aggressive Republicans wondered if he had deserted the cause. Horace Greeley expresssed the wish that Seward would "stand up more squarely to Mason on the issues of the raid, and fight back."

What evidence existed to implicate Seward? Not one substantial link and for that matter not a respectable inference. There are only scattered comments to the effect that Seward and a number of other "Black" Republicans, were involved. 37

The most lamentable, even disgraceful, episode in the select committee's performance was the treatment rendered Joshua Giddings. Giddings, an old-timer in the antislavery movement, had fought slavery and the system's attack upon fundamental constitutional rights in the halls of Congress in the 1840s. He had been censured by Congress in those days for his militant antislavery actions. Giddings appeared before the committee on February 3,

36 Henry J. Raymond to Seward, Jan. 8, 1860, Seward Papers, Rush Reeves Library, University of Rochester. 37 Mason Report, pp. 253 ff; S. Wilkinson to Seward, Jan. 1, 1860, ibid.

1860. Upon reading the testimony and crossexamination, the strategy of the committee becomes obvious. While it ruled out of order testimony about the motivation behind the arming of Brown and the citizens in Kansas, it made motivation the major subject in Giddings's case. He had been subpoenaed because he had invited Brown to lecture in Ashtabula County and had helped to raise funds for him there. When asked why he had done so, Giddings replied in terms of the higher law doctrine and stated that nature's law and the law of nature's God, had created all men, black and white, equal.

An attempt was then made to interpret Giddings's beliefs as an invitation to insurrection. The logic ran roughly thus: If you preach doctrines of equality, then you upset the balance of society, raising threats to stability and good order. Agitation and tension will, of necessity, follow, breeding an emotional atmosphere for the John Browns to exploit. Giddings countered by observing that when laws invade "the rights of any innocent being to life, liberty or happiness," unrest will result. He rested his position on the basic principles of the Declaration of Independence. But by the standards of 1860, especially in the context of the Harpers Ferry raid, those doctrines were no longer patriotic; they were subversive. There were no justifiable reasons for calling Giddings, particularly in light of the committee's procedural ruling prohibiting testimony about motivation. Not one pertinent or relevant question was asked of him, or one significant theme developed. It was partisanship cloaked under the dignity of a congressional investigation.38

On June 25, 1860, the Mason committee completed its task and submitted its findings to the Senate. Included in that document were the majority and minority reports, the official journal with certain portions left out, several appendices, and the testimony of the witnesses. The quality of the reports, particularly that of the majority, indicates that the procedural strategy adopted by the committee prevented it from fulfilling a significant part of its mandate.

Written by Mason, the majority report acknowledges that failure. It does, however, present a factual summation of the testimony, but concludes by stating that unless the states

38 Ibid., pp. 147 ff.

enact laws to prevent such occurrences, there will be no peace between them. As for the matter of who aided Brown and knew about the intended inroad at Harpers Ferry, or if a broader conspiracy existed, the committee majority found, "It does not appear that he entrusted even his immediate followers with his plans, fully, even after they were ripe for execution. Nor have the committee been enabled to trace knowledge of them to any."

Correlative to this conclusion it then followed that contributions to Brown were not made "with actual knowledge of the use for which they were designed by Brown." Rightly, the majority report criticized the loose, almost irresponsible, oversight Brown's supporters applied in seeing that their funds and support were not used in any illegal fashion. Mason wrote, "The committee cannot but remark on the feeble, and as it resulted, the abortive effort of the chairman of the Massachusetts committee to prevent a murderous use of these arms by Brown," or the failure of northern philanthropists to make "any inquiry as to the way in which the money would be used by him."

The provision calling for recommendations to prevent such incidents in the future was not met. "The committee, after much consideration, are not prepared to suggest any legislation, which, in their opinion, would be adequate to prevent like occurrences in the future." The reason for the failure is obvious. It did not debate the question, nor did the committee subpoena any witnesses who might suggest legislation; nor did it ask any of the witnesses it called if they had any ideas on the subject. This, of course, was dereliction of duty. The chief constitutional justification for the committee was to explore the need for legislation, the one angle not pursued by the committee. As for the phrase "after much consideration" neither the printed or original journal entries indicate any discussion of the question.

The committee majority, however, had some ideas short of legislation on that subject. One suggestion offered was that Northerners cease giving money and other forms of support to the abolitionists. Wrote Mason: 'With such elements at work, unchecked by law and not rebuked but encouraged by public opinion, with money freely contributed and placed in irresponsible hands, it may easily be seen how this expedition to excite servile war in one of

the States of the Union was got up; and it may equally be seen how like expeditions may certainly be anticipated in future whenever desperadoes offer themselves to carry them into execution." And if the North did not alter its practice of permitting freedom of speech and assembly, warned Mason, "the committee can find no guarantee elsewhere for the security of peace between the States of the Union."' 39

The minority statement, written by Collamer, concurred in the conclusion reached by the majority, concerning the question of whether a broader conspiracy existed and whether those who aided Brown did so with full knowledge. Wrote Collamer: "Although some of the testimony tends to show that some abolitionists have at times contributed money to what is occasionally called practical abolitionism . . . and may have placed too implicit confidence in John Brown, yet there is no evidence to show, or cause to believe, they had any complicity with this conspiracy." In his opening comments Collamer took great pains to point out that the North and the Republicans had not approved of Brown and had done all that they could to see that a full and open investigation of the seizure was made.

But Collamer took strong exception to the majority's assertion that John Brown was the product of a society in the North that encouraged disrespect for law and order. The testimony, he charged, conclusively showed that Brown's raid "was but an offshoot from the extensive outrages, and lawlessness in Kansas," committed by proslavery forces who attempted to force their institution upon the free territories.

The unrest, concluded Collamer, was the product of the South trying to expand its slave system into other areas. "So long as slavery is claimed before the world as a highly benignant, elevating, and humanizing institution, and as having Divine approbation, it will receive at the hands of the moralist, civilian and theologian, the most free and unflinching discussion; nor should its vindicators wince in the combat which their claims invite." The tranquility of the nation was disturbed not by those who loved freedom but by those who wanted to restrict it. He could not be party to an expansion of those policies which substi

39 Ibid., pp. 1-19.

tuted restriction of rights for fundamental constitutional rights.40

Thus after weeks of existence and spending over $3,500, the Mason committee completed its work by reporting a few banalities back to the Senate. This anticlimax does not correlate with its epochal and stormy history. Profound and meaningful questions had been raised in committee, on the Senate floor, and in the courts. History-making precedents had been set. Unprecedented assertions of power by the Senate had been sustained. Extensive debate over the constitutional issues of congressional investigatory power had taken place 40 Ibid., pp. 21-25.

and resolved in favor of Congress. But none of the critical issues raised led to any meaningful proposals; no attempt was made to translate the evidence into anything concrete. Maybe nothing could have been done anyway given the circumstances of the time. Perhaps George Luther Stearns was right when, after testifying, he wrote to Samuel Gridley Howe, "Washington, as it is today, is the meanest hole in creation and Congress the meanest part of Washington.... If they are our representatives, we are indeed of a low type." "' 41

41 Frank Preston Stearns, The Life and Public Service of George Luther Stearns (New York, 1969), p. 213; Discharge of witnesses list, Com. Docs.

1917-52

JOHN DANIEL LANGER

Early in 1943, Gen. George C. Marshall, chief

of staff of the United States Army, ordered an investigation into the loyalty of Gen. Philip R. Faymonville. He was responding to charges that Faymonville, then heading an American aid mission in Russia, "was so pro-Soviet as to raise the question in some persons' minds as to whether he was being 'blackmailed' by the Soviet Government."1 Such investigations were anything but commonplace in the wartime army. Faymonville was anything but typical of wartime army officers. Accusations of communist leanings tainted his reputation from the middle of the 1930s until his death in 1962. In his obituary, a friend wrote that time and the cooling of passions would cast him in a more favorable light.2 After fourteen years passions have cooled, and-just as important -records have become available that permit initial steps toward such a reevaluation.

Faymonville built his military career around his interest in the Soviet Union. For a few

1976 by John Daniel Langer

1 "The Influence of Brigadier General Philip R. Faymonville on Soviet-American Military Relations," n.d., p. 1, "intelligence" file, box 29, Edwin M. Watson Papers, University of Virginia (hereafter cited as Faymonville report).

2 Anatole G. Mazour, "Philip R. Faymonville," California Historical Society Quarterly 42 (Mar. 1963):84.

years, he enjoyed in the army the kind of authority that George Kennan and Charles Bohlen later acquired in the State Department. Because their attitude toward Russia was one of caution, they were able to benefit from cold war tensions. Faymonville's laurels came to him at the high points of Soviet-American relations: recognition in 1933 and wartime partnership in 1941. Sympathy, rather than caution, characterized his approach to the Soviets.

Faymonville explained his interest in Russia indirectly. He first predicted a war between the United States and Japan and then selected Russia as a natural ally in such a conflict. His train of thought had nothing to do with-and, in fact, preceded- the Russian revolution. It reflected not radicalism but the natural concerns of a young army officer. Sometime in 1916 or 1917, while commanding an ordnance depot in the Philippines, Faymonville took up his study of the Russian language. Although a promising officer-in 1912 he had graduated ninth in his class at the military academylanguage study suited him better than army routine. By middle age he was fluent in Russian, German, Spanish, French, and Japanese.3

3 Ibid.; Demaree Bess, "The General Called the Turn," Saturday Evening Post, Aug. 29, 1942, p. 12; Ralph Izard, “A