While the stories shed light on the feelings of their tellers, the details about Faymonville were malicious and often inaccurate.61

However disreputable, the investigation at least shook up an intolerable situation. Standley was already on his way out. At the beginning of March 1943, he had publicly criticized the Soviets for failing to acknowledge American aid. That "indiscretion" cost him what standing he had ever had with Stalin's government and led Roosevelt and Hopkins to abandon him as a channel for serious business. With calculated embarrassments, they finally drove him to resign on May 3.62 Several months later, yet while Standley was still waiting to be relieved, Faymonville's loyalty report began to be circulated around a few Washington offices. At the White House, Roosevelt's assistant, Gen. Edwin Watson, filed it away. Adm. William Leahy, the president's personal chief of staff, read it and concluded that "the whole lendlease administration in Russia needs clearing out because of inefficiency." Even General Burns admitted that a housecleaning was in order.63 With the ambassadorship about to change hands, everyone agreed that the time was right to appoint a "clean slate" of personnel.

The extent of the clean slate was not so undisputed. Joseph E. Davies wanted the military attaché recalled but warned that to withdraw Faymonville would be to risk Soviet suspicion. Burns recommended that "if satisfactory to [the] new ambassador," Faymonville should be promoted. Rumors even circulated that Faymonville might inherit the ambassadorship.64 The general, however, was too vulnerable to survive any shuffle of personnel. When Davies asked Hopkins to intercede for him, "he [Hopkins] said for certain reasons now, he couldn't. He would like to, but it was beyond anything he could do." The president

61 Faymonville report.

62 Standley and Ageton, Admiral Ambassador, pp. 331-382; Hopkins, memo, Mar. 10, 1943, "footnotes: 1943" file, Hopkins Papers; diary entry for Mar. 13, 1943, chronological file, box 12, Davies Papers.

63 Diary entry for Sept. 17, 1943, vol. 9, box 4, William D. Leahy Papers, LC; Burns to Hopkins, Aug. 16, 1943, "Faymonville, Philip R." file, box 140, Hopkins Papers.

64 Diary entry for Sept. 24, 1943, chronological file, box 14, Davies Papers; Burns to Hopkins, Aug. 16, 1943, “Faymonville, Philip R." file, box 140, Hopkins Papers; Faymonville report, p. 6; New York Times, May 29, 1943.

had decided to recall Faymonville along with both attachés and to replace them with a "coordinated" military mission under Gen. John R. Deane. To reporters, FDR intimated that the lend-lease representative had been "too friendly with [the] Russians." 65

In spite of his remarks to the press, Roosevelt had not changed his mind about Russian policy. He sacrificed Faymonville because Faymonville had drawn the fire of his critics. By removing the general, he placated those critics for a time without giving up anything of substance. The concession was as meaningless as the new orders with which he had mollified Standley. Faymonville came home, and Gen. Sidney Spalding- the man who had originally recruited him- took his place. Although Spalding was responsible to the ambassador as Faymonville never had been, the new ambassador was another member of the "Hopkins shop": Averell Harriman.66

The recall, which meant nothing to Roosevelt or his policy, spelled the end of Faymonville's career. Burns tried to protect him from charges of disloyalty and even recommended him for the Distinguished Service Medal. 67 His efforts, however, netted little. Faymonville, like the attaché who returned with him, lost his grade. The War Department explained that the rank had never been more than temporary. Unlike the attaché, who won reassignment to the Russian desk of military intelligence, Faymonville found himself shunted off to an ordnance post in Arkansas. In March 1944, Vice President Henry Wallace, playing out another presidential sacrifice, decided to take Faymonville with him on his trip to China. When he conveyed that intention to Marshall, "the General went straight up in the air. He said Faymonville was a representative of the Russians, not of the United States."' 68

Faymonville remained in the army until

65 Diary entry for Sept. 25, 1943, chronological file, box 14, Davies Papers; A. A. Berle, Jr., to U. S. Embassy, Moscow, Sept. 28, 1943, document 861.20/585A, RG 59, NA; notes from off-the-record briefing, Oct. 20, 1943, "pers. memo Oct. 1943" file, box 23, Clapper Papers.

66 Deane, Strange Alliance, pp. 10, 27, 91-92.

67 Burns to Hopkins, Aug. 16, 1943, and Burns to adjutant general, June 20, 1946, "Faymonville, Philip R." file, box 140, Hopkins Papers.

68 New York Times, Nov. 18, 1943; J. W. Russell to Foreign Office, Jan. 4, 1944, F.O. 371/N238/238/38; John Morton Blum, ed., The Price of Vision: The Diary of Henry A. Wallace.

1948. Upon retirement he returned to San Francisco where he supported the opera and made a circle of friends at Stanford University.69 Fortunately, both for him and for the country, he somehow escaped the attention of Sen. Joseph McCarthy. His name surfaced only in one congressional investigation of the period: the McCarran committee's probe into the Institute of Pacific Relations.70 Even then, the senators never called him to testify. They were right if they concluded that there was no case against him. They were unaccountably wrong if they passed over him as an unpromising source of publicity. His background contained more than enough material to excite the public and enhance an investigator's anticommunist credentials.

1942-1946 (Boston, 1973), p. 314.

69 Mazour, "Philip R. Faymonville," p. 84.

70 U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws, Hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, 82d Cong., 1st and 2d sess., pt. 1, pp. 153, 176, pt. 4, p. 988, pts. 1-14, passim.

Faymonville made a good victim. Involved in controversy most of his life, he fought for his views but seemed too preoccupied to defend himself. Under other circumstances, people might have remarked on his singleminded devotion to his work. As it was, he displayed an obliviousness to the opinions of the men around him that became self-destructive. Gen. John Deane may have hinted at that when he wrote one of the fairest contemporary evaluations of Faymonville. Arriving in Moscow in October 1943, he reported to Marshall, "Despite everything that has been said, . . [Faymonville] impressed me more favorably than any of the old regime. He did his job well and was the only one who didn't think everyone else in Russia both Russian and American was an S.O.B. I think his trouble lay in a too literal interpretation of his instructions and a stubborn persistence in refusing to depart from his interpretation." 71

71 Forrest C. Pogue, George C. Marshall: Organizer of Victory, 1943-1945 (New York, 1973), p. 288.

John Tyler's

STEPHEN W. STATHIS

Recently the United States has undergone a series of unprecedented political experiences. Although a concerned citizenry viewed the events accompanying Spiro Agnew's resignation, the appointment and confirmation of Gerald R. Ford and later Nelson Rockefeller, and the sad, swift transition from Richard Nixon to Gerald Ford, few if any Americans doubted that the transfer of power would come about in an orderly manner. The legitimacy of the transition was not at issue, even among the most vocal critics. It should not be assumed, however, that the general confidence accompanying these changes in leadership is based solely upon the provisions of the twenty-fifth amendment as ratified in 1967.

Since the retirement of the first president there has been a peaceful tradition of the changing of the guard in the United States-a tradition deeply rooted in this country's pragmatic constitutional system. John Adams's assumption of the presidency in 1797, the selection by the House of Representatives of

1976 by Stephen W. Stathis

The author wishes to express his appreciation to his colleague William R. Tansill and his former mentors Stanford Cazier, C. Blythe Ahlsrom, and the late Milton R. Merrill for their generous help and suggestions in the preparation of this article.

his son, John Quincy Adams, as president in 1825, and the peaceful conclusion of the disputed Hayes-Tilden election of 1876-each is illustrative of a remarkably stable system. Perhaps even more significant, however, have been the peaceful, almost routine, transfers of the presidential mantle following the deaths of eight incumbent presidents.

A thorough examination of the constitutional debates of 1787 offers strong evidence that the historical practice of a vice president succeeding automatically to the presidency upon the death of a president did not originate with the framers of the Constitution. Rather, it came a half century later when John Tyler became chief executive in April 1841.1 Although students of the presidency have long

1 For the most precise statement on what the framers intended, see Ruth Silva, Presidential Succession (New York, 1968), pp. 14-15, 167-168. It is her conclusion (p. 167) that a "study of the records of the Federal Convention shows that a Vice President . . . was never intended to become President by succession. If his exercise of the presidential power was founded on vacancy, he was to act as President until a President should be supplied by special election. . . . The Constitution does not once say that a Vice President shall become President, but says he shall act as President, that the presidential duties shall devolve upon him, and that he shall exercise the office of President of the United States." Edward S. Corwin argues, "[That] Tyler was wrong in his

debated the constitutionality and significance of Tyler's precedent-setting action, the events that brought about his confirmation continue to be ignored. Even the most comprehensive studies have mistakenly portrayed Tyler's succession as a largely unquestioned process almost totally devoid of political intrigue.2

Such an interpretation is inaccurate. In reality, Tyler's succession was characterized by shrewd political manipulation by which he was able to outmaneuver even the wily Henry Clay whose party had so recently adopted the political refugee from Virginia.

reading of the original intention of the Constitution is certain. It was clearly the expectation of the Framers that the Vice President should remain Vice President, a stopgap, a locum tenens, whatever the occasion of his succession, and should become President only if and when he was elected as such." Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 1787-1957 (New York, 1962), p. 54. Herbert Horwill in similar language explains that it is "usage and usage alone, that transforms a Vice President into a President" upon the death of an incumbent chief executive. Herbert W. Horwill, The Usages of the American Constitution (Oxford, 1959), p. 59. Similar discussions may be found in Wilfred E. Binkley, The Man in the White House (Baltimore, 1958), pp. 268-269; Richard H. Hansen, The Year We Had No President (Lincoln, 1962), pp. 13-20; James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, 4 vols. (New York, 1854), 1:298; Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution (Boston, 1937), 637n; and Westel Woodbury Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States, 3 vols. (New York, 1929), 3:1471. Charles K. Burdick is not certain that a succeeding vice president was intended to be president but agrees that usage has established that he is in the event of a president's death. Charles K. Burdick, The Law of the American Constitution: Its Origin and Development (New York, 1922), pp. 59-60. Earlier opinions of a somewhat differing nature are expressed by John W. Burgess, Political Science and Comparative Constitutional Law (Boston, 1891), p. 239; William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States (Philadelphia, 1892), p. 57; Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (Boston, 1833), p. 336; John Randolph Tucker, The Constitution of the United States, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1899), 1:711; and David K. Watson, The Constitution of the United States: Its History, Application, and Construction, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1910), 1:891-902.

2 See Oliver Chitwood, John Tyler: Champion of the Old South (New York, 1939), pp. 202-206; Leonard Dinnerstein, "The Accession of John Tyler to the Presidency," Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 70 (Oct. 1952): 447-458; and Robert Seager, And Tyler Too (New York, 1963), pp. 147-152. Oscar D. Lambert and Robert J. Morgan suggest that a certain amount of controversy existed but make no effort to explain their premise. Oscar Doane Lambert, Presidential Politics in the United States, 1841-1844 (Durham, 1936), p. 5; Robert J. Morgan, A Whig Embattled: The Presidency Under John Tyler (Lincoln, 1954), p. 16. Silva mistakenly concludes that contention did not develop between the Whigs and Tyler because he was not regarded as a "'usurper" as many claim. Her arguments are inconclusive. Silva, Presidential Succession, p. 18.

At the time of Tyler's selection as William Henry Harrison's running mate in 1839 neithe his opinions nor his loyalties were considered important. He received the Whig nomination because he was "from the South and had beer a strong advocate of State Rights." As Tyler himself later admitted, the nomination was neither solicited nor expected. He had remained throughout the entire proceedings at the December 1839 Whig convention in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, "perfectly and entirely silent" on all issues.3 Tyler became the Whig vice presidential candidate without ever "becoming what either Clay or Harrison could have called a Whig." All that really mattered was his ability to garner the Southern vote. No one seemingly cared what he believed, since the Whig strategists planned to "fool the voters and avoid the issues."' 4

From the outset of the campaign the Whigs employed the strategy of keeping "Harrison vague and Tyler quiet while the party managers whipped up enthusiasm for their Janus in a carnival atmosphere of torchlight parades, slogans, catchy campaign songs, and semidrunken political rallies."5 They projected Harrison, the aristocrat, as a man of humble means with a log cabin background. Incumbent Martin Van Buren, his Democratic opponent, was depicted "as an effete, cowardly, champagne-drinking fop living in the regal splendor of the White House." Log cabins were built:

in every village in the old settled parts of the country where they had not been seen for generations. In every cabin there was a barrel of cider on tap, free to all comers, and this often reinforced by a keg of

3 Richmond Enquirer, July 2, 1842; (Washington) Daily National Intelligencer, Aug. 27, 1844.

4 William O. Stoddard, The Lives of the Presidents, 10 vols. (New York, 1888), 5:44. For explanations of why Tyler received the nomination, see Chitwood, John Tyler, pp. 172173; Benjamin Watkins Leigh, "John Tyler and the Vice Presidency," Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine 9 (July 1927): 89-94; Seager, And Tyler Too, pp. 134-135; (New York) Democratic Republican New Era, Apr. 9, 1841; New York Herald, Apr. 6, 1841; and Washington Globe Apr. 7, 1841.

5 Seager, And Tyler Too, p. 136. See also Robert Gray Gunderson, The Log Cabin Campaign (Lexington, 1957); and A. B. Norton, The Great Revolution of 1840: Reminiscences of the Log Cabin and Hard Cider Campaign (Mount Vernon, Ohio, 1888).

6 Seager, And Tyler Too, p. 136.